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Abstract 
Environmental accounting literature reminds us that prosperity can be ephemeral if it is 
built on depletion of natural resources. Traditional national accounting practice ignores 
the loss of natural resources. According to standard environmental accounting, this 
produces exaggerated income, encourages unsustainable levels of consumption and is 
misleading when assessing the economic prospects of resource extracting countries. 
While the historiography of oil-extracting countries departs from entirely different 
concepts and methods, it contains plenty of arguments that resemble those of the 
environmental accountants. This thesis shows how Mexican and Venezuelan scholars 
have discussed the concept of national wealth, the ephemeral prosperity delivered by oil 
depletion and the biases that oil cash introduced in the perceptions of their countries' 
economic performance. Nonetheless the arguments in the historiography lack quantitative 
support for the most part. 
The dissertation connects these previously disparate literatures and explores the resulting 
synergies. A priori, it seems that environmental accounting provides the tools for 
quantifying the hitherto qualitative observations of the historiography of two countries 
with very different strategies regarding the depletion of their natural resources. While 
Mexico approximates very closely the theoretical case of a closed economy, Venezuela 
has been considered the textbook example of a resource-export-driven economy. In the 
end, history proves to be an excellent laboratory for an ex-post analysis of the concepts, 
models and methods of environmental accounting. 
This study contributes to the surprisingly small amount of comparative historical studies 
of the oil industries and the economic histories of Venezuela and Mexico. The most 
important conclusion derived from the comparative analysis of the theoretical models of 
environmental accounting is that the competing methods available in the literature seem 
to apply to different scenarios. Furthermore, the results of the thesis show that the role of 
technological change in sustaining the historical levels of consumption is substantial since 
the terms of trade did not improve in the continuous way needed to rescue economies 
from declining levels of consumption. This is an important finding because gains from 
trade have now been included in some environmental accounting models but 
technological change is left out. Overall, the thesis is an examination of the tractability 
and usefulness of environmental accounting as a tool of economic analysis over the long 
run. 
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This thesis combines concepts from economic history and environmental accounting to 
develop what has been called environmental historical national accounts. It examines the 
tractability and usefulness of environmental accounting as a tool of economic analysis 
over the long run. The experiences of Venezuela and Mexico during the twentieth century 
are scrutinised in the light of environmental accounting methods. Environmental 
accounting is expected to be relevant to the economic histories of Venezuela and Mexico 
given the weight that natural resources, particularly oil, have had in the economic 
development of both countries in the twentieth century. Below, we pose six basic 
questions regarding this research. Why is environmental accounting relevant to economic 
history? What are the primary issues being researched? Why focus on oil depletion? Why 
these two oil producers? What are the advantages of undertaking environmental 
accounting over the long run? Finally, what are the implications of the thesis? 
Why is environmental accounting relevant to economic history? 
In the first place, the estimation and analysis of long-term economic performance and its 
different methods of measurement are central to the study of economic history. Economic 
historians have made a huge effort to construct historical series of income and output for 
almost every country. ' National accounts, and the gross domestic product (GDP) in 
particular, have become the central tool for analysing economic change and the different 
patterns of development within and between countries, helping us to understand the 
present and to plan better for the future. However, thanks to the literature on 
environmental accounting, recognition is growing that national income has never been 
accurately calculated for economies based on natural resources. According to this 
literature, ignoring the loss of natural resources, via degradation or depletion, in 
calculations of national income and output can mask the destruction of resources 
available to a country behind the false appearance of a growing national economy. 2 An 
economy can consume more (i. e. grow) as a result of an improvement of its productivity, 
1 Among others S. Kuznets, Income and Wealth series (Cambridge, 1951); P. Deane, and W. A. Cole, 
British Economic Growth, 1688-1959: Trends and Structure. University of Cambridge. Department of 
Applied Economics. Monographs, Vol. 8 (Cambridge, 1959).; K. Ohkawa, Capital stock: estimates of long 
term economic statistics of Japan since 1868 (Tokyo, 1966); C. Feinstein, National Income, Expenditure 
and Output of the United Kingdom, 1855-1965 (Cambridge, 1972) ; L. Prados de la Escosura, De Imperio a 
Nacidn : el crecimiento econdmico espanol (1730-1930) (Madrid, 1988) A. Baptista, Bases Cuantitativas de 
la Economia Venezolana, 1830-1989 (Caracas, 1991). 
2 P. Dasgupta and K. G. Mäler, 'The Environment And Emerging Developing Issues', in Proceedings Of 
The World Bank Annual Conference On Development And Economics 1990 (New York, 1991), p. 101. 
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or it can consume more from an increasingly rapid depletion of natural resources. 
Consider, as an extreme hypothetical case, a country that lives simply on exporting its 
exhaustible resources and importing consumption goods with the export revenue. 
Assume, too, that resources are costless to extract and that other than extraction there is 
no domestic production. The income of this country, as historically measured, could be 
large, and it would even be seen to be rising. However, when measured as suggested by 
some approaches to environmental accounting, its income would be nil. Environmental 
accountants argue that in the case of resource-based economies `traditional accounting 
practices exaggerated income, encouraged unsustainable levels of consumption and 
obscured the necessity to implement greatly needed policy adjustments'. A priori, this 
adjustment seems to be important for a number of countries which resemble, for some 
part of their economic histories, the hypothetical `country' mentioned above. 
What are the primary issues being researched? 
The principal concern here is the quantification of the claims of environmental 
accounting; or in other words, to what extent environmental historical national accounts 
diverge from traditional national accounts. Standard historical GDP series, like those of 
Maddison or Hofman, generally used as a starting point for the analysis of the historical 
economic performance of most countries, fail to recognise the special characteristics of 
income generated by resource-led economies 4 If the allegations of environmental 
accounting were correct, these traditional statistics would yield misleading analyses for 
economies heavily reliant on natural resource exploitation. Economic historians recognise 
that our knowledge of national income, output and wealth is not static. In fact, our 
historical estimates are constantly under revision, new indices are constructed, new data 
are included, new techniques are applied to the old data, etc. All of which results in 
amendments to previous conclusions and, in some cases, new interpretations. This 
research fits within that spirit of constant revision of income measures. This is 
3 S. El Serafy, 'The Proper Calculation Of Income From Depletable Natural Resources', in Ahmad, Serafy, 
et al. (eds. ), Environmental Accounting For Sustainable Development: a UNEP- World Bank Symposium 
(Washington D. C., 1989), p. 10. It is fair to notice that it is not only the environmental literature that argues 
along these lines. Studies on rentier states, that is oil producer countries, put forward similar concerns about 
national income accounts yet from a complete different perspective. See for instance, H. Mahdavy, 'The 
Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: the Case of Iran', in Cook (ed. ), Studies 
in the Economic History of the Middle East (Oxford, 1970) and R. Stauffer, Accounting for "Wasting 
Assets' Income Measurement for Oil and Mineral-Exporting Rentier States, Vol. 25 (Vienna, 1984). 
° A. Maddison, Monitoring The World Economy, 1820-1992 (Paris, 1995) ; A. A. Hofuran, The Economic 
Development of Latin America in the Twentieth Century (Cheltenham, UK, 2000). 
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particularly important for Latin America countries since it is widely recognised that its 
`quantitative economic history remains to be done for the most part. '5 
Why focus on oil depletion? Why these two oil producers? 
The divergence from traditional income measures `is more important for countries where 
non-renewable resources are being run down. v6 Among non-renewable resources it is hard 
to think of a natural resource that shapes economies more than oil has done throughout 
the twentieth century. In addition to its non-renewable nature and the unarguable 
relevance of oil receipts for oil producer economies, the fact that oil exploitation has 
occurred for over a century justifies the choice of two oil producers for testing the 
usefulness of environmental accounts in historical terms. 
Mexico and Venezuela have been oil producers since the dawn of the oil era. Mexico 
started commercial production in 1901 and was the world's greatest oil exporter and 
second producer by 1921. Venezuela replaced Mexico in this position during the inter- 
war years. Chapter 1 shows that both countries relied on oil as their major source of 
income and engine of development at different times in their histories. The fact that they 
followed opposite paths in their pioneer oil politics is also relevant to the issue being 
investigated. While Mexico nationalised its oil industry by 1938 and followed an inward- 
looking strategy of depleting the oil just to the extent necessary to fulfil domestic 
requirements, Venezuela adopted a pure export-oriented strategy, leaving her oil in 
foreign hands until 1976. After almost forty years of looking at each other with a mixture 
of criticism and wonder, defending their own exploitation strategy as the best possible, 
Mexico and Venezuela ended the twentieth century as state-owned medium-sized oil 
exporters. 
Venezuela's exploitation policy resembles more closely the hypothetical `country', 
mentioned above, living simply from exporting its non-renewable resources and 
importing consumption goods with the export revenue, whereas Mexico's conservationist 
approach fits better with the `productive' (but closed) economy, at least during the period 
1938-1976. A priori, following the premises of environmental accounting, Venezuela's 
traditional income estimates will diverge further from environmentally adjusted estimates 
than will those of Mexico for that period. Yet the main question in this context is whether 
s From the introduction of J. H. Coatsworth and A. M. Taylor (eds. ), Latin America and the World Economy 
since 1800 (Cambridge, MA, 1999) 
6 S. El Serafy, 'The Proper Calculation Of Income From Depletable Natural Resources', in Ahmad, Serafy, 
et at. (eds. ), Environmental Accounting For Sustainable Development: a UNEP- World Bank Symposium 
(Washington D. C., 1989), p. 10. 
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environmental accounting is useful when classifying these two strategies in terms of their 
efficiency and their implications for long run sustainable development. 
What is also relevant is that Mexicans and Venezuelans of different epochs were not 
unaware of the ephemeral prosperity embodied in their resource-driven economies, as 
Chapter 3 demonstrates. The literature on oil producers is plenty of arguments that 
resemble those of the environmental accountants. In the case of Venezuela, it has been 
argued that `due to the nature of oil revenues an increasing gap opened between the real 
production capacity and its earning and expenditure possibilities'. 7 Also it has been stated 
that `after decades of consuming more than they produced, to restore balance, 
Venezuelans' real incomes and consumption would have to decline'. $ For their part 
Mexicans feared that a misleading and ephemeral prosperity would have taken place in 
the country if production had continued at the pace of the early years of the twentieth 
century. The arguments of the historiography are mostly supported by qualitative rather 
than quantitative evidence. Contemporaries lacked the concepts and tools that 
environmental accounting offers for quantifying their arguments. Environmental 
historical accounts have the potential to fill this quantitative gap. 
What are the advantages of undertaking environmental accounting over the long run? 
In principle, it is economically sound to adjust conventional national output and income 
measures for the depletion of environmental assets, particularly of non-renewable 
resources. More than two decades of work on environmental accounting have shown, 
however, that there are significant obstacles to the construction of accurate estimates of 
augmented national income and output. In addition to the conceptual issues, the most 
daunting obstacles are problems involved in estimating quantities of stocks and flows and 
providing monetary valuation .9 This research 
does not escape these problems. A good 
deal of the work presented in the following chapters concerns the elaboration of the data 
series needed. The construction of consistent time-series data is one of the contributions 
of the thesis. It is argued that `a national programme of environmental accounting should 
be long-term because the statistics required take a long time to be developed and the 
7 A. Uslar Pietri, 'Los males del petr5leo', El Nacional (1985) 28th April. The increasing disparity between 
consumption and production in a country such as Venezuela is also referred by B. Mommer and A. 
Baptista, 'El Petröleo En Las Cuentas Nacionales: Una Proposic6n', Working Paper IESA 10 (1983), p. 3. 
Furthermore, it has also been argued that resource-abundant economies grow more slowly precisely because 
they are likely to be living beyond their means since the natural resource allows the economy to afford 
extraordinary (unsustainable) consumption possibilities. F. Rodriguez and J. D. Sachs, 'Why do resource- 
abundant economies grow more slowly? ', Journal of Economic Growth 4 (1999), p. 278. 
8 M. Naim and A. Pinango (eds. ), El caso Venezuela: una ilusiön de armonia (Caracas, 1974). 
9 W. D. Nordhaus and E. C. Kokkenlenber (eds. ), Nature's Numbers: Expanding the U. S. National Economic 
Accounts to Include Environment (Washington D. C., 1999), p. 44. 
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analysis of some environmental effects may require long time series'. 10 The data series 
developed in the thesis also permit the quantitative comparison of the sharp contrasts 
between the Mexican and Venezuelan oil industries in terms of basic indicators such as 
production, exploration policies, labour and capital costs, fiscal policies, etc. 
Environmental accounting can also benefit from the long-run approach of this research. 
History provides an excellent laboratory for an ex-post analysis of the concepts, models 
and methods of environmental accounting, because it has been recognised that `it is 
necessary not only to develop more comprehensive models, but also to devote more effort 
to verification of these models through ex-post comparisons of predictions with observed 
results. "' Indeed, this research aims to fill `the gap between the considerable progress 
made towards resolving basic theoretical issues and the lack of agreement on the 
empirical side about the most appropriate methods for making specific adjustments'. 
12 It 
is here where the repeated testing in different national contexts becomes crucial. In 
principle, the exercises of evaluation in Chapters 4 and 5 have the objective of comparing 
the different depletion strategies followed by Mexico and Venezuela. Yet they also 
confront the shortcomings of the theory and the abstractions of the methods with 
historical facts and figures, making evident some new gaps between theory and practice 
of environmental accounting that do not appear in shorter term exercises. 
What are the implications of the thesis? 
If environmental accounting premises are correct, some of the issues raised in the 
historiography regarding the ephemeral prosperity of Mexico and Venezuela will finally 
find a quantitative support. In the process, the oil industries of Mexico and Venezuela are 
empirically compared for the first time over the whole of the twentieth century. This 
quantitative comparison can shed some light on the political and ideological claims that 
historically have been made by both sides regarding their chosen strategy of depletion. 
These analyses are of fundamental importance for the comparative economic history of 
the two countries. 
In addition, by providing a quantitative measure of the contribution of environmental 
resources, environmental accounting in historical terms also opens a door for further 
10 P. Bartelmus, E. Lutz, et al., 'Environmental Accounting : an operational perspective', in Serageldin and 
Steer (eds. ), Valuing The Environment: proceedings of the First Annual International Conference On 
Environmentally Sustainable Development held at the World Bank, September 30-October 1,1993 
(Washington D. C., 1993), p. 177. 
11 A. M. Freeman, The Measurement of Environmental and Resource Values: Theory and Methods 
(Resources for the Future, Washington D. C., 1993), p. 14. 
12 J. R Vincent, 'Green accounting: from theory to practice', Environment and Development Economics 5 
(2000), p. 23. 
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explorations in other debates in economic history. The thesis will help to assess the 
appropriateness of traditional national accounts for oil producers and for resource driven 
economies in general. This will surely contribute to the ongoing debate regarding the 
concept of national income and its measures. Growth accounting could also gain from 
environmental accounting. In one of his seminal articles, Moses Abramovitz admits that 
his measures of convergence do not allow for variation in the richness of countries' 
natural resources in relation to their populations, since productivity measures reflect 
differences in natural resource availability as well as levels of technology. 
13 This 
problem could be addressed if differences in natural resource endowments were taken 
into account in a standardised manner. Hence, broader economic history controversies 
can profit from environmental historical accounting. 
The methodological considerations contribute to the evolution of environmental 
economics by showing inconsistencies, improving definitions, qualifying methods and 
conventions, etc. If these tools turn out to be useful in historical perspective, it will 
generate greater confidence in the implementation of future policies based upon their use. 
Oil stocks and flows, values and depreciation estimates derived from the thesis are major 
items within the environmental accounts of Mexico and Venezuela. They will be of use 
for those attempting the more ambitious objective of producing a complete set of 
environmental historical national accounts including all the other natural resource 
depletion, damages to flora, fauna and ecosystems plus pollution for Mexico and 
Venezuela. These historical series can also serve as benchmarks for comparison with 
other oil- producing countries. Therefore, the results of this research will be useful for 
those currently working on the generation of environmental accounts. 
The analysis of different economic strategies and their impact on development and 
environmental depletion measures can yield new questions for the long-term sustainable 
growth debate. Consequently, the results obtained could have implications for political 
planning over the use of the environment. 
13 M. Abramovitz, 'Catching up, forging ahead and falling behind', Journal of Economic History 46 (1986) 
2, pp. 392-393. 
14 Some enquiry on this direction is present in M. Rubio, 'Resource-Led Growth Failure: Faulty Policies and 
Misleading Performance Indicators, a Proposition', in 75th Annual Conference of the Economic History 
Society. New Researchers Papers (Glasgow, 2001). 
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The structure of the thesis 
The thesis is organised in the following manner. Chapter 1 provides the historical 
background to the experiences of Mexico and Venezuela, both in relation to oil and to 
their economic performances during the twentieth century. It demonstrates that, despite 
the deep contrasts between both countries, there are many links between the Venezuelan 
and Mexican histories. 
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework of environmental accounting. The Chapter 
starts with a definition of `environment', paying particular attention to non-renewable 
resources, the part that most closely relates to this research. Three ways of accounting for 
the environment in national accounts are then introduced. The analysis of the concepts of 
income and depreciation in national accounts concludes the first half of the chapter. As 
methodological considerations are the main concern of this chapter, the second half is 
devoted to the theoretical exposition of the methods of evaluation that will be used later 
on. More crucially it presents the concept of resource rent on which all the methods rely. 
Chapters 3 and 4 provide further insight regarding the history, the historiography and the 
statistics of the oil industry in both countries yet under different perspectives. Chapter 3 
presents in more depth the different approaches to oil exploitation in each country. It 
demonstrates that the concerns the environmental literature has put together throughout 
the 1990s can be traced back to the early days of the petroleum industry. The historical 
qualitative sources show that Venezuelans and Mexicans of all epochs have recognised 
the special characteristics of oil receipts and the risks of ephemeral prosperity that they 
entailed. The chapter also shows the lack of appropriate quantification of the value of oil 
depletion and its impact on traditional indicators of economic performance. 
Chapter 4 seeks to calculate the resource rent. It discusses not only the data, but also the 
most suitable ways of using the available information. It provides sensitivity analysis and 
produces series of resource rents for Mexico and Venezuela for most of the twentieth 
century. In the process, the chapter compares the two oil industries in terms of costs, 
profits, labour, etc. The contrasting production strategies translate into very different rent 
results. 
Chapter 5 puts together the ideas and results of previous chapters, in order to estimate the 
value of oil resources and its depreciation according to the different methods. This 
chapter represents the contribution of economic history to environmental accounting. It 
proves that the theoretical assumptions underlying the methods are crucial to the results, 
and that variation from the restricted scenario for which the methods are constructed 
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changes both the values obtained and the expected biases of the methods. The results of 
the chapter generate more questions than answers, but improve understanding of the 
methods of evaluation by analysing known and previously ignored strengths and 
weakness. 
The adjustments to traditional national accounts are carried on in Chapter 6. The first part 
of the chapter is devoted to the adjustment at the GDP level and the impact of such 
adjustment to the growth and performance portrayed in Chapter 1. Nevertheless, the core 
of environmental accounting literature opts for the correction of the net income. In this 
chapter the results of the previous chapters are used to elucidate the main claims of 
environmental accounting: did traditional indicators exaggerate income? Did traditional 
indicators encourage unsustainable levels of consumption? The answer to these questions 
is produced in a sequence of three exercises that connect the findings of the previous 
chapters. The results of this chapter also respond to some of the unanswered questions of 
the historiography: was there a gap between the production and the consumption capacity 
of the Venezuelan economy? Was correct the belief of the Mexican government of the 
early part of the twentieth century was that even if Mexico had continued to exploit the 
oil fields and exporting the resource it would not have contributed to higher income 
levels? The last section of the chapter responds these questions using the results of this 
and earlier chapters. 
The conclusion summarises the main findings of the thesis and points to a research 
agenda for economic historians, environmental accountants and policy-makers. 
In the Appendices the sources and data series are described and discussed. 
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'Of all the self-mutilating theories adopted by Latin American governments, 
none has lasted as long as the idea that countries grow rich 
by exploiting what lies under their soil, 
rather than through the hard work of adding value to goods and services. 
This myth has proved particularly potent when it comes to oil'. ' 
Chapter 1 
The Historical Setting: A Century of Oil in Mexico and 
Venezuela 
1.1 A Century of Oil 
A Common Heritage 
A Similar Departure (1900s-1930s) 
Different Paths (Late 1930s-Early 1970s) 
Times Of Reaction (1970s) 
A Common Crisis (1980s) 
1.2 Overall Performance 
It is somewhat surprising not to find many comparative historical studies of either the 
oil industries or the economic histories of Venezuela and Mexico. The comparative 
studies that are available appeared either in the first half of the century or in the post- 
oil boom crisis. It is true that most monographs about Venezuela start by emphasising 
the little attention that the country has attracted historically. According to Goodman, 
1 'Energy in Latin America. Even oil is growing less sacred'. In The Economist. ( 1996). 
2 M. Acosta Saignes, Petröleo en Mexico y Venezuela (M6xico D. F., 1941) does a comparative study of 
the evolution and development of the petroleum exploitation in Mexico and Venezuela with a clear 
opposition to companies and the policies followed by the Venezuelan government of the early half of 
the century. M. Matos Romero, Venezuela y Mexico ante el Imperialismo (Maracaibo, 1939) compares 
the ill effects of the imperialist penetration in both countries particularly in Venezuela. 
For the post-oil boom crisis period see Kaplan M. (coordinador), A. R. Brewer-Carias and otros, 
Petröleo y desarrollo en Mexico y Venezuela. (Mexico D. F., 1981). More recently I. F. Palacio Solano, 
America Latina: el estigma del petröleo. Mexico, Ecuador y Venezuela (Mexico, D. F, 1996). Outside 
the oil industry A. Gilbert, 'Self-Help Housing During Recession', in Abel and Lewis (eds. ), Welfare, 
Poverty and Development in Latin America (Oxford, 1993) compares the welfare effects of the 1980s 
crisis. For its part, E. A. Baloyra, 'Oil Policies and Budgets in Venezuela, 1938-1968', Latin America 
Research Review 9 (1974) 2, follows a methodology previously used to analyse the political evolution of 
the Mexican Revolution to analyse Venezuela's government expenditures. It is an exceptional case 
where a study of Mexico is applied to Venezuela. A notable exception is also J. F. Thynne, 'British 
Policy On Oil Resources 1936/1951: With Particular Reference To Mexico, Venezuela And Persia' 
(DPhil Dissertation, London School of Economics, 1995). 
3 See for example the prefaces or introductions to the following monographs L. W. Goodman, J. 
Mendelson Forman, M. Naim, et al. (eds. ), The lessons of the Venezuelan experience (Washington D. C., 
1995); J. D. Martz and D. J. Myers (eds. ), Venezuela: The democratic experience (New York, 1986); M. 
Naim, Paper, Tigers and Minotaurs. The politics of Venezuela's Economic Reforms (Washington, D. C., 
1993); J. Ewell, Venezuela. A Century of Change (London, 1984) and F. Coronil, The magical state: 
Nature, money, and modernity in Venezuela (Chicago and London, 1997). 
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in scholarly terms, `Venezuela had the least interesting combination of characteristics - 
exceptional and unexciting without being a likely model for others. It was too 
exceptional to be included in multi-country comparative studies of political or 
economic development, and it offered insufficient attraction as single case to lure 
many students'. 4 In contrast, Mexico enjoys one of the largest historiographies of the 
continent. 
This chapter outlines the historical evolution of the Mexican and Venezuelan 
economies and their oil industries during the twentieth century. It will demonstrate 
that, despite the deep contrasts between the two countries, particularly regarding their 
oil policies throughout the century, there are many links between the Venezuelan and 
Mexican histories. It provides the historical background to the analysis and estimates 
that will follow in the thesis. Chapters 3 and 4 provide further insight regarding the 
history, the historiography and the statistics of the oil industry in both countries. The 
final section of this chapter sketches the economic performance of both countries 
throughout the century according to their GDP and GDP per capita. It also makes a 
first enquiry into whether these statistics are misleading indicators of the actual 
economic performance of Mexico and Venezuela during the twentieth century. 
1.1 A Century of Oil 
A Common Heritage 
In the case of oil, the common link between Mexico and Venezuela can be traced back 
to the Spanish heritage. Virtually all defenders of the policies of Latin American 
governments in regard to subsoil mineral wealth have begun their defence with a 
reference to the heritage from Spanish law that determined that the sovereignty of the 
subsoil rests in the Nation. 5 In other words, the property of the subsoil remains with 
4 Goodman, Mendelson Forman, Naim, et al. (eds. ), The lessons of the Venezuelan experience, p. 4. 
S Some examples for the Mexican case are Mexico. Camara de Diputados (by M. de la Pefa), Estudio 
juridico, politico y econömico sobre el Art 27 constitucional (Mexico D. F., 1921), M. Manterola, 
'Legislaciön fiscal especial sobre petreleo y derivados', Revista de Hacienda 1 (1938) 6, A. Garcia 
Robles, La Question du Petrole au Mexique et le Droit International (Paris, 1939). 
Venezuelan also justified their right to grasp part of the benefits from the companies starting from this 
very same principle. Law related works were very prominent in the earliest stages of the oil industry 
development, see for instance: J. J. Abreu, 'Sobre la exoneraci6n de los derechos de importaci6n', Revista 
de Fomento (December 1938) 7; A. Planchard Burguillos, 'Comentarios a la legislaci6n venezolana de 
hidrocarburos', Revista de Fomento (1938) 7; R. Gonzalez Miranda, , Estudios acerca 
del regimen legal 
del petrdleo en Venezuela. Coleccibn de Estudios Juridicos, Vol. XXI (Caracas, 1954). Venezuela. 
Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons, "The petroleum industry and its fiscal obligations in Venezuela by 
A. Para', in Ist Venezuelan Petroleum Congress organised by the Venezuelan Society of Petroleum 
Engineers (Caracas, 1962), T. E. Carrillo Batalla, 'La distribuciön del ingreso fiscal petrolero entre 
gastos corrientes y gastos de inversion', in La evaluaciön de la inversion del ingreso fiscal petrolero en 
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the Nation, regardless of the owner of the surface. This practice in Spanish legal 
history was first codified in the early fourteenth century, when Alfonso XI decreed 
that all mines of any metal and their produce were property of the Crown and were not 
to be worked without licence or grant. 6 The Mexican mineral code of 1884 broke with 
this principle for 25 years, changing it to the unity of the surface and subsoil of the 
Anglo-Saxon tradition. In 1910 Mexico reverted to the Spanish principle. This 
institutional arrangement is the main common historical feature of the petroleum 
industries of the two countries, since it entitled the nation (i. e. the government) to 
benefit from the exploitation of the natural resources that lay underneath its soil by the 
mere principle of ownership. Yet their histories are linked in more ways than by their 
institutional heritage. When reviewing the evolution of the oil industry in both 
countries and the main themes of the historiography, the bonds become at least as 
apparent as the contrasts. 
A Similar Departure (1900s-1930s) 
At the dawn of the twentieth century, Venezuela and Mexico based their economies on 
the primary sector, as did most of the rest of Latin America. Agriculture and mining 
(Venezuelan coffee and Mexican non-precious metals -copper, lead, zinc, silver, not 
as yet oil) accounted for most of the productive effort and exports of both countries. 
There was relatively little artisan industry of the type to be found virtually everywhere 
in Latin America by the turn of the century. Two long dictatorships, Porfirio Diaz 
(1876-1911) in Mexico and Juan Vicente Gomez (1908-1935) in Venezuela, brought, 
in their time, the political stability that encouraged foreign investors to explore the 
countries' oil. The oil industry added to the `export-led' pattern of the early part of the 
century, just displacing some traditional products such as coffee and cacao in 
Venezuela [conference sponsored by Universidad Central de Venezuela. Foro Petrolero 1965] 
jCaracas, 1968), D. Bendahan, La Legislaciön Venezolana sobre Hidrocarburos (Caracas, 1969). 
M. Rippy, Oil and The Mexican Revolution (Leiden, 1972), p. l. The first four chapters of this book 
review the different laws regarding minerals in Mexico. 
7 The following works provide good insight into the economic history of the early part of the twentieth 
century. For Venezuela see: C. R. Silva, 'Bosquejo histdrico del desenvolvimiento de la economia 
venezolana en el siglo XX', in Mendoza (ed. ), Venezuela Moderna: Medio siglo de historia 1926-1976 
(Caracas, 2nd ed., 1979); T. E. Carrillo Batalla, El desarrollo del sector manufacturero industrial de la 
economia venezolana (Caracas, 1962); J. Salazar-Carrillo, Oil and Development in Venezuela During 
the Twentieth Century (London, 1994). For Mexico: Cardenas, E. (compliador), Historia Econdmica de 
Mexico (5 Vols), Lecturas edited by P. Brazdresch, Vol. 64 (M6xico, D. F., 1992-1994); Colegio de 
M6xico, Estadisticas econ6micas del Po>firiato: corn ercio exterior de Mexico, 1877-1911(M6xico D. F., 
1960); Colegio de Mexico, Seminario de Historia Moderna de Mexico, Estadisticas econ6micas del 
Porfiriato: fuerza de trabajo y actividad econömica por sectores (Mexico D. F, 1965); S. H. Haber, 
Industry and Underdevelopment. The Industrialisation of Mexico, 1890-1940 (Stanford, 1989); C. W. 
Reynolds, The Mexican Economy. Twentieth-Century Structure and Growth (London, 1970). 
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Venezuela and silver in Mexico. Their growth performances during this period are 
described as high but yet unstable (see Table 1-1.4 below) .8 
It could be said that, for the first part of this history, Venezuela was the recipient of 
Mexican oil policies, whereas for the second part, Venezuelan conduct affected the 
Mexican situation. It is an historical fact that the Mexican oil industry developed 
before Venezuela's. The development of the oil industry in the south of the United 
States and the similarity of its coastal area to that of northern Mexico attracted world- 
wide attention in the first two decades of the century. 9 Literally hundreds of oil 
companies were organised to exploit the Mexican subsoil. 10 From 1901 to 1911, 
around 25 million barrels of oil were exported from Mexico without the payment of a 
penny in taxes. " Nevertheless, between 1914 and 1920, the foreign enclaves, 
especially the oil industry, stood out as islands of prosperity in the sea of destitution 
caused by the Mexican Revolution. 12 The oil industry and the revival of mining in the 
1920s helped to soften the immediate economic hardship of the Revolution. 
13 
Mexico's first great oil boom peaked in 1921; by then, the country had become the 
major oil exporter in the world. During those years, Mexican oil production accounted 
for almost a quarter of the world's oil production. 14 Nevertheless, the changes initiated 
by the Revolution -the rise of economic nationalism- started to become evident by the 
1920s. The consequence for the oil industry was the decline of production and the 
shift of investment elsewhere, chiefly to Venezuela. '5 
8 R. Thorp, Progress, Poverty and Exclusion. An Economic History of Latin America in the 20th 
Century (New York, 1998), p. 16. 
9 The modern oil industry began when the first producing well was drilled in Titusville, Pennsylvania, 
United States in 1859. 
10 Some 447 companies existed in Mexico in 1919, but only 24 produced in exportable quantities Rippy, 
Oil and The Mexican Revolution, pp. 137, fnt. 18. 
" Ibid, p. 137 quoting an official Mexican publication. 
12 A. Knight, 'The Political Economy of Revolutionary Mexico, 1900-1940', in Abel and Lewis (eds. ), 
Latin America, Economic Imperialism and the State: The Political Economy of The External Connection 
form Independence to the Present (London, 1992), p. 295. 
, 
13 Thorp, Progress, Poverty and Exclusion. An Economic History of Latin America in the 20th Century 
p. 68. Reynolds, The Mexican Economy. Twentieth-Century Structure and Growth initially 
demonstrated this. 
14 J. Noriega, Influencia de los hidrocarburos en la industrializaciön de Mexico, Vol. 3 (M6xico D. F., 
1944), p. 211. 
's J. C. Brown, 'Why Foreign Oil Companies Shifted Production from Mexico to Venezuela during the 
1920s', American Historical Review (1985) 90. 
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Table 1.1- 1: Nominal investment in Latin America by the US and the UK in 1913 
and 1929 (US dollars per capita) 
US investment UK investment 
1913 1929 1913 1929 
Argentina 5.22 52.70 243.17 184.61 
Brazil 2.11 14.47 49.11 42.98 
Chile 4.33 91.96 95.87 90.57 
Colombia 0.40 36.46 6.96 5.32 
Peru 7.76 27.08 29.50 25.28 
Uruguay 4.29 40.76 206.0 138.21 
Mexico 36.30 41.92 42.53 - 
Venezuela 1.15 55.34 15.83 31.45 
Sources: Elaborated from investment data by R. Thorp, 'Economy, 1914- 
1929', in Bethell (ed. ), Latin America Economy and Society 1870-1930 
(Cambridge, 1989) p. 64 except for Mexico, data on direct foreign investment 
from G. Gereffi and P. Evans, 'Transnational corporations, dependent 
development, and state policy in the semiperiphery: a comparison of Brazil 
and Mexico', Latin America Research Review 26 (1981) 3, p. 36 and P. Evans 
and G. Gereffi, 'Foreign Investment and Dependent Development: 
Comparing Brazil and Mexico', in Hewlett and Weinert (eds. ), Brazil and 
Mexico: Patterns in Late Development (Philadelphia, 1982), p. 128 
. Population 
from A. Maddison, 'Economic and Social Conditions in Latin 
America, 1913-1950', in Urrutia (ed. ), Long-term Trends in Latin American 
Economic Development (Washington, D. C., 1991), p. 8 
23 
Until the end of 1922, the development of the Venezuelan petroleum industry was 
restricted. Despite the big number of oil concessions, no great deposits had been found. 
On 14 December 1922, the blowout of well Los Barrosos N°2 in the La Rosa area 
showed Venezuela's great oil potential to the world. It produced an estimated 100,000 
barrels every 24 hours for nine consecutive days. It started a rush into Venezuelan 
oil. 16 Table 1.1-1 shows how Venezuela passed from being one of the Latin American 
countries with the lowest foreign investment per capita in 1913 to become the largest 
per capita recipient of US funds by 1929. In Venezuela, as in Mexico in the previous 
decades, three companies -Standard Oil, Shell and Gulf- controlled the majority of 
output. 
The development of the oil industry in Venezuela benefited from the definitive take- 
off of the oil industry at world level during those years. Engines used diesel oil more 
and more often; oil replaced coal in ships and other engines; aeronautics were born; 
automobiles began to be produced on a large scale. In addition, the Mexican 
16 Data from A. R. Martinez, Venezuelan Oil Development and Chronology (London, 1989), p. 39-41. 
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Revolution and its aftermath discouraged foreign investment in Mexican oil. 
Furthermore, Venezuela applied the most liberal oil policy of the continent. 
Exploration and operation rights were fixed at very low rates. `From 1878 to 1920 the 
government granted 1312 contracts for oil exploitation. Most of which belonged to 
foreign companies'. '7 
A huge per-well production volume after 1922; low transport costs; 18 low political risk 
factors (an all-powerful dictator and a docile labour force); 19 and `the best petroleum 
law in the world' combined to give Venezuela an important international cost 
advantage. The combination of those factors led Venezuela to replace Mexico as the 
world's largest oil exporter in 1928. By 1930 Venezuela was also the world's second 
largest producer after the United States, while Mexico had fallen to the seventh 
position. 
In both countries, the literature of this first period is dedicated to the development of 
the industry and to the somehow difficult relationships established between the foreign 
companies and the governments. 20 More specific concerns in the Mexican case are the 
role of the workers and to the links between oil and the Revolution. 2' The different 
perspectives taken from inside and outside the country are readily observable within 
17 W. M. Sullivan, 'Situaciön econömica y politica durante el periodo de Juan Vicente Gomez, 1908- 
1935', in John Boulton Foundation (ed. ), Politica y economla en Venezuela, 1810-1976 (Caracas, 1976), 
258. ý$ 
Most of the fields were situated in the Ea stern Shore of Maracaibo Lake. Lake and ocean tankers were 
used. They were able to transport huge amounts of crude at a very low cost. 
19 Military ruled Venezuela from 1899, when General Castro's army took Caracas, up to 1958 when 
Betancourt returned to power as constitutional president, except for a three year period between 1945 to 
1948, when military shared power with the Accidn Democratica party. 
20 The first chapters of the following books, provide a good review of the initial stages of the Mexican 
industry: G. Grayson, The Politics of Mexican Oil (Pittsburgh, 1980); J. Lopez Portillo, El petrdleo de 
Mexico (Mexico D. F., 1975); G. A. Menendez, Doheny, el cruel (Mexico D. F., 1958); E. W. Owen, Trek 
of the Oil Finders: A History of Exploration for Petroleum (Oklahoma, 1975); PEMEX, (Petrbleos 
Mexicanos) (ed. ), La Industria Petrolera en Mexico : una Crönica (Mexico D. F., 1988), Vol. 1 and 
Chapter 8 in Rippy, Oil and The Mexican Revolution . 
For the initial stages of Venezuela's oil industry it is worth looking at: Arnold et at., The First Big Oil 
Hunt: Venezuela 1911-1916 (New York, 1960); E. Lieuwen, Petroleum In Venezuela: A History, Vol. 
47 (Berkeley, 1954); Martinez, Venezuelan Oil Development and Chronology ; P. E. Mejia Alarc6n, La 
industria del petröleo en Venezuela (Caracas, 1972); McBeth, Juan Vicente Gomez And The Venezuelan 
Oil Industry, 1908-1935 (Oxford, 1983); Sullivan, 'Situaciön econdmica y politica durante el periodo de 
Juan Vicente Gomez, 1908-1935'. 
For Mexican governments relation with the companies see the first chapter of A. J. Bermudez, The 
Mexican National Petroleum Industry: A case study in Nationalisation (Stanford, 1963) and also D. C. 
Baldridge, Mexican Petroleum and the United States-Mexican relations, 1919-1923 (London, 1987). 
Once again Lieuwen, Petroleum in Venezuela: A History is useful for Venezuela. See also his E. 
Lieuwen, 'The politics of energy in Venezuela', in Wirth (ed. ), Latin American Oil Companies and the 
Politics of Energy (London, 1985). 
21 For oil workers issues see V. Novelo, La dificil democracia de los petroleros (Mexico, D. F., 1991); R. 
Ramirez Heredia, La otra cara del petröleo (Mexico, D. F., 1979); S. L. Adleson, 'The Cultural Roots of 
the Oil Workers' Unions in Tampico 1910-1925", in Brown and Knight (eds. ), The Mexican Petroleum 
Industry in the Twentieth Century (Austin, 1992). In relation with the Revolution see for example, J. C. 
Brown, Oil and Revolution in Mexico (Oxford, 1993) and Rippy, Oil and The Mexican Revolution . 
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this early period. From the foreigners' perspective, the companies were responsible for 
the development of the country's market for the use of fuel, converting the economy to 
this modem source of industrial energy; for the expansion of production and refining 
of petroleum products for exports and for the overall improvement of the financial 
situation of the country and the generation of infrastructure. Nonetheless, the hosts did 
not view the petroleum industry developed by foreigners as an unmitigated blessing. 
They accused the wealthy companies of financing reactionary political movements, 
dividing and repressing the workers, extracting the nation's non-renewable resources, 
and subordinating domestic needs to the international interest, making huge profits in 
the process. 2 In Venezuela, the arguments remained mostly unchanged for most of the 
century. As for Mexico, the controversy turned to a different issue after 1938. 
Different Paths (late 1930s-earlyl970s) 
Whatever the wording -Mexicans tend to refer to it as `the nationalisation', whereas 
foreigners just call it `the expropriation'-, the decision implemented by the Mexican 
government on 18 March 1938 of taking over foreign companies' assets and the 
cancellation of their rights represented the appendix to a nationalist process rooted in 
the Revolution. 23 Simultaneously, it also constituted an early precedent to the 
nationalisation of most oil industries across the world throughout the century and one 
of the first government commitments to state enterprise in Latin America. As 
Maddison recalls, state enterprise was still minimal in the Western World by the 
1930s, except in Mexico. 24 Therefore, the decision generated a heated controversy in a 
world where the state played no economic role as yet. Nonetheless, the important issue 
for our discussion is that 1938 marks the beginning of the Mexican inward-looking 
strategy, which implied cutting down of oil production just to the level of internal 
demand, the decision to eliminate exports and the reduction of exploration activity. 
These main aspects of Mexican oil policy remained basically unchanged for almost 40 
years. 
zz Brown, Oil and Revolution in Mexico, p. 1. 
23 Ibid, and also Rippy, Oil and The Mexican Revolution. 
24 The Mexican government not only created PEMEX (Petroleos Mexicanos, the national company in 
charge of Mexican oil since 1938 and for the rest of the twentieth century), but the Federal Electricity 
Commission in 1937, and also forced foreign companies out of the insurance sector. In 1942, the 
government participated in the Altos Homos steel plant, and in 1943 it created a fertilizer company. In 
other countries, policy also began to move in that same direction during the Second World War. 
Maddison, 'Economic and Social Conditions in Latin America, 1913-1950', p. 15. 
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The literature on the causes, justification, process and consequences of expropriation- 
nationalisation is, by far, the largest among that dedicated to the Mexican oil 
industry. 25 From the American side, `the expropriation' has no causes, no economic 
justification and terrible consequences for the Mexican economy. 26 The long and 
laborious process to reach a final settlement between the government and the 
companies also contributed to additional material in the literature. 7 But for many years 
afterwards, Mexican oil occupied an anonymous position within the country's 
literature, barely mentioned outside PEMEX's regular reports to the government and 
the nation. If oil did reappear as a topic from time to time, it was just in reappraisals of 
the nationalisation. 28 
The Mexican expropriation of foreign companies' property caused enough turmoil in 
oil spheres for some voices to demand a similar action in Venezuela. During the late 
1930s and the early 1940s, the shadow of nationalism rose strongly in Venezuela. 
29 
Congressional opposition to the foreign companies was already considerable in 1937. 
A small vociferous group of leftists in the Chamber of Deputies agitated for partial 
nationalisation. The companies feared the worst when the government, early in 1938, 
announced a suspension of the granting of concessions. Yet, the overall impression in 
Venezuela regarding nationalisation was that: 
`A solution as extreme as Mexico's was out of question. The relative 
importance of petroleum in Venezuela was far greater. Mexico produced one- 
fourth as much, had five times as many people, and had a more diversified 
economy. In sparsely settled Venezuela, where petroleum stifled agriculture 
25 For causes and consequences of the nationalisation it is worth looking at the following books: J. C. 
Brown and A. Knight (eds. ), The Mexican Petroleum Industry in the Twentieth Century (Austin, 1992); 
J. Silva Herzog, Mexico y su Petröleo. Una Lecciön para America (Buenos Aires, 1959); L. Meyer, 
Mexico and the United States in the Oil Controversy. 1917-1942 (Mexico, 1972); L. Meyer and I. 
Morales, Petröleo y Naciön (1900-1987). La politica petrolera en Mexico (Mexico, D. F, 1990); For an 
official view see Mexico. Secretarla de Patrimonio Nacional, El Petrdleo de Mexico (Mexico D. F., 1940 
1st ed., 1963) and J. Silva Herzog, Historia de la Expropiaci6n de las Empresas Petroleras (Mexico 
D. F., 1964). For a more radical perspective against the American see: J. Basurto, El Conflicto 
Internacional en Torno al Petrdleo de Mexico (Mexico D. F., 1976). 
For a plain justification see Garcia Robles, La Question du Petrole au Mexique et le Droit International. 
26 Among others, the obvious interested party Standard Oil Company, The Reply to Mexico (New York, 
1940) but also W. C. Gordon, The Expropriation of Foreign-Owned Property in Mexico (Washington 
D. C, 1941) and R. B. Gaither, Expropriation in Mexico. The Facts and the Law (New York, 1940). 
27 'Mexico's unsolved problem'. In The Petroleum Press Service. (London, 1941); M. Manterola, 'La 
Situaci6n Actual de la Industria del Petr6leo en Mexico', Revista de Economia IV (1941) 16; Standard 
Oil Company, Present Status of the Mexican Oil "Expropriations" (New York, 1940); Standard Oil 
Company, The Reply to Mexico. 
28 The following texts reappraise the nationalisation from different perspectives. Bermudez, The 
Mexican National Petroleum Industry: A case study in Nationalisation; J. R. Powell, The Mexican 
Petroleum Industry 1938-1950 (Berkeley, 1956); Silva Herzog, Historia de la Expropiaciön de las 
Empresas Petroleras, 1917-1942; Basurto, El Conficto Internacional en Torno al Petr6leo de Mexico . 29 An extremely well documented summary of facts is presented by Lieuwen, Petroleum In Venezuela: 
A History in his Chapter 6, `Controversy, 1935-1941', pp 72-89. The rest of the paragraph is based on 
the information provided on those pages. 
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and domestic industry, where the government depended on oil for most of its 
income, and where petroleum dollars paid for imported food, expropriation was 
asking for disaster'. '° 
The review of the quantitative evidence confirms these views. Figure 1.1-1 shows not 
only the enormous difference in production between the two countries, but also the 
different size of the internal market for oil. Table 1.1-2 shows that, while Venezuela's 
population is the size of Cuba's, Mexico is one of the biggest countries in Latin 
America. The dependence of the Venezuelan economy on oil can hardly be 
exaggerated. Table 1.1-3 shows that, as early as 1929, over two-thirds of the 
Venezuelan exports were oil exports, a figure only comparable with Brazil's 
dependence on coffee on at that time, while Mexico's exports were much more varied 
almost a decade before the nationalisation. 
Figure 1.1- 1: Oil production and home consumption in Mexico and Venezuela. 
1901-1989 (thousand barrels) 
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Note: vertical lines mark the Mexican nationalisation of the oil industry in 1938 and the 
Venezuelan nationalisation in 1976. Data series and sources listed in Appendix A 
'° Opinions expressed in the following diaries and dates: Critica, June 23,1937; Altura, May 5,1938; 
Excelsior (Maracaibo edition), March 16,1937, as quoted in Ibid., p. 76-77, footnote 23. 
O C) 00N i(J w; QO (7 co O) N VI 00 
(p {Qý fp 
O t') (D Qf 
mN Oi(ý] 
m 
OOi QOi GO'f Oý Qý Oý Oý OI 1R3m QQ1 QQi Oý Oý T OBI QNI Gý Of Oý Oý Of Oý Oý Qf Oý 
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr 
year 
A century of oil 
Table 1.1- 2: Population of Latin America, 1913-1985 (thousands). 
28 
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Cuba Mexico Peru Uruguay Venezuela 
9-country 
Total 
1913 7,653 23,660 3,463 4,885 2,469 14,930 4,507 1,165 2,590 65,322 
1929 11,592 32,894 4,306 7,131 3,742 16,290 5,576 1,570 2,927 86,028 
1938 13,724 39,480 4,915 8,688 4,427 18,991 6,372 1,829 3,685 102,111 
1950 17,150 51,942 6,091 11,597 5,516 27,376 7,630 2,239 5,145 134,686 
1965 22,283 80,403 8,510 18,488 7,810 43,500 11,470 2,693 9,119 204,276 
1973 25,189 99,836 9,856 22,571 9,036 56,481 14,350 2,821 11,844 251,984 
1980 28,237 118,518 11,104 25,892 9,720 69,655 17,290 2,908 14,930 298,254 
1985 30,557 133,966 12,070 28,620 10,090 77,938 19,700 3,010 17,216 333,167 
Source: Maddison, Economic and Social Conditions in Latin America, 1913-1950', p. 8 
Table 1.1-3: Commodity Composition of Latin American Exports, 1929. 
(Percentages of total exports). 
Argentina Wheat 29.2; maize 17.6; frozen, chilled, and tinned meat 12.8; linseed oil 12.6 
Brazil Coffee 71.0 
Chile Nitrates 42.1; copper 40.4 
Colombia Coffee 60.6; petroleum 21.3 
Cuba Sugar 79.5 
Mexico Silver 20.6; other minerals 47.0 
Peru Oil 29.7; copper 22.4; wool 21.0; sugar 11.5; lead 5.1 
Uruguay Wool 30.7; frozen, chilled, and tinned meat 30.2; hides and skins 12.7 
Venezuela Oil 74.2; coffee 17.2 
Source: Statistisches Reichsamt (1936) as quoted in Maddison, 'Economic and Social Conditions in 
Latin America, 1913-1950', p. 4 
A change in the balance of power in Venezuela is nonetheless identifiable during the 
early 1940s. It can be said that up to 1943 the State had to conform to the royalties that 
firms chose. Several early attempts to increase the government's share of companies' 
income ended up with the minister who proposed the law fired and the law 
withdrawn. 31 Nevertheless, the Mexican decision gave hope and courage to the 
Venezuelan nationalists and also increased the bargaining power and aspirations of the 
Venezuelan government. A new Hydrocarbon Law was passed in 1943 with the aim of 
assuring the government one half of the net profits of the industry. It was to rule the 
31 In an attempt to take advantage of the competition for obtaining oil concessions, the Venezuelan 
government drafted the 1918 law, which raised the royalties from 5 percent to 15 percent. The American 
government and companies firmly protested. As a consequence the minister who proposed the law was 
fired, and company lawyers drafted their own law which set royalties at 10 percent. On a further 
occasion, when the depression induced a fall in the price of crude oil, a new attempt to increase the 
government's share of oil industry profits was carried out in 1930. A new reglamento imposed state 
fiscal and technical controls over the produces. Shell and Standard officials 'visited' General Gomez, as 
a result, the reglamento was abolished and the minister was fired again. From Lieuwen, Petroleum In 
Venezuela: A History and Venezuela. 
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industry with small modifications until the nationalisation in 1976. For many of the 
subsequent years, Venezuela's governments influenced the world's oil market, with 
their tax and concession policies, probably as no other single country. 
The so-called `anti-imperialist' literature supported the case for nationalisation of 
Venezuelan oil throughout the early 1940s. 32 It made clear references to the Mexican 
case along with strong opposition to private companies and the policies followed by 
the Venezuelan government of the early part of the century. In all, the main concern of 
this literature was the analysis of the distortions that oil was introducing in Venezuela 
at all levels: political, social and economic. In particular, the displacement of the 
hitherto most important sector, agriculture, by the petroleum sector was subject to 
continual consideration. 33 Nevertheless, the main subject among scholars continued to 
be the relationships between politics and industry. 34 They now concentrated on the 
level of the royalties that the government should impose on the firms. 5 Whether 
Venezuela took the advantage that it should from its oil has been the recurrent topic of 
the Venezuelan literature 36 
The increasing role of other regions, especially the Middle East, in the production of 
oil and gas during the 1950s displaced Venezuela from its long-standing privileged 
position in world markets. Venezuela, producing heavy oil and having a higher per- 
barrel cost of extraction (around 80 cents), had every reason to fear all-out competition 
from the Middle East producers (with 20cent/barrel costs). Output quotas were the 
only way that Venezuela could protect its oil industry against cheap foreign oil. 
37 The 
road to the creation of OPEC in 1960 and the next stage of the oil industry history had 
just begun. 38 
32 Examples of this line of argument are Matos Romero, Venezuela y Mexico ante el Imperialismo and 
Venezuela. The latter represents the communist point of view. 
33 Examples are R. D. Leon, De agro-pecuario a petrolero (Caracas, 1944); M. Egana, Tres decadas de 
producciön petrolera (Caracas, 1947); L. F. Calvani, Nuestro Maximo Problema (Caracas, 1947). The 
matter of the conflict oil-agriculture was already present in the previous decade as demonstrated by R. A. 
Camejo, 'Lineamientos de la Industria del Petrbleo en Venezuela', Revista de Fomento (1938) 7. 
34 F. Tugwell, The politics of oil in Venezuela (Stanford, 1975), J. E. Hartshorn, Oil Companies and 
Governments (London, 1967). 
35 See Chapter 4 in Lieuwen, Petroleum In Venezuela: A History ; Mejia Alarcon, La industria del 
petröleo en Venezuela presents representative correspondence and law making of the epoch. 
36 Numerous conferences were organised regarding the use Venezuela should have made of its oil, see 
for example: T. E. Carrillo Batalla, La evaluaciön de la inversion del ingreso fiscal petrolero en 
Venezuela [conference sponsored by Universidad Central de Venezuela. Foro Petrolero 19651 
(Caracas, 1968); Mieres, F. (coordinador), Hacia la Venezuela Post-petrolera [conference sponsored by 
la Academia Nacional de las Ciencias Econömicas in 19851, Vol. 1 (Caracas, 1989). 
37 J. Amuzegar, Managing the Oil Wealth: OPEC's Windfalls and Pitfalls (London, 1999), p. 27. 
38 For the role of Venezuela in the creation of the OPEC, its consequences for the country and the 
world's oil markets from the Venezuelan perspective, see for instance L. Vallenilla, Oil: the Making of a 
New Economic Order. Venezuelan Oil and the OPEC (New York, 1975); S. G. Rabe, The road to OPEC 
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Economically, the 1950s and 1960s were very prosperous decades overall for both 
Mexico and Venezuela. The so-called `Mexican economic miracle' occurred before 
the rebirth of the petroleum industry, and was characterised by high growth and low 
inflation. 9 National income in Venezuela also grew rapidly, and the country enjoyed 
one of the highest per capita growth rates in the world. " In Venezuela, the rapid 
growth on petroleum production did contribute to rapid growth in the rest of the 
economy. 41 Yet Mexican and Venezuelan strategies regarding the role of oil in their 
economies differed substantially. The main objective of Pemex was adequate supply 
of the national market, despite the higher yield that could had been obtained from 
sales abroad. 42 In contrast, oil cash has been Venezuela's income ever since the advent 
of the oil era; other sources were relatively small or quickly eliminated. 43 
Times of Reaction (1970s) 
Mexican nationalists took pride in their independence compared with the foreign 
spoliation of national wealth that Venezuela was suffering. Venezuelan nationalists 
looked with envy at the Mexican ability to exploit their own resources. Whether there 
was genuine concern for the depletion of oil as such rather than a share in the gains is a 
different matter. After almost forty years of running in opposite directions, looking at 
each other with a mixture of wonder and criticism, and each defending its strategy 
against the other, the shock in oil prices of the early 1970s generated enough 
disturbances to force the Mexican and Venezuelan governments to redirect their 
: United States relations with Venezuela, 1919-1976 (Austin, Texas, 1982) and section 2.6 in J. C. Bou6, 
Venezuela. The Political Economy of Oil (Oxford, 1993). 
39 There is no full agreement among scholars about the 'miracle years' for Mexico. Fitzgerald refers to 
the period from 1950-65 as so; Hamilton writes that 'a large number of people were left out of the 
'Mexican Miracle' from 1940-70'; On her part, Lustig characterises the period 1950s-1973 as of high 
growth and low inflation. See E. V. K. Fitzgerald, 'Financial constraints upon relative autonomy: the State 
and capital accumulation in Mexico, 1940-1982', in Anglade and Fortin (eds. ), The State and Capital 
Accumulation in Latin America. Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Vol. 1 (London, 1985), p. 230; N. Hamilton, 
'State-class alliance and conflicts: issues and actors in the Mexican economic crisis', in Hamilton and 
Harding (eds. ), Modern Mexico. State, Economy and Social Conflict (London, 1986), p. 9 and N. Lustig, 
'Equity and growth in Mexico', in Teitel (ed. ), Towards a New Development Strategy for Latin America. 
Pathways from Hirschman's Thought (Washington, D. C., 1992), p. 22 1. 
40 J. D. Martz and D. J. Myers, 'The Politics of Economic Development', in Martz and Myers (eds. ), 
Venezuela: The Democratic Experience (New York, 1986), p. 73. Their closer look to the economic 
performance of Venezuela describe the period 1953-1957 as one of expansion; the transition to 
democracy (1958-1963) as one of crisis and the years 1964-1968 as times of stabilisation and growth. 
For a different periodisation of the Venezuelan economy see Echevarria, O. A., La economia venezolana, 
1944-1994 (Caracas, 1995). 
41 J. A. Hanson, 'Cycles of Economic Growth and Structural Change since 1950', in Martz and Myers 
(eds. ), Venezuela: The Democratic Experience (Caracas, Ist ed., 1977), p. 64. 
42 G. Philip, Oil And Politics In Latin America. Nationalist Movements And State Companies 
(Cambridge, 1982), p. 336. 
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policies. Obviously, the changes in strategy can by no means be solely attributed to the 
sudden price increase of 1973, but it can be taken as the turning point. 
The nationalisation of Venezuela's oil industry in 1976 can be considered as the 
culmination of a very long nationalist process, somehow inspired by Mexico's 
nationalisation a generation before. 4 In a world already shaken by oil news, the 
Venezuelan nationalisation of petroleum production did not excite much attention in 
the international media. 45 There was nothing new about it; the years after the Second 
World War had witnessed the expansion of the role of the state in the economy, and 
most of the main oil producing countries had nationalised their industries during the 
previous decade. 46 Nevertheless, within Venezuela's oil literature, as in Mexico forty 
years earlier, the nationalisation occupies a prominent place. 7 For its part, Mexico 
reconsidered its inward-looking strategy. Forced by the pressure of having become a 
net oil importer during the late 1960s, the increase in exploration investment was 
generously rewarded with major oil discoveries in the south of the country in 1974. 
The country's production and exports then experienced an important thrust, putting 
Mexico's name back in international oil reports. 
As shown in Figure 1.1-1 above, the events of the 1970s had major effects on both 
countries' output levels. The rebirth of the Mexican oil industry coincided with the 
slowdown in production in Venezuela which was caused by the nationalisation 
process. Mexico's production regained its 1921 level in 1974, and surpassed that of 
Venezuela by 1981. As a result, Mexican dependence on oil achieved relatively high 
levels during this period (see Figures 1.1-2 to 1.1-4 below). However important oil 
became for Mexico since the mid-1970s, its dependence on oil income never achieved 
Venezuela's standards. Yet their economies resembled each other more than ever 
before. 
43 Thorp, Progress, Poverty and Exclusion. An Economic History of Latin America in the 20th Century, 
p. 77. 
44 For an officials review of the first ten years of the Venezuelan national oil industry see: PDVSA, 
(Petröleos de Venezuela S. A. ), Los primeros diet anos de la industria petrolera nacional 1976-1985 
(Caracas, 1986). 
°S Goodman, Mendelson Forman, Nairn, et al. (eds. ), The lessons of the Venezuelan experience, p. 4. 
46 Some oil nationalisation dates: 1961 Qatar, 1962 Indonesia and Libya, 1967 United Arab Emirates, 
1969 Algeria, 1971 Nigeria, 1972 Ecuador (left OPEC in 1992), 1973-75 Gabon. For a review of 
national oil companies in Latin America see Philip, Oil And Politics In Latin America. Nationalist 
Movements And State Companies. 
47 G. Coronel, The Nationalisation of the Venezuelan Oil Industry. From Technocratic Success to 
Political Failure (Lexington, Massachusetts, 1983); J. F. Petras, M. Morley and S. Smith, The 
Nationalisation of Venezuelan Oil (New York, 1977) and C. E. Baena, 'The politics of oil in Venezuela: 
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A Common Crisis: 1980s 
Events from the mid-1970s to the first half of the 1980s put both economies to the test 
and, as never before, both governments faced similar problems. High growth rates, this 
time based on oil revenue in both cases, were now accompanied by inflationary 
pressures hitherto unknown. The increasing intervention of the state in the economy 
and expansionary policies, reflected in the raising level of government expenditures, 
were fuelled by the oil boom optimism. Yet oil windfalls were insufficient to finance 
the ambitious development projects outlined by both governments. Huge foreign 
borrowing financed the corresponding deficit. 
The fall of oil prices by mid-1981, the macro-economic imbalances, the inconsistency 
of state policies and the rise of international interest rates were the starting point of 
what thereafter has been known as the `debt crisis'. By the mid-1980s, both countries 
were in the throes of very deep recessions. They saw the price of their principal export 
plummet and both have experienced substantial declines in gross domestic product. 
Mexico and Venezuela were also counted among Latin America's largest debtors, both 
in absolute and per capita terms. The fall in living standards was very marked. The 
experience of recession was difficult for both countries because, as Table 1.1-4 shows, 
neither was used to anything but rapid economic growth. 48 
The implementation of orthodox economic programmes, cutting down government 
expenditures (especially public investment and social expenditures), was able to 
contain inflation and reduce the deficit. But the period was one of economic stagnation 
and declining living standards. During the late 1980s and 1990s, oil windfalls were 
regarded more cautiously and even considered as one of the causes of the `lost 
decade'. 9 
a decision-making analysis of PDVSA's internationalisation policy' (DPhil dissertation, London School 
of Economics, University of London, 1997). 
'a In fact, the literature often emphasises the sudden shift from boom to crisis that occurred during this 
period. For the Mexican case see: J. A. Teichman, Policymaking in Mexico: from Boom to Crisis 
(London, 1988); J. Ros, 'Mexico from the Oil Boom to the Debt Crisis: and analysis of policy responses 
to external shocks, 1978-1985, in Thorp and Whitehead (eds. ), Latin American Debt and Ajustment 
Crisis (Oxford, 1987). On Venezuela see: F. Bourguignon, 'Venezuela: Absorption without Growth', in 
Gelb (ed. ), Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Course? (Washington, D. C., 1988); Goodman, Mendelson 
Forman, Naim, et al. (eds. ), The lessons of the Venezuelan experience ; R. Vaez-Zadeh, 'Oil Wealth and 
Economic Behavior: the case of Venezuela, 1965-8 1', IMF Working Paper, WP/88/56 (1988, June 30); 
Mieres, Hacia la Venezuela Post-petrolera [conference sponsored by la Academia Nacional de las 
Ciencias Econömicas in 1985]. 
49 See among others A. Gelb and Associates, Oil Windfalls, Blessing or Course? (Washington, D. C., 
1988); R. M. Auty, Resource-based industrialization: sowing the oil in eight developing countries 
(Oxford, 1990); 'Putting Mexico together again'. The Economist, 4-Feb-95; 'Mexico. Suckled on oil'. 
The Economist, 25-Jul-98; 'Mexico's economy. Miracle or mirage? '. The Economist, 11-Apr-98; ' The oil 
industry. Latin lessons'. The Economist, 3-Jan-98; Goodman, Mendelson Forman, Naim, et al. (eds. ), 
The lessons of the Venezuelan experience ; T. L. Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro- 
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In brief, one can divide the history of Mexican oil into three phases. The first goes 
from the start of commercial crude oil production 1901 to 1938.50 Within this period, 
Mexico became the second largest producer of petroleum, after the United States, and 
the largest oil exporter. The second phase links the expropriation-nationalisation of the 
oil industry in 1938 with the mid- 1970s. In this period, Mexico was producing mainly 
for its own internal consumption with negligible exports and became a net importer of 
petroleum by the late 1960s. Finally, the new era of Mexican energy development was 
launched by major oil discoveries in the south of the country in 1974, and the 
country's production and exports experienced an important thrust. 
As for Venezuela, it is also argued that there were three different periods in its oil 
industry history. The first was the ultraliberal period, which gave the country the lead 
in the world's oil exports during in the inter-war period. A second period of emerging 
nationalism started during the post-war years, which led firstly to the creation of OPEC 
(1960) and finally to the nationalisation of the industry in 1976. The latter represents 
the starting point of the last period. 
It is not possible however, to identify phases in the pattern of dependence on oil 
exports in the case of Venezuela (see Figure 1.1-2). Oil exports became the main 
export product in Venezuela by the late 1920s, and by the 1930s already accounted for 
80 percent of total exports. Indeed, from 1933 to 1983 the share was over 90 percent, 
reaching levels close to 98 percent in the years around 1950. Even after nationalisation 
in 1976 the share stood at around 95 percent. Only during the last years of the period 
did the share of oil exports decrease below the 90 percent mark. In contrast, the 
Mexican oil exports share in total exports, exhibits two peaks separated by a very long 
period of almost non-existent oil exports. Hydrocarbon exports accounted for half of 
total exports in 1921 and for more than 70 percent in the early 1980s. 
States, Vol. 26 (Berkeley, 1997); Meyer and Morales, Petr6leo y Naciön (1900-1987). La politica 
petrolera en Mexico; Naim, Paper, Tigers and Minotaurs. The politics of Venezuela's Economic Reforms 
; M. Urrutia, Twenty-Five Years of Economic Growth, 1960-1985', in Urrutia (ed. ), Long-Term Trends 
in Latin American Economic Development (Inter-American Development Bank, Washington D. C., 
1991); A. Uslar Pietri, 'LEn qu6 medida se ha cumplido el vaticinio de Uslar Pietri (Ahora, 1936) sobre 
el parasitismo rentista en la Venezuela petrolera? ', in Mieres (ed. ), Hacia la Venezuela Post-petrolera 
[conference sponsored by Ia Academia Nacional de las Ciencias Econdmicas in 1985J, Vol. 1 (Caracas, 
1989). 
50 Bermudez, The Mexican National Petroleum Industry: .4 case study in Nationalisation p. 1. 
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Figure 1.1- 2: Oil exports as percentage of total exports by value, Venezuela and Mexico 1911-1989. 
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Sources: see Appendix B. 
Figure 1.1- 3: Share of oil taxes in government fiscal revenue, Venezuela and Mexico 1911-1989. 
, d% 
Sources: see Appendix C. 
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The claims about the different phases in Venezuela's oil history are better appreciated 
in the fiscal dependence figures of Figure 1.1-3. 'l Since the implementation of the 
Hydrocarbons Law of 1943, Venezuelan governments obtained over half of their fiscal 
income from the oil industry, and as much as 85 percent in 1974. The dependence of 
Mexican governments on oil taxes never exceeded the 40 percent (which constituted 
the maximum achieved in 1983). During the first oil boom in the early 1920s, oil taxes 
accounted for a mere 20 percent of total government income. After nationalisation in 
1938, the importance of oil taxes for government revenues continuously decreased and 
remained below 5 percent. 
Figure 1.1- 4: Share of the oil sector in total GDP conventionally measured, 
Venezuela and Mexico 1920-1992 
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Sources: see Appendix D. 
Figure 1.1-4 shows the share of the oil sector GDP in total GDP conventionally 
measured in Venezuela and Mexico from the 1920s to the 1990s. As with the fiscal 
and trade indicators, it shows that historically the oil sector has been much more 
important for Venezuela than for Mexico as a consequence of their different strategies. 
The share of the oil sector in total GDP in Mexico remained well under 5 percent 
`' The emphasis on policy/political phases is especially strong in: R. Espinasa and B. Mommer, 
'Venezuelan Oil Policy In The Long Run', in Fesharaki (ed. ), International Issues In Energy Policy. 
Development And Economics (Oxford, 1992) and R. Betancourt, Venezuela: Oil and Politics (Boston, 
1979). 
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throughout the century. 52 According to these data, the oil sector in Venezuela 
represented between 15 to 25 percent of the traditional GDP during the twentieth 
century. 53 The implication of these figures is that the non-oil component of total GDP 
was calculated to be about 95 percent in Mexico and between 75 and 85 percent in 
Venezuela. Despite the importance of these contrasts, no historical or contemporary 
study traces the links between the experiences of Mexico and Venezuela. There is 
definitely room for a comparative study of these two countries. 
1.2 Overall Performance 
Possibly, the aftermath of the debt crisis and the reappraisal of the oil windfall 
phenomenon account partly for increasing concerns regarding sustainable 
development. Sustainability concerns in terms of the limits to growth imposed by the 
physical finiteness of the available resources had emerged already in the 1970s. 54 The 
events of the 1980s questioned sustainability regarding the economic rather than the 
physical exhaustion of natural resources as sources of income for primary producers. It 
was at this time that environmental accounting came forward, claiming that traditional 
national accounting methods produce misleading indicators of economic performance 
for resource-based economies. 55 For such economies, `traditional accounting practices 
exaggerated income, encouraged unsustainable levels of consumption and obscured the 
necessity to implement greatly needed policy adjustments. ' 56 
52 Possibly during the first oil boom in the 1920s oil sector contributed more than 5 percent to Mexico's 
gross product, but data are not available for either GDP or oil GDP. 
s' In the case of Venezuela, different sources and base years affect not only the levels obtained but also 
more crucially, the relative sizes of the different macro-economic aggregates. Different sources are 
contrasted in Appendix D. 
54 Two obvious references in this tradition are Meadows et al., The limits of growth (New York, 1972) 
and J. W. Forrester, World Dynamics (Cambridge, 1971). Some eminent economists produced then 
insights in environmental issues, among others P. Dasgupta and G. Heal, 'The Optimal Depletion of 
Exhaustible Resources', Review of Economic Studies. Symposium on the Economics of Exhaustible 
Resources (1974), R. M. Solow, 'The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics', The 
American Economic Review 64 (1974) 2; R. M. Solow, ' Intergenerational Equity and Exhaustible 
Resources', Review of Economic Studies (1974) and J. Stiglitz, 'Growth with exhaustible natural 
resources: efficient and optimal growth paths', Review of Economic Studies. Symposium on The 
Economics of Exhaustible Resources (1974) 41. 
55 Actually, it was not only the environmental literature that argued along these lines. Studies on rentier 
states, that is oil producer countries, put forward similar concerns about national income accounts yet 
from a complete different perspective. See for instance, H. Mahdavy, 'The Patterns and Problems of 
Economic Development in Rentier States: the Case of Iran', in Cook (ed. ), Studies in the Economic 
History of the Middle East (Oxford, 1970) and R. Stauffer, Accounting for "Wasting Assets". Income 
Measurement for Oil and Mineral-Exporting Rentier States, Vol. 25 (Vienna, 1984). These approaches 
are also analysed in passing in Chapter 2. 
56 S. El Serafy, 'The Proper Calculation Of Income From Depletable Natural Resources', in Ahmad, 
Serafy and Lutz (eds. ), Environmental Accounting For Sustainable Development: a UNEP- World Bank 
Symposium (Washington D. C., 1989), p. 10. 
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Nevertheless, the economic histories of Mexico and Venezuela are still told in 
accordance with traditional accounting methods. According to Table 1.1-4 above, 
Venezuela had the best overall performance in Latin America throughout the twentieth 
century. 57 In comparative terms, Venezuela started the century with the lowest GDP 
per capita of the six bigger Latin American countries but by the 1950s it had surpassed 
them all, as shown in Figure 1.2-1. Furthermore, by 1958 Venezuela had the seventh 
highest average income in the world, slightly greater than that in the United Kingdom 
and significantly higher than incomes in France and Germany. 58 
Figure 1.2-1: Index of GDP per capita of six Latin American countries, 1900-1994 
Indac of GOP per capita in six Latin Pnuiran Countries. (Latin Arterican Average 100) 
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Source: based on the GDP per capita produced by A. A. Hofman, The Economic Development 
of Latin America in the Twentieth Century (Cheltenham, UK, 2000), pp. 156-157. Latin 
American average refers to the average GDP per capita of the 6 countries referred. 
$7 A view corroborated in Hofman and Mulder, The Comparative Productivity Performance of Brazil 
and Mexico, 1950-1994', p. 87. 
`R D. F., Larson, The Role of Agriculture in Venezuela's Economic Rise and Decline. Ref. 682-33, 
Abstracts of Current projects. 1999. Available from: http: //econ. worldbank. org. 
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During most of the first two decades of the century, Venezuelans barely had access to 
half the GDP per capita of the average Latin American had. In the middle of the 
century however, Venezuelans enjoyed a GDP per capita fifty per cent higher than the 
average Latin American. Coming towards the end of the twentieth century, 
Venezuela's GDP per capita slowly returned to levels closer to the rest of Latin 
America, and by the 1990s had fallen below the average. 
Mexicans commenced the twentieth century with the third biggest GDP per capita of 
Latin America. For the years of the Revolution it is plausible to think that the relative 
performance of the country improved thanks in part to the successful performance of 
the large mining and petroleum enclaves, which insulated themselves from the most 
serious effects. 59 In 1921, the year of maximum production in the first era of the 
Mexican oil industry, Mexico reached 136 percent of the Latin American average GDP 
per capita. That level was not regained until the end of the 1970s thanks again to the 
rebirth of the Mexican oil industry. Taking the historical perspective, these indicators 
lead one to say that the strategy of Venezuela in exploiting its resources has been more 
successful than that of Mexico in conserving the resources for better times, at least for 
the period 1938-1973. 
Nevertheless, as Maddison recalls, `it is useful to make plausibility checks, e. g. to see 
whether the apparent growth rates or levels of performance of a country in question 
make it an 'outlier'. 0 After all, the hypothesis of environmental accounting is that that 
income is not being accurately calculated for economies based on natural resources. 
The problem is relevant to practically all countries where non-renewable resources are 
being run down without being restored. But it is most acute where such resources are 
being exploited in the public sector, either directly or through foreign interest. 1 Since 
both Mexico and Venezuela fit into such a description at some point in their histories, 
the first question is whether there is any indication that the GDP figures of these two 
countries may be a misleading indicator of their actual performance. 
59 The data in figure 1.2-1 Reynolds, The Mexican Economy. Twentieth-Century Structure and Growth , 
p. 29. See also J. E. Sterrett and J. S. Davis, 'The Fiscal and Economic Condition of Mexico. Report 
submitted to the International Commitee of Bankers on Mexico'. (New York, 1928). 
60 A. Maddison, Monitoring The World Economy, 1820-1992 (Paris, 1995), p. 125. 
61 El Serafy, "The Proper Calculation Of Income From Depletable Natural Resources', p. 10. 
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Figure 1.2-2: GDP per capita ranking V. S. HDI ranking for 1913,1939,1950,1973 
and 1995 for 36 countries 
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Sources: Data for 1939 by J. Metzer, The Divided Economy of Mandatorti Palestine, Vol. II (1998), the 
rest by N. F. R. Crafts, 'The Human Development Index and changes in standards of living: some 
historical comparisons', European Review of Economic History (1997) 1. 
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A preliminary way of enquiring along these lines is to consider indicators other than 
income-exclusive ones. Among those, the Human Development Index (HDI) is 
probably the most widely used. 62 Figure 1.2-2 presents the ranking of a series of 
countries according to their GDP per capita versus their HDI index for 1913, 
1939,1950,1973 and 1995. For each year, the diagonal represents the same GDP and 
HDI ranking among the countries represented. If a country is above the diagonal, it 
indicates that the country had a higher international ranking than its GDP ranking 
when a broader measure of development is taken (HDI). By contrast, when a country 
is below the diagonal, it signals that the country had a lower development (HDI) than 
its pure economic indicator suggests. 
Mexico maintained a steady position in both rankings throughout the period 
considered. In contrast, Venezuela has had a long tradition as an outlier when it comes 
to measuring its economic development in terms of HDI rather than in GDP per capita 
terms. In the extreme case of 1950, Venezuela had the world's fourth greatest GDP per 
capita but its human development indicators push it down to the nineteenth position. 
Regarding their relative positions, the gap between Mexico and Venezuela is much 
smaller when development in measured by HDI rather than GDP. These results of the 
HDI index point in the direction suggested by the environmental accounting literature. 
The actual state of development of some economies is well below the position that 
their `income indicators' would suggest. This seems sufficient motivation to enquire 
further about the primary question of this research, that is the quantification of the 
claims of environmental accounting and whether they have sufficient impact to 
modify the impressions conveyed by traditional economic indicators. 
62 The HDI grew out of the general feeling that conventional measures of GDP may not be adequate to 
capture all the socio-economic changes involved in processes of economic development. See United 
Nations, Human Development Report (New York, 1991) 
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'Since no complete detailed system for the description of the natural environment exist, it seems that a 
full system of integrated environmental economic accounts is not attainable at the present time. This 
situation will not be overcome in the near future. It should not, however, hinder our efforts... 'l 
Chapter 2 
The Theoretical Frame: Environmental Accounting Concepts 
and Methods for Non-Renewable Resources 
2.1 Looking for Definitions 
The Different Components 
Non-Produced Economic Exhaustible Assets 
2.2 Three Ways of Accounting for Environment 
The System of National Accounts 
The Satellite Environmental Accounts 
The Integrated Environmental Accounts 
Further Observations 
2.3 Approaches and Methods of Evaluation 
Sustainability Approach 
Methods of Evaluation 
A Sustainability Indicator 
2.4 Conclusions 
It may be because economics is the science of allocating scarce resources among 
competing needs that the environmental assets only become an important issue in the 
economic research agenda when they become scarce. As early as 1865, Jevons already 
raised The Coal Question! One century later, it turned into `the oil question' and in the 
1970s, eminent economists focused on environmental issues. 3 At that time, the `limits 
to growth' seemed to many to be approaching rapidly. 4 However, the debate, the 
forecasts, the models and the prescriptions subsided as soon as oil prices returned to 
normal by the mid 1980s. The 1990s literature on environment focused on degradation 
-pollution, ozone layer, greenhouse effect-, though concerns for the long term remain 
' European Commission, Eurostat, European System for the Collection of Economic Data on the 
Environment (SERIEE) -1994 version (Brussels, 1994) p. 21 paragraph 1028. 2 W. S. Jevons, The Coal Question (Cambridge, 1865). 
Among others P. Dasgupta and G. Heal, The Optimal Depletion of Exhaustible Resources', Review of 
Economic Studies. Symposium on the Economics of Exhaustible Resources (1974), R. M. Solow, The 
Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics', The American Economic Review 64 (1974) 2 
R. M. Solow, ' Intergenerational Equity and Exhaustible Resources', Review of Economic Studies (1974) 
and J. Stiglitz, 'Growth with exhaustible natural resources: efficient and optimal growth paths', Review 
of Economic Studies. Symposium on The Economics of Exhaustible Resources (1974) 41. 
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central but under a different name: `sustainable growth'. Nevertheless, it is within this 
literature that a real interest in measuring the economic significance of the 
environment finally arose. 
The international development organisations, as major users and producers of national 
accounts, as advisers to developing countries, and as co-ordinators of systematic data 
collection and exchange, have initiated various efforts to improve the usefulness of 
environmental data. The Conference of European Statisticians of the Economic 
Commission for Europe began to investigate the organisation and use of environmental 
data in 1973. The United Nations Statistical Office (UNSTAT) began working on the 
problems of organising environmental data in 1974. In 1983 the first of several 
Environmental Accounting Workshops was held. In late 1984 the UNSTAT presented 
`A Framework for the Development of Environment Statistics' .5 
A number of countries have now prepared environmental accounts including Norway, 
Canada, The Netherlands, Denmark, France, Japan, Australia, the United States and 
the United Kingdom. 6 These accounts vary in the aspects that they consider: 
atmospheric emissions, water, oil and gas depletion, etc. The World Bank, the United 
Nations, the World Resources Institute and some other international organisations are 
also involved in the development of environmental accounts, especially in less 
developed countries. In addition to these efforts, some studies have been carried out as 
° Two obvious references in this tradition are: Meadows et al., The limits of growth (New York, 1972) 
and J. W. Forrester, World Dynamics (Cambridge, 1971). 
s R. B. Norgaard, 'Linkages between Environmental and National Income Accounts', in Ahmad, Serafy, 
et al. (eds. ), Environmental accounting for sustainable development: a UNEP-World Bank symposium 
(Washington, D. C., 1989), p. 54. 
6 The first work on resource valuation is said to have been done in Norway in the 1970s and they were 
pioneers in natural-resource accounting beginning with oil. France began work in 1978. References can 
be found in the relevant bodies dealing with national statistics: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Statistics 
Canada, Statistics Netherlands, Statistics Sweden, INSEE (France), National Office for Statistics (UK), 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (US). For Japan see K. Oda, K. Arahara, et al., 'Japan: the System of 
Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting (SEEA) -trial estimates and remaining issues', in 
Uno and Bartelmus (eds. ), Environmental Accounting in Theory and Practice, Vol. 11 (London, 1998). 
Both J. R. Vincent, 'Green accounting: from theory to practice', Environment and Development 
Economics 5 (2000) and W. D. Nordhaus and E. C. Kokkenlenber (eds. ), Nature's Numbers: Expanding 
the U. S. National Economic Accounts to Include Environment (Washington D. C., 1999) provide 
excellent surveys of the environmental accounting works done by public and private agents. 
7 United Nations, Concepts and Methods of Environmental Statistics: Statistics of Natural Environment. 
A Technical Report (New York, 1991); United Nations, Integrated Environmental and Economic 
Accounting, Vol. XVII (New York, 1993); United Nations, Integrated Environmental and Economic 
Accounting: An operational Manual. (New York, 2000); United Nations. Committee on New and 
Renewable Sources of energy and on Energy for Development, 'Energy and Sustainable Development: 
Development of Energy Resources in Developing Countries', E/C. 13/1996/1. (1996) New York, 12-23 
February 1996; World Bank, Monitoring Environmental Progress: A Report on Work in Progress. 
(Washington, D. C., 1995); World Bank, Monitoring Environmental Progress: Expanding the Measure 
of Wealth (Washington, DC, 1996); World Bank, Expanding the Measure of Wealth. Indicators of 
Environmentally Sustainable Development, Vol. 17 (Washington, D. C., 1997). 
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doctoral research in universities, such as the study of oil and gas depletion in the 
United States by T. F. Slaper$ and on Thailand's deforestation accountancy from 1970 
to 1990 by C W. Sadoff. 9 
Due in part to these efforts, recognition is growing that national income has never been 
accurately calculated for economies based on natural resources. In consequence, the 
first steps towards historical environmental national accounting have been taken. 1° It 
has been argued that income should be gradually adjusted for degradation of 
petroleum, forestry and fisheries, water quality soil erosion one at a time until our 
methodologies firm up and the physical basis of our calculation improves. " The main 
reason is that, as section 2.1 of this chapter shows, different environmental assets 
comprise different economic concepts, adjustments and methods. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 introduces three ways of 
accounting for the environment in national accounts. The analysis of the concepts of 
income and depreciation in national accounts set the start of the final section. The 
methodological considerations are the main concern of this chapter, hence, the second 
half is devoted to the theoretical exposition of the methods of evaluation that will be 
used later on. More crucially it presents the concept of resource rent. 
8 T. F. Slaper, The Theoretical and Empirical Viability of Measuring the Value of Resource Depletion in 
the National Accounts: The Case of Oil And Gas in the United States' (DPhil Dissertation, The 
American University, 1995). 
9 C. W. Sadoff, 'Natural Resource Accounting: A Case Study Of Thailand Forest Management' (DPhil 
dissertation, University of California, 1993). Many other recent studies are quoted in Chapters 2,4 and 
5. 
10 M. Lindmark, Towards Environmental Historical National Accounts for Sweden. Methodological 
Considerations and Estimates for the 19th and 20th Centuries., Vol. 21 (1998). '1 S. El Serafy, 'The Environment as Capital', in Lutz (ed. ), Toward Improved Accounting for the 
Environment: An UNSTA T- World Bank Symposium (Washington, D. C., 1993) p. 19. 
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2.1 Looking for Definitions 
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This section endeavours to define and specify the object of measurement. Its main aim 
is to find a clear definition of exhaustible resources as economic goods. In order to do 
that, the first step is to clarify concepts about the many ingredients contained in the 
word `environment'. `The environment' will be broken into pieces, to be able to 
distinguish its economic characteristics. Finally, a small piece -exhaustible resources- 
will be fully defined, in order to establish its economic characteristics. 
Starting in the obvious place, the English dictionary gives the following definition for 
environment: 
`Environment: the physical surroundings, conditions, circumstances, etc., in which a 
person lives [... ] (the environment) : the totality of the physical conditions on the 
earth or a part of it'. 12 
Titles such as: `Valuing the Environment ; 'The Environment and Emerging 
Developing Issues' or `Changing the Face of the Earth: Culture, Environment and 
History' could be referring to any aspect of the `environment'. 13 By definition, they 
might be talking about whatever physical conditions in whichever part of the earth. 
Hence, before anything else, we need to specify what aspects concern us: natural 
resources, water quality, soil erosion, raw materials, nature, exhaustible resources, 
natural endowment, pollution, the ozone layer, the greenhouse effect, fisheries, 
forestry, etc. All of these are frequently included in or even replaced by the word 
`environment' regardless. 
This huge oversimplification undermines most economic approaches to environmental 
issues. Specific definitions and classification are the first steps that any science must 
take. Moreover, according to the definition just given, `the environment' cannot, by 
any means, be considered as a homogeneous economic entity. 
The Different Components 
a) Standard Classifications 
It is no easy task trying to differentiate the economically different components of the 
totality of the physical conditions on the earth. In practice, and at this stage of 
12 The Oxford Compact English Dictionary, (1996). 
13 I. Serageldin and A. Steer (eds. ), Valuing The Environment (Washington D. C., 1993), P. Dasgupta 
and K. G. Mäler, The Environment And Emerging Developing Issues', in Proceedings Of The World 
Bank Annual Conference On Development And Economics 1990 (New York, 1991), I. G. Sin-anion, 
Changing The Face Of The Earth: Culture, Environment, History (London, 1989). 
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development, it might not be easy to choose among different approaches and 
methodologies. 14 We may first try to identify the elements according to Figure 2.1-1 
below. 
Figure 2.1-1: Flows between environment and economy 
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Sources: Own elaboration. 
There are several relevant concepts that can be identified from this simple cycle. The 
environment generates resources (outputs), a part of which turn into inputs for the 
economic production process. At the same time, during the production process, waste 
and pollution are generated and deposited back in the environment. 
Let us consider the very simple example of oil extraction within this framework, 
although the analysis could be applied to most natural resources. Here we can identify 
four elements: oil reservoirs represent the outputs from the environment. Part of these 
reserves are drilled and oil is stored. This constitutes an input for the economic 
production process. Finally, the pollution and waste generated by the oil industry and 
its externalities are deposited back in the environment. 
A first classification of the components of the cycle is mostly agreed. It is the division 
between produced and non-produced assets. The former are assets produced by 
economic activity in previous periods and not yet exhausted. j5 They fall within the 
grey shadowed area on Figure 2.1-1. They would be fully represented by the outcomes 
14 E. Lutz (ed. ), Toward Improved Accounting for the Environment: An UNSTAT-World Bank 
Symposium (Washington, D. C., 1993). 
15 C. Bryant and P. Cook, 'Environmental issues and the national accounts', Economic trends ( 1992 Nov) 
469 p. 102. 
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of the `economic production process' box (including pollution and waste). Problems of 
definition arise with non-produced assets (i. e. `the environment' box and the flows 
coming out of it). The United Nations System of National Accounts (SNA) refers to 
non-produced assets only as economic assets, that is, assets over which ownership 
rights are enforced and which provide economic benefits to their owner. 16 That would 
leave us only with the inputs flow into the economic activity. The Office for National 
Statistics of the United Kingdom (ONS) and the Statistical Division of the United 
Nations (UNSTAT) both sub-divide non-produced assets into non produced economic 
assets and non produced environmental assets. '7 That is, they try to distinguish both 
flows and the box itself. Yet their definitions are different. On the one hand, UNSTAT 
completes the SNA's definition. It includes in environmental assets all the rest of the 
non-produced assets excluded from the SNA's definition of economic assets. That is, 
by exclusion, environmental assets would be all non-produced assets over which no 
ownership rights are enforced and which do not provide any economic benefit. In 
Figure 2.1.1, this is everything but the input flow within the white area. On the other 
hand, the ONS gives a rather more confusing set of definitions. It defines non- 
produced economic assets as natural resources which have been taken into the 
economic system for use as part of the economic system's productive capacity, or 
which are managed as an economic resource. Environmental assets, according to the 
ONS's definition, are non-produced assets which are not part of the production process 
but are affected by it. Moreover, they provide the following examples: 
16 Quoted from P. Bartelmus, E. Lutz and J. van Tongeren, 'Environmental Accounting: an operational 
perspective', in Serageldin and Steer (eds. ), Valuing The Environment: proceedings of the 
First Annual 
International Conference On Environmentally Sustainable Development held at the World 
Bank, 
September 30-October 1,1993 (Washington D. C., 1993), p. 163. 
rest of the discussion 17 Bryant and Cook, 'Environmental issues and the national accounts', p"102 The t 
on the ONS's definitions is based on this same source and United Nations, Integrated 
Environmental 
and Economic Accounting, Vol. XVII (New York, 1993). 
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Table 2.1-1: General classification of produced and non-produced assets 
Produced assets Non-produced assets 
Economic assets Non economic assets 
Buildings, machinery, vehicles, Proven reserves of oil, gas, coal, Unproven reserves of oil, gas, 
stocks, work in progress... Cultivated land-, coal, etc. 
Commercial forests Uncultivated land, 
Water in reservoirs, Managed Natural woodland, 
fish stocks, Rivers, lakes and coastal 
Game reserves waters' 
Ground water, 
Air, '" 
Eco-systems 
Source and notes: own elaboration. `-' Signals inconsistencies. 
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Upon closer examination, one realises that some assets could easily fall within 
different categories, and that there are inconsistencies between and within both 
classifications. Some of these are indicated in Table 2.1-1. For example, following the 
UNSTAT classification, cultivated land could be seen as a produced asset being 
generated by economic activity in previous periods and not yet exhausted. The same 
could be said of commercial forests if they were just the fruit of commercial 
reforestation (they become assets produced by economic activity). In the ONS's 
definition rivers, lakes and coastal water as well as air do not have a price; thus they 
are considered non-economic assets. However, they enter in the production function. 18 
`In order that a thing should have a price, it must be appropriable, but it is not 
necessary that a thing should be appropriable (thus, to have a price) for it to be a factor 
of production'. 19 Hence, following from such a definition, those should be considered 
factors of production and re-classified as economic assets. 
These inconsistencies add to the major problem of these and other classifications: they 
are too broad. Assets with a different economic nature share the same place. They still 
do not help to understand environmental resources as economic goods. The example 
also demonstrates the difficulty of building classifications and definitions. Let us try a 
reconstruction bearing these considerations in mind. 
1$ The definition of a factor of production `is that it should make a contribution to production, in the 
sense that if it were removed, production (or output) would be diminished. Or more usefully, if a part of 
it were to be removed, production would be diminished ' in J. R. Hicks, Classics and Moderns, Vol. 3 
(Oxford, 1983), pp. 121-122. 
19 Ibid., parenthesis added. 
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b) A Personal Attempt 
As seen above, one could argue that cultivated land is a produced asset; an oil barrel 
unsold during the previous year would also be a produced asset. If we base our 
distinction on the fact of human intervention in produced assets, it would transform all 
non-produced economic assets into produced assets. However, it could be said that a 
produced asset goes through several transformations led by human intervention. Then, 
non-produced assets would be those which suffer very few (if any) transformations by 
the human hand. Of course, it is still a very open definition, as `several' and `very few' 
transformations remain a matter of subjective appreciation. Nevertheless, it makes the 
point a bit clearer. 
Once within the non-produced assets category, the next step is to differentiate between 
those that have a direct economic role and the others. Given the two possibilities 
above, the most manageable seems to be that presented by UNSTAT. It gives two clear 
criteria to decide what constitutes a non-produced economic asset and what does not. 
On the one hand, property rights exist and are enforceable over the asset. On the other 
hand is the issue of benefits to the owner. Let us qualify this second condition, 
substituting `benefits' by an `actual profitable use of the asset at a given point in time'. 
Hence, the definition of a non-produced economic asset would be a non-produced asset 
for which property rights and an actual profitable use exist and are enforced at a given 
point in time. Both must hold simultaneously to apply the definition. By exclusion, the 
assets that do not satisfy either or both characteristics are non-produced environmental 
assets. The various implications of this definition will be developed later. 
At this point, we have exactly the same degree of disaggregation as the previous two 
classifications. A further categorisation will divide assets among renewable, restorable 
and exhaustible. Renewable assets can be re-established in their quality and quantity. 
Restorable assets can be restored in quality but not in quantity. Exhaustible assets 
cannot be recovered in quality or quantity once they had been used up. All non- 
produced assets are suitable for one of the three classes. They are mutually exclusive 
for individual assets. Nevertheless, they are not absolute categories. Assets can easily 
change class over time. One can consider the exceptional case where the degradation 
of a renewable or a restorable resource is no longer recoverable at any price. In such a 
case, it would turn into an exhaustible asset. Some examples of the different categories 
are provided in Table 2.1-2. 
n in L 
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Table 2.1-2: Specific classification of non-produced assets 
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PRODUCED NON-PRODUCED 
Buildings ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMIC 
Machinery 
RENEWABLE RENEWABLE 
(biota... ) (commercial forest, fisheries.. ) 
RESTORABLE RESTORABLE 
(air, water, soil... ) (certain types of water and soil... ) 
EXHAUSTIBLE EXHAUSTIBLE 
(mineral and fuel reserves) (commercialised fuels, minerals... ) 
Source: Own elaboration 
Although it might look unimportant, this further step makes an enormous difference 
when considering the economic characteristics of different non-produced assets. The 
next section will show this by focusing on the implication of the definitions given 
when trying to take non-produced assets as economic goods. It will emphasise the 
analysis of non-produced economic exhaustible assets. 
Non produced Economic Exhaustible Assets 
By combining all the definitions above, the definition of non-produced economic 
exhaustible resources would be: 
An asset which suffers very little (if any) transformation by human 
intervention, for which property rights and an actual economic profitable use 
exist and are enforced at a given point in time and which cannot be restored in 
quality or quantity once it is used. 
In relation to Figure 2.1-1, we are only considering a small part of the inputs flow. 
Each of the three components of this definition adds some information to the economic 
treatment one should give exhaustible resources. The small degree of transformation 
by human intervention tells us something about added values. With little or no 
transformation, little or no added value is generated. This could be noteworthy when 
dealing with National Accounts, where added value is precisely what is supposed to be 
measured. 
Some of the most important implications come from the `economic' definition. First, 
assets will change category -from environmental to economic and vice versa- over 
time as property rights and profitable uses appear and disappear. Natural gas was non- 
economic for a long period of time, with existing property rights but no profitable use. 
Second, the classification is based on the actual legal and economic status of the assets 
and not on the nature of the asset itself. This means that not all oil is per se a non- 
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produced economic asset. Assets will change category depending on location. 
Antarctica's oil will not constitute an economic asset, for it lacks profitable economic 
use. Some types of soil will have developed property rights and profitable uses, but not 
others, and so on. In addition, this also reflects the possibility of economic exhaustion 
of the assets, which turns to be more important than the actual physical exhaustion. 
Think for instance of the Chilean guano that ceased to have a profitable use when 
artificial fertilisers become available at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
The third component of the definition has some other important implications. In 
principle, exhaustible assets can only be treated as a stock of goods since receipts from 
selling minerals, gas or oil cannot be used to recreate them. El Serafy argues that the 
concept of depreciation, commonly related to capital, cannot apply to assets that 
cannot be replaced. 20 Indeed El Serafy, treats sales of exhaustible natural assets as 
sales out of stock and not as production that would account as value added, which they 
are not. 21 On the contrary, renewable resources can be considered as capital. `Resource 
exploitation, particularly if the resource is eventually restored, could then be viewed as 
a means of `borrowing' capital when perfect capital markets do not exist. In such a 
circumstance, exploitation of resources may in fact prove a prudent long-term 
development strategy'. 2 In response to El Serafy's argument it is sufficient to say that 
no man-made capital is expected to be restored and replaced to its exact original form. 
In addition, we have just seen that exhaustible resources have the capacity to become 
obsolete. Yet capital goods have a different economic treatment from that which is 
accorded for sales from stocks in National Accounts. This issue reappears in the next 
section as well as in later chapters. 
This section has demonstrated the need for broader specification and economic 
definition of natural assets. Since the problem we attempt to measure, i. e. the illusion 
of progress derived from traditional growth measures, is more relevant to countries 
where non-renewable resources are being run down we shall concentrate on the 
estimation of the environmental adjustments needed for the depletion of a specific non- 
produced economic exhaustible resource, namely oil. 
20 Quoted from P. Vaze, 'Environmental Accounts- Valuing the Depletion of Oil and Gas Reserves', 
Economic Trends (1996, April) 510, p. 37. 
21 S. El Serafy, 'The Environment as Capital', in Lutz (ed. ), Toward Improved Accounting for the 
Environment: An UNSTA T- World Bank Symposium (Washington, D. C., 1993), p. 20. 22 C. W. Sadoff, 'Natural Resource Accounting: A Case Study Of Thailand Forest Management' (DPhil 
dissertation, University of California, 1993). 
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2.2 Three Ways of Accounting for Environment 
National accounting is by no means an exact science. Therefore, nations should not 
expect to measure either their income or their wealth precisely; their objective should 
be to approximate these as closely as possible using clear, widely accepted methods 
that are applicable in a wide array of circumstances. 23 
National accounts have provided the most widely used indicators for the assessment of 
economic performance, trends of economic growth, and the economic counterpart of 
social welfare. These economic indicators, and national accounts generally, have been 
criticised from three inter-related perspectives: their shortcomings as welfare 
indicators, their inability to assess the sustainability of the current development path, 
and their inadequacy as a measure of true economic activity. Having recognised these 
three problems, scholars have attempted to generate alternative indicators or to adjust 
the national accounts to measure: welfare, sustainability and true economic activity. 24 
In relation to the environment, national accounts have neglected: (1) scarcities of 
natural resources that threaten the sustained productivity of the economy; (2) the 
degradation of environmental quality, mainly from pollution, and its consequences for 
human welfare. In addition, some expenditures for maintaining environmental quality 
are counted as increases in national income and product. Such outlays should be 
considered as a maintenance cost rather than fmal consumption. 25 The depletion of 
23 E. Lutz (ed. ), Toward Improved Accounting for the Environment: An UNSTAT-World Bank 
Symposium (Washington, D. C., 1993). 
24 Although the first welfare-adjusted version of the national accounting system (that of W. D. Nordhaus 
and J. Tobin, Economic Growth and Declining Social Welfare (New York, 1972)) did not include 
environmental aspects, these were progressively added to welfare adjustments to traditional economic 
indicators. See for example: X. Zolotas, Economic Growth and Declining Social Welfare (Athens, 
1981), H. E. Daly and J. B. Cobb, For the Common Good (London, 1990)and T. Jackson and N. Marks, 
Measuring Sustainable Economic Welfare. A pilot index: 1950-1990 (Stockholm, 1994). Sustainable 
development has been examined, among other economists, by P. Dasgupta and G. Heal, 'The Optimal 
Depletion of Exhaustible Resources', Review of Economic Studies. Symposium on the Economics of 
Exhaustible Resources (1974), R. M. Solow, 'The Economics of Resources or the Resources of 
Economics', The American Economic Review 64 (1974) 2; R. M. Solow, ' Intergenerational Equity and 
Exhaustible Resources', Review of Economic Studies (1974); J. Stiglitz, 'Growth with exhaustible natural 
resources: efficient and optimal growth paths', Review of Economic Studies. Symposium on The 
Economics of Exhaustible Resources (1974) 41 and J. M. Hartwick and R. Lindsey, NNP and Economic 
Depreciation of Exhaustible Resource Stocks (Ontario, 1989) . For the shortcomings of the system of 
national accounts as a measure of true economic activity see for example R. Eisner, 'Extended Accounts 
for National Income and Product', Journal of Economic Literature XXVI (1988) and C. W Cobb. and 
J. B. J. Cobb, The Green National Product: a proposed Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (New 
York, 1994). 
25 P. Bartelmus, E. Lutz and J. van Tongeren, 'Environmental Accounting: an operational perspective', in 
Serageldin and Steer (eds. ), Valuing The Environment: proceedings of the First Annual International 
Conference On Environmentally Sustainable Development held at the World Bank, September 30- 
October 1,1993 (Washington D. C., 1993). 
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non-renewable resources has been considered both from the sustainability and true 
economic activity perspectives. 26 
The Environmental Accounting Workshops have struggled with the complex 
methodological issues of how various heterogeneous environmental data should be 
selected, organised, aggregated, and incorporated into or linked with the information 
provided by the System of National Accounts (SNA)2.7 There are at least three ways of 
approaching the integration of natural resources with traditional economic indicators. 
These are: direct inclusion into the SNA, the development of separate Satellite 
Environmental Accounts (SEA), and a more sophisticated attempt in terms of the 
System of Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting (SEEA). The three 
attempts respond to different conceptions and to different aims when accounting for 
natural resources. This section will describe them very briefly. In addition, it will 
survey what has been empirically done so far within each approach. The main aim is to 
ponder the tractability, usefulness and coherence of each of the alternatives -National 
Accounts, Satellite Accounts and Integrated Accounts- with regard to our objective of 
taking account of resource depletion in measures of economic growth in an historical 
perspective. 
The System of National Accounts 
The System of National Accounts (SNA) traces both the activities related to the 
production and disposition of goods and services and the associated income flows. 8 In 
other words, it merely assesses the implications of past behaviour for profits or 
income, thus providing a measurement of performance and therefore indicating net 
worth. Traditional economic indicators like the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the 
National Income and other macroeconomic variables related to the national accounting 
system were designed as tools for economic analysis and an aid for conducting 
economic policy. On the basis of the accounts, individuals, entrepreneurs and 
26 The welfare objection does not generally account for the depletion of natural resources as such 
although it eventually acknowledges the indirect effects of pollution and externalities caused by the 
depletion and use of non-renewable resources. The most notable exception is the Index of Sustainable 
and Economic Welfare (ISEW) proposed in C. W. Cobb and J. B. J. Cobb, The Green National Product: a 
proposed Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (New York, 1994). Their introduction provides great 
detail on previous welfare adjustments to GNP. 
27 R. B. Norgaard, 'Linkages between Environmental and National Income Accounts', in Ahmad, Serafy 
and Lutz. (eds. ), Environmental accounting for sustainable development :a UNEP-World Bank 
symposium (Washington, D. C., 1989), p. 54. 
28 A. Harrison, 'Natural Assets and National Accounting', in Lutz (ed. ), Toward Improved Accounting 
for the Environment: An UNSTAT-World Bank Symposium (Washington, D. C, 1993), p. 22. 
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governments can make decisions about the future, relying also on many other factors, 
including their expectations. 29 In a broader sense GDP has almost literally been seen as 
a measure of national success. 30 
In theory, the GDP can be estimated in three different ways: 31 
(1) The income approach, which is total income earned from the production of goods 
and services. 
(2) The output method, which is the sum of value added by activities that produce 
goods and services. 
(3) The expenditure method, which is the sum of the total expenditure on all finished 
good and services, work in progress, and stocks, less the cost of imports. 
Figure 2.2-1 summarises the three approaches. In practice, only two methods are 
generally by national statistics offices. 32 These can be valued at market prices or at 
factor cost. The valuation at market prices is the actual price paid for the output of an 
industry. The valuation at factor cost refers to the three factors of production: labour, 
capital and land. Hence, in theory, it consists of wages, profits and rents. It will 
generally result in a smaller GDP than that obtained at market prices, because it is 
measured after the payment of taxes on expenditure and the receipt of subsidies. 
However, as firms buy large amounts of fuel, materials and services from one another, 
simply adding gross outputs would result in double, or multiple, counting of output. 
Double counting is avoided by subtracting purchased inputs from gross output to get 
value added for each enterprise. The national product is total value added. 33 At the firm 
level value added is the value of the firm's output minus the value of the inputs it 
purchases from other firms. Essentially it is the sum of the factor incomes: the wages 
and profits of the firm. 34 
29 S. El Serafy, 'The Environment as Capital', in Lutz (ed. ), Toward Improved Accounting for the 
Environment: An UNSTA T- World Bank Symposium (Washington, D. C., 1993), p. 19. 
30 M. Lindmark, 'Some principles for Environmental Historical National Accounting. A discussion 
paper', in Nordiska Historiska Nationalräkenskaper- Workshop 2 in Jyväskylän Yliopsto Historian 
Laitos. Suomen Historian Julkaisuja 25 (Järvenpää, 1997), p. 58. 
31 P. Vaze and S. Balchin, 'The Pilot United Kingdom Environmental Accounts', in Economic Trends 
(1996), p. 45. 
32 Thanks to M. Weale for pointing tome that only two estimates of GDP are actually calculated. 33 J. Black, A dictionary of economics (Oxford, 1997). 
34 D. W. Pearce (ed. ), The MIT dictionary of modern economics (Boston, 1992). 
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Figure 2.2-1: Three estimates of Gross Domestic Product 
Income Estimate 
Factor incomes from: 
Employment (including contributions to national insurance etc) 
Self-employment 
Rent (included imputed rents and charges) 
Gross trading profits: 
Companies 
Public Corporations 
Government enterprises 
Residual error: 
GDP 
Output Estimate 
Value Added 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Transport &Communications 
Distribution 
Government Services 
Adjustment for financial 
services 
Residual Error 
Expenditure Estimate 
Consumer expenditure 
Government Final Consumption 
Gross domestic capital formation 
Fixed capital 
Increased stocks 
Exports-Imports 
Net indirect taxes 
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Source: R. G. D. Allen, An Introduction to National Account Statistics, (1980), p. 28. 
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The gross measures of the national accounting system provide an insight into the 
performance of the economy but for understanding where the economy is heading to, 
the use of net measures is needed. The basic reasoning for the use of net measures is 
that the GDP of the year is not very effective at identifying whether a nation is 
building up its capital or living off its capital. `A part of the year's consumption may be 
supported by drawing on stocks of goods held by business firms at the start of the year, 
wearing out machines and plant, and using up natural resources. A nation thus living 
on its capital has a current consumption larger than its national income. ' 35 Apart from 
war, such a situation has been historically perceived as unusual, but only because - 
environmental accounting argues- the use of natural resources has been ignored in 
national accounts so far. 
The Hicksian definition of income is 'the largest permanently maintainable level of 
consumption sustained on those receipts that are not derived at the expense of 
declining capital. '36 At the national level, this concept is approximated by the net 
income measures (NDP and NNP). Net income is derived from the GDP by two main 
adjustments. First, net property income from abroad has to be added as national 
income, and transfers of income abroad by residents of other countries should be 
subtracted. This transforms the `domestic' into `national' product (GNP). Second, to 
pass from 'gross' to `net', consumption of fixed capital has to be subtracted. The 
consumption of fixed capital accounts for the part of the capital base that is used up in 
generating the output in the current period and therefore, should be replaced in order to 
be available to sustain production in the next period. This adjustment is central to the 
arguments of environmental accounting as shown below in Section 2.3. 
Based on the Hicksian definition, the net income has been identified as the best proxy 
to the level of sustainable income of an economy. Nevertheless, some caveats are 
needed. At a high level of abstraction and under certain restrictive assumptions, it can 
be shown that the theoretical concept of NNP is indeed income in the sense that Hicks 
employed. 37 Nevertheless, the practical application of this criterion at the national level 
35 C. S. Shoup, Principles of National Income Analysis (Cambridge, MA, 1947), p. 10 
36 T. M. Crowards, 'Natural Resource Accounting: A Case Study of Zimbabwe', Environmental and 
Resource Economics 7 (1996), p. 214. For the original definition of income see Chapter 14 in J. R. Hicks, 
Value and Capital: An inquiry into some Fundamental Principles of Economic Theory (Oxford, UK, 
2nd ed., 1946). 
37 See, M. L. Weitzman, 'On the Welfare Significance of National Product in Dynamic Economy', 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 90 (1976) 1. 
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has been criticised. 38 `It should be pointed out that there is a fundamental difference 
between the abstract concept of NNP and the actual practice. The former requires 
'shadow' or accounting prices derived from inter- and intratemporal optimisation 
models that accurately reflect economic scarcity. The later measures market or 
transaction prices, which is appropriate for economic management. If NNP were 
calculated on the basis of shadow prices, it would be a better measure of Hicksian 
income. The two would only converge in a highly idealised economy -perfect 
competition, no policy-induced distortions (e. g. taxes), perfect knowledge and 
foresight and so forth'. 39 According to Sefton and Weale, `the two are only equal if the 
country actually follows a constant consumption path. P40 Notwithstanding these 
caveats, the net income at market prices is, in practice, the best approximation to the 
level of income that we can consider sustainable. In addition Weitzman demonstrated 
that the net income at market prices `is the `annuity equivalent' or `stationary 
equivalent' [of future consumption] or ... a proxy for money-metricised welfare'. 
1 In 
brief, the net income provides information about a country's long-run economic 
possibilities. 
The environmental accounting literature argues that since the traditional system of 
national accounting (SNA) ignores the use of natural resources, national accounts 
produce misleading signs about the prospects of the economy. A priory, given the 
definitions in the SNA, it seems impossible to include environmental assets within this 
framework. The environment does not have money values ascribed to it. After all, it 
consists of non-produced assets and hence is outside the production boundary 
considered by the SNA. Yet this is just a problem of considering `the environment' as 
a whole. It would be quite infeasible to account for `all' the physical surroundings, 
conditions, circumstances, etc. in which a person lives (the dictionary definition of 
environment) either within the SNA or within any other system. 
The situation changes when, if instead of considering the whole environment, we take 
38 Hicks himself acknowledged its difficulties: ' by considering the approximations to this criterion, we 
have come to see how very complex it is, how unattractive it looks when subjected to detailed analysis. 
We may allow a doubt to escape us whether it does, in the last resort, stand up to analysis at all, whether 
we have not been chasing a will-o'-the-wisp', Hicks, Value and Capital: An inquiry into some 
Fundamental Principles of Economic Theory, p. 176. 
39 C. S. Pearson, Measuring Sustainable Development (Cambridge, UK, Ist. ed., 2000), p. 488. 
40 J. A. Sefton, and M. R. Weale, 'The net national product and exhaustible resources: The effects of 
foreign trade', Journal of Public Economics 61 (1996), p. 28. They also state that `if the production 
frontier is concave, then the actual market value of output will always be higher than sustainable output 
or consumption' (p. 29, fn. 5). 
" M. L. Weitzman, The linearised Hamiltonian as comprehensive NDP', Environment and Development 
Economics (2000) 5, p. 59 
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a deeper view of it and classify its different items according to their economic 
characteristics. Take our definition of exhaustible economic non-produced assets from 
the previous section. Among the characteristics attributed to exhaustible economic 
non-produced assets, was that they have an actual profitable use to their owners. 
Hence, an associated income flow exists. This economic rent contributes to national 
accounts in the form of wages, return to capital invested, taxes paid to government and 
other forms of rent appropriation. Though the rent appears in the GDP, no allowance is 
made for the fact that the assets base is being liquidated in order to generate this 
income. So at least a part of the environment is already included into the system, albeit 
probably in an inaccurate way. 
There are several works that try to include the depletion of exhaustible resources 
within the SNA. El Serafy's attempt using Saudi Arabia's oil data is probably the most 
significant. 42 His methodology, the user cost method, is presented later in the chapter 
and tested empirically in Chapter 5. For its part, OPEC commissioned a study in 1984 
in order to promote further research into the question of measurement of oil or 
mineral-derived income. 3 Stauffer started from the same conviction that the GDP of 
oil exporting states is exaggerated, because some of their `income' is due to the 
consumption of depletable oil resources and hence is the liquidation of capital, not 
income. He constructed two adjustments to the GDP, naming them `non-depletable' 
GDP and `oil-independent' GDP. The former is a static measure in which the 
economic rents from oil have been debited against the total GDP. According to him, 
this is the value that allows comparison most closely with the GDP reported by states 
not dependent upon the exploitation of exhaustible resources. The `oil-independent' 
GDP is the net result after subtracting the multiplier impacts of those mineral rents. 
Stauffer's calculations included Kuwait, Nigeria, Norway, Saudi Arabia, the United 
States and Venezuela for a period ranging from the early 1970s to 1980, constrained by 
data availability in some countries. For Venezuela, his adjustment is equal to about 
one-half of the reported GDP, so that the non-depletable GDP lies between 50 percent 
and 62 percent of the nominal figure. Despite being an extremely interesting work and 
providing a comprehensive survey of the theoretical framework and methods of 
evaluation, Stauffer's work is not an historical study. Baptista and Mommer have made 
42 S. El Serafy, 'The Proper Calculation Of Income From Depletable Natural Resources', in Ahmad, 
Serafy and Lutz (eds. ), Environmental Accounting For Sustainable Development: a UNEP- World Bank 
Symposium (Washington D. C., 1989). 
° R. Stauffer, Accounting for "Wasting Assets" Income Measurement for Oil and Mineral-Exporting 
Rentier States, Vol. 25 (Vienna, 1984). 
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a slightly different attempt for the Venezuelan economy. 44 They focused on the 
difference between oil as a productive activity and oil as a non-productive activity. 
Non-productive stands for the ground rent gained by Venezuela due to the mere 
ownership of oil. This can be thought of as a rental paid by the importer to the exporter 
for the use of the resource. They suggest that non-productive oil profits should not be 
included in GDP, and subsequently calculated a GDP that excluded the rent. They 
called this measure `non-rent GDP'. On the view of Baptista and Mommer, only 
exported oil generates rents, regardless of the level of internal prices for oil. In their 
reasoning `oil reservoirs are public property, [Venezuelan consumers] will never pay 
for the natural resource [... ] the income that would be generated by increasing 
domestic energy prices to international market levels must be considered taxes, not 
rent'. 5 Other authors have also expressed this idea of `international ground rent 
payment' and the need of taking into account the effects of the terms of trade in 
resource exporting countries 46 The methodological section of this chapter analyses the 
theoretical model put forward by Sefton and Weale in this regard. 7 
The crucial difference between these last two studies and the ones carried from the 
environmental perspective is that for environmentalist the depletion is the important 
fact regardless of who is producing and who is consuming the resource. The common 
theme of all of them is the adjustment of the traditional income measures, although 
they diverged greatly in their approach and the methods for calculating the adjustment. 
Section 2.3 will investigate further the divergences and similarities of approaches and 
methodologies just outlined here. 
44 There are various works in which Baptista and Mommer develop this idea. The best summary and 
empirical work is B. Mommer and A. Baptista, 'El Petrdleo En Las Cuentas Nacionales: Una 
Proposicön', Working Paper IESA 10 (1983). See also A., Baptista, 'Integrar el petröleo: fundamentos 
para una nueva politica petrolera', in Ideas sobre el porvenir de Venezuela (Caracas, 1993); A., Baptista, 
Teoria Econömica del Capitalismo Rentistico. Economia, petrdleo y renta (Caracas, 1997) and B., 
Mommer, ' Integrating the oil. A structural analysis of petroleum in the Venezuelan economy', Latin 
American Perspectives 23 (1996 summer) 90. 
43 B. Mommer, ' Integrating the oil. A structural analysis of petroleum in the Venezuelan economy', 
Latin American Perspectives 23 (1996 summer) 90, p. 147. 
46 See M. R. Weale, 'Environmental Statistics and the National Accounts', in Dasgupta, P. and K. G. 
Mäler (eds. ), The Environment and Emerging Development Issues, Studies in Development Economics, 
edited by UNU/WIDER, Vol. I (Oxford, 1997), p. 100. 
47 J. A. Sefton and M. R. Weale, The net national product and exhaustible resources: The effects of 
foreign trade', Journal of Public Economics 61 (1996). 
Concepts and methods 
Satellite Environmental Accounts 
60 
An attempt to solve the apparent incapacity of SNA to include environmental issues 
was the creation of a system of Satellite Environmental Accounts (SEA). It has 
become an increasingly popular way of developing new aspects of economic and 
social accounting, because it is flexible and permits experimental innovations to be 
introduced while preserving the basic system intact for a more conventional analysis. 
Environmental Accounts are central to assessing the relationship between the economy 
and the environment. The SEA aim to provide information, by industry and for the 
economy as a whole, on the way in which economic development affects the 
environment in an objective, comprehensible and systematic form 48 
Therefore, SEA have a complementary role in relation to the SNA. The SNA will keep 
us informed about the evolution of our product and income and the SEA will tell us 
how our `welfare' evolves (understanding that `welfare' stands here for a certain level 
of environmental quality). It is important to note that, in practice, SEA just account for 
those parts of the environment directly related with economic activity; either as a 
source of raw materials or as a recipient of wastes (that is, the shadowed area in Figure 
2.1-1 above). The SEA mainly account for changes in volume of non-produced 
economic assets, degradation of non-produced economic assets reflected in market 
values of assets and it separates environmental protection expenditures from the SNA. 
Given that is not possible to find widely agreed prices for environmental damage, 
implementations of SEA often use a mixture of monetary and physical units (for 
instance metric tons of CO2). 
On the empirical side, this approach seems particularly well suited to the interests of 
national statistics offices. At least two empirical attempts can be cited here, though 
neither relates to our case studies. One is the pilot United Kingdom Environmental 
Accounts (UKENA) by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). They present 
atmospheric emissions disaggregated by households and industries, data on depletion 
and stocks of oil and gas reserves and estimates of environmental expenditure by 
industry. A combined input-output matrix accompanies the accounts 49 UKENA data 
48 Vaze and Balchin, "The Pilot United Kingdom Environmental Accounts', p. 41. 
49 Ibid. for a complete description of UKENA. 
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relate to 1993. The other empirical attempt along these lines is by the Institut National 
de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE) so 
As for our concern about adjusting the measures of economic performance, the SEA is 
not intended to help us. It can be said that the aim of SEA is to keep us informed of the 
situation of the environment, without losing sight of traditional economic measures 
through concerns over environmental issues. In the view of the ONS, `values placed 
upon environmental damage are, to a degree, subjective. The ONS thinks it would be 
confusing to present such numbers along side data from the core accounts'. 51 
Integrated Environmental Accounts 
The SEA describe the first step towards accounting for the environment by generating 
environmental detail separately, without changing SNA concepts and procedures. For 
more comprehensive environmental-economic analysis, modifications in the SNA are 
required. This further step is known as the System of Integrated Environmental and 
Economic Accounting (SEEA) 5.2 The two basic modifications to the traditional SNA 
are: (1) considering volume changes of environmental assets as costs to the 
production/income accounts, and (2) to cover previously ignored non-produced 
environmental assets, by replacing SNA's market valuation by a maintenance-cost 
valuation. As a consequence of these valuations, alternative green indicators of value 
added, net domestic product (NDP), and capital formation can be calculated. 53 This is 
an ambitious programme, for its aim is to incorporate the whole `environment' into the 
traditional measures of economic performance. Figure 2.2-2 shows the position of the 
different additions to and modifications of conventional economic accounts in the 
overall framework of the SEEA. 
50 Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, Les Comptes Satellites de 
l'Environm ent, Methodes et Resultats (Paris, 1996). 
51 Vaze and Balchin, 'The Pilot United Kingdom Environmental Accounts', p. 47. 
52 United Nations, Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting, Vol. XVII (New York, 1993) 
United Nations, Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting: An operational Manual. (New 
York, 2000). 
53 The bulk of this section comes from Bartelmus, Lutz and van Tongeren, 'Environmental Accounting: 
an operational perspective' . 
Concepts and methods 62 
Figure 2.2-2: Framework for integrated environmental and economic accounting 
Produced assets 
l including natural Nun-prudu. cd assets 
assets) 
'I cunumie ; u. rls'Imiron 
mental 
ssets 
Opening stocks of 
Opening stocks of Opening stocks 
Sui , : md u, c tables hruduccd assets 
non-produced (physical assets only) 
ernnonuc assets 
Output Imports 
environmental 
protection goats 
protection 
Gruss capital 
Imcnneti tie Lrporls - Final consumpWm 
(iro+s capital formation (tar land 
consurnptiun formation onlvl 
_ Gross capital Intermediate Exports for 
Final consumption of t irons capital nation fur fort 
consumption for 
environmental 
environmental ibnnuuon for 
environmental 
environmental protection goods and cnvirunmental protection (for land 
protection services protection only) 
Gros,, domrslic 
product 
isumption of fixed 
capital used for capital used for 
environmental environmental 
protection protection 
Net Dorne tic 
Product 
Compensation to 
employees 
Operating surplus 
Taxes on Production 
Depletion of non- _ý. "-duccd.... Depletion of non- produced asses 
pw 
produced assets 'environmental' (except for land) 
assets 
Degradation of non- 
Degradation of non- 
Degradation of non- Degradation of non- proJueed 
produced assets produced assets 
produced- assets (for environmental' 
auJustea net 
domestic product 
actor meomcs and Factor incomes dnJ 
current transter paid current transfer paid Other Other accuntul. itiun 
w less rceehcd trenn to less received from accumulation 
abroad abroad 
Net Disposable Current external Other flume hnnees 
Other volume Other volume 
Income halan. c (or plum uced assets 
changes for non- 
changes 
produced assets 
External use of 
natural assets less Res uluation Re, "In"win 
national use of 
: xternal natural assets 
Environmentally Closing stocks for 
Closing stocks for ('losing stocks 
adjusted net produced assets 
non-produced (Physical assets only) disnosable income assets 
Source: A. Allierei, and P. Bartelmus, 'Implementation of' environmental accounting: towards an 
operational manual', in Uno, K. and P. Bartelmus (eds. ), Environmental Accounting irr Theory and 
Practice, Economy and Environment, Vol. II (London, 1998), p. 17. 
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Along these lines is the pilot project presented by Van Togeren et al. 54 The work of 
Van Togeren et al. was originally published as Environment Working Paper of the 
United Nations (N. 50) in 1991 and has been cited in several other publications as one 
of the first attempts to include the environment in traditional measures of economic 
performance. 55 This final version is included in a volume edited by Lutz, which 
constituted one of the early efforts to establish a common framework for the 
integration of the environment in national accounts. 
Van Togeren et al. focused on three environmental problems facing Mexico: oil 
depletion, soil degradation and air and water pollution. They started by classifying 
`environmental assets' and split them into `economic' and `non-economic', which in 
the end is no more than a division between those that have a market price and those 
that do not. Given the topic of this thesis, this brief review focuses on the way that the 
study treated oil depletion, leaving the other issues aside. Nevertheless, some of the 
criticisms of the paper apply to the whole of its underlying assumptions and not 
specifically to the treatment of oil depletion. 
Van Togeren et al argue that that oil depletion matters because it implies the 
quantitative exhaustion of a natural resource that is an important source of revenue for 
the economy. The traditional economic aggregates do not make any allowance for 
depletion of natural capital as they do for the depreciation of man-made capital. This 
practice, they argue, affects the future income-generating capacity of the economy. In 
other words, traditional economic analysis treats oil resources as free goods. Their 
classification of `environmental assets' treats oil as `capital' by drawing an analogy 
between natural resources and man-made capital. Hence, in their view new discoveries 
are regarded as capital accumulation and oil depletion is subtracted from NDP, as it 
would be done with man-made capital depreciation. On the empirical side, Van 
Togeren et al. used official data from Pemex for the year 1985. The Environmentally 
Adjusted Net Domestic Product represents 86% of the traditional GDP. `Yet more 
needs to be done both in terms of further applied works as well as in term of 
conceptual work'. 56 
54 J. Van Tongeren, S. Schweinfest, E. Lutz, et al., 'Integrated Environmental and Economic 
Accounting: A Case Study for Mexico', in Lutz (ed. ), Toward Improved Accounting for the 
Environment: An UNSTA T- World Bank Symposium (Washington, D. C., 1993). 
ss See for example C. Bryant and P. Cook, 'Environmental issues and the national accounts', Economic 
trends (1992 Nov) 469 and Bartelmus, Lutz and van Tongeren, 'Environmental Accounting: an 
operational perspective'. 
s Ismail Seragelding, Vice-president, Environmentally Sustainable Development, in the foreword to E. 
Lutz (ed. ), Toward Improved Accounting for the Environment: An UNSTAT-World Bank Symposium 
(Washington, D. C., 1993). 
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The main purpose of Van Togeren's study was to apply SEEA methods in a country at 
a relatively early stage of industrial development, where actual environmental 
problems were still limited. At the same time, limited statistical and accounting 
capacities in the country provided a test of the feasibility of attempting to estimate 
SEEA with constrained resources. Van Togeren et al. also attempted the accounting of 
subsoil assets such as copper, gold, and silver for the years 1986-90. These studies 
demonstrated the feasibility as well as the difficulties and limitations of such 
accounting. Among the latter, the most important are the many significant data gaps 
that had to be bridged by numerous assumptions and rough estimates. 
Further Observations 
We have seen so far three ways of accounting for natural resources. Their different 
aims can be identified within the framework provided by Figure 2.1-1. The SNA only 
accounts for the input flow. The SEA accounts for the input to the economic process 
and the outflow of pollution and waste going back into the environment. Finally, the 
SEEA tries to account for all the flows represented in the diagram. With regard to 
including historical resource depletion in measures of economic performance, it seems 
that only direct inclusion in the SNA or a restricted use of the SEEA can be of help. 
Restricted because in the SEEA framework presented in Figure 2.2-1 this research can 
only contribute to the few boxes highlighted in the figure (depletion of non-produced 
assets, opening and closing stocks of non-produced economic assets) and therefore can 
produce only a partially environmentally adjusted NDP. For its part, the SEA does not 
have any aim of `inclusion', for it only sets the environmental accounting aside. 
However, a second problem appears when moving a step closer towards empirical 
application. It is whether depletion should be subtracted from GDP or NDP. Let us 
remember that the direct inclusion into the SNA opts for the adjustment of GDP, 
whereas the SEEA prefers to correct NDP. Very briefly, the reasoning behind each 
choice is as follows. In the view of the United Nations and the World Bank (parents of 
the SEEA), all natural resources are assimilated to man-made capital. The NDP is GDP 
minus an allowance made for the deterioration of man-made capital. Viewed this way, 
a depreciation allowance for the loss of natural capital ought to be subtracted only 
from NDP. Nevertheless, in traditional national income accounting, the reduction in 
the inventory in the current period of, say, autos produced but not sold in the previous 
accounting period shows up as a reduction in gross and net investment and hence is 
subtracted from GDP. Therefore, if one characterises exhaustible resources as `stock' 
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(inventory) rather than `capital' (fixed assets), it would lead us the adjustment of 
GDP. 57 These distinctions are crucial for the calculations in Chapter 6. 
The main aim of this section was to consider the usefulness and tractability of each of 
the alternatives -National Accounts (SNA), Satellite Accounts (SEA) and Integrated 
Accounts (SEEA)- with respect to our objective of including resource depletion in 
measures of economic performance in an historical perspective. Given the descriptions 
above, it is clear that, the SEA is not useful. It creates a parallel account system for the 
environment, but does not aim to include the environment as part of the economic 
indicators. For its part, the SEEA tractability is problematic in an historical 
perspective. Full implementation of the SEEA requires an enormous amount of data 
(e. g. air and water quality, lost of ecosystems, resource depletion, defensive 
expenditures). Most of these data would be difficult to obtain in historical series and it 
is even difficult to gather at present. Nevertheless, as El Serafy argued, `let us adjust 
income gradually for degradation of petroleum, forestry and fisheries, water quality, 
soil erosion one at a time, until our methodologies firm up and the physical basis of 
our calculation improves'. 58 Therefore, the only approaches that seem to be 
simultaneously useful and tractable are direct adjustment of the traditional SNA and 
the partial completion of the entries corresponding to oil in the SEEA. 
In any case, the discussion and testing of the different valuation methods is one of the 
contributions of the present research. The thesis contributes towards the improvement 
of both the SEA and the SEEA approaches that use the same evaluation methods. 
Some of the numbers generated in the process will, however, be useful in the future for 
those aiming to generate a complete set of satellite or integrated accounts. The 
theoretical discussion of the actual valuation methods used by the literature is in the 
final section of this chapter and its empirical evaluation takes place in Chapter 5. 
57 For a brief discussion on the debate over whether natural capital should be considered inventory or 
fixed asset see C. S., Pearson, Measuring Sustainable Development (Cambridge, UK, Ist ed., 2000), 
p. 495-496. 
58 El Serafy, The Environment as Capital', p. 19. 
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2.3 Approaches and Methods of Evaluation 
Two distinct approaches concerning environmental degradation in relation to national 
income accounts derive from the previous section. While the sustainability approach 
emphasises the intergenerational justice and long term sustained economic growth, the 
true economic activity approach stresses the generation of better measures of the 
current economic performance for mineral producers. Adjustments obtained from the 
first approach will result in a divergence from traditional NNP, whereas the second 
case will end up with a different from traditional GDP . 
59 This section surveys the 
seemingly competing methods available for computing the values associated to 
resource depletion that will subsequently be used to adjust national income accounts. 
Since most environmental accounting exercises derive from the sustainability approach 
it constitutes the bulk of the section, although estimation methods from the competing 
approach are also reviewed in passing. For exposition purposes the section first defines 
the premises of the sustainability approach, then reviews the methods of estimation of 
natural capital depreciation and finally presents an indicator of sustainability that 
requires the use of such estimations. 
Sustainability Approach 
The premise of the sustainability approach is that since the extraction of any natural 
resource enriches the generation using it while reducing the quantity available to future 
generations, these could be compensated for this loss if investments were made to 
ensure the maintenance of the flow of goods and services. Such compensation (re- 
investment) is intended to guarantee sustainable development that in this context can 
be defined as no declining per-capita well being over time 60 The literature has 
established that in order to achieve constant real consumption through time (the lower 
bound of sustainability) it is necessary to keep the underlying capital stock constant. 61 
59 The question of whether these two objections are complementary or substitutes is as yet unclear. In 
theory, the two adjustments advocate two different measures. The sustainability approach advocates for 
a 'reproducible' income measure and the true economic activity objection seeks for a 'non-depletable' 
income measure. Where 'reproducible' stands for the amount that is left for consumption after a 
reinvestment is done each year to maintain a given level of consumption and 'non-depletable' means the 
income that is derived from other sources than the ruin down of the resource. The nomenclature has 
been borrowed from R. Stauffer, Accounting for "Wasting Assets". Income Measurement for Oil and 
Mineral-Exporting Rentier States, Vol. 25 (Vienna, 1984), p. 13. 
60 C. S. Pearson, Measuring Sustainable Development (Cambridge, UK, Ist ed., 2000), p. 474. 
Alternative approaches to sustainable income can be found in W. D. Nordhaus, 'How Should We 
Measure Sustainable Income? ', Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1101 (1995). 
61 This is the line of analysis set by J. R. Hicks, Value and Capital: An inquiry into some Fundamental 
Principles of Economic Theory (Oxford, UK, 2nd ed., 1946); J. Hartwick, 'Intergenerational Equity and 
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The implication in relation to national income accounts is that the cost associated with 
depleting the natural resource is conceptually equivalent to the consumption of fixed 
capital that is discounted for transforming gross into net measures. 62 The traditionally 
computed NDP does not account for the depreciation of natural capital, and therefore, 
it can no longer be considered a good approximation to income in the Hicksian sense. 
The question being debated among those practising natural resource accounting is how 
to measure that cost of depleting natural resource capital. 63 The starting point is the 
concept of depreciation. 
Methods of evaluation 
The selling price of an asset, where competition exists, should be equal to the value of 
the asset, V. The market rate of interest is i. So if the asset is sold and the proceeds are 
ý /(1 +i). 
64 `banked', the `profit' or return after a period elapsed is iv 
The alternative to selling the asset is to keep the asset for a period. The benefits of 
owning a capital asset for a period is composed of two items; first, N1, the per period 
rent earned by using that asset, and second, the capital gain or loss incurred when the 
asset is sold at the end of the period, Vt+r V1. In equilibrium, the benefits of selling the 
the Investing of Rents from Exhaustible Resources', American Economic Review 67 (1977) 5 and R. 
Solow, 'On the intergenerational allocation of natural resources', Scandinavian Journal of Economics 
(1986) 88 and it is the line followed by the U. N. System of National accounts. 
According to the weak sustainability criterion, the particular mix of resources in the stock does not need 
to be maintained and sustainability could be accomplished through investment in new capital. Under 
strong sustainability, the maintenance of individual stocks is required. For support of the weak 
sustainability see R. Solow, 'On the intergenerational allocation of natural resources'. Strong 
sustainability criterion had been preferred by D. Pearce and others, Blue Print For A Green Economy 
(London, 1989). In relation to non-renewable resources, weak sustainability became more widely 
accepted since the only infinitely sustainable consumption level of non-renewable resources under the 
strong criterion is not to use the resource at all since it cannot be replaced. 
62 The United Nations manual of National Accounting describes no less than four methods for 
calculating the consumption of fixed capital, which represents the bulk of the discount from gross to net 
measures. United Nations, System of National Accounts 1993 (New York, 1993), paragraph 6.188 and 
following. Strictly speaking depreciation and consumption of fixed capital do not refer to the same thing 
(the depreciation reported each year is set equal to a proportion --usually one tenth- of the original costs 
of the capital goods while capital consumption in the present year is usually calculated as a proportion 
of the prevailing replacement cost), both terms plus `depletion cost' are interchangeably used in the text 
For exact definitions of the terms see D. King, An Introduction to National In comeAccounting (London, 
1984), p. 12 and 31-32. 
63 G. D. Santoprieto, 'Alternative Methods for estimating resource rent and depletion costs: the case of 
Argentina's YPF', Resources Policy 24 (1998) 1 p. 39. This work provides an excellent review of 
alternative methods proposed from the sustainability perspective. So does P. Vaze, 'Environmental 
Accounts- Valuing the Depletion of Oil and Gas Reserves', Economic Trends (1996, April) 510. 
64 This section derives from J. Hartwick and A. Hageman, 'Economic depreciation of mineral stocks and 
the contribution of El Serafy, in Lutz (ed. ), Toward Improved Accounting for the Environment: An 
UNSTAT-World Bank Symposium (Washington, D. C., 1993), pp. 215-216. Herein we shall use the 
formulae in discrete time rather than continuous time. The practical difference is to use iV /(1 +i) rather 
than iV. Though it may be thought that in the real world extraction occurs in continuous time, 
accountants work with discrete periods, commonly years. Hartwick suggests that discrete time is a more 
accurate estimate of depreciation for the first period. 
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asset should equal the benefits of `holding' the asset. Thus the fundamental assets 
equilibrium equation states: 
iV1 /(1 +i)= Nt+ (Vt+r Vi) 
Rearranging, the change in value of the asset during the period is 
V, +, -i` (l+i) 
V, -N, 
[2.3-2] 
The change in value of the asset should be equal to the difference between the receipts, 
N,, and the true income. The general assumptions regarding mineral assets have a 
limited time horizon, and that the natural asset continues to be extracted at constant 
pace until exhausted generating a stream of rents. Under those assumptions the change 
in value can be identified with the natural asset depreciation, i. e. the decline in the 
value of the asset due to its depletion over time. This equation serves to frame several 
conceptually equivalent methods of computing depreciation. Here we show this is the 
case of the present value method, the net price method, the user cost method and the 
imputed income method. 
The left-hand side of equation 2.3-2 suggests that depreciation could be calculated 
based on changes in observed market values for mines. In some cases, the reserves of 
natural assets and exploitation rights are marketed. However, in fact there have been 
very few publicly recorded sales of natural resources. 65 So the first problem is that Vr 
is not readily available. Nevertheless, even if market transactions of mineral reserves 
are rare to observe, we can estimate what would be the expected market price of such 
transaction. The market prices are supposed to reflect to a high degree the expected net 
returns from the exploitation of the resource since investors would base their decision 
of buying an asset on relative present values of future net income streams. 66 Therefore, 
the value, V4 of a natural resource can be defined as the sum of the expected net 
revenue flows discounted at nominal or real interest rates i for the life n of the asset, 
that is its present value: 67 
65 Santoprieto, 'Alternative Methods for estimating resource rent and depletion costs: the case of 
Argentina's YPF, p. 40. 
66 A. Born, 'Development of Natural Resources Accounts: Physical and Monetary Accounts for Crude 
Oil And Natural Gas Reserves In Alberta, Canada', Statistics Canada (1992) 34. 
67 The appropriateness of using present valuation for valuing non-renewable resources has been 
contested by A. K. Dixit and R. S. Pindyck, Investment under Uncertainty (Princeton, 1992) and in J. L. 
Paddock, D. R. Siegel, et al., 'Option Valuation of Claims on Real Assets: the Case of Offshore 
Petroleum Leases', The Quarterly Journal of Economics 103 (1988) 3. The argument states that since oil 
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Y=N+N,,, + 
N1+2 
+...... + 
N°+" [2.3-3] 
`` (1+i) (1+i)2 (l+i)" 
where N1 is defined as the gross revenue from the resource minus the costs of 
extraction, development and exploration, over the period n that represents the expected 
lifetime of the resource, Rllg1, that is the reserves to production ratio. The calculation 
of the change in the value of the asset becomes theoretically possible, but in order to 
become operational the present value needs assumptions regarding the behaviour of N1 
in the future, which involves assumptions regarding extraction rates, prices, costs, etc. 
At least one proposal has been made regarding the optimal behaviour of the rents 
generated by non-renewable resources. It is known as the Hotelling rent theory. 68 
According to this theory, the price of a depletable resource includes two components: 
the production cost and the resource rent or depletion cost. 69 As a consequence the 
Hotelling rent is defined as the difference between the price of the resource and the 
marginal cost of extraction, that is u=(p-mc) 70 The Hotelling rent reflects the unit 
value of the natural stock. Thus to optimise rents derived from the resource, increases 
in rent per unit due to increasing scarcity will be set equal to the rate of discount, or in 
other words the rate of change in rental will exactly match the rate of interest. This 
can be illustrated as follows: 7' 
[2.3-4] 
(u, 
+, -U, 
)=i 
ut 
Since the rent per unit is assumed to rise annually by the rate of interest, expected 
future rents can be expressed as a function of present rental: 
ur+1-u, (1 +i); uI+2=ut(1 +i)2; ( ..... ); u1+n=ur(1 +i)n 
[2.3-5] 
price uncertainty is not completely diversifiable, the greater is the perceived volatility of oil prices, the 
larger would be the discount rate, and the smaller (greater) the estimated value of the undeveloped 
(depleted) reserve. However, this would underestimate the value of the reserve. The reason is that it 
ignores the flexibility that the owner has over when to actually develop the reserve, that is the reserve's 
option value. Also note that, because of this option value, the greater the volatility of oil prices is, the 
larger the value of the reserve is -just the opposite of what a standard present value calculation would 
tell us. 
68 H. Hotelling, 'The Economics of Exhaustible Resources', Journal of Political Economy 39 (1931) 2. 
69 Ibid, and also P. Dasgupta and G. Heal, Economic Theory and Exhaustible Resources (Cambridge, 
1979). 
70 P. Bartelmus, E. Lutz, et al., 'Environmental Accounting: an operational perspective', in Serageldin 
and Steer (eds. ), Valuing The Environment: proceedings of the First Annual International Conference 
on Environmentally Sustainable Development held at the World Bank; September 30-October 1,1993 
(Washington D. C., 1993) Appendix 1, p. 170. 
71 The algebraic manipulation that follows belongs to T. M. Crowards, 'Natural Resource Accounting: A 
Case Study of Zimbabwe', Environmental and Resource Economics 7 (1996), p. 216-217. 
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Total annual rent in year t (N, ) is the product of the quantity extracted (qd and unit rent 
ut in that year: 
Nr =grur [2.3-6] 
Substituting into equation 2.3-3 the value of the mine in year t can be expressed as: 
qt+tut(I+l) 
+ 
qt+2ut(1+1)2 qt+nut(I+l)n 
yt _- q`u` + 
(1 +i (1 -i- i2...... 
+ 
(1 + i)" 
which simplifies to 
[2.3-7] 
V =(qt+qt+l +qt+2+..... +qt+n)ut 
[2.3-8] 
Let us define Q as the total stock of resource in year t, i. e. the sum of all possible 
future quantities extracted. Then the value of the resource in a given year is Qu1, which 
is known as the Hotelling Valuation Principle (HVP). The present value of the 
resource in the following year is then: 
V+ý =1 (Q-4r)ur+t =(Q-q, )u, [2.3-9] (l+i) 
The depreciation is the loss in value due to the use of the asset during a given period, 
derived from V1 minus V1+,, so that equation 2.3-2 simplifies to 
Vi- V1+, = Qur(Q-qd ur = grur = Nr [2.3-10] 
Thus according to this simplification the depreciation of an asset can be calculated by 
estimating the total rent for the year, Nt, where N1=(p -mc)gf.. Thus, thanks to the 
Hotelling rent theory, we can estimate the depreciation of the mineral assets without 
having to calculate the total value of the resource, just by using the rents generated in 
the current year. This method is known as the net price method. 
The net price method was first used by Reppetto to estimate the depletion of 
Indonesian oil reserves, and has become one of the standard methods in enviromnental 
accounting. 72The net price method is based upon the premise that total profit from 
resource extraction represents Hotelling rents (with normal profit regarded as 
necessary cost of extraction). A first problem is that this surplus may be composed of 
72 R. Repetto, Wasting Assets: Natural Resources in the National Income Accounts (Washington, D. C., 
1989). Repetto advocated adding the discovery of new resources to the income in the year of discovery. 
This proposition is discussed in later chapters. Most users of this method, calculate the net price 
adjustment without treating new discoveries as income see for example, J. Van Tongeren, S. 
Schweinfest, et al., 'Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting: A Case Study for Mexico', in 
Lutz (ed. ), Toward Improved Accounting for the Environment: An UNSTAT- World Bank Symposium 
(Washington, D. C., 1993); US Department of Commerce, 'Accounting for mineral resources: issues and 
BEA's initial estimates', Survey of current business (1994, April). 
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several distinct types of rents in addition to the resource rent. These could include rents 
due to the differences in the costs of production, monopoly rents due to the exercise of 
market power in setting price, or ownership rents claimed by the owners of the 
resource in the form of royalties, surface taxes, etc. The assumption in the net price 
method that total profits reflect only Hotelling or scarcity rents implicitly assumes that 
marginal costs of extraction remain constant. Hartwick and Hageman show that when 
marginal costs are rising, total profits can be expected to overestimate Hotelling rents 
by including a proportion of rents derived from holding the assets (Ricardian rent). 3 
Given the difficulty of measuring marginal costs, empirical studies have used average 
cost of extraction as an approximation. 74 In fact, the most common way to calculate N, 
has been to obtain the surplus revenue accruing to the owners of the resource after 
accounting for the contribution of labour and capital inputs. " This implies constant 
marginal costs. Given that marginal costs are expected to increase as the resource is 
depleted, the total rents calculated using average costs might overestimate the true 
value of Hotelling rent and therefore exaggerate asset depreciation. 
There are some other possible distortions on the cost side of the formula that are 
mostly ignored by the literature. For instance, state-owned enterprises are likely to 
have higher production costs than firms operating in competitive markets 76 This is 
relevant and recognised for Venezuelan PDVSA, Mexican PEMEX, recently privatised 
Argentinean YPF, etc. Higher costs mean lower value of the rent, and the subsequent 
underestimation of the resource rent for those countries. The consequence is that part 
of the resource rents that ought to have been re-invested for sustainable development 
has already been spent on inefficient production in the current period. 77 In the extreme 
case an oil sector that is being subsidised may result in negative rents if the gross 
73 Hartwick and Hageman, 'Economic depreciation of mineral stocks and the contribution of El Serafy'. 
74 The most notable exceptions to the widespread use of average costs are: J. M. Hartwick, Natural 
resources, national accounting and economic depreciation', Journal of Public Economics (1990) 43. He 
obtains marginal extraction costs from a series by Adelman. For their part, J. R. Vincent, 'Resource 
depletion and economic sustainability in Malaysia', Environment and Development Economics (1997) 2 
and J. R. Vincent, T. Panayotou, et al., 'Resource depletion and sustainability in small open economies', 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (1997) 33, convert observed average costs to the 
marginal extraction cost after forecasting mineral prices and applying a discount rate. M. L. Weitzman, 
'Pricing the limits to growth from minerals depletion', Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1999) 2, 
p. 704 estimates marginal costs to be about 40 percent higher than unit (average) costs for crude oil and 
natural gas. 
75 Santoprieto, 'Alternative Methods for estimating resource rent and depletion costs: the case of 
Argentina's YPF', p. 39. 
76 The view of J. Amuzegar, Managing the Oil Wealth: OPEC's Windfalls and Pitfalls (London, 1999), 
p. 10 that `state ownership of oil ... made misallocation, 
inefficient use, waste and misappropriating much 
easier than if the reserves had been in private hands' seems to be widely accepted. 
'' Santoprieto, 'Alternative Methods for estimating resource rent and depletion costs: the case of 
Argentina's YPF', p. 43 
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revenue cannot afford the production costs. This can be easily the case in a country in 
which oil prices are set artificially low in order to lubricate the rest of the economy, 
such as in Mexico. Some evidence supporting this point will be presented in Chapter 4. 
All in all, it would be hard to imagine a set of assumptions more at odds with the 
actual characteristics of resource use in most countries (and in particular our two case 
studies) than the assumptions underlying the Hotelling rent, and thus the net price 
method: 78 
" optimal management (in presence of state enterprise and/or monopoly/oligopoly) 
" endogenous prices (most countries are price takers on international prices) 
" endogenous costs (technological advance has driven extraction costs steadily 
downward) 
" absence of production constraints (in general producers do face production 
constraints) 
In situations where these assumptions are violated, which is to say most empirical 
situations, the simplification of the net price method becomes misleading. This 
theoretical analysis will be endorsed in Chapter 5, when the method will be 
implemented. 
Finally, the net price method may also overstate the true depletion cost since it does 
not consider that the surplus for a depletable resource also includes a part that can be 
consumed. In principle, the net price method allocates the full rent for reinvestment in 
order to guarantee the consumption level of future generations. It has been argued that, 
in presence of technological change, re-investment of the entire surplus value would 
mean that future generations would inherit a capital sum far greater than necessary for 
them to receive an after depletion revenue equal to that received by the present 
generation. 9 
Along these lines, El Serafy has argued that only a part of the rents generated by the 
resource are to be reinvested for guaranteeing future consumption. 8° El Serafy argued 
that the surplus for a depletable resource represents two values: (1) a true income 
component which can be consumed; and (2) a separate depletion costs. The depletion 
7e J. R. Vincent, 'Green accounting: from theory to practice', Environment and Development Economics 5 
(2000), p. 21. The last assumption added from W. D. Nordhaus and E. C. Kokkenlenber (eds. ), Nature's 
Numbers: Expanding the U. S. National Economic Accounts to Include Environment (Washington D. C., 
1999), chapter 3. The comment that follows belongs to the former source. 
79 Mikesell, 1994, Resources Policy, n. 20 as quoted by Santoprieto, 'Alternative Methods for estimating 
resource rent and depletion costs: the case of Argentina's YPF' . 60 S. El Serafy, 'The Proper Calculation Of Income From Depletable Natural Resources', in Ahmad, 
Serafy, et al. (eds. ), Environmental Accounting For Sustainable Development: a UNEP- World Bank 
Symposium (Washington D. C., 1989). 
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costs or `user cost', should be set aside year after year and invested to create a 
perpetual stream of income that would provide the same level of true income, both 
during the life of the resource and after the resource has been exhausted. 81 The user 
cost method has been widely used as alternative to the net price and the present value 
methods. 82 
As the previous two methods (present value and net price), the user cost method can 
also be thought in terms of the fundamental equation of assets equilibrium [2.3-1]. 83 
Here the scenario is one in which the mine could theoretically either be sold and the 
revenue invested in financial assets, thereby earning interest X each year to infinity, or 
alternatively rentals, N could be earned yearly from exploitation of the asset for a finite 
period of n years until reserves are fully depleted, which is given by the reserves. to 
production ratio Rp/g1. The present value of the finite series, NG should equal the 
present value of the perpetual income, X. The present value of the finite series is: 84 
1 
e, N 
NLl- 
n=O +t)° 
1 1- 
1+i 
The present value of the infinite series Xis: 
X_x [2.3-12] 
+i)" 1_ 1 
1+i 
Setting equations 2.3-11 and 2.3-12 equal and multiplying by the denominator gives: 
1 
[2.3-13] 
X=N I- (1 i)n+l + 
Rearranging the equation, the amount representing the `user cost' is: 
N-X =Nl(1+i)" +1 [2.3-14] 
Ibid, p. 13. 
B2 See for instance the pilot environmental accounts of Papua New Guinea in Bartelmus, Lutz, et al., 
'Environmental Accounting: an operational perspective'. 
83 User cost in the Keynensian sense can be regarded as capital depreciation: the decline in the value of 
an asset through its use in producing an economic rent. J. M. Keynes, The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money (London, 1973), p. 69-70. However, El Serafy argued that depletion of 
natural resources couldn't be conceptually regarded as depreciation and he suggested that his user cost 
calculation has to be discounted from the traditional GDP measure. See El Serafy, S., 'The Environment 
as Capital', in Lutz (ed. ) Toward Improved Accounting for the Environment, an UNSTAT-World Bank 
Symposium, Washington, 1993, p. 20-21. 
84 From the Annex 2 of C. Bryant and P. Cook, 'Environmental issues and the national accounts', 
Economic trends (1992 Nov) 469. 
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where X is the true income that can be consumed, N is the total annual receipts (net of 
extraction cost), i the rate of discount and n the further number of years for which current 
extraction rates could be sustained. 
The user costs (or depletion costs) measured by this method is just a mere percentage of 
the receipts. This percentage depends upon two values, the discount rate i, and the 
expected life of the resource, n. The following table and graph show the effects of 
different discount rates and life expectancies for an identical net receipts value. 
Figure 2.3-1: User cost sensitivity to life expectancy and discount rate 
n 
User cost results for different n and i 
N i=3 i =6 i =15 
1 1000000 942595,9 889996,4 756143,7 
5 1000000 837484,3 704960,5 432327,6 
10 1000000 722421,3 526787,5 214943,2 
15 1000000 623166,9 3936463 106864,8 
20 1000000 537549,3 294155.4 53130,7 
30 1000000 399987,1 164254,8 13133,1 
50 1000000 221463,2 51215,4 802,4 
100 1000000 50517.3 2780,4 0,7 
Source: own elaboration 
User costs at different i and n 
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In general the greater the life expectancy of the reserve and the higher the rate of discount 
used, the lower the proportion that the user cost suggests should be reinvested. If the 
reserves were to be exhausted in one-year time almost the whole of the receipts obtained 
should not be consumed but reinvested for guaranteeing a sustainable income. If the 
resource was to last for a long enough period the cash obtained could be almost entirely 
consumed, reinvesting a minimum amount that goes to zero when the life expectancy 
surpasses the century. The logarithm graph also demonstrates that the effect of an extra 
year of life of the reserve reduces the user cost at a faster pace the higher the rate of return 
considered. 
Observe that in order to calculate the user costs, `El Serafy needed several assumptions 
that are likely to bias the estimates. '85 Regarding N, the current level of receipts is held 
constant during the lifetime of the resource. The rate of extraction is also held constant 
until the final exhaustion of the resource, thus the life expectancy of the reserve in the 
8' Hartwick and Hageman, 'Economic depreciation of mineral stocks and the contribution of El Serafy'. 
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present year, n, is not allowed to change over time. It also assumes a constant discount 
rate. Finally, El Serafy is implicitly assuming an open economy, since it needs 
someone to sell the resource to. Hartwick does by implication say the user cost method 
does not apply to a closed economy case. 86 The effects of these assumptions will be 
further explored in Chapter S. 
Sefton and Weale elaborated what we are going to call the imputed income method. As 
opposed to the methods discussed above, their departing point is not the Hicksian 
concept of income. Instead, they place the work of Weitzman in a more general 
framework and define welfare income as `the discounted value of the future product of 
the interest rate and consumption along a chosen future consumption path'. Within 87 
this general framework their paper derives the necessary adjustment for an open 
economy which exported natural resources. Their main claim is that the net price 
method is based on a closed-economy model and therefore it is inappropriate for 
resource exporting countries. 88 Their suggestion is that an imputed income for the 
stock of the resource targeted for export should be included in the measures of 
income. 89 
The adjustment proposed by Sefton and Weale to conventional income for the use of 
non-renewable resources can be expressed as follows once the rate of interest is held 
constant over time: 90 
NNP,, =NNP, -s(0)(R, (0)+R2(0))+ 
fsrR2exp 
- 
Jrdz dt [2.3-15] 
00 
86 J. M. Hartwick, , 'Natural resources, national accounting and economic 
depreciation', Journal of Public 
Economics (1990) 43. 
87 J. A. Sefton and M. R. Weale, 'The net national product and exhaustible resources: The effects of 
foreign trade', Journal of Public Economics 61 (1996) p. 45. They generalised the model presented in 
Weitzman, 'On the Welfare Significance of National Product in Dynamic Economy'. 
88 The models explicitly mentioned by Sefton and Weale are Dasgupta and Heal, Economic Theory and 
Exhaustible Resources and Hartwick, 'Natural resources, national accounting and economic 
depreciation'. 
89 In fact their model suggest two adjustments: an imputed income for the stock of resource targeted for 
export and a rate of interest effect. Yet, the second adjustment is considered 'harder to estimate and it 
seems reasonable to assume is negligible as real interest rates can be expected to remain almost constant 
in the long run', Sefton and Weale, 'The net national product and exhaustible resources: The effects of 
foreign trade', p. 46. 
90 This equation is a simplification of equation (46) in Ibid, p. 40, which originally reads: 
jrCI exp(- 
)rd 
s }lf = C, (0) + q, (0)1, (0) + (s(0)R, (0) - T(O)) + r(0)H, (0) -s(0)(R1(0)+ Rl(0))+ JsrR, 
+ jrdr)dl + Ir H, expl - Jrdz)dt 
The left-hand side is welfare income. The four first terms in the right-hand side are the principal 
elements of the standard NNP: consumption, investment, the balance of trade and net property income. 
The last term corresponds to the imputed income due to future interest rate changes and it is equal to 
zero if the interest rate is not expected to change over time. 
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NNP, v and NNPC denote the welfare income and the conventional expenditure estimate 
of national income respectively. The rest of their nomenclature is as follows: s 
represents the per unit price of the resource net of costs; RI the amount of the resource 
used domestically, R2 the amount of the resource exported and r is the rate of interest. 
As derived from Weitzman's work, in the absence of natural resource, the 
conventional income equals the welfare income. 
According to Sefton and Weale `the term s(0)(R, (0)+R2(0)) is Hartwick's adjustment 
for the extraction of exhaustible resources in a closed economy'. 91 Indeed, translating 
into our own notation we can write this term as u(qj+qz)= Nt, that is the per unit rent 
times the amount produced in the year. The remainder of the expression adds up to an 
imputed income on the stock of the resource targeted for export. Both terms together 
constitute the adjustment term proposed by Sefton and Weale. 
They argue that a resource exporter `can enjoy a level of positive consumption, 
because even though the country deplete its resource stock, the value of the remaining 
stock increases in value'. 92 This, they say, can be illustrated clearly from the 
expression above. If the resource producing country exports all its oil, R1=0, then they 
claim the adjustment term becomes 
-sR2+ 
frsR2exp(- Jrdr)dt=0 [2.3-16] 
00 
So they conclude that `in this case welfare income equals the conventional measure of 
NNP so there is effectively no adjustment required'. 93 But how can the adjustment 
term be equal to zero? Take the alternative form of expressing the adjustment term also 
provided by Sefton and Weale. Define SE(t) as the amount of the present stock of the 
resource earmarked for export, so that 
SE(t) =f R2(r)dr [2.3-17] 
Making use of Hotelling's rule, which implies that the price of the resource net of 
extraction costs increases over time at the rate of interest (this is the continuous version 
of the discrete equation 2.3-4 above), thus 
s= s(0) exp( I rd r) [2.3-18] 
91 Ibid, p. 40. 
92 Ibid, p. 41-42. 
93 Ibid, p. 42. 
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then the adjustment term can be expressed as: 94 
77 
- sR2 + r(0)s(0)SE [2.3-19] 
Since R1=0, all of the resource is exported and SE equals the whole stock of the 
resource available S(O). Observe that for adjustment term to become zero (so that no 
adjustment is required), the only possibility is that the ratio of production to reserves 
must equal the exogenous rate of interest (RI/S(0)=r), otherwise `the adjustment could 
95 be positive or negative at any point along the optimal path' 
A closer look at the adjustment proposed by Sefton and Weale reveals that, if the 
whole of the resource is exported, their adjustment is conceptually equivalent to the 
adjustment framed by the FEAE equation. Translated into the notation used earlier in 
the chapter, s is the per unit price of the resource ul; R2 is the quantity extracted for 
exports q2 (understanding that total production equals production for domestic use plus 
production for exports, qt=q f+q1); Q was the notation used for the reserves or total 
stock S(O); using discrete instead of continuous time formulation, so that the interest 
rate is i. If all the production is exported the adjustment proposed by Sefton and Weale 
becomes: 
- u, q, +tu, Q, [2.3-20] (l+i) 
the first term is simply N1, and by equation 2.3-8 we know that u1Q is the value of the 
resource V, according to the Hotelling Valuation Principle (HVP), substituting 
-NN+ V [2.3-21] (1+i) 
The adjustment proposed by Sefton and Weale is precisely the change in value of the 
asset as defined in equation 2.3-2, if the country exports all of its production, the per 
unit rents increase following Hotelling's rule and the interest rate does not change over 
time. In a closed economy model, where the country exports none of its resources and 
the rate of interest is constant, the adjustment is identical to the net price, -Nt, because 
there will be no gains from trade, thus VV is nil. 
From this exposition it is clear how all four methods (change in value, net price, user 
cost and imputed value) are conceptually equivalent within the frame of the 
94 This is simply the result of taking the solution of the integral side of the adjustment term from 
equation (48) in Sefton and Weale (assuming real interest remains constant) as in Ibid, p. 48. 
95 Ibid, p. 42. 
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fundamental equation of asset equilibrium (FEAE). 96 All four result in adjustments to 
the traditional estimate of net national income in the form: 
NNPadjusIed = NNPC - (V - V, +, ) = NNP, - N, +1+i Vt [2.3-22] 
Of course, the four methods considered differ in their expectations about the future 
rents earned by the resource, ut and N. The net price and the imputed income 
approaches assume an optimal extraction path with the unit rents following Hotelling's 
rule. The user cost method assumes that future unit rents will be equal to current 
values. The change in value method (the change in present value) can be calculated 
under either assumption, but it can also be calculated using the historical evolution of 
the rents. Thus the values of Vt and of the total adjustment will differ across methods, 
unless very restrictive assumptions apply. 97 All in all, an estimation of the value of the 
rent per unit, ut, and the aggregate rent, N1, at time t is needed. 
Stauffer calculates a current-year `mineral rent' that is equal to the gross value of total 
production, minus operating costs and an imputed rate of return to all capital investment 
or exploration outlays attributable to current-year production, essentially Nt as defined 
above. Nevertheless, according to this author `the rent can be approximated without 
serious error using the government revenues from oil only in those cases in which the 
government fully participated in the production operations and captures most of the 
96 A noticeable exception to the main line of argument followed here for the estimation of resource value 
and its depreciation is M. H. Adelman, 'Mineral Depletion with Special Reference to Petroleum', Review 
of Economics and Statistics (1990) 72. Adelman argues that the resource rent should be seen as 
discovery value. In his view, mineral stocks are not non-renewable assets but rather, as any other capital 
assets, mineral stocks can be created and consumed. Reserves constitute an inventory that can be 
replenished by investing in the discovery and development of additional stocks. Resource rent from this 
perspective is the cost of replacing the inventory used up in production. Exploration costs become the 
tacit value of the resource. This approach implicitly uses the strong sustainability criterion since it 
measures depletion costs according to the costs of maintaining the stock of each particular resource. The 
question is whether this is the best way of valuing the compensation for future generations. The Stone 
Age did not ended because of a lack of stone and the oil age may well end leaving behind plenty of oil 
in the world's fields. It is not difficult to think of a future scenario in which despite having the same 
stock of natural resources, future generations choose not to use it. They will own a stock of oil of the 
same size as we do, but how would that provide them with the same flow of goods and services we 
enjoyed if that stock is worthless? 
9' The net price approach can be considered as a special case of both the user cost and the imputed 
income approaches. If either the depletion period or the discount rate are zero or if the extraction is 
costless the user cost becomes just N,, the net price adjustment. See Hartwick and Hageman, 'Economic 
depreciation of mineral stocks and the contribution of El Serafy', p. 117. Sefton and Weale demonstrate 
that if all of the resource is used for domestic production, rather than for financing imports or investment 
abroad with the export revenue (that is R2=0), their adjustment is identical to the net price. See Sefton 
and Weale, The net national product and exhaustible resources: The effects of foreign trade', p. 43. In 
addition, according to Vaze, if new discoveries are not treated as income the net price gives the same 
adjustment to income as the present value. Vaze, 'Environmental Accounts- Valuing the Depletion of Oil 
and Gas Reserves', p. 40. 
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rents. ' 98 Stauffer is not the only proponent of approximating the value of N, by oil taxes. 
Mommer whose starting point differs from both Stauffer and the sustainability approach, 
also used oil taxes as a proxy for N, 99 Chapter 4 is devoted to the estimation of, u, and N, 
and will check the appropriateness of using oil taxes as proxy measure for rents. 
To say that the methods are conceptually equivalent and anticipate they may get 
different answer due to their different underlying assumptions also implies that they 
attempt to resolve different questions. Sefton and Weale's adjustment seeks a better 
indicator of where the economy is heading, since their welfare income embodies 
information about the expected path of future consumption. The Sefton and Weale 
model does not respond to the question of how much of the resource should be 
consumed internally or exported, or the proportions of the export revenue that should 
be dedicated to import goods and investment. This is quite different from the net price 
and user costs method that apart of adjusting the conventional estimates of net income, 
try to establish how to distribute N, between consumption and investment in order to 
guarantee the consumption of future generations. While the net price allows no 
consumption from the rent in the current period, by allocating all the rent for 
reinvestment, the user costs allows a proportion of the rent to be consumed in the 
present period and the remaining fraction should be reinvested. The two questions: 
What is the `true' net income of the economy? And what should be done to achieve 
sustainability? are interrelated since the future of the economy is conditioned by the 
current consumption and investment choices. 
A Sustainability Indicator 
A further question that the environmental literature attempts to answer is to what 
extent the specific strategy of a resource producer is sustainable. The definition of non- 
renewable capital consumption is critical in the efforts to analyse economic 
sustainability in resource-extracting economies not only because that is the value that 
is supposed to adjust the traditional NDP but also in the generation of sustainability 
indicators. It was mentioned above, that in order to achieve constant real consumption 
through time it is necessary to keep the underlying capital stock constant. It becomes a 
requirement that the value of the net change in the total capital stock (K) must be equal 
or greater than zero: 
98 R. Stauffer, Accounting for "Wasting Assets ". Income Measurement for Oil and Mineral-Exporting 
Rentier States, Vol. 25 (Vienna, 1984) p. 19 and p. 24 
" B. Mommer, ' Integrating the oil. A structural analysis of petroleum in the Venezuelan economy', 
Latin American Perspectives 23 (1996 summer) 90, p. 141. 
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dK=K=d(K"'+Ktv+K)Z0 [2.3-23] 
t 
Note that the total capital stock is defined as K= KM +KN +KH, where KM is man-made 
capital (or `reproducible physical capital'), in the conventional sense of machines and 
infrastructure; KN is natural capital, and KH denotes human capital. The net capital 
accumulation can be expressed as: 
K= S(t) - bx(t) [2.3-24] 
where S(t) is gross savings and S is depreciation on overall capital stock. From 
equations 2.3-15 and 2.3-16, Pearce and Atkinson established an intuitive rule for 
sustainability: 10° 
S(t) - b7c(t) z0 [2.3-25] 
Decomposing K into its three main components, this becomes: 
S(t) - 
SMKM 
- 
811KH 
- 
SNKN Z0 [2.3-26] 
For current purposes we assume 81 = 0, that is, knowledge and skills do not 
`depreciate'. If we assume knowledge and skills are specific to an individual 
(acknowledging the non-rival public good aspects of knowledge), depreciation occurs 
through either death or obsolescence. 101 
Dropping time and dividing by GDP (Y) gives: 
S_ SMKM 
_ 
SNKN 
ZO [2.3-27] 
YYY 
Inequality 2.3-19 provide us with a sustainability indicator in the form 102 
Z=S_ 
8MKM ÖN N [2.3-28] 
where Z is a sustainability index also denominated `genuine savings'. It is an intuitive 
zero-order rule for determining whether a country is on or off a sustainable 
development path at any one point in time. The value of Z must be either zero or 
10° This was pioneered in D. W. Pearce and G. Atkinson, 'Capital Theory and the Measurement of 
Sustainable Development: An Indicator of Weak Sustainability', Ecological Economics 8 (1993) and 
more recently used by D. W. Pearce and G. Atkinson, 'Measuring Sustainable Development', in Bromley 
(ed. ), Handbook of environmental economics (Cambridge, MA, 1995). The latter is the source of the 
discussion presented here. 
101 This is also the assumption adopted by Pearce and Atkinson, although they recognise that: 'obviously 
if human capital depreciation is different from zero the sustainability criterion presented here will alter 
[... ] depreciation may occur through obsolescence [or] the loss of indigenous skills and knowledge. 
Such considerations are important but actual measurements present immense difficulties'. Pearce and G. 
Atkinson, 'Measuring Sustainable Development', p. 168. See World Bank, Expanding the Measure of 
Wealth. Indicators of Environmentally Sustainable Development, Vol. 17 (Washington, D. C., 1997) for 
the results of making human capital depreciation different from zero. 
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positive to ensure sustainability. According to the World Bank, `the policy 
implications of measuring genuine savings are quite direct: persistently negative rates 
of genuine savings must lead, eventually, to declining well being'. 103 
A number of different theoretical objections to the validity of the rule of `keeping 
genuine savings above zero' have been put forward. Several authors have noted the 
role of the terms of trade and capital gains in modifying the Z>O rule for an open 
economy. 104 The reasoning had been based on Hotelling's principle by which resource 
rents rise over time at the rate of interest as the resource grows scarcer. With marginal 
costs not declining faster than the interest rate, future resource prices will be higher 
than current ones, thus providing the resource exporter with improving terms of trade. 
Therefore, the exporter of natural non-renewable resources can have negative genuine 
savings and still ensure sustainability. '°5 For his part, Weale argues that given these 
gains in the terms of trade, the exporter of natural resources `does not have to do any 
investing in order to maintain its level of income constant, so the whole of the revenue 
is available for consumption'. 106 Therefore, the sustainability rule would differ for 
open and closed economies. 
Also, both technological change and population growth are left out of the sustainability 
index presented. On the one hand, in the event of technological change, a constant 
capital stock would leave future generations with higher well being than the present 
generations, as the capital stock grows more productive. Then technological change 
would be consistent with a declining capital stock and negative net savings! 07 On the 
other hand, a growing population creates an investment need to increase the overall 
capital stock in order to maintain capital per head and thus sustainability of 
102 It is worth emphasising that Z is an indicator of 'weak' sustainability. It assumes substitution 
possibilities between the component parts of capital. It is therefore possible to run down the stock of 
natural capital provided that the proceeds are reinvested. 
103 World Bank, Expanding the Measure of Wealth. Indicators of Environmentally Sustainable 
Development, p. 8. This report used the net price method for evaluating natural capital depreciation. 
104 See G. B. Asheim, 'Hartwick's rule in open economics', Canadian Journal of Economics 86 (1986); 
G. B. Asheim, 'Capital gains and net national product in open economies', Journal of Public Economics 
59 (1996) 3 and J. M. Hartwick, 'Sustainability and constant consumption paths in open economies with 
exhaustible resources', Review of International Economics 3 (1996) 3. 
105 E. Newmayer, 'Measuring Genuine Savings: Are Most Resource-extracting Countries Really 
Unsustainable? ', in Munasinghe, M., O. Sunkel and C. de Miguel (eds. ), The Sustainability of Long-term 
Growth. Socioeconomic and Ecological Perspectives (Cheltenham, UK, 2001), p. 424; 
106 M. Weale, 'Environmental Statistics and the National Accounts', in Dasgupta, P. and K. G. Mäler 
(eds. ), The Environment and Emerging Development Issues, Studies in Development Economics, edited 
by UNU/WIDER, Vol. I (Oxford, 1997), pp. 99-100. 
107 R. M. Solow, 'Intergenerational Equity and Exhaustible Resources', Review of Economic Studies 
(1974), pp. 29-46. 
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consumption per head. In sum, technological change permits a declining capital stock 
only to the extent that this change exceeds population growth. 108 
Chapter 6 will return to the sustainability index and to these issues in order to 
determine whether Venezuela and Mexico have been living beyond their means at any 
point during the 20"' century. 
2.4 Conclusions 
This chapter is to applied green accounting as say, microeconomic theory is to market 
analysis: it furnishes the economic rationale for the exercise and serves as broad 
guideline for conducting it and interpreting the results. 
The Fundamental Equation of Asset Equilibrium served as general framework for 
presenting an array of seemingly competing methods of environmental accounting, two 
of which (net price and user cost) have now found its way into the proposed systems of 
environmental accounting. The other two, present value and imputed income, have 
never been used in applied studies. An important conclusion derives from the analysis 
of the different methods: they seem to apply to different scenarios. Hartwick does by 
implication say the user cost method does not apply to a closed economy case. 109 
Sefton and Weale argue that the net price method does not apply to open economies, 
and from their theoretical propositions it can be inferred that, at least in part, the user 
cost method applies to the open economy case. 110 In open economies the possibility of 
capital gains on the depleting asset stock becomes relevant but not otherwise. These 
theoretical implications are the fruit of the comparative analysis of the methodologies 
provided in this chapter. 
The arduous task of fitting the real world into these theoretical models is Chapters 4 
and 5 endeavour. The theretical models implicitly assume that depletion takes place 
under very strict assumptions (optimal depletion, constant prices, and constant 
marginal extraction costs, homogeneous reserves and perfect information to mention 
some). Chapter 4 analyses how far from reality these assumptions are in the case of oil 
when calculating the resource rent (u1 and NI). The effects of removing these 
assumptions will be explored in Chapter 5 when the methods are applied to the 
historical data set. Chapter 6 will come back to the issues presented in Section 2.2 
108 D. W. Pearce, and G. Atkinson, 'Measuring Sustainable Development', in Bromley, D. W. (ed. ), 
Handbook of environmental economics (Cambridge, MA, 1995), p. 176. 109 J. M. Hartwick,, 'Natural resources, national accounting and economic depreciation'. 
110 J. A. Sefton, and M. R. Weale, The net national product and exhaustible resources'. 
Concepts and methods 83 
regarding the inclusion of environmental depletion in national income accounts and to 
the sustainability indicator just presented. Before entering the numerical analysis, 
Chapter 3 describes the different resource depletion strategies of Mexico and 
Venezuela. It also demonstrates that the worries presented in this chapter regarding the 
particular nature of income in economies based on non-renewable resources have long 
been present in the debates regarding the exploitation of oil in these two countries. 
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'It is illusory, and would be harmful, 
to pretend that petroleum produced and exported in large quantities 
could become the factotum of Mexico's economy 
or the panacea for Mexico's economic ills. 
Mexico does not wish ever to be forced to export 
such an indispensable energy and chemical resource'1 
`Oil is fantastic and induces fantasies. 
It created the illusion of a miracle; 
it created, in practice, a culture of miracles... 
Oil wealth had the power of a myth .2 
Chapter 3 
Oil illusion and delusion: Mexico and Venezuela 
1900s-1980s 
3.1 Mexico: The Perception of the Oil Question during the Century 
The First Oil Boom: Naive Optimism (1901-1930s) 
The Nationalisation: Facing Reality (1938-1970) 
The Second Oil Boom: Bounded Optimism and Crisis (1970s-1980s) 
3.2 Venezuela: The Illusion of Oil Wealth through History 
The Early Years 
Comprehending the Reality of Oil (1940s) 
Measuring the Gains (1950s-1960s) 
Illusion and Delusion (1970s-1980s) 
3.3 Conclusions 
`In the current system of national accounts, revenue derived from the sale of 
natural resources is treated as current income, or rent, that is available for 
consumption. If the revenue accrues to the public sector, it can be used just like 
revenue from any other source, such as the proceeds from income taxes. Given 
their short perspective, the politicians in charge of such economies often do not 
want to be reminded that the revenue derived from liquidating their country's 
natural assets is neither recurrent nor sustainable. A developing country rejoices 
in having its leadership praised for illusory rapid economic growth, apparently 
high rates of saving and investment, and deceptively stable or near stable price 
levels brought about by import surpluses. Such apparent prosperity is bought at 
the cost of assets erosion -a sure recipe for future economic decline'. 
1 Antonio Bermddez, Director General de Petröleos Mexicanos for the period 1947-1958, in 1963 as 
quoted in R. Duncan, Mexico's Petroleum Exports: safe collateral for a $50 Billion Loan? Available 
from: www. halcoyn. com/duncanrc/. (cited Dec 2000). 
2 Jose Ignacio Carbujas, a Venezuelan political commentator. This sentence was pronounced in a 
conference given for the Presidential Commission for State Reform (COPRE); no date provided. As 
quoted in F. Coronil, The magical state: Nature, money, and modernity in Venezuela (Chicago and 
London, 1997), p. 1. 
3 S. El Serafy, 'The Proper Calculation Of Income From Depletable Natural Resources', in Ahmad, 
Serafy, et al. (eds. ), Environmental Accounting For Sustainable Development: a UNEP- World Bank 
Symposium (Washington D. C., 1989), p. 10. 
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These words of Salah El Serafy were written in 1989, when he was Economic Adviser 
to the World Bank. However new they sounded at the time of the `environmental 
revolution', this chapter shows that Mexicans and Venezuelans of different epochs 
have not ignored the false prosperity of resource driven economies. Yet their 
arguments were not strictly related to the national accounts framework, and they 
hardly ever quantified their claims. For the purposes of this chapter, one needs to 
analyse the wide literature on oil and economy, looking for references regarding the 
issue of the use of natural resources and the generation of wealth for the country. This 
chapter returns to the history and historiography presented in Chapter 1 but seeking 
references to the issues referred in Chapter 2, namely, the concerns about the effects of 
oil exploitation on the income and wealth of the country. The chapter demonstrates 
that Mexican and Venezuelan scholars have contemplated the matter of the actual 
wealth of the country, the ephemeral prosperity delivered by oil depletion and the 
biases that oil cash introduced in the economic perception of the country. 
The chapter also sets out the different approaches to oil exploitation in both countries 
in greater depth. While the Mexican government opted very early on for using oil to 
supply the domestic market with cheap energy, Venezuelan governments adopted the 
`sowing oil' slogan almost simultaneously. As will become clear in the ensuing 
chapters, the implications of each strategy affected every aspect of oil exploitation: 
management, pace of exploration and exploitation, prices, costs of operation, etc. 
3.1 Mexico: The Perception of the Oil Question during the Century 
The following sections follow the benchmarks of the Mexican industry described in 
Chapter 1 in order to analyse different contemporary views. Therefore, the first section 
covers the years from the start of commercial production of crude oil in 1901 to 1938. 
The second section scrutinises the period between the expropriation-nationalisation of 
oil production in 1938 and the mid-1970s. For this period, Mexico was mainly 
producing for its own internal consumption with a small amount of exports, becoming 
a net importer of petroleum by the late 1970s. The last section analyses the new era of 
Mexican energy development that was launched by major oil discoveries in the south 
of the country in 1974, then the country's production and exports experienced an 
important thrust. 
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As mentioned above, during the early days of the twentieth century Mexico was 
following the pattern of a typical export economy, which depended upon increasing 
exploitation of natural resources with cheap labour and foreign capital and technology 
to expand production for overseas markets. Due to the small amount of oil produced at 
this time (a maximum of 10 thousand barrels), the government did not bother to give it 
any special tax treatment until 1912. Oil was not yet a major item of international 
trade and investment, neither a crucial source of power nor an object of bitter 
economic and political competition. For most people, chapopote was not more than a 
local curiosity or a local resource for fishermen and furniture-makers. Chapopote was 
the indigenous word for asphalt. It was used as a form of varnish or to waterproof boat 
bottoms. 
Indeed, oil became only known by the catastrophes it caused 5 In 1908, the British 
company of W. Pearson, hit a gusher. The well caught fire and burned uncontrollably 
for 58 days, with an estimated loss of a million tons of oil. When the raging fire was 
finally bought under control, the well produced only salt water. One year later, a 
second gusher, Portero del Llano No. 4, burst from the soil at a tremendous pressure. 
Engineers improvised the technology required to tame the well: three million barrels of 
oil spewed into the surrounding countryside, devastating the fields during the 60 days 
before it was capped. From the perspective of the early literature, the accidents were 
justifiable; thanks to them, Mexican oil potential became known to the world. 
However, one can assume they were the cost incurred for the early development of the 
industry. Considering that the oil wasted in both accidents almost equalled the actual 
amount exported in those years, the cost acquires its full dimension. They represented 
lost oil stocks for the nation, although no one considered them so or valued their 
dimension in monetary terms. Waste was not yet a worry. 
This attitude slowly changed, partly due to the nationalism arising from the 
Revolution, and also to the increasing economic importance of oil for Mexico. Oil 
companies managed to isolate production from the effects of the Revolution, so that 
4 D. G. Lopez Rosado, Curso de Historia Econdmica de Mexico (Mexico D. F., 1963). 
s Summaries of the main accidents of this epoch originally extracted from journals and pamphlets of the 
time are available from the following sources: PEMEX, (Petröleos Mexicanos), El Petröleo (Mexico 
D. F., 1970), pp. 130-135; `Introduction' to J. C. Brown and A. Knight (eds. ), The Mexican Petroleum 
Industry in the Twentieth Century (Austin, 1992); R. B. Mancke, Mexican Oil and Natural Gas. 
Political, Strategic and Economic Implications (New York, 1979). 
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output in 1921 was fifty-three times greater than in 1910.6 At the beginning of the first 
oil boom, in 1917, the geologist Miguel Bustamante wrote a long report that can 
possibly be considered the first Mexican oil monograph. The report provides some 
very useful information on prices, taxes, production, etc., and surveys and summarises 
foreign and national articles. In addition, the whole of its second chapter is dedicated 
to `the future of the Mexican oil industry and its influence on the industrial 
development of the Republic'. What comes out of those pages can be called naive 
optimism. Naive because it implied hoping and dreaming about the limitless 
possibilities of oil as an engine of economic growth and political independence for 
Mexico. But overall, naive when considering Mexico as an unlimited producer of raw 
materials and hydrocarbon fuel. Apparently, Mexican gushers showed signs of lasting 
longer than in any other place in the world. 8 This was not only a Mexican view; a 
couple of years earlier, an article published in San Francisco stated that Mexican oil 
fields would last much longer than American ones. 
Despite considering the oil fields to be everlasting, Bustamante repeats once and again 
the importance of preventing the waste of Mexican natural resources for the future of 
the Republic. Here we find what is probably the most recurrent topic of Mexican oil 
history, namely, Mexican oil should be for today's and tomorrow's Mexicans: 
` It is not enough that the land of our birth contains inexhaustible treasures and 
that our soil is fertile; it is also necessary to know how to take advantage of those 
resources and not to dissipate them on behalf of foreign nations... '. 1O 
`[... ]it will be possible to develop the exploitation of the natural resources that 
these territories contain in immense quantities and variety [... ] in some other 
more prosperous time'. ' 1 
The first statement already shows the incipient nationalism regarding resource 
exploitation. Even if the resources were inexhaustible, the key was how to take 
advantage nationally. The second one points at a possible conservation strategy, 
waiting for better times for using the resources, which implicitly indicates a concern 
for future generations. 
6 A. Maddison and associates, The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and Growth. Brazil and Mexico 
(Washington, D. C., 1992) p. 145. 
Mexico. Secretaria de Industria y Comercio, El petröleo en la Republica Mexicana (Mexico D. F., 
1917). 
8Ibid., p. 83. 
9 Huntley, L. G, San Francisco, 1915. Quoted in Ibid., p 32. 
10 Ibid., p. 91. 
u Ibid., p. 103. 
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As would occur again in the 1970s, the forecasts in 1917 were over-optimistic. The 
potential estimated production was 200 million barrels per annum. 
12 Such 
production would imply massive investment in infrastructure, but would allow the 
establishment of oil related industries and other industries supported by national 
demand in the Republic. Furthermore, industries established abroad would come to 
Mexico due to the unlimited quantities of hydrocarbons available and the advantage 
of low wages. 13 Oil could make it all possible. After all, oil was seen as the ultimate 
transforming force able to take the Mexican economy to a higher level: 
`Fortunately, the economic conditions of the Nation can be rapidly transformed 
by oil exploitation when we achieve a wide internal consumption [... ] we shall 
be able to avoid the present lack of affordable fuel by having unlimited 
quantities, which has been so far the main obstacle to all our growth attempts. 
In summary: to be profitable for the country our oil industry should endeavour, 
by all possible means, to use all of its production within the country in order to 
increase our means of transport and to develop national industry and 
la agriculture'. 
The path towards economic success was through affordable energy for the country. 
Contrary to what happen in other Latin American countries (i. e. Venezuela), 
Mexico wanted to take advantage of oil as a source of energy within the country 
from the very beginning. 
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These ideals received their most famous -though not necessarily their most 
efficacious- assertion in the 1917 Constitution in which Article. 27 stated that: 
`The Nation shall at all times have the right to impose on private property such 
limitations as the public interest may demand, as well as the right to regulate the 
utilisation of natural resources which are susceptible of appropriation, in order to 
conserve them and to ensure a more equitable distribution of public wealth' 15 
Conservation and distribution issues were at the core of the article that would provide 
the constitutional basis for the oil expropriation. 16 However, the immediate post- 
revolutionary governments maintained a hands-off policy with regard to American 
12 In order to understand the magnitude of that estimation one must consider that Mexico produced only 
30 million barrels in 1916. The forecast multiplied the actual production times six. 
13 Mexico. Secretaria de Industria y Comercio, El petröleo en la Rep4blica Mexicana p. 104. 
14 Ibid., p. 100. 
is Organisation of American States. General Secretariat, Constitution of Mexico 1917 (Washington D. C., 
1977), p. 8. 
16 The same article also provided the constitutional basis for the land reform, since it referred to `natural 
resources' as a whole. For an early analysis of the implications of the article see Mexico, Camara de 
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property, and the potential threat posed by the 1917 Constitution was not taken very 
seriously in the 1920s. 17 
Notwithstanding the differences in language and concerns, it is possible to identify 
some aspects of the later environmental literature in early Mexican writings on oil. 
Both Bustamante and the clauses dedicated to oil in the 1917 Constitution try to take 
into account the interest of future generations. However, the fact that these early 
judgements considered oil exploitation as the economic panacea for Mexico's ills, 
distinguishes them from the environmental approach. 
The Nationalisation: Facing Reality (1938-1970) 
In 1917, everything seemed possible in Mexico thanks to oil. 
Looking at contemporary sources, no one would be able to 
foresee the long decline of the industry for the half-century 
ahead. The predicted production of 200 million barrels per 
annum would not be achieved until some sixty years later. 
What took place in the years immediately after Bustamante's 
article was the rise and fall of Mexican oil production, as 
shown in Table 3.1-1. Production increased almost three fold 
in four years (1917-1921), taking Mexico to a prominent 
position among oil producers and exporters. '8 Yet, this was 
not maintained for long. By 1928 production was below what 
it had been ten years before and it did not recover the levels 
of the early 1920s until the 1970s. 
Table 3.1-1: 
Oil production. 
Mexico 1917-1928 
(thousand barrels) 
Year Production 
1917 55,293 
1918 63,828 
1919 87,063 
1920 157,069 
1921 193,398 
1922 182,278 
1923 149,584 
1924 139,678 
1925 115,515 
1926 90,421 
1927 64,121 
1928 50,151 
Source: Appendix A 
The increasing disagreement between companies and government was both cause and 
consequence of the reduction in production. From the Mexican point of view, the 
companies exhausted oil fields in order to cope with demand. The so-called limitless 
capacity of Mexican oil fields turned into fears of exhaustion in the 1920s and 1930s. 19 
From the companies' side, the government's increasing nationalist tendencies 
paralysed exploration and reduced production. The creation of national reserves -i. e., 
the retention of land for further exploration and potential exploitation by the state- 
Diputados (by M. de la Pera), Estudio juridico, politico y econdmico sobre el Art 27 constitucional 
(Mexico D. F., 1921). 
17 R. Thorp, 'Economy, 1914-1929', in Bethell (ed. ), Latin America Economy and Society 1870-1930 
(Cambridge, 1989), p. 63. 
18 Mexico was the world's greatest exporter and second larger oil producer in 1921. 
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exemplified the point made by the companies. 20 As a consequence, capital started to 
flow away from Mexico, particularly to Venezuela. For the companies, Venezuela was 
a better recipient of capital since they found legislative facilities similar to those of 
Mexico before 1910.21 
Mexicans justified the decline of the oil industry in a different manner. The recent 
discoveries of oil in Venezuela attracted capital which otherwise would have been 
invested in further development of the Mexican industry, if Mexican oil fields had not 
been over-exploited beforehand. 22 The general agreement among Mexican scholars 
was that oil exploitation could not be done in a sensible manner when there were 
several companies involved. 23 According to this view, fields would be totally 
exhausted under private exploitation. Oil was such an important element that its 
exploitation should be beyond individual interest. Oil should not be extracted for profit 
but for the salvation of a society. In addition, the companies were accused of hiding 
profits. 24 The companies were said to be distorting information about their profit 
margins in order to evade taxes. They were not only exhausting Mexican oil, but also 
going away without paying any compensation. 
According to one observer of the time, liberal countries were just generating a 
`misleading and ephemeral prosperity' by allowing rapid exploitation of their oil 
resources.. In her own words: 25 
`A misleading and ephemeral prosperity would have taken place in Mexico if the 
legislation of the beginning of the century had continued to apply. Rich oil fields 
would have probably been discovered. If they were not exhausted by now, they 
would be exploited to the top of their capacity. We would remain as the world's 
second oil producer while wanting for the day of the complete exhaustion to 
arrive. That day we would find that no wealth had been retained'. 26 
19 M. Manterola, 'La Situacibn de la Industria del Petröleo en Mexico y su Reciente Nacionalizaciön', 
Revista de Economia 1(1937) 1-6, p. 364. 
20 For a discussion of National Reserves see J. Lopez Portillo, 'Las Reservas Petroleras Mexicanas', 
Revista de Economic It (1938) 7-12. 
21 On this matter see J. C. Brown, 'Why Foreign Oil Companies Shifted Production from Mexico to 
Venezuela during the 1920s', American Historical Review (1985) 90. 
22 At least that is the Mexican view expressed by several authors in the monthly journal of the National 
Union of Mexican Economists - Revista de Economic- quoted below. It is also the view of E. Sangines 
Villavalva, 'La industria petrolera en Mexico', Revista de Hacienda 11 (1938 Marzo). 
23 The following sentences mostly come from: Lopez Portillo, 'Las Reservas Petroleras Mexicanas'. 
Identical views are expressed by Sangines Villavalva, 'La industria petrolera en M6xico'. 
24 J. Silva Herzog, 'La expropiaci6n de las compaflias petroleras en Mexico', Revista de Economia II 
(1938) 7-12. 
25 Sangines Villavalva, 'La industria petrolera en Mexico'. (Although published in 1938 the article was 
written in June 1937). 
26 Ibid., p. 10. Note the reference to the change of legislation already mentioned in Chapter 1. From 
1884 to 1910, Mexico adopted the unity of soil and subsoil prevalent in North American legislation -the 
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To some extent, these words are very similar to the more recent environmental claims 
stating that `the expansion of economic activity as a consequence of accelerating the 
liquidation of subsoil assets is applauded as good economic performance and it is 
confused with the growth that comes from labour, capital formation, technological 
progress, and efficient organisation'. 27 Mexicans were identifying some of the 
premises of the environmental accounting. This is not to say that the agenda of the 
Mexican government and scholars matched environmentalists' concerns, but it is 
certainly true that the idea of the ephemeral prosperity brought about by resource 
exploitation was present as early as the 1930s. 
What was on the agenda of the Mexican government was the nationalisation of the oil 
industry. In fact, it had long been contemplated. As mentioned above the first hints can 
be identified in the 1917 Constitution. During the 1930s, President Cardenas made 
known on repeated occasions his earnest desire to `to put the machinery in to the hands 
and ownership of the workmen' since that was the faithful interpretation of the 
Revolution. According to him, `the economic independence of Mexico should be based 
accordingly on the liberation of the subsoil from the usurious exploitation to which it 
is now subjected'? $ On 18 March 1938, the Mexican government expropriated by 
executive decree the property of seventeen foreign-owned oil companies without 
compensation. As mentioned in Chapter 1, thousand of pages were written for and 
against this action. 
On the other side of the conflict were the American and British companies whose 
property was confiscated. They supported their position against the expropriation not 
only in defence of their own interests and on a legal basis, but also on grounds of 
efficiency, macro-economic performance and even in social terms. On the American 
side, Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company published two extensive pamphlets on the 
owner of the surface so is of the subsoil. The Revolution brought back the old Spanish split between 
both -subsoil substances belong to the State independently of surface's owner. 27 El Serafy, The Proper Calculation Of Income From Depletable Natural Resources', p. 12. 
28 Speech of March 28,1934, at Villa Hermosa, Tabasco, p. 81 as quoted in Standard Oil Company, The 
Reply to Mexico (New York, 1940), p. 31. The role of the workers in the nationalisation process was 
mentioned in passing in Chapter 1. For a deeper analysis of this issue, see among others S. L. Adleson, 
'The Cultural Roots of the Oil Workers' Unions in Tampico 1910-1925', in Brown and Knight (eds. ), The 
Mexican Petroleum Industry in theTwentieth Century (Austin, 1992); V. Novelo, La dificil democracia 
de los petroleros (Mexico, D. F., 1991); and R. Ramirez Heredia, La otra cara del petr6leo (Mexico, 
D. F., 1979). 
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matter by 1940.29 Apart from discussing the genuine legal issues of the `confiscation', 
it also judges the record of the Mexican government in the oil business: 30 
`The practices of this Mexican oil company [Pemex] are instructive. To date it 
has developed no new oil fields. For the most part it has contented itself with 
tapping oil fields discovered and developed through private initiative... The 
prospect that a substantial volume of oil will continue to be produced by the 
Mexican government is not great' 31 
The companies judged the government incapable of running the industry in their 
absence. In truth it took Pemex almost a decade to organise itself. 32 Emphasising 
Pemex's incapacity by the lack of discoveries and the poor prospects of producing 
substantial volume by the national company brings an interesting point to our 
attention. For the companies the key variable was how much oil they could extract. 
Below we will see that the real issue for the Mexican government was not how much 
oil was available, but for how long would it last 33 
The foreigners continued their arguments against the expropriation by questioning the 
achievements of the government: 
`Nothing has been accomplished by the oil expropriation, which could not have 
been better accomplished by wise governmental regulation of the industry. The 
only real justification for the step, even from the Mexican point of view, was the 
prospect of improving the standard of living within the country. To date this has 
not been accomplished, while the oil expropriated has been sold so hurriedly and 
at such cheap prices as to constitute a sad commentary on the announced ideal of 
conserving the oil in the interest of the nation'. 34 
From the foreigners' perspective the nationalisation was a failure in all respects. 
According to the companies, the mismanagement of the industry by the government 
made it inefficient and economically unsustainable, and failed to fulfil its aim of 
conserving the oil and improving living conditions in the country. The nationalisation 
process, or rather the whole debate over subsoil rights, seriously slowed the pace of 
29 Standard Oil Company, Present Status of the Mexican Oil "Expropriations" (New York, 1940) and 
Standard Oil Company, The Reply to Mexico. 
30 For two different views on legal issues concerning the nationalisation see A. Garcia Robles, La 
Question du Petrole au Mexique et le Droit International (Paris, 1939) for the Mexican side, and R. B. 
Gaither, Expropriation in Mexico. The Facts and the Law (New York, 1940) for the American side. 
31 Standard Oil Company, Present Status ... (1940), pp. 45-46. Square brackets added. 32 On 31 July 1946 the company was still trying to produce a report on the company's activities for 
1938-1939. PEMEX, (Petröleos Mexicanos), 'Estado at 31 de julio de 1946 del trabajo de la memoria 
1938-1939'. (Unpublished internal document, 1946). 
33 See also Appendix E for the exploration policies of Pemex and a brief analysis of the causes behind 
the lack of discoveries in the early days of the national company. 
34 W. C. Gordon, The Expropriation ofForeign-Owned Property in Mexico (Washington D. C, 1941). 
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economic growth. 35 The inefficiency of the national company has been established by 
the literature and even been recognised by Pemex officials. 36 
The government's understanding of sustainability and economic development diverged 
substantially from the companies' view. Overall, the government pursued public 
benefits over private profits: 
`Pemex contributes to the support of national industry and to Mexico's national 
railways by selling them fuels at the world's lowest prices. Such a thing would 
not be possible if Pemex was a private company whose aims should logically be 
lucrative'. 37 
Therefore, the Mexican government justified the low prices argued by the companies 
in terms of the benefits for society and the country's economy of enjoying inexpensive 
energy. The reproach of the companies also referred to failure to sell abroad. Even 
though the rhetoric of Pemex stabilised the fulfilment of domestic requirements before 
oil could be exported, the truth was that the nationalisation had provoked an American 
blockade for Mexican oil. 38 Pemex could do very little to obtain higher prices when no 
market was available. 
On the macro-economic side of the argument, neither the effects of the Great 
Depression on the Mexican economy nor the latter's general performance during the 
1930s have been clearly established in the literature. 9 However, economically, and to 
a lesser extent fiscally, oil was much less important than it had been back in the early 
1920S. 40 Consequently, it is difficult to establish the effect of the nationalisation on the 
Mexican economic growth in those years. Nevertheless, if the premises of 
environmental accounting hold, even if Mexico had continued to exploit the oil fields 
at a rapid pace, it would not have contributed to higher income levels. This also seems 
to have been the belief of the Mexican government. 
35 S. H. Haber, Industry and Underdevelopment. The Industrialisation of Mexico, 1890-1940 (Stanford, 
1989). 
36 G. Philip, Oil And Politics In Latin America. Nationalist Movements And State Companies 
(Cambridge, 1982), pp. 338-339; L. Randall, The Political Economy of Mexican Oil (New York, 1989), 
1-2; PEMEX, (Petröleos Mexicanos), Venta de Pemex 1950-1962 (Mexico D. F., undated), pp. 1Off 
PEMEX, (Petr6leos Mexicanos), Informes del Director General Senador Antonio J. Bermüdez 1947- 
1952 (Mexico D. F., 1952), 1948 report, p. 52. 
38 J. D. BAez, 'Influencia de la guerra en el petrdleo mexicano', Revista de industria 5 (1939 November) 
35. 
79 E. Cardenas, 'The Great Depression and Industrialisation. The case of Mexico', in Thorp (ed. ), Latin 
America in The 1930s, The Role of Periphery in the World Crisis (Oxford, 1984). 
40 L. Meyer, Mexico and the United States in the Oil Controversy. 1917-1942 (Mexico, 1972), as quoted 
by A. Knight, 'The Political Economy of Revolutionary Mexico, 1900-1940', in Abel and Lewis (eds. ), 
Latin America, Economic Imperialism and the State: The Political Economy of The External Connection 
form Independence to the Present (London, 1992), p. 303. Knight continues, `the expropriation was 
more significant as an act of nationalist defiance, carrying important political consequences both at 
home and abroad, than as element within some broad, integrated blueprint for national development'. 
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What is clear is that by the late 1930s the Mexican government insisted on the path, 
initially suggested by Bustamante in 1917, of making productive use of their oil 
endowment within the country's boundaries: 
`Our effort should lead towards consuming in the country all the oil we produce; 
wasting not a single drop; we can be certain that when we have achieved this 
ideal, Mexico will be prosperous, important and respected' 41 
For the Mexican authorities, it was obvious that the only way the country's economic 
conditions could benefit from the national endowment of oil resources was by 
providing affordable energy for the country. This doctrine shaped the principles ruling 
Pemex's policy for the subsequent decades. These were: 
1. The conservation of Mexico's petroleum resources and their use for the good of the 
nation. 
2. The abundant and efficient supply of fuels to all consumers of the Republic. 
3. Sale for export only when domestic needs had been fulfilled. 
4. The contribution to public expenditures of the highest possible amounts through 
the punctual payment of taxes and duties that the Exchequer determines. 
5. The promotion of the social and cultural improvement of oil workers and their 
families by raising their living standards. 
6. The guarantee that the exploitation of petroleum resources would leave collective 
benefits to the regions whose natural wealth has been exploited. 42 
These principles stated unequivocally that the Mexican government considered oil as a 
resource for national development in a very specific way: as a source of affordable 
energy for the country and of income for the oil workers. The fact that those principles 
imposed a heavy burden on Pemex, particularly on its finances, was considered just as 
a subsidy to the national economy. 43 
41 Baez, 'Influencia de la guerra en el petr6leo mexicano', The Engineer Jose D. Baez was chairman of 
the oil department of the Mexican Exchequer (Jefe del Departamento del Petr6leo de la Secretarfa de la 
Economia Nacion al). 
42 PEMEX, Informes del Director General Senador Antonio J. Bermüdez 1947-1952 , report of 1949, 
104. 
°p3 Pemex estimated that the indirect subsidy to the national economy between 1950 and 1962 was 
7693.8 millions of pesos and a direct subsidy for the same period 3559.1 millions of pesos. In fact, 
Pemex was obliged to sell its products at production cost and even below cost for many years. The 
yearly report of the General Director of Pemex in 1957 indicated that the diesel cost them 46.2 cents per 
litre but they only sold it at 17.9 cents so the lost 28.3 cents. The 'tractomex' cost them 44.4 cents per 
litre but they sold it at 13.1 so on, and so forth. This policy affected the costs structure of the company 
which worsened during the 1950s. By 1950 for every peso of product sold the company had to spent 
17.3 cents. However, in 1962 for every peso sold, the company spent 22.3 cents. Data from PEMEX, 
Venta dePemex 1950-1962, pp. 17ff, 10 and 29. 
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Partly as a consequence of conservation and self-sufficiency policies, and the weak 
financial situation of Pemex, only ten percent of the potentially productive geological 
Table 3.1-2: Mexico's 
R/P selected years 
Year Reserves R/P 
Mill Ye- 
barrels 
1960 4,787 29.3 
1965 5,078 24.1 
1970 5,568 19.7 
1975 6,338 15.5 
1976 11,160 25.4 
1977 16,002 22.9 
1978 40,194 64.9 
1979 45,126 61.1 
Sources: Appendix E 
areas were explored between 1938 and 1970.44 The outcome 
was that Mexico started importing oil products by 1956. By 
the 1960s Pemex recognised that Mexico was on the edge of 
facing a real energy supply problem. As Table 3.1-2 shows, 
Mexico's reserves to production ratio (R/P), in other words 
the life expectancy of Mexican oil fields, had been declining 
since 1960. The mandate of supplying abundant and 
affordable fuels to the Republic was at risk. Exploration 
needed to be urgently supported. The creation of the Instituto 
Mexicano del Petröleo in 1965 helped substantially to 
improve the gathering and systematic interpretation of the geophysical information 
available. The rebirth of the Mexican oil industry was on the way. 
The Second Oil Boom: Bounded Optimism and Crisis (1970s-1980s) 
The first results of the increasing exploration activity were visible by 1972.45 In 1974, 
Mexico produced enough oil to be able to export. Two years later huge discoveries 
were made public, together with the decision to export oil in meaningful amounts 
again. Oil continued being a core development resource for the Mexican government, 
but now not only as a supply of economical abundant energy but also, for the first time 
since the nationalisation, as an earner of export revenues. Several explanations are 
given for the change in policy of the 1970s. `A change in administration in 1976 
combined with serious economic problems. Other variations derive from unexpected 
frustration and unanticipated opportunities that emerged as the nation's export 
potential increased. Still another explanation is the novelty of the situation that saw the 
decision-makers confronted with new conditions that had not been carefully thought 
out' 46 
The change in oil policy was a process in two phases. During the presidency of 
Echevarria (1970-1976), nationalistic sensitivities and domestic political discretion 
weighed heavily in favour of conservationist rhetoric, but evolving practice hinted at a 
44 A. M. Sordo and C. R. Lopez, Exploraci6n, Reservas y Produccian de Petröleo en Mexico, 1970-1985 
(Mexico D. F., 1st. ed., 1988). See Appendix E for Pemex's exploration policies. 
45 Between ten and fifteen years elapse from the beginning of exploration work until economically 
profitable production is obtained. 
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less restrictive policy. 47 After 1976, with the rise of Lopez Portillo to the presidency, 
the official stance changed to emphasise increasing exports. Oil was expected to 
relieve the economy from both foreign and fiscal constraints. The public and private 
sectors went on an investment spree beginning in 1978, which was accelerated by an 
oil price rise and new oil discoveries in 1979.48 
By the early 1980s, Pemex played a strategic role in the country's situation and 
prospects. Oil exports accounted for 75 percent of Mexico's total merchandise exports, 
making them the main source of foreign exchange. The oil industry contributed 26 
percent of fiscal revenues (see Table 3.1-3). In addition, almost a third of total public 
Table 3.1-3: Fiscal and export dependency on oil. Mexico 1972-1982 
Year Fiscal revenue Export revenu e 
Total Oil ONTotal Total Oil OiuTotal 
mill pesos mill pesos mill pesos mill pesos 
1972 148,445 1,921 1.3% 20,830.0 324 1.6% 
1973 205,661 2,283 1.1% 25,896.3 449 1.7% 
1974 281,626 3,800 1.3% 35,665.0 1,668 4.7% 
1975 403,615 7,674 1.9% 38,280.0 5,288 13.8% 
1976 528,451 9,682 1,8% 57,354.8 7,003 12.2% 
1977 734,180 19,764 2,7% 105,504.0 23,431 22.2% 
1978 950,647 30,283 3,2% 137,996.2 41,796 30.3% 
1979 1,293,073 62,390 4,8% 201,219.9 91,691 45.6% 
1980 683,781 168,107 24,6% 347,325.3 239,503 69.0% 
1981 931,777 242,706 26,0% 475,974.4 357,538 75.1% 
1982 1,515,403 317,040 20,9% 1,275,914.5 953,188 74.7% 
Sources: Appendixes B for export data and C for fiscal data. 
investment was 
directly carried out 
by the oil industry. 49 
In words of Ramon 
Beteta, in theory, 
`oil wealth should 
bring Mexico 
beyond the reach of 
the ambitions of the 
powerful'. 50 High 
expectations of 
future public 
revenues encouraged a rising fiscal deficit. For some time, this public-expenditure-led- 
growth made possible for the economy to grow at 8 and 9 percent per annum. In 1981, 
with lower oil prices and higher interest rates, the deficit reached unprecedented levels. 
It was largely financed with more indebtedness in the erroneous belief that the decline 
in oil prices was temporary. This was the most serious mistake of the Mexican 
government according to Lustig. 5' The limit of external borrowing capacity was finally 
46 E. Williams, The Rebirth of the Mexican Petroleum Industry (Massachusetts, 1979), p. 42. 
47 Ibid. 
4e N. Lustig, Mexico, the remaking of an economy (Washington, DC, 1992), p. 20 
49 M. R. Beteta, 'The Role of The Oil Industry in Mexico', in Falk (ed. ), Petroleum and Mexico's Future 
(London, 1987). 
so 'Introduction' to P. S. Falk (ed. ), Petroleum and Mexico's Future (London, 1987). Mr. Beteta was 
head of Pemex from 1982 to 1987. 
51 Lustig, Mexico, the remaking of an economy, p. 26. 
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reached in 1982, following large devaluations of the peso, chaos in the financial 
markets and the beginning of the international debt crisis 52 
The oil boom did not produce the desired dramatic transformation of the economy and 
permanent improvement in living standards. On the contrary, crisis and increased 
poverty followed it. This forced a reconsideration of the role oil played in the Mexican 
economy: 
`Mexico should reduce its dependence on oil.... [Petroleum] neither signifies 
any special excellence on our part nor makes us worthy of any special privilege. 
Rather, it placed on our shoulders many grave responsibilities and problems'. 5 
In a very brief period of time, oil passed from being once again the cure to all Mexican 
economic ills to being at the root of most problems. Yet we also know that, in 
comparative perspective, Mexico's history is not one of `petrodependency'. This was 
only a relatively recent concern for Mexico. Not even in the 1920s did the Mexican 
government contemplate `petrodependency' as an issue. Nevertheless, it did not take 
too long for the old rhetoric of the 1930s, which had been abandoned in the late 1970s, 
to come back but with slight modifications: 
`Hydrocarbons are non-renewable resources and therefore finite. For this reason, 
and given that the period of cheap and abundant energy is coming to an end, we 
must be increasingly conscious of how important it is for the country to save 
hydrocarbons and to use them economically and rationally. As we make progress 
in using and conserving our energy resources, we shall be able to prolong our 
export capacity and, with it, our foreign exchange earnings. Above all, we shall 
be able to maintain our current level of self-sufficiency' 54 
The finiteness of the oil endowment, the conservationist approach to its use, and 
maintaining the level of auto-sufficiency had formed part of Pemex's policy from the 
beginning of its existence. The main difference is that, from the 1970s, export and 
fiscal revenues from the oil sector re-emerged as contributions to the economic 
progress of Mexico. The ephemeral prosperity that this may entail was forgotten. 
52 For the chain of events leading to the 1982 crisis see J. Ros, 'Mexico from the Oil Boom to the Debt 
Crisis: and analysis of policy responses to external shocks, 1978-1985', in Thorp and Whitehead (eds. ), 
Latin American Debt and Ajustment Crisis (Oxford, 1987) and/or the numerous references provided by 
Chapter 1 in Lustig, Mexico, the remaking of an economy. 
s' Beteta, 'The Role of The Oil Industry in Mexico', p. 64. 
54 Ibid., p. 71. 
Oil Illusion 98 
After this brief survey of Mexican policies towards oil exploitation it is worth asking 
how `conservationist' Mexican governments were from the 1930s to the 1970s when 
applying today's `green' criteria to their decisions. If one were to analyse Mexican 
strategy for that period from the eyes of today's green economist, the result would not 
be totally satisfactory. For the `green' economist, the basic idea is that `true' or 
`sustainable' income is that flow of income that leaves the capital stock of the 
economy intact. " In other words, no development path can be sustained beyond the 
short-run if it involves running down national assets. 56 That is separate from the issue 
of who is exploiting the resources. Bustamante's proposition differs from the latter as 
long as Mexicans were entitled to use their oil resources on their behalf. 
It is also possible to ask whether the `conservationism' exhibited by Mexican 
authorities with respect to oil exploitation was just a result of the situation created by 
their own nationalistic aspirations. After the expropriation, exploration activities 
stopped and export markets were closed to Mexican oil. Had they aimed at exporting 
oil, they would have found it very difficult. Even during the mid-1980s, when the 
export policy began to inch back to a rather moderate stance, the main concern was 
economic destabilisation brought about by oil revenues, not the conservation of the 
resource for future generations. 
The Mexican strategy resulted in a slower pace of exploitation overall, which would be 
approved by `green' standards. However, the reasoning leading to such a result was 
not inspired by environmental but nationalistic principles. Notwithstanding this, it is 
also true that Mexican scholars and government officials acknowledged very early on 
in the century some of the crucial concerns of the environmental literature of the last 
quarter of the century. 
55 D. W. Pearce, 'Valuing The Environment : Past Practice, Future Prospect', in Serageldin and Steer 
(eds. ), Valuing The Environment: proceedings of the First Annual International Conference On 
Environmentally Sustainable Development held at the World Bank, September 30-October 1,1993 
(Washington D. C., 1993). 
56 Ibid., p. 53. 
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3.2 Venezuela: The illusion of Oil Wealth through History 
Chapter 1 made clear the importance of oil for Venezuela. The historiography of 
Venezuelan oil covers not only exploitation itself but also many repercussions and 
influences on the economy, society, politics and culture of Venezuela. 57 However, it is 
not the purpose of this section to analyse the literature on oil and development in 
Venezuela, nor to distinguish between authors who bless oil for all the progress it 
brought to Venezuela and those who blame oil for all the problems of the country. The 
aim of the present paragraphs is briefly to review the historiography, looking for 
testimonies throughout the century that corroborate the claim that the leitmotif of this 
research has not been ignored by Venezuelans of different epochs. 
In the historical statements of politicians, experts and journalists, it is easy to identify 
concerns about the `real gains' from oil, which emerged almost as soon as 
Venezuelans realised their dependence on oil. Nevertheless, since national accounting 
in Venezuela was not developed until the 1950s, there is no direct suggestion that the 
economic performance portrayed by national statistics may be misleading for 
Venezuela until the second half of the century. 58 
The benchmarks chosen for the analysis of Venezuela are based on the discussion in 
Chapter 1. The first one is the ultraliberal period of the early years of the oil industry. 
Those come to an end with the change in the balance of power between the companies 
and the government brought about by the Hydrocarbon Law of 1943. During the 
subsequent decades, the State progressively gained more control over the industry, 
which ultimately culminated in nationalisation in 1976. Finally, the oil boom and bust 
of the late 1970s and early 1980s is analysed. 
The Early Years 
As early as 1839 the Ministry of Finance sought advice from a scholar of the time, 
Jose Vargas, about the possible ways in which the State could benefit from `certain 
mineral substances found scattered in the country'. 59 In his reply to the Ministry, 
Vargas stated that: 
57 I. Rodriguez Gallard, El petröleo en la historiografia venezolana (Caracas, 1974). This work provides 
an excellent review of the Venezuelan literature on oil up to the 1970s, as does J. V. Lombardi, G. 
Can: era Damas, et al., Venezuelan History: A comprehensive working bibliography (Boston, 1977). 
S8 See Appendix D for a brief description of the evolution of national accounting in Venezuela. 
39 When Spanish colonists arrived in Maracaibo in 1499, they found Indians using oil and asphalt that 
emerged naturally on the lake shores. Nevertheless, these substances were rarely used during the 
colonial period. 
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`It would be more convenient to rent the mine [of asphalt/oil] than its 
direct exploitation by the State. I would suggest to the Government that 
it continues its inquiries to discover the extent to which the mineral 
exists... it is my only belief that this finding has more value for 
Venezuelan people and its liberal government than the finding of silver 
and gold. ' 60 
Vargas acknowledged that the best way to take advantage of the `mineral substance' 
was by leasing the rights to exploit the mines to the private sector. He not only 
proposed the main outline of Venezuelan oil policy almost a century in advance, but 
also correctly predicted the crucial importance that oil would acquire for Venezuela. 
At the turn of the century, Venezuela was largely an agricultural and underdeveloped 
country. Yet there were signs that oil could be found in large quantities in the 
country. 61 The government strictly followed the advice given by Vargas: from 1878 to 
1920, the government awarded 1312 contracts for oil exploitation. 2 Juan Vicente 
Gömez's dictatorial regime (1908-1935) relied on the new fiscal revenues generated 
by the oil concessions to confront the stagnant economy and the large foreign debt. 
The government preached about the brilliant future oil secured for Venezuela: 
`The economic and industrial activity is vast in the country. Mining in particular 
has enormous progress assured mainly because of oil, but also due to the 
existence of extensive deposits of gold, copper, coal, etc. Venezuela holds the 
first position among South American oil producers, and her natural endowment 
guarantees her a brilliant future'. 63 
As in the early days in Mexico, oil was perceived as the key for the economic success 
of the country. In fact, the aim of one of the earliest ministers of industrial planning 
(Gumersindo Torres) was to obtain as much revenue from oil as Mexico did at the 
60 Extracts from the letter of Jose Vargas to the Ministry of Finance. The full text of the letter can be 
found in P. E. Mejia Alarc6n, La industria del petröleo en Venezuela (Caracas, 1972) pp. 81-83. The 
letter is also quoted in A. R. Martinez, 'El papel de la explotaci6n petrolera en el proceso de 
modernizaci6n de la sociedad venezolana y la perspectiva inmediata', in Mieres (ed. ), Hacia la 
Venezuela Post-petrolera [conference sponsored by la Academia Nacional de las Ciencias Econömicas 
in 19851, Vol. 1 (Caracas, 1989), p. 12. 
61 The existence of widely scattered oil seeps had been known for centuries. The first reported 
application for an oil lease was in 1863 and the first two oil concessions were issued in 1866 (though 
asphalt concessions were granted as early as 1854). The Petroleum Times, 23 July 1927. 
62 Most of the contracts belonged to foreign companies, though in 1913 Royal-Dutch Shell bought 
nearly all the concessions granted between 1907 and 1912. W. M. Sullivan, 'Situaci6n econ6mica y 
politica durante el periodo de Juan Vicente G6mez, 1908-1935', in John Boulton Foundation (ed. ), 
Politica y economia en Venezuela, 1810-1976 (Caracas, 1976), p. 258. 
63 Minister Dr. Planas-Suarez in an interview to the newspaper 'Dimineata ' of Bucharest (9 Oct 1924) 
during the First Diplomatic Mission of Venezuela to Romania, as quoted in Venezuela. Ministeno de 
Relaciones Exteriores, 'La Primera Misi6n Diplomitica de Venezuela en Rumania', Boletin del 
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 1 (1924) 1. 
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time. 64 Yet, while the Mexican government was hinting at increasing the use of the 
resource domestically, the Venezuelan government dictated laws that facilitated the 
expansion of the oil industry. The law passed on 13 June 1922 gave the oil companies 
the incentives to redouble their exploration efforts. 65 Major discoveries followed in the 
subsequent years, which led Venezuela's oil production to overtake that of Mexico by 
1928.66 
Nevertheless, there were criticisms of government policy on oil exploitation. For 
some, the concessions were nothing but the `surrender of national sovereignty to the 
imperialist capital'. The overall perception was that `only the favourites of the dictator 
prospered. The petroleum enclave benefited foreigners and the dictator' 67 After 
Gomez's death in 1935, opponents of the petroleum industry were permitted to speak 
openly. The attacks were three-pronged: against Gömez's policy, against company 
behaviour, and against the industry's dominant position in the national economy. 68 
They marked the onset of the shadows of nationalism that were to impregnate the late 
1930s and were the prelude of the changes of the early 1940s. 
In 1936, Arturo Uslar Pietri urged the Venezuelan government to `sow oil'. 69 Uslar 
Pietri referred to `sowing oil' as the use that the State made of oil tax revenues. 
According to him, the cash received by the State from selling oil was not the result of 
any productive effort but a kind of `divine loan' with either terms or interest. 70 
Therefore, it should be employed precisely as a loan: prudently and sensibly, taking 
into account the returns and the possibilities of recovering the amount received. His 
concern was how to transform the transitory income from oil into permanent wealth 
64 J. Salazar-Carrillo, Oil and Development in Venezuela During the Twentieth Century (London, 1994), 
p. 37. 
65 Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
66 As mentioned in Chapter 1, no major discoveries occurred in Venezuela until the blow out of well Los 
Barrosos No2 in December 1922. 
67 L. Allen, Venezuelan Economic Development. A Politico-Economic Analysis. Contemporary Studies 
in Economic and Financial Analysis, edited by Altman, E. I. and I. Walter, Vol. 7 (Connecticut, 1977), 
p. 3. 
68 E. Lieuwen, Petroleum In Venezuela :A History, University of California Publications in History, 
Vol. 47 (Berkeley, 1954). It is worth recalling here that the commented bibliography of this work 
provides an excellent overview of the historiography of oil before the 1950s. 
69 A. Uslar Pietri, 'Siembra del petr6leo', Ahora, (14 June 1936). 
70 A. Uslar Pietri, 'LEn qu6 medida se ha cumplido el vaticinio de Uslar Pietri (Ahora, 1936) sobre el 
parasitismo rentista en la Venezuela petrolera? ', in Mieres (ed. ), Hacia la Venezuela Post-petrolera 
[conference sponsored by la Academia Nacional de las Ciencias Econdmicas in 19851, Vol. 1 (Caracas, 
1989), p. 1 14. The rest of the argument also relies in this source. 
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for the nation, not whether Venezuela was obtaining a `fair share' (participaciön justa) 
of the petroleum profits. 7' 
Uslar Pietri's proposition set the basis of the national policy regarding the use of 
monetary resources obtained from oil in the promotion of development in its human, 
scientific and economic dimensions. 2 Already in 1937, one finds echoes of `sowing 
oil' in speeches in Congress and in government publications. 3 Transforming the 
transitory income from oil into permanent wealth for the nation required treating oil 
income as `extraordinary resources' that should not form part of the ordinary national 
income flow but be set aside and reinvested. 74 In this regard, Ulsar Pietri's concerns 
were identical to the environmental accounting literature of the 1990s presented in 
Chapter 2. 
Comprehending the Reality of Oil (1940s) 
The nationalist voices that rose in Venezuela spurred on by the nationalisation of oil in 
Mexico were the prelude to the reforms that took place in Venezuela in the early 
1940s. The balance of power shifted slowly from the companies towards the 
government side. The Hydrocarbon Law of 1943, which broadened the government's 
technical and administrative powers, made this obvious. 5 The enforcement of the 
1943 law had a special importance in the historic evolution of the petroleum industry, 
since it governed the industry with small modifications until nationalisation in 1976. It 
introduced the concept of income tax and raised royalties to 16213 percent. This figure 
was calculated in order to assure the government of one-half of the net profits of the 
71 I. Rodriguez Gallard, El petröleo en la historiografla venezolana (Caracas, 1974), p. 86. For a good 
insight into the 'fair share' question see J. P. Perez Alfonzo, La Dinc mica del Petröleo en el Progreso de 
Venezuela [conference sponsored by Universidad Central de Venezuela. Foro Petrolero 19651 
(Caracas, 1965). Some more radical propositions from the left can be found in the works of Hector 
Malave Mata and Pedro Mejia Alarcon. 
72 E. Arcilla Farias, 'LEn que medida se ha cumplido el vaticinio de Uslar Pietri (Ahora, 1936) sobre el 
parasitismo rentista en la Venezuela petrolera?, ten que medida se ha sembrado el petr6leo7, Lcuil es el 
significado del momento actual en esta evolucidn? ', in Mieres (ed. ), Hacia la Venezuela Post-petrolera 
[conference sponsored by la Academia Nacional de las Ciencias Econdmicas in 1985], Vol. 1 (Caracas, 
1989), p. 124. 
73 See Venezuela. Camara de Diputados, 'Intervencibn del Senador Rojas Contreras', in Diario de 
Debates: (Caracas, 1937, July 3) and Venezuela. Ministeno de Hacienda, Memoria (Caracas, 1937). 
74 See Arcilla Farias, 'LEn que medida se ha cumplido el vaticinio de Uslar Pietri... ', p. 124. See also the 
doctrine of Perez Alfonso as government minister during the late 1950s, and his intervention in the 
seminar by T. E. Carrillo Batalla, 'El ingreso fiscal petrolero', in La evaluaciön de la inversion del 
ingreso fiscal petrolero en Venezuela [conference sponsored by Universidad Central de Venezuela. 
Foro Petrolero 1965] (Caracas, 1968), p. 51. 
75 Lieuwen, Petroleum In Venezuela :A History, p. 97. 
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Mexico were the prelude to the reforms that took place in Venezuela in the early 
1940s. The balance of power shifted slowly from the companies towards the 
government side. The Hydrocarbon Law of 1943, which broadened the government's 
technical and administrative powers, made this obvious. 5 The enforcement of the 
1943 law had a special importance in the historic evolution of the petroleum industry, 
since it governed the industry with small modifications until nationalisation in 1976. It 
introduced the concept of income tax and raised royalties to 1623 percent. This figure 
was calculated in order to assure the government of one-half of the net profits of the 
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Venezuela [conference sponsored by Universidad Central de Venezuela. Foro Petrolero 1965] 
(Caracas, 1965). Some more radical propositions from the left can be found in the works of Hector 
Malave Mata and Pedro Mejia Alarc6n. 
72 E. Arcilla Farias, 'LEn que medida se ha cumplido el vaticinio de Uslar Pietri (Ahora, 1936) sobre el 
parasitismo rentista en la Venezuela petrolera?, Len qu6 medida se ha sembrado el petrdieo?, Lcuil es el 
significado del momento actual en esta evoluci6n? ', in Mieres (ed. ), Hacia la Venezuela Post-petrolera 
[conference sponsored by la Academia Nacional de las Ciencias Econbmicas in 1985], Vol. 1 (Caracas, 
1989), p. 124. 
73 See Venezuela. Camara de Diputados, 'Intervenci6n del Senador Rojas Contreras', in Diario de 
Debates: (Caracas, 1937, July 3) and Venezuela. Ministerio de Hacienda, Memoria (Caracas, 1937). 
74 See Arcilla Farias, 'LEn qu6 medida se ha cumplido el vaticinio de Uslar Pietri... ', p. 124. See also the 
doctrine of P6rez Alfonso as government minister during the late 1950s, and his intervention in the 
seminar by T. E. Carrillo Batalla, 'El ingreso fiscal petrolero', in La evaluaci6n de la inversion del 
ingreso fiscal petrolero en Venezuela [conference sponsored by Universidad Central de Venezuela. 
Foro Petrolero 1965] (Caracas, 1968), p. 51. 
7s Lieuwen, Petroleum In Venezuela :A History, p. 97. 
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industry. 76 The 1943 law also introduced the principle of reversion. The concessions 
would last forty years, and at that time the concession and all property associated with 
it would revert free of encumbrances to the State. Gumersindo Torres had already 
introduced the idea of reversion in his law of 1920, but the companies rewrote it the 
following year. The 1943 law was clear and unequivocal: the companies could extract 
oil owned by the nation from the nation's property for a specified period after which 
everything, including all improvements and company property, belonged to the State. 77 
Most of the reforms introduced in 1943 set the pattern for other oil countries' 
legislation in subsequent decades. 
According to the Venezuelan government, `the system 
of taxing the oil industry did not come into existence 
spontaneously. It grew with the realisation that oil is a 
non-replaceable natural resource that belongs to the 
nation'. 78 This recognition led the oil minister during the 
three years of the first Accibn Democrätica government 
(1945-48) to attempt to reduce the amount of oil 
extracted in order to preserve future generations' 
income. It was all in vain, since his efforts did not offset 
the expanding market for Venezuelan oil in the post-war 
reconstruction of Western Europe. In addition, the 
government had an increasing need for funds to finance 
Table 3.2-1: 
Oil Production. 
Venezuela 1940-1950 
(thousand barrels) 
1940 183 800 
1941 226,800 
1942 152,000 
1943 179,400 
1944 257,000 
1945 323,400 
1946 388,500 
1947 434,900 
1948 490 000 
1949 482,000 
1950 546,000 
Source: Appendix A. 
ambitious programs of social reform and economic development. 79 Accordingly, 
Venezuelan production almost doubled between 1945 and 1950 (see Table 3.2-1). 
The increasing production also increased the dependence of Venezuela's economy 
upon oil. The Ministry of Development, in its analysis of diverse aspects of the 
Venezuelan economy towards the end of the decade recognised that: 
`About 2 million bolivars of imports for a population not exceeding four 
million people, in a country with a very small internal economic activity, 
provides a clear idea of the condition of the Venezuelan economy. To this 
76 Yet, on 1948, arguing that 1943 was a year of unusually low market price, thus royalties were 
insufficient to guarantee the government one-half of the profits, the congress moved the 50-50 concept 
to the income tax. 
77 Allen, Venezuelan Economic Development. A Politico-Economic Analysis, p. 65. 
78 From the introduction to Venezuela. Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons, 'The petroleum industry 
and its fiscal obligations in Venezuela by A. Parra', in Ist Venezuelan Petroleum Congress organised by 
the Venezuelan Society of Petroleum Engineers (Caracas, 1962). 
79 E. Lieuwen, 'The politics of energy in Venezuela', in Wirth (ed. ), Latin American Oil Companies and 
the Politics of Energy (London, 1985). 
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grave situation we shall add the fact that 95 percent of all we import is paid for 
by exports of a single product: oil. [... ] this denotes a dangerous circumstance 
which need to be reversed [... ] we know we cannot produce oil forever. We 
have to make the effort to produce different products in order to be less 
dependent on foreign commodities and to be able to pay with things other than 
oil'. 80 
None of the issues raised in the analysis were new. The dependence on oil revenues 
had been recognised since Juan Vicente Gömez's times. The transitory nature of oil 
proceeds had been acknowledged by the adoption of the `sowing oil' slogan. The only 
difference was that the magnitudes involved at the end of the 1940s were greater than 
ever before. The share of oil exports in total exports rose from 90 percent in 1935 to 97 
percent in 1948. The percentage of government income dependent on oil revenues had 
been about 30 percent in 1935 but was double that amount in 1948.81 
Venezuelan governments progressively started to impose their authority over the oil 
industry during the 1940s. However, the strategy regarding oil exploitation still 
followed the advice provided a century earlier: leasing the oil fields to the private 
sector in order to produce revenues for the State. 
Measuring the Gains (1950s-1960s) 
From the point of view of this research, the 1950s and 1960s provide some more 
useful testimonies regarding the misleading nature of economic statistics for oil 
producing countries, the difficulties of measuring the value of natural resources and 
the evaluation of the oil depletion strategy followed by Venezuela. 
The concerns about the `special' economic circumstances of the country and the 
possibly misleading indicators displayed by the incipient national statistics become 
apparent by the early 1950s. Within the country itself, the government admitted that 
`the circulation of such an extraordinary volume of wealth (that obtained from oil) 
injects a special bonanza to the country's economy'. 82 The perception that Venezuela's 
economic indicators were peculiar also started to be contemplated by international 
organisations in their reports. A 1955 survey on the post-war industrialisation of Latin 
eo Venezuela. Ministerio de Fomento, Diversos Aspectos de la Economia Venezolana (Caracas, 1948), 
pp. 5-6. 
See Appendixes B for export data and C for fiscal data. 
82 Venezuela. Ministerio de Trabajo, Realidades de la Seguridad Social (Caracas, 1955), p. 141. 
Parenthesis and emphasis added. The translation may lose some of the connotation of the sentence in 
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2. In a speech to the newly instated National Congress in 1959, the Ministry of Mines 
and Hydrocarbons declared that: 
`To determine the intrinsic value of a non-renewable natural product would be 
very difficult if not impossible. That value was never considered before in cost 
studies, because economists generally based their theories in man-made 
products and not natural resources. The great abundance of the latter allows 86 their exploitation for some time without assigning them any intrinsic value'. 
The Minister identified a key area of environmental accounting of crucial relevance to 
this research: the monetary valuation of non-produced economic exhaustible assets. He 
also acknowledged that part of the problem lay in the fact that natural resources 
generally lie outside the interest of economic boundaries -generally constrained to 
produced assets. We know from Chapter 2 that the solution has been to assimilate the 
properties of natural resources to those of man-made assets. Finally, he concluded that 
there was no urgent need to assign any value to the resources given their abundance. 
The environmental literature aims to demonstrate that even when most natural 
resources have not grown scarcer historically, it is still important to account for the 
cost of exploiting them. 
Nonetheless, even if assigning an intrinsic value to the resource was considered an 
impossible task, the cost associated with the depletion of the natural resources was not 
a totally neglected issue. In the words of Perez Alfonso, former oil minister, in 1965: 
`We are liquidating national assets [when extracting oil]; therefore, the national 
commitment should be to substitute those liquidated assets in order to avoid 
collective ruin. [To that end] we should set aside the oil fiscal receipts (ingreso 
petrolero) and reinvest it'. 87 
The first sentence of this remark is identical to the arguments of the sustainability 
school presented in Chapter 2. The difference, however, is that Venezuelans assigned 
the value of the fiscal intake by the State to the oil depleted. 88 The reasoning was as 
86 Venezuela, Government of, Exposition of the Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons to the National 
Congress (Caracas, 1959), p. 6. 
87 See the words of Perez Alfonso in Carrillo Batalla, 'El ingreso fiscal petrolero', p. 51. 
88 Carrillo Batalla, 'El ingreso fiscal petrolero', p. 42. It is fair to notice at this point that fiscal oil 
receipts are referred to as 'oil income' (ingreso petrolero) in the original documents. 'Oil income' 
should generally refer to all the cash flows directly thrown into the economy by the oil industry. 
However, these cash flows have two distinctive components, each of which tends to be referred as 'oil 
income'. On the one hand, what is normally identified as the oil sector contribution to the national 
income that basically aggregates wages and salaries plus the remuneration to capital. On the other hand, 
the fiscal intake by the State from the oil industry. 'Sowing oil' analysts referred to 'oil income' only as 
the oil fiscal intake by the State. Nevertheless, from their discussion it is possible to say that they were 
identifying the oil fiscal revenue with the oil depletion value. 
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follows. 89 The State owned the mineral resources by law. 90 Therefore, when mineral 
products are sold, a national good is being traded and liquidated. Hereupon, the State 
should be compensated for the liquidation of the mines. In this view, taxes upon oil 
extraction are not a fiscal obligation on nature, but the price received from the sale of a 
good that belongs to the national endowment. Taxes are the liquidation value of a pre- 
existing asset. Therefore, oil fiscal revenues should not form part of the national flow 
of resources available in any given year and should be reinvested in the promotion of 
economic development 91 Otherwise, Venezuelans would fail `to transform the 
transitory wealth from oil into permanent wealth for the nation'. 2 These statements 
constitute the essence of the `sowing oil' rhetoric. 
Scholars and policy makers have attempted to evaluate the success of `sowing oil' 
policies ever since its adoption as a generic slogan in the late 1930s. The general 
conclusion was much the same whenever the evaluation took place either in 1950s, 
1960s or the late 1980s: sowing oil had been a flawed project. 93 It could be said that 
rather than `sow' it had been an oil spill 94 In general terms, the economic resources of 
the nation had only been marginally used. 95 
In order to evaluate `sowing oil' policies, comparisons were drawn between the oil tax 
revenues collected by the government and public capital expenditure. The approach 
adopted was to consider that all of the fiscal receipts should have been invested in 
capital goods. That is, the equivalent to the net price approach that suggests that all the 
e9 The nature of the oil taxes has been taken from Carrillo Batalla, 'El ingreso fiscal petrolero', p. 16-17 
and several of the remarks of the participants of in the seminar. See, in particular, Perez Alfonso's 
commentaries there and in T. E. Carrillo Batalla, 'Evaluaciön de la inversion del ingreso fiscal petrolero 
en Venezuela: resumen y conclusiones', in La evaluaciön de la inversion del ingreso fiscal petrolero en 
Venezuela [conference sponsored by Universidad Central de Venezuela. Foro Petrolero 19651 
(Caracas, 1968), p. 114. 
90 We saw in Chapter 1 that contrary to the unity of soil and subsoil prevalent in the North American 
legislation, where the owner of the surface also owns the subsoil, the old Spanish law split between 
both, giving the ownership of the subsoil to the State regardless of the surface's owner. 
91 Arcilla Farias, 'LEn quo medida se ha cumplido el vaticinio de Uslar Pietri... ', p. 124. 
92 A. Uslar Pietri, De una a otra Venezuela (Caracas, 1966). Emphasis added. 
93 Among others, see, Lieuwen, Petroleum In Venezuela :A History, p. 119; T. E. Carrillo Batalla, La 
evaluaciön de la inversion del ingreso fiscal petrolero en Venezuela [conference sponsored by 
Universidad Central de Venezuela. Foro Petrolero 1965] (Caracas, 1968); C. Balestrini, 'LCual ha sido 
el papel cumplido por la explotaci6n petrolera en el proceso de modernizaci6n de la sociedad 
venezolana? ', in Mieres (ed. ), Hacia la Venezuela Post-petrolera [conference sponsored by la Academia 
Nacional de las Ciencias Econdmicas in 1985], Vol. 1 (Caracas, 1989). 
94 Hector Malave Mata in his intervention in the seminar by T. E. Carrillo Batalla, 'La distribucidn del 
ingreso fiscal petrolero entre gastos corrientes y gastos de inversion', in La evaluacidn de la inversion 
del ingreso fiscal petrolero en Venezuela [conference sponsored by Universidad Central de Venezuela. 
Foro Petrolero 19651 (Caracas, 1968), p. 91. 
95 `Sowing oil', The Economist, 7 Jan 1950. 
Oil Illusion 108 
resource rent is to be reinvested for guaranteeing future consumption. 96 Figure 3.2-1 
shows the evolution of total tax receipts, oil tax receipts, total public expenditure, 
public capital expenditure and the traditional GDP of Venezuela for the period 1917- 
1964. 
Figure 3.2- 1: Evaluating `sowing oil policies'. Tax receipts, public expenditure 
and GDP in Venezuela 1917-1964 
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Sources and notes: 
Total oil taxes: for 1917-1955 include royalty, surface tax, income tax (from 1944), customs 
duties, other taxes, and occasional taxes from Venezuela. Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons, 
'The petroleum industry and its fiscal obligations in Venezuela by A. Parra', Appendix D, 
Table D-5. For the years 1955-1964 include actual regular taxes collected by the Exchequer, 
PODE 1970, p. 155 
GDP: calculated using GDP in million bolivars of 1968 from A. Baptista, Bases Cuantitativas 
de la Economia Venezolana, 1830-1989 (Caracas, 1991), pp. 35-36, reflated by the GDP 
deflator of Venezuela in Ibid., p. 300-301. 
Total tax receipts: Banco Central de Venezuela, La economia venezolana en los ültintos treinta 
cinco anos (Caracas, 1978), p. 273. 
Public expenditure: 1917-1964, Carrillo Batalla, La evaluacidn de la inversion del ingreco 
fiscal petroleru en Venezuela (conference sponsored by Universidad Central de Venezuela. 
Faro Petrolero 1965] 
, cuadro no. 
1, p. 225. 
Public capital expenditure: 1917-1964, Ibid. , cuadro no I, p. 225. The figures of capital investment from Carrillo Batalla exclude the amortisation of public debt (p. 81). 
vfi R. Repetto, Wasting Assets: Natural Resources In the National Income Accounts (Washington, D. C., 
1989). 
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Several conclusions were drawn from these series in 1965. The first related to the 
narrowing gap between total GDP and total public expenditure. The public sector had 
become increasingly important in Venezuela, and public expenditure was 
progressively funded more by oil fiscal income. Yet the issue on which analysts 
focused was the evolution of oil tax receipts and public capital investment. As long as 
oil tax revenues exceeded public capital investment, they said, it was possible to talk 
of national impoverishment, given that the economy was failing to undertake 
investment equivalent to the fiscal resources received from the exploitation -i. e. 
depletion- of a non-renewable resource. 7 From 1927 to 1963, the capital investment 
done by Venezuelan governments failed to match the fiscal oil tax receipts collected, 
excluding 1958 - the only year with a fiscal deficit too. From 1917 to 1964, 
Venezuelan governments collected an aggregate of 44,552.04 million bolivars in 
concept of oil taxes, of which 29,960.05 million bolivars were dedicated to capital 
expenditure (i. e., 67.2 percent). The amount under-invested annually, or rather the 
scale of the yearly impoverishment of Venezuela, ranked between 2 to 6 percent of the 
actual GDP of the country for every year. According to these authors, the difference 
between oil tax receipts and capital investment constituted the measure of 
impoverishment of Venezuela during those years. 8 
Nevertheless, public administrators and government employees defended the policy of 
not investing the whole of the oil tax revenue in capital goods. From their perspective, 
Venezuela did not have sufficient resources, other than oil, to support its current 
expenditures. The existing situation required the sale of oil and the use of part of the 
fiscal receipts for this kind of expenditure. They also pointed to the fact that bigger 
capital investment implied increasing current expenditures. `If we build more 
hospitals, we need to increase the number of doctors, nurses and resources needed for 
the maintenance of the service; if we build universities and schools, we need to pay the 
teachers... ' 99 This position was closer to the one proposed by the user costs method, 
97 Hector Malave Mata in his remarks during the second session of the conference, in Carrillo Batalla, 
'La distribuci6n del ingreso fiscal petrolero entre gastos corrientes y gastos de inversi6n', p. 9. 
96 Ibid., p. 79. 
9' Hector Hurtado, Director of Cordiplan -Oficina de Coordinaci6n y Planificaci6n-, on his remarks 
during the seminar in Carrillo Batalla, 'Evaluaci6n de la inversi6n del ingreso fiscal petrolero en 
Venezuela: resumen y conclusiones', p. 148. Some other authors pointed out later that the main problem 
of Venezuelan investment was indeed the fact that such investment was only profitable because part of 
the oil receipts was devoted to the consumption of goods produced by those investments. See A. 
Baptista, 'LEn qu6 medida se ha cumplido el vaticinio de Uslar Pietri (Ahora, 1936) sobre el 
parasitistmo rentista en la Venezuela petrolera?, L en qub medida se ha "sembrado el petr6leo"? ', in 
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which asserts that investing all of the receipts from the natural resource may not be the 
best solution and therefore allows for part of the rent to be consumed in the current 
period. All in all, the suggested evaluations of the success of `sowing oil' shared 
important features with some of the methods later developed by the environmental 
accounting literature already introduced in Chapter 2. The crucial difference is that the 
value of oil depletion was approximated by oil taxes. It will be shown in Chapter 4 that 
taxes were inadequate as a proxy for oil depletion. 
Despite limited achievements and persistent setbacks, it was generally believed that 
Venezuela had steadily progressed towards modernity since the end of the 1950s. 
'°° At 
the same time, the evidence suggests that the first doubts regarding the adequacy of 
Venezuela's economic statistics and oil exploitation strategy surfaced in this period. 
Illusion and Delusion (1970s-1980s) 
As a major oil producer and founder member of the OPEC, Venezuela's position in the 
mid- i 970s seemed outstanding: 
`The Venezuelan nation stands on the summit of success in 1975. On every 
side evidence of maturity, prosperity and promise brightens the economic and 
political landscape. [... ] The petroleum price increases of 1973 and 1974, for 
which Venezuela may claim some credit, have provided the financial resources 
for economic growth and diversification [... ] It have yielded the highest growth 
rate and per capita income in Latin America and a sound basis for 
expansion'. '°' 
Venezuelans apparently had every reason to feel they were exceptional. Politically, 
Venezuela was treated as an exception in Latin America, cited as a model of a 
successful transition to democracy or as having `consolidated' democracy. 102 
Economically, the oil boom provided extraordinary resources. To give some idea of 
the dimensions of the increase of oil prices in the national economy, let us say that the 
value of oil exports almost tripled between 1973 and 1974 (see Table 3.2-2). Between 
1973 and 1976, the fiscal income rose form 11,221 million bolivars to 28,991 million 
Mieres (ed. ), Hacia la Venezuela Post-petrolera [conference sponsored by la Academia Nacional de las 
Ciencias Econ6micas in 19851, Vol. 1 (Caracas, 1989), p. 135. 
100 F. Coronil, The magical state: Nature, money, and modernity in Venezuela (Chicago and London, 
1997), p. 367. 
101 Allen, Venezuelan Economic Development. A Politico-Economic Analysis, p. 3. 
102 Coronil, The magical state: Nature, money, and modernity in Venezuela, p. 367. Venezuela enjoyed 
a democratic regime since 1958, while autocratic and/or military regimes were the norm in Latin 
America. 
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bolivars. Monetary liquidity increased from 21,300 million to 51,200 millions bolivars. 
International reserves grew from $2,400 millions to $9,300 millions. 103 In addition, the 
Venezuelan data showed increasing income equality from the late 1950s until 1983 
and a more equal income distribution than that found in the other large Latin American 
countries. 
104 
Table 3.2-2: Fiscal and export dependency on oil. Venezuela 1972-1982 
Year Fiscal revenue 
Total Oil 
mill bolivar mill bolivar 
oil/total 
Export revenue 
Total Oil oil/total 
mill bolivar mill bolivar 
1972 12,309.12 7,964 64.7% 16,273 15,090 92.7% 
1973 16,099.00 11,221 69.7% 23,642 22,306 94.3% 
1974 42,649.53 36,508 85.6% 64,062 61,827 96.5% 
1975 38,130.49 29,513 77.4% 46,704 44,666 95.6% 
1976 39,443.54 28,991 73.5% 39,244 37,089 94.5% 
1977 36,572.21 26,588 72.7% 41,640 39,481 94.8% 
1978 38,566.10 24,798 64.3% 39,548 37,528 94.9% 
1979 55,791.00 38,440 68.9% 61,908 58,519 94.5% 
1980 76,022.13 54,964 72.3% 83,072 78,328 94.3% 
1981 77,918.95 59,608 76.5% 84,647 81,723 96.5% 
1982 73,376.79 46,154 62.9% 71,191 67,068 94.2% 
Sources: Appendixes B for export data and C for fiscal data. 
Nonetheless, there were simultaneously some critical voices already pointing to the 
illusory nature of the situation in titles such as An Illusion of Harmony: Venezuela's 
case. 105 According to these authors, the rush of petroleum income temporarily 
postponed a critical assessment of Venezuelan development. ' 06 It took almost a decade 
for these arguments to become mainstream opinions. The reason for such a delay was 
precisely the healthy appearance of most economic indicators and the confidence in 
continuing high oil prices. 
At this time of bonanza, the government planned to set aside half of the current oil 
revenues for long-term and foreign investment through the Venezuelan Investment 
103 Banco Central de Venezuela, La economia venezolana en los ültimos treinta cinco anos . 104 M. Urrutia, Twenty-Five Years of Economic Growth, 1960-1985', in Urrutia (ed. ), Long-Term 
Trends in Latin American Economic Development (Inter-American Development Bank, Washington 
D. C., 1991), p. 57, cf. United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, La distribucidn del 
ingreso en America Latina (New York, 1970) p. 6; P. P. Kuczynski, 'The Economic Development of 
Venezuela: a Summary view as of 1975-1976', in Bond (ed. ), Contemporary Venezuela and its role in 
international affairs (New York, 1977), p. 49 and C. R. Silva, 'Bosquejo hist6rico del desenvolvimiento 
de la economia venezolana en el siglo XX', in Mendoza (ed. ), Venezuela Moderna: Medio siglo de 
historia 1926-1976 (Caracas, 2nd ed., 1979). 
103 M. Nairn and A. Pinango (eds. ), El caso Venezuela: una ilusibn de armonia (Caracas, 1974). 
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Fund in 1974.107 Shortly after, the government of Carlos Andres Perez nationalised the 
oil industry in 1976. It was seen as the culmination of a slow process through which 
Venezuela progressively gained more control over the resource and the revenues it 
generated. The nationalisation was to guarantee for Venezuela not a percentage of the 
gains but one hundred percent of the benefits from the exploitation of petroleum. 108 As 
occurred in Mexico, ambitious projects, waste and increased volume of luxury and 
capital imports gradually consumed a higher proportion of current revenues. Less was 
channelled into the Venezuelan Investment Fund, and more foreign loans were sought. 
High interest rates and inflation in the US and Europe contributed to inflation and a 
rising debt service in Venezuela. In 1977, the current account balance showed the first 
deficit since 1972.109 
Nevertheless, it was not until well into the 1980s, when oil prices stabilised, that a 
serious analysis of the effects of the roller coaster of the 1970s took place. 11° Moses 
Naim, Minister of Industry in the government of Carlos Andres Perez in the late 
1980s, wrote: 
`Venezuela's oil wealth no doubt encouraged the plunder by contributing to the 
widespread perception held by Venezuelans and foreign creditors alike that the 
country remained rich... A similar delusion about oil wealth had diverted 
attention from Mexico's grave institutional weakness in the late 1970s (... ) 
In sum, after decades of consuming more than they produced, to restore 
balance, Venezuelans' real incomes and consumption would have to decline" 11 
Although not explicitly exposed along the lines of the sustainability school, this quote 
alluded to the discrepancy between expenditure and production in natural resource 
producer countries. As Naim here, other authors had also recognised that due to the 
nature of oil revenues an increasing gap opened between the real production capacity 
106 J. Ewell, Venezuela. A Century of Change (London, 1984), p. 180 reports a survey of Venezuelan 
society and economy in 1973, which revealed a number of bottlenecks that limited progress in some 
areas. 
107 Ibid., p. 198. 
108 As in the case of Mexico, there is a prolific literature analysing the process leading to the 
nationalisation of the oil industry in Venezuela, its origins, development and effects. Just to mention 
some: see L. Vallenilla, Oil: the Making of a New Economic Order. Venezuelan Oil and the OPEC 
(New York, 1975) for the origin of the nationalisation process. For a good insight into the technicalities 
of the nationalisation and its origins see J. F. Petras, M. Morley, et al., The Nationalisation of 
Venezuelan Oil (New York, 1977). A review of the effects of nationalisation after some years can be 
found in G. Coronel, The Nationalisation of the Venezuelan Oil Industry. From Technocratic Success to 
Political Failure (Lexington, Massachusetts, 1983). 
109 Ewell, Venezuela p. 198. 
110 A summary of the literature of the 1980s and 1990s concerning the myth of oil wealth can be found 
in Coronil, The magical state: Nature, money, and modernity in Venezuela , p. 367-380. 111 M. Naim, Paper, Tigers and Minotaurs. The politics of Venezuela's Economic Reforms (Washington, 
D. C., 1993), p. 3 and p. 28. 
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of that society and its earning and expenditure possibilities. ' 12 Venezuela's exceptional 
financial wealth made it possible for the State to implement dazzling development 
plans that obscured structures typical of other Latin American nations. 113 Authors like 
Karl recognised this when portraying the paradox of the plenty: oil producers were 
supposed to be rich but confronting very difficult realities. 14 It was only after the 
1980s' crisis that the effects of resource availability on the behaviour of economic 
agents began to be recognised and analysed. It has been argued that the availability of 
oil resources entails a confidence effect -on perceived future incomes- that influenced 
the behaviour of economic agents; lls This partly explained why producer countries 
increased their debts and creditors facilitated credit. 
Despite problems that had become evident by the early 1980s, the myth of Venezuela 
as a wealthy democratic nation steadily advancing toward modernity continued to hold 
into the 1990s. The myth endured currency devaluations, a prolonged decline in the 
standard of living, massive popular riots, and two abortive military coups in 1992. 
Nevertheless, the final recognition that Venezuela `suffered from the political, 
economic and social problems common to most Latin American countries' led to the 
`collapse of Venezuelan exceptionalism' in the mid-1990s. 116 
From an environmental perspective, the 1980s crisis can be interpreted as the effects of 
having ignored the loss of natural resources in calculations of national income, which 
masked the true state of the economy. 
112 A. Uslar Pietri, 'Los males del petr6leo', El Nacional (1985) 28th April. The increasing disparity 
between consumption and production in a country such as Venezuela is also referred by B. Mommer 
and A. Baptista, 'EI Petr6leo En Las Cuentas Nacionales: Una Proposic6n', Working Paper IESA 10 
(1983), p. 3. Furthermore, it has also been argued that resource-abundant economies grow more slowly 
precisely because they are likely to be living beyond their means since the natural resource allows the 
economy to afford extraordinary (unsustainable) consumption possibilities. F. Rodriguez and J. D. 
Sachs, 'Why do resource-abundant economies grow more slowly? ', Journal of Economic Growth 4 
(1999), p. 278. 
113 Coronil, The magical state: Nature, money, and modernity in Venezuela, p. 369. 
114 T. L. Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States, Vol. 26 (Berkeley, 1997). 
115 R. Vaez-Zadeh, 'Oil Wealth and Economic Behavior: the case of Venezuela, 1965-81', IMF Working 
Paper, WP/88/56 (1988, June 30). 
116 Coronil, The magical state: Nature, money, and modernity in Venezuela , p. 368 and L. W. Goodman, J. Mendelson Forman, et al. (eds. ), The lessons of the Venezuelan experience (Washington D. C., 1995). 
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3.3 Conclusions 
114 
Through the diverse testimonies displayed in this chapter, it has been shown how the 
Mexican and Venezuelan governments took different positions regarding the use of 
their natural resources for most of the twentieth century. While Mexico's 
administration believed that the best way of making use of the national oil endowment 
was to provide affordable energy for the country's industrialisation, Venezuelan 
governments maintained that the role of oil resources was to provide the monetary 
means for developing the nation. The different views resulted in divergent strategies, 
which affected every aspect of oil exploitation: legislation, management (public vs. 
private), pace of exploration and exploitation (slow vs. fast). More important to the 
methodologies of environmental accounting, each country approximates very closely 
the theoretical cases of a closed economy and an open economy willing to sell most of 
the resource to the rest of the world. 
The qualitative evidence provided in this chapter also shows that Mexican and 
Venezuelan scholars identified the ephemeral healthy appearance of resource driven 
economies very early on in the century. However, it is worth recognising that most of 
the arguments provided were related not to the national accounting framework but to 
nationalistic rhetoric. Nevertheless, the intuitions were present. The quantification of 
the arguments was nonetheless missing, except for the attempts to evaluate `sowing 
oil' policies in Venezuela and the standard non-oil GDP measures. If environmental 
accounting premises are correct, some of the issues raised in the historiography 
regarding the ephemeral prosperity of Mexico and Venezuela will finally find a 
quantitative endorsement. 
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Chapter 4 
The calculation of the resource rent 
4.1 Stock of Petroleum 
4.2 Oil Prices 
4.3 Cost Side of the Equation 
Some Reflections on Labour Costs 
Operation Costs 
Capital Costs 
4.4 The Resource Rent 
The Resource Rent in Venezuela, 1920-1985 
The Resource Rent in Mexico, 1921-1987 
4.5 Oil Taxes and Rents 
4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter seeks to calculate the resource rent accruing from oil in Mexico and 
Venezuela for most of the twentieth century. It has already been mentioned in Chapter 
2 that all the methods considered are subject to the calculation of a resource rent, 
whether they are seeking to adjust for the consumption/depreciation of (natural) capital 
or for the amount that should not be considered production/added value. According to 
the theory underlying the Hotelling rent, the price of a depletable resource has two 
components: production costs and resource rent or depletion cost. ' The most common 
way to estimate the latter is to calculate the surplus revenue accruing to the owners of 
the resource after accounting for the contribution of labour and capital inputs. Data on 
prices, quantities of oil extracted, labour and capital costs are required. Precisely 
because the details of the data underlying the calculation make a difference, the 
chapter first presents and contrasts the series of data used, together with offering 
reflections on labour and capital costs, before presenting the actual values obtained for 
the resource rent. Given the complications associated with the data, several 
permutations are considered as possible approximations to the resource rent. 
' H. Hotelling, The Economics of Exhaustible Resources', Journal of Political Economy 39 (1931) 2; 
P. Dasgupta and G. Heal, Economic Theory and Exhaustible Resources (Cambridge, 1979). 
2 G. D. Santoprieto, 'Alternative Methods for estimating resource rent and depletion costs: the case of 
Argentina's YPF, Resources Policy 24 (1998) 1, p. 39. 
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The chapter starts with an account of the physical resource stock. Prices and the cost 
side of the equation are considered afterwards. The resource rent is then presented 
under several permutations of the costs for each country. Since part of the literature 
argues that oil taxes might be a good approximation to the rent under certain specific 
circumstances, the chapter concludes with a comparison of the rents estimated here 
with the actual taxes obtained by the Mexican and Venezuelan governments. 
3 The 
conclusion is that both governments managed to capture a bigger share of the rent as 
the century went by, but neither was able to capture the whole of the rent at any point 
in time. Hence, taxes do not make a good proxy for the resource rent. They only 
measure how good governments are at seizing rents, but do not show the part of the 
rent that labour (via extra wages or extra workers) and/or capital (via extra profits) 
managed to acquire. 
4.1 Stock of Petroleum 
How much we have, how much we have used and how long will it last are key 
questions at the time of valuing any asset. Reserves, depletion, variations in the stock, 
and the production-to-reserves ratio are particularly relevant to the valuation of natural 
resources. Though only the quantity produced is needed for the calculation of the rent, 
the total amount held at a specific point in time and its change over time is required for 
the calculation of the resource depreciation that will be elaborated in Chapter 5. In 
addition, opening and closing stocks of non-produced assets are a required piece of 
information in the SEEA system (see Figure 2.3-1 above). Therefore, an account of the 
physical resource is an important piece of information for this research. This section 
presents comparative historical data on the amount of oil used and available for 
Mexico and Venezuela. 
Figure 4.1-1 shows production and proven reserves of hydrocarbons in Mexico and 
Venezuela for the period 1901-1989. Proven reserves are mineral deposits located on 
or below the earth's surface which are economically exploitable, given the current 
technology and relative prices. 4 As a matter of convenience, the term `reserves' is 
commonly used for `proven reserves'. All in all, the reserves available in both 
countries increased throughout the century -most dramatically in Mexico, whose 
3 Among those advocating the use of oil taxes as proxy for the rent are R. Stauffer, Accounting for 
'Wasting Assets. Income Measurement for Oil and Mineral-Exporting Rentier States, Vol. 25 (Vienna, 
1984), p. 19 and also B. Mommer, 'Integrating the oil. A structural analysis of petroleum in the 
Venezuelan economy', Latin American Perspectives 23 (1996 summer) 90, p. 141. 
United Nations, System ofNational Accounts 1993 (New York, 1993), paragph. 13.59. 
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reserves sharply rose during the early 1970s. Mexico only experienced a significant 
period of declining reserves from the 1980s onwards. However, this was mostly due to 
technical adjustments of the extremely optimistic figures produced during the 1970s 
rather than the result of rapid depletion. 5 In contrast, Venezuela went through a period 
of declining reserves between the second half of the 1960s and the early 1970s, which 
coincided with the years of maximum oil output. A plausible explanation is that 
companies reacted to the impending nationalisation process by reducing their 
productive and exploration activities. `This determined that the oil industry in 
Venezuela was in a stagnant situation at the time of the nationalisation. The indices of 
reserves, production, level of employment and reduction of investment in all activities 
confirm this situation'. 6 Technological change and the increase of the relative price of 
petroleum made previously un-exploitable resources increasingly available. 
Figure 4.1-1: Hydrocarbon Reserves and Depletion. Mexico and Venezuela 1901-1989 
(Million barrels) 
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` 'Seismic shifts'' (Survey 4 of 8)'. The Economist, 6 December 1997. In fact, according to A. M. Sordo 
and C. R. Lopez, E. xploracirin. Reservus y Producciön de Petr6leo en Mexico. 1970-1985 (Mexico D. F., 
1st. ed., 1988), p. 102-103, prior to 1976, proven reserves were estimated by a 'conservative' method 
based on wells under development. The change to a method that widened the range of 'proven reserves' 
to the reserves that were economically and technically feasible of development almost doubled the 
reserves available for that year. This fact only introduces a warning about the conservatism of the 
figures before 1976 and the exaggerated optimism of those after 1976. 
6 PDVSA, (Petr6leos de Venezuela S.. A. ), Los primeros diez ar1os de la indtismia petrolera nacional 
1976-1985 (Caracas, 1986), p. 9. 
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The fact that reserves available to each generation increased over time sharply 
contrasts with the implicit assumption behind most writings in green accounting, 
which assume the increasing scarcity of resources. This may constitute a problem for 
the current research, if this underlying assumption underpins the models and methods 
so strongly that they cannot deal with scenarios such as the historical one depicted here 
with increasing resources over time. This question is explored in Chapter 5. 
The different path of production followed by both countries has already been 
mentioned in previous chapters, yet let us recall it here once more. Even during the 
years of the Revolution, the number of barrels of oil produced was carefully annotated 
in Mexico. There is not much discrepancy between the different figures published. In 
brief, one can identify three periods in the history of Mexican oil production. The first 
extends from the first commercial production of crude oil in 1901 to the 
nationalisation-expropriation of the industry in 1938. Within this period, Mexico 
became the second largest producer of petroleum after the United States, and the 
largest oil exporter. Mexican production first peaked in 1921. However, Mexico did 
not regain the 1921 level of production until 1974. The second phase runs from 
expropriation-nationalisation of oil production in 1938 to the mid-1970s. In this 
period, Mexico was producing mainly for its own internal consumption with a 
negligible amount of exports, and had become a net importer of petroleum by the late 
1960s. Finally, the new era of Mexican energy development was launched by major oil 
discoveries in the south of the country in 1974, and the country's production and 
exports experienced an important thrust. 
There is a complete series of oil produced in Venezuela since the first shipment in 
1917.8 Venezuela had surpassed Mexico's production in 1928, and extraction 
accelerated thereafter except for a short slowdown in the early 1940s due to the Second 
World War. Venezuela replaced Mexico as the world's second largest oil producer and 
kept the position until 1961, when it dropped to the third place thanks to the surge in 
7 A. J. Bermudez, The Mexican National Petroleum Industry: A case study in Nationalisation (Stanford, 
1963) p. 1. 
8 One should be aware of possible problems with the reliability of the data presented here. Although 
they come from official publications of the Republic of Venezuela, there are reasons to think production 
might be underestimated. Since exploitation taxes, commonly known as royalties, represented a fixed 
amount of the production value declared by the company, this likely to have resulted in an under- 
declaration of production by the companies. Underestimation of the value of oil exports in the official 
accounts seems unavoidable. Indeed, the efforts to improve the inspection system always found strong 
opposition from the companies. On this matter, see Chapter 6 in E. Lieuwen, Petroleum In Venezuela: A 
History, Vol. 47 (Berkeley, 1954). 
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the Middle East. 9 Venezuela accounted for a maximum of 15 percent of world oil 
production over the whole period. 10 The late 1960s represented the zenith of 
Venezuela's production. By then, Venezuela produced ten times the amount of oil 
Mexico was producing. As consequence of the foreseeable nationalisation, 
Venezuela's production started to decline from 1970. For its part, Mexico oil 
production revived in the mid 1970s and achieved its maximum output level in 1982, 
shortly after surpassing Venezuela's production for the first time in over fifty years. 
It is worth mentioning that the difference is more one of pace of extraction rather than 
one of radically different endowments, since the total endowment is relatively similar 
as Table 4.1-1 shows. The contrast between in the rate of extraction is expected to 
leave its mark in the value of the resources. 
Table 4.1-1 Accumulated oil production 1901-1985. Mexico and Venezuela 
Accumulated oil production until 
Mexico 
Mill. Barrels 
Venezuela 
Mill. Barrels 
1905 0.5 0 
1915 127.24 0 
1925 1,301.46 38.14 
1935 1,765.63 1,148.14 
1945 2,173.63 3,199.64 
1955 2,871.08 8,945.04 
1965 3,906.01 19,786.04 
1975 5,562.74 31,934.04 
1985 12,661.31 39,421.04 
Oil reserves in 1985 70,900.00 29,236.00 
Aggregated oil endowment 1905-1985 83,561.00 68,747.00 
Sources: Own elaboration from the data in Appendixes A and E 
Some methods do not require the stock of resources available but the variation of the 
stock. The series of proven reserves just presented represents the closing stock of the 
year in question (since they are measured at the 3l of December) and the opening 
stock of the year immediately after. During the year, new discoveries are added to the 
reserves and also extraction takes place. Figure 4.1-2 presents the variation of stocks 
both by plotting the new discoveries (gross additions) and the net changes (differences 
between opening and closing stocks). 
The massive discoveries in Mexico of the first half of the 1970s dwarf the importance 
of the discoveries made throughout the century despite the re-scaling of the graph. 
9 United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Petroleum Exploration: Capital 
Requirements and Methods of Financing (New York, 1962), p. 3. 
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Figure 4.1-2 -Yearly variation of hydrocarbon reserves: Mexico and Venezuela 1901-1989 
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The variation of reserves displays mostly positive changes. In fact, the data indicate 
just 11 years for Venezuela in which the closing stock was smaller than the 
corresponding opening stock from the previous year (1961-62,1965-70,1972 and 
1974-77) and 16 years for Mexico (1939,1945-1948,1950,1953,1965,1970-72 and 
1984-88). For the rest of the series, reserves increased. These figures will be relevant 
for the calculation of the net price in its most extreme variation, given that the change 
in the volume of reserves (and not current production) is the figure used for the 
calculation of the resource depletion. As has already been mentioned, an increasing 
volume of reserves is the exception rather than the rule among the theoretical models 
in vogue. 
Finally, another set of methods is not concerned with how much we have, use or how 
the stock varies, but with how much longer the resource is expected to last. The 
"' Oil and Gas Journal, 'World overview', Oil and Gas Journal, (monthly) December. 
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reserves-to-production ratio, namely the life expectancy of the resource, named ii 
herein, is calculated by dividing the proven reserves by the amount produced in a given 
year. Figure 4.1-3 contrasts the life expectancy of oil reserves in Mexico and Venezuela 
Figure 4.1-3: 
Life expectancy of oil reserves. Mexico and Venezuela 1920-1989 
for the period 1920-1989. 
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The evolution of the life expectancy of the resources between 1940 and the early 1970s 
contributes to an understanding of the gloomy forecasts produced at the end of that 
period, such as the one of the Club of Rome. " Indeed, the time horizon of oil reserves 
showed an unbroken declining tendency for some 25 years after the Second World War. 
Despite having held smaller reserves for most of the period, the slower pace of 
exploitation allowed Mexican reserves a longer life expectancy than those of Venezuela 
for most of the period. Nevertheless, the short life expectancy of Mexican reserves over 
the 1920s is notorious. It is worth remembering that the peak of production of the first 
Mexican oil era was in 1921. These figures justified the fear of exhaustion revealed by 
contemporary commentators and the subsequent deceleration of the oil production that 
caused life expectancy to grow until the late 1930s. ' From then onwards, the lack of 
Meadows et al., The limits of growth (New York, 1972). 
The fear of exhaustion in the 1920s and 1930s was already referred in Chapter 3. See also J. Silva 
Herzog, 'La expropiaciön de las companias petroleras en Mexico', Revista de Economic II (1938) 7-12; 
o 
-ý Mexico RIP ratio Venezuela WP 
Sources: elaborated from data in appendix A and appendix E 
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discoveries drove n downwards in a path hardly broken until the huge discoveries of 
1974.13 These discoveries pushed the life expectancy of Mexican reserves to a level never 
achieved before: 60 years. 
Until the end of 1922, the development of the Venezuelan petroleum industry was 
restricted. Despite the big number of oil concessions, no great deposits had been found. 
On December 146' 1922, the blowout of well Los Barrosos No2 showed the world 
Venezuela's great oil potential and started a rush into Venezuelan oil. 14 After this 
explosive start with massive discoveries in the early days of Venezuela's oil history - 
leading the value of n to 55 years in 1924- n descended to its historical minimum, seven 
years, in 1929. The slowdown of the production due to the war drove n to a peak in 1942. 
From then onwards, the profile of the life expectancy of Venezuela's oil reserves is quite 
similar to that of Mexico, with a continuous descent until the early 1970s. The cutback in 
production after the nationalisation in 1976 accounts for the rise of n more than any 
exceptional new discoveries in Venezuela during this last period. 
The crucial relevance of n to the overall results is revealed in Chapter 5. Therefore it is 
worth briefly reflecting here on the nature of this variable. To what extent can the life 
expectancy of the resource be understood as a choice variable? To be sure, the addition of 
new discoveries to the known stock is a highly uncertain activity that relies a great deal 
on good fortune. '5 Yet it can be argued that the intensity of exploration activities and of 
the extraction rate depend upon management decisions. In fact, Pemex adopted a 20 year 
reserve to production ratio (n=20) as official policy during most of the 1950s and 
1960s. 16 It is interesting to notice how this policy relates to the result that makes the 
adjustment term equal to zero in Sefton and Weale model. Section 2.3 showed that if 
the ratio production to reserves matches the rate of interest, no adjustment to 
conventional income was needed within this model. This rule is just the inverse of n. If 
we believe that a5 per cent is a reasonable long run interest rate, the corresponding life 
expectancy of the resource is precisely 20 years. If the premises of Sefton and Weale 
model hold it is reasonable to expect Mexican welfare income and conventional 
J. Lopez Portillo, 'Las Reservas Petroleras Mexicanas', Revista de Economla II (1938) 7-12 and E. 
Sangines Villavalva, 'La industria petrolera en Mexico', Revista de Hacienda 11 (1938 Marzo). 13 For Mexican exploration policies, see Sordo and Löpez, Exploraci6n, Reservas y Produccian de 
Petrbleo en Mexico, 1970-1985 Appendix E includes a brief note on Pemex's exploration policies. 
14 A. R. Martinez, Venezuelan Oil Development and Chronology (London, 1989), p. 39-41. 15 United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Petroleum Exploration: Capital 
Requirements and Methods of Financing , p. I. 16 See PEMEX, (Petrdleos Mexicanos), Informe del Director General, 1953-1960 (Mexico D. F., 1953- 
1960) and Sordo and Ldpez, Exploraci6n, Reservas y Produccidn de Petr6leo en Mexico, 1970-1985, 
and Appendix E. 
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income should differ by much. It is not clear whether the Mexican government took this 
sort of arguments into account when choosing a 20 years time horizon. 
Management can influence the value of n by either intensifying exploration activities- 
thus increasing the probability of new discoveries- or by cutting/accelerating the rate of 
extraction. Since the value of n directly derives from these decisions affecting the 
magnitude of reserves and production, it is clear that there is some discretion over its 
value. 
The physical account of hydrocarbon resources in Mexico and Venezuela reveals the 
increasing availability of economically exploitable deposits over time. Over time, both 
countries have enjoyed similar endowments with some advantage for Mexico, which is 
mostly due to the huge discoveries of the early 1970s. This fact, in conjunction with the 
slower pace of exploitation in Mexico, gives Mexican reserves a longer life expectancy 
than Venezuelan ones for most of the century. The effects and implications of these facts 
for the valuation of the resource and its depreciation value will be further developed in 
Chapter 5. 
4.2 Oil Prices 
The pricing of crude oil is one of the most controversial issues relating to the 
international petroleum industry. Even inside the American oil industry, which has the 
most elaborate price reporting and statistical series of any oil business in the world, it 
is not easy to get rational discussion of the way in which these prices are formed. '7 An 
additional difficulty consists in deciding what prices to use: posted prices, realised 
prices, discounted prices, etc. Posted prices are the most relevant to our discussion 
since they are the real foundation of revenue of the host governments of producing 
countries. Historically speaking, posted prices originated in the United States and they 
were the buyer's price, not the seller's prices. That is, refiners, who thus defined the 
prices they were willing and prepared to pay for crude oils at the wellhead from any 
producers connected to their pipeline gathering system, announced them. After 
transportation costs were added, posted prices were determined at export terminals on 
the U. S Gulf Coast. '8 One should be aware of the fact that realised prices were well 
under posted prices, and therefore using posted prices will overestimate the actual 
17 J. E. Hartshorn, Oil Companies and Governments (London, 1967)p. 128. However, something can be 
said about some of the variables that influence the price of oil. For definitions and the geographical 
distribution of different types of oil, see G. Jenkins, Oil Economist's Handbook 1985 (1985). See also 
the brief summary presented in Appendix E. 18 T. Rifai, The Pricing of Crude Oil (London, 1974), p. 8. 
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value of the resource. In any case one should also be aware that a price per barrel, 
whether posted, realised or discounted, is based on averaging: the average of the price 
during each year (oil prices vary daily), the average of the prices in different markets, 
the average of the price of different qualities of oil. Therefore, it is just an 
approximation to the actual value of oil produced in a year. A brief description of the 
oil price series available for Mexico and Venezuela and contrasts between them is 
presented in this section. 
No historical series of Mexican crude oil prices has been available previously. The 
construction of the price series presented here, is one of the original contributions of 
this research. From nationalisation in 1938 until 1975, official price series for Mexican 
crude oil do not exist. 19 Arguably, the reason is that most crude oil was for internal 
consumption. Therefore, there was no market price but only a transfer price within 
Pemex units. Regrettably, the transfer price was never calculated as such. 20 
Nevertheless, Mexico continued to export a small surplus of crude oil each year after 
nationalisation. ' The Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior S. A. (National Bank of 
Foreign Trade Co), systematically recorded the value and volume of crude oil exported 
from 1935 to 1973.22 Therefore, the price per barrel of Mexican oil can be inferred 
from these series after converting units (cubic meters, tonnes, dollars, etc. ). The time 
series has been constructed from assembling value and volume data from production 
(1901-1937) and for exports of crude oil (1938- 1975) plus the official price list from 
1975. The complete price series has been cross checked with New York posted prices 
and Venezuelan oil market prices, which can provide a `market' consistency to the 
series once one accounts for the differences in quality and the transport costs. 
An oil price series for Venezuela is readily available from 1917 to 1990. That is not to 
say that it is free of problems for the purpose of this research. Tax-reference prices and 
exchange rates complicate the matter. From 1966, taxes were computed at the new 
higher rate, based on the tax reference price or the realised price, whichever was the 
higher. Tax reference prices for crude oils were set according to a mathematical 
19 P. Muioz and J. C. Boue former employees of Pemex, in a private communication to the author. 20 Still in 1980 'Pemex does not give any data regarding the value of crude and gas at well', Mexico. 
Secretaria de Programaciön y Presupuesto, La industria petrolera en Mexico (Mexico D. F., 1980), p. 11. 21 The amount exported is generally smaller than ten percent of the total amount of crude oil produced. 
Elaborated products were also exported in small amounts. 22 Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior S. A., 6 anos en ei comercio exterior de Mexico (M6xico D. F., 
1964). 
Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior S. A., Comercio Exterior de Mexico (Mexico D. F., Volumes for 
the period 1948-1973). 
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formula articulated on basic gravity differentials. `3 For the calculation of the rent, 
however, realised prices are used here. 
The recent history of oil prices is well known, and almost everybody can identify the 
early 1970s as the crucial benchmark. This is easily identifiable in the graphical 
representation of oil prices throughout the century presented in Figure 4.2-1. 
Figure 4.2-1 Oil prices in Mexico and Venezuela. 1920-1989 (dollars per barrel) 
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Sources: see Appendix F 
However, the period before 1970 also has some interesting features. Before the First 
World War oil was an extremely cheap product. It was only after the onset of the war 
that the barrel of oil achieved the $1 mark, and this is the time when Venezuela joined 
the market. This price remained as the highest achieved until the onset of the Second 
World War. The price then rose to a new level of between $1.5 and $2.5, which 
remained relatively stable until the 1970s. The conventional wisdom about oil prices 
over the 1950s and 1960s was that, it was in fact difficult to find an export product less 
subject to violent fluctuations than petroleum. `4 Throughout that period, Mexican oil 
23 Rifai, The Pricing of dude Oil. 
'' International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The Economic Development of 
Venezuela (Baltimore, 1961 ), p. 21. The report continues: '... and the establishment in 1960 of the OPEC 
may reinforce these stabilizing tendencies'. It took thirteen more years to prove the analysis wrong. 
Mexico Venezuela 
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received a lower price than Venezuelan oil, due to quality. Most Mexican oil was 
heavy and therefore of lower value than the medium-to-heavy Venezuelan oil 25 For 
almost three-quarters of the twentieth century, the price of a barrel of oil fluctuated 
within an extremely narrow band at a very low price. 
The oil crisis of the early 1970s swept away this long tradition of stable oil prices. It 
also altered the ranking of the two countries under scrutiny; from 1974, the Mexican 
price per barrel surpassed that of Venezuela. The gap widened during the second round 
of the crisis, when the roller coaster of oil prices took Mexican oil to almost $40 a 
barrel in 1981, only to slump to less than $10 a barrel in April 1986. Price volatility 
also affected Venezuela, but within a narrower band ranging from $30 to $15. Both 
high prices and high volatility of oil prices marked the last quarter of the twentieth 
century. 
Without discussing the forces that impacted on prices, this section has presented the 
historical evolution of reconstructed oil price series of Mexico and Venezuela. The 
evolution of oil prices fits very much into the standard periodisation of an economic 
history of the twentieth century. It has a pre-1914 era, an inter-war period, a new level 
during the post-war years, and a final act in which oil prices took a central role from 
the early 1970s until the mid-1980s. Since in essence the resource rent per unit is price 
minus costs, trends in prices have a major impact on the evolution of the resource rent. 
But much can also happen on the cost side that is explored in the following section. 
25 US Tariff Commission, 'Production cost of petroleum products and of refined petroleum products'. 
(Washington, D. C., 1932), p. 51. 
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4.3 Cost Side of the Equation 
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Ideally, marginal cost is required for the calculation of Hotelling rents. Although, the 
empirical data covers a whole range of costs: `operating costs', `costs of extraction', 
`average production costs', `development costs', etc., no marginal costs are included. 
Some authors have attempted to estimate marginal costs, but most studies use average 
costs as a proxy. 26 The most common way to estimate the resource rent is to calculate 
the surplus revenue accruing to the owners of the resource after accounting for the 
contribution of labour and capital inputs. 27 Even so, reliable cost estimates are not 
easy to find. Adelman started his chapter about crude oil production costs by stating 
that `few if any published costs estimates are explained; fewer are reproducible; nearly 
all are irrelevant'. 8 Dealing with a historical data set and a State owned company does 
not improve matters either. 
Some Reflections on Labour Costs 
The payment to labour is the first component discounted from gross income in order to 
obtain the value of the resource rent. Since the size of the costs directly affects the 
magnitude of the resource rent, it is mandatory to explore the possible bias introduced 
by the costs in the calculation of the rent. Historical wages series are available from 
official sources for both Mexico and Venezuela. 
26 These exceptions together with the underlying assumptions and implications of using average costs as 
a proxy for marginal costs were noted in Chapter 2. 27 G. D. Santoprieto, 'Alternative Methods for estimating resource rent and depletion costs: the case of 
Argentina's YPF', Resources Policy 24 (1998) 1, p. 39. 
28 From Chapter 2, 'Crude oil Production Costs' in M. A. Adelman, The World Petroleum Market 
(Baltimore, 1972). 
The rent 
Figure 4.3- 1: 
Total wages paid in the oil industry: Venezuela and Mexico, 1920-1985 
. 10000 
1 of 
C 
100 
tI 
10 l 
rn rn rn rn c rn rn määm ä- m m- ä--- ä-- rn rn 
Sources : For Venezuela labour costs 1921-1991 A. Baptista, Bases Cuantitativas de la 
Economia Venezolana, 1830-1989 (Caracas, 1991), pp. 139-141. 
For Mexico labour costs 1934-1936 Mexico. Secretaria de Patrimonio Nacional, El 
Petröleo de Mexico (Mexico D. F., 1940 Ist ed., 1963), pp. 477-510. For the year 1937 
PEMEX, (Petröleos Mexicanos), Informes del Director General Senador Antonio 
J. Bermüdez 1947-1952 (Mexico D. F., 1952), 1938-1992 Mexico. Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica Geografia e Informätica (INEGI), Estadisticas histöricas de Mexico (Mexico 
D. F., 3rd ed., 1994), p. 573. 
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The profile of Venezuela's aggregate wages in the oil industry in Figure 4.3-1 depicts 
the history of the oil industry faithfully. 29 It shows the explosive development of the 
industry in the early 1920s, the effects of the Great Depression and the expansion of 
the oil industry during the 1940s and 1950s. The relatively smooth transition to a 
mature industry in the 1960s is clearly reflected in the slowdown of the growth of 
aggregate wages during this period. Between 1973 and 1975 the inflationary effect of 
the oil shock is also visible. The nationalisation, however, offers a more distinct profile 
than all the other oil-related variables when it comes to aggregate wages. By 1976, 
most of the data series relating to oil in Venezuela slow down and some even 
29 See Chapters 1 and 3. 
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plummeted. 30 However, aggregate wages after 1976 experienced a growth rate similar 
to that of the 1950s. This effect will have obvious consequences to the calculation of 
the rent: higher payments to labour imply a lower rent. 
By contrast, if one was to tell the history of the oil industry in Mexico by the evolution 
of the aggregate wages as shown in Figure 4.3-1 one would have to talk of a declining 
industry up to the 1930s followed by an impressive -almost constant- growth 
thereafter. With regard to wages, the Mexican oil industry does not appear to be much 
smaller than that of Venezuela. Indeed, it is apparent that the Mexican surpassed the 
Venezuelan oil industry in aggregate salaries paid by 1968. However, this picture does 
not coincide with the historical evolution of production in the Mexican oil industry. 
Between 1944 and 1972, Mexico produced one-tenth the amount of oil that Venezuela 
produced yearly. The gap between aggregate salaries does not correspond to such a 
difference in production. The immediate consequence should be that labour costs per 
barrel were much higher in Mexico than in Venezuela. Figure 4.3-2 shows the labour 
costs per barrel as reported in the primary sources. 
According to official figures, Mexico's labour cost per barrel far exceeds the labour 
costs of Venezuela -as much as ten times by the late 1960s, when the gap was widest. 
In Mexico, the nationalisation of 1938 resulted in growth of the labour cost per barrel 
to the extent that, by the late 1940s, it almost equalled the price of a barrel of oil. 
Indeed already by 1942, the labour cost per barrel was double that of 1937. It is worth 
remembering that one of the main reasons put forward for the nationalisation was to 
improve the status of oil workers. 1 The labour cost per barrel also increased sharply in 
Venezuela after the 1976 nationalisation. In fact, labour costs per barrel went in 
Venezuela above those in Mexico in 1982, for the first time since both countries 
entered world oil markets at the beginning of the century. 
30 In particular production, exploration activities slowed down after nationalisation in Venezuela. Recall 
related sections earlier in this Chapter. 31 See V. Novelo, La dificil democracia de los petroleros (Mexico, D. F., 1991); R. Ramirez I leredia, La 
otra cara del petröleo (Mexico, D. F., 1979); S. L. Adleson, 'The Cultural Roots of the Oil Workers' 
Unions in Tampico1910-1925", in Brown and Knight (eds. ), The Mexican Petroleum Industry in the 
Twentieth Century (Austin, 1992). 
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Figure 4.3- 2: 
Labour costs per barrel of oil produced: Venezuela and Mexico, 1927-1985 
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Sources: as Figure 4.3-1 for wages and appendix A for production figures; 
Note: For Mexico, the figures from 1975 to the end of the series are a three-year moving average 
in order to smooth the effects of the shocks on the peso/dollar exchange rate. 
Prima facie, the comparison between the labour costs per barrel of oil produced in 
Venezuela and Mexico points to the inefficiency of the Mexican oil industry. Some 
possible driving forces behind this result that are worth exploring include the 
differences in the volume produced, the different physical characteristics of oil 
production in both countries, the appropriation of rents by the labour force (through 
extra wages or extra workers) and qualifications regarding the data available. 
The immense volume of oil produced in Venezuela compared with Mexico and the 
different location of the oil fields may account for part of the difference in labour costs 
per barrel. It is plausible to assume that the amount of people needed in a well is more 
or less fixed, regardless of the amount of oil the well is able to produce. After all, final 
output depends on the geophysical conditions of the oil field. Then the high volume 
per well in Venezuela will have pushed down the average labour cost per barrel since 
its fields were better endowed. 32 Therefore, the high volume would be responsible in 
part for the lower cost per barrel in Venezuela. 
32 It is possible to argue on the contrary that the poor performance of Mexican oil fields was due to the 
lack of investment in more advanced technologies. For instance, Pemex stopped to using gas injection in 
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It has also been argued that the different location of the fields may partly have 
accounted for the difference in labour costs per barrel. The costs of opening a field in 
Mexico were much greater compared with Venezuela, especially in the dense jungle, 
thick forests and maze of little streams. Far more organisational work (and thus labour) 
was necessary in Mexico than in Venezuela. 3 Location also greatly influences one 
important cost item: transport. In Mexico, there were no railways connecting the fields 
to the ports. A particular site would be virtually inaccessible during the rainy season. 34 
In contrast, most of the fields in Venezuela were situated on the eastern shore of 
Maracaibo Lake, where tankers able to transport huge amounts of crude were used. 
Furthermore, the Mexican average depth per well was above 2500 meters since the 
1950s and even beyond 3000 meters in specific years. 35 Every meter deeper is 
substantially more expensive to drill. Not only did Mexicans have to drill deeper to 
find oil, but also their strike rate was relatively low. For much of the time for every 
two productive wells drilled, Pemex drilled three unproductive ones. 36 Therefore, the 
location of the fields would explain higher labour requirements in Mexico than in 
Venezuela, and also would partly justify higher overall operation costs (which are 
analysed below). Nevertheless, some authors have suggested that oil operations in 
Mexico were in any case less profitable than they would have been had they taken 
place in Venezuela. 37 Therefore, one has to consider the hypothesis of Mexican labour- 
inefficiency argument. 
some fields. Estimates for Poza Rica fields considered that 'with no-gas injection the ultimate recovery 
was 1360 mill barrels, with injection of 40 mm c. f. /day the ultimate recovery rose to 1740mill barrels'. 
PEMEX, (Petr6leos Mexicanos), 'Estimated Oil, Gas and Condensate production at the end of 1949 and 
June 1950'. (Mexico D. F., 1951). Nevertheless, the fact is that Venezuelan wells were far more 
productive than Mexican, pushing average costs per barrel down. 
3 W. C. Gordon, The Expropriation of Foreign-Owned Property in Mexico (Washington D. C, 1941), 
p. 84. (Parentheses added). The author refers to the comparison of Mexico with the USA. The lower cost 
of exploration and development in Venezuela compared to Mexico were already identified in Chapter 1. 
30 Gordon, The Expropriation of Foreign-Owned Property in Mexico , p. 84. 35 Data compiled from the following sources, Mexico. Secretaria de Hacienda y Crbdito Publico. 
Direcci6n General Tecnica de Ingresos. Oficina de Investigaciones Econ6micas, La Industria del 
Petröleo en Mexico; Mexico. Secretaria de la Economia Nacional. Direcci6n General de Estadistica, 
Mexico en cifras (Mexico D. F., 1938); Mexico; PEMEX, (Petr6leos Mexicanos), Informe del Director 
General, 1953-1960 (Mexico D. F., 1953-1960); 1947-1952; PEMEX, (Petr6leos Mexicanos), Anuario 
Estadistico 1988 (Mexico D. F., 1988); PEMEX, (Petr6leos Mexicanos), 'Memoria de Labores 1973', in 
Instituto Mexicano del Petr6leo (ed. ), Memorias de Labores 1965-1973, Vol. I (1984) and Rippy, Oil 
and The Mexican Revolution. Data available upon request from the author. 
36 For exploration issues see Appendix E. Suffices to mention here that mismanagement and lack of the 
appropriate human resources have been raised as explanations for Pemex's low exploration success. 
These arguments can also explain part of the overall cost difference between Mexico and Venezuela. 37 L. Randall, The Political Economy of Mexican Oil (New York, 1989), p. 2 (see p. 195 for the 
estimation). In a pure econometric exercise, Randall finds that oil operations in Mexico were 18 percent 
less profitable than they would had been in Venezuela from 1976 to 1984, controlling for percentage 
changes in output per well. Even though her findings are weak, since does not account for other factors 
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One possibility is that the Mexican oil industry was using an amount of labour above 
the efficient level. That is, the labour force was appropriating part of the resource rent 
via over staffing. In order to explore this possibility Figure 4.3-3 plots the official 
figures of employees in the oil industry. 
Figure 4.3-3: Labour force employed in oil industry: Venezuela and Mexico, 1922-1995 
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Sources: Mexican labour force for 1934-1935 from Mexico. Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito 
Publico. Direcciön General Tecnica de Ingresos. Oficina de Investigaciones Econömicas, La 
Industria del Petrc leo en Mexico (Mexico, D. F, 1938), pp. 68-70, and 1938-1988 from Mexico. 
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informätica (INEGI), E. ctadisticas histciricas de 
Mexico 
, p. 
573. Venezuelan labour force from Baptista, Bases cuantitativas de la economia 
Venezolana. 1830-1995 (and data dick) 
, cuadro 
B-5 
Indeed, the total number of workers in the Mexican oil industry is above the total 
number of workers in the Venezuelan industry for most of the period excluding the 
years 1945 to 1955, which corresponds to the expansion of Venezuelan oiI industry. 
The Mexican labour force was double that of Venezuela in 1976 and it was four times 
greater by the 1990s. Considering Mexico's production was much smaller (one-tenth 
of Venezuela's) for most of the period, this is surprising. The Mexican oil industry 
seems to have employed far more people than would have been efficient. 
However, these results have been derived from the aggregated data set. The Mexican 
data presented so far did not distinguish between the different branches of the industry. 
The figures of the labour force for Mexico include all the workers of Pemex, regardless 
of their activity within the firm. By contrast, the Venezuelan figures reflect only 
employment in the production branch of the industry. Since the resource rent 
such as the location of the fields, the depth of the well, etc, it is worth exploring the wage inefficiency 
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calculation depends crucially on the costs of extracting the resource, one needs to 
make sure that only the labour costs of extracting the resource are included. 
The data series on exploration, production, refining and some scattered data on 
employment in Mexican oil fields can be used to estimate the size of the Mexican 
labour force actually employed in oil production only. Figure 4.3-4 shows the results 
obtained and contrasts them with the total labour force in Mexico and employment in 
the Venezuelan oil fields. 
Over time the amount of workers directly involved in production was a slowly 
decreasing share of the total aggregate of workers in the oil industry. On average, 
Mexican production workers represent about half of the total labour force of the 
Mexican oil industry. Only towards the end of the period were more people involved 
in activities other than production. Subtracting the non-production branch still leaves 
Mexico's labour force in the fields at a level that appears to be excessive. Mexico 
extracted more oil than Venezuela only before 1927 and after 1981. According to this 
new set of data, Mexico employed more people than Venezuela in the fields from 
1965. At that time Mexico was still producing one-tenth as much oil as Venezuela. 
One can conclude that the Mexican unions obtained benefits in the form of expanded 
employment. 
hypothesis. 
The rent 134 
Figure 4.3- 4: 
Employees in oil fields Vs total numbers of employees in the oil industry. 
Mexico and Venezuela 1921-1989 
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Sources: as Figure 4.3-3 for total employees. See Appendix G for the estimation of the 
labour force in the oil fields for Mexico 
The other possibility is that Mexican oil workers were appropriating part of the 
resource rent through extra wages, thanks to the bargaining power of the Oil Workers 
Union. 38 To explore this hypothesis, we would ideally like to compare the wage 
received by the oil workers with their marginal productivity. Unfortunately, with the 
data available, we can only compare average productivity of labour with average 
wages in both countries. The results are shown in Table 4.3-1. Starting from a very 
similar wage level in the late 1920s, Venezuelan average wages took off in the early 
1930s whereas Mexican average salary remained stationary for the first half of the 
decade. This is in line with the arguments used by the Mexican government motivating 
the expropriation on grounds of the low salaries paid by the foreign companies. 39 
38 See for instance, chapter 10, ' The Oil workers' strike of 1937' in M. Rippy. Oil and The hlexicun Revolution 
(Leiden. 1972) for an overview of the Union role in the nationalisation. 
"'Despite the fact that the oil workers were probably the best paid group in Mexico from the point of view of daily 
wages in pesos, government experts argued that the high cost of living in the oil zones meant that, in reality, the oil 
workers were receiving lower wages than workers either in the mines or on the National Railroads of Mexico. ' 
Gordon, The Expropriation of' Foreign-Owned Property in Mexico . p. 
1 12. By contrast, the Venezuelan worker, 
entirely unfamiliar with petroleum work, was not very efficient at first; tasks requiring technical skills had to be 
performed by foreigners. The oil workers, however. were slowly turning into the elite of the Venezuelan labour 
force, for they received free medical treatment, housing, training and a wage far in excess of that paid elsewhere in 
the Republic. E. Lieuwen, Petroleum In Venezuela. A History, Vol. 47 (Berkeley, 1954) p. 50. 
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Table 4.3- 1: Average productivity Vs average wage per worker In the oil industry: 
Venezuela and Mexico, 1920-1985 
Annual average productivity per worker Annual average wage per worker 
Year Mexico 
US dollars 
Venezuela 
US dollars 
Ratio 
Mx/Vz 
Mexico 
US dollars 
Venezuela 
US dollars 
Ratio 
MxNz 
1920 N/A 388 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1921 10,493 334 3143% N/A N/A N/A 
1922 10,011 355 2823% N/A 877 N/A 
1923 8,898 517 1722% N/A 871 N/A 
1924 8,938 979 913% N/A 924 N/A 
1925 10,345 1,692 612% N/A 925 N/A 
1926 8,586 2,975 289% N/A 899 N/A 
1927 4,726 2,751 172% 933 907 103% 
1928 3,019 5,146 59% 839 907 92% 
1929 2,761 13,087 21% 793 906 87% 
1930 2,591 17,604 15% 621 948 65% 
1931 2,188 7,754 28% 621 843 74% 
1932 1,806 8,187 22% 622 746 83% 
1933 2,076 5,846 36% 623 1,103 56% 
1934 4,377 8,721 50% 624 1,687 37% 
1935 4,243 5,865 72% 711 1,642 43% 
1936 3,610 6,048 60% 812 1,696 48% 
1937 5,875 7,966 74% 921 1,751 53% 
1938 3,268 9,386 35% 868 2,148 40% 
1939 2,354 8,527 28% 941 2,272 41% 
1940 1,840 10,379 18% 844 2,717 
31% 
1941 2,265 13,058 17% 1,000 2,463 41% 
1942 1,949 6,932 28% 1,042 3,142 33% 
1943 1,907 7,043 27% 1,058 2,816 38% 
1944 1,932 6,052 32% 1,334 2,725 49% 
1945 1,888 6,619 29% 1,503 3,074 49% 
1946 2,351 8,015 29% 1,646 2,833 58% 
1947 2,783 16,235 17% 1,788 3,253 55% 
1948 4,371 26,636 16% 1,695 3,610 47% 
1949 4,034 24,878 16% 1,464 4,854 30% 
1950 4,841 25,661 19% 1,146 4,110 28% 
1951 5,171 27,778 19% 1,332 4,633 29% 
1952 6,003 32,599 18% 1,502 5,122 29% 
1953 4,632 34,566 13% 1,578 5,369 29% 
1954 4,623 36,193 13% 1,424 5,826 24% 
1955 4,358 40,340 11% 1,449 5,944 24% 
1956 4,887 47,443 10% 1,639 6,127 27% 
1957 5,727 62,013 9% 1,784 7,259 25% 
1958 5,528 58,430 9% 1,929 7,526 26% 
1959 5,256 60,404 9% 2,187 7,820 28% 
1960 4,706 63,384 7% 2,346 9,409 25% 
1961 6,802 66,914 10% 2,392 9,286 26% 
1962 7,354 72,977 10% 2,582 9,090 28% 
1963 7,191 98,102 7% 2,714 9,735 28% 
1964 7,512 75,618 10% 2,941 7,571 39% 
1965 6,741 80,887 8% 3,083 10,251 30% 
1966 6,687 90,971 7% 3,345 7,988 42% 
1967 6,707 88,290 8% 3,477 8,775 40% 
1968 6,164 104,522 6% 3,757 9,522 39% 
1969 6,898 98,900 7% 3,995 8,664 46% 
1970 6,842 104,981 7% 4,324 11,106 39% 
1971 8,322 130,455 6% 4,651 11,076 42% 
1972 9,662 130,924 7% 5,056 11,856 43% 
1973 16,018 197,250 8% 5,268 12,707 41% 
1974 58,215 480,003 12% 6,341 16,381 39% 
1975 79,220 374,769 21% 6,974 20,081 35% 
1976 93,103 358,149 26% 6,494 15,615 42% 
1977 108,280 335,573 32% 6,166 11,700 53% 
1978 121,653 284,574 43% 7,290 17,183 42% 
1979 209,857 421,942 50% 9,412 17,179 55% 
1980 458,844 535,021 86% 11,942 27,738 43% 
1981 537,856 577,017 93% 11,637 28,543 41% 
1982 516,404 473,302 109% 9,037 26,918 34% 
1983 388,048 433,027 90% 8,336 30,148 28% 
1984 392,869 452,147 87% 7,634 23,652 32% 
1985 385,855 405,503 95% 7,429 25,924 29% 
Sources: for the average productivity of labour oil production from Appendix A and prices from Appendix F 
divided by the labour force in oil fields shown in Figure 4.3-4. For the average wages the aggregate wages as in 
Figure 4.3-1 divided by the corresponding labour force from Figure 4.3-4. 
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The average Mexican salaries grew more after the nationalisation of the industry, but 
still remained far from the average wage received by Venezuelan oil workers. The 
average annual wage of a Mexican worker was about one-third the average 
Venezuelan wage in nominal terms for most years after nationalisation. Nonetheless, 
the average productivity of Mexican workers was much smaller -between one tenth 
and one fourth- than that of Venezuelan workers. Furthermore, while the relative size 
of the Mexican average productivity per worker continuously decreased as percentage 
of that of Venezuela, the relative size of the Mexican average wage rather than 
diminishing accordingly, maintained and even increased its relative size for the period 
1940-1970. The evidence in Table 4.3-1 seems to suggest that Mexican average wage 
should have been even smaller given the difference in average productivity of labour 
between the two countries. The reasoning appears to turn around from the mid-1970s. 
The Mexican average productivity per worker increased sharply and almost achieved 
Venezuelan level, however the Venezuelan average salaries continued doubling those 
of Mexican workers. In fact, it has been argued that the Venezuelan oil union obtained 
its benefits from high wages while the Mexican unions obtained benefits in the form of 
expanded employment for the 1970s and 1980s. 40 
Figure 4.3- 5: Labour costs of production per barrel of oil. Mexico and Venezuela 1920-1988 
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Sources: for wages Figures 4.3-1 and for labour force Figure 4.3-4. Appendix A for oil production. 
L. Randall, The Political Economy oJ' Lfeiican Oil, p .12. 
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How are these qualifications to the data likely to affect the calculation of the resource 
rent? The repercussions on labour cost per barrel are noticeable. Taking account only 
of employees in the production branch of the industry, Mexico's oil production was 
still more labour intensive than Venezuela's. Figure 4.3-5 again compares labour costs 
per barrel in both countries, but now on the basis of labour involved in production. 
Mexican production costs per barrel are still the higher of the two. Although the gap 
has closed considerably compared with Figure 4.3-2 (which used the official aggregate 
data on labour costs), Mexico's labour costs per barrel surpassed Venezuela's until the 
early 1980s. This last fact can be explained by the changes in production that occurred 
in those years. While Mexico's production shot up dramatically (thus pushing down 
average costs per barrel), Venezuela's oil production slowed down due to the effects of 
nationalisation (causing an increase in the average labour costs per barrel). 
When calculating the rent we should bear in mind that part of the rent is likely to have 
been appropriated by labour via wage premia and over-employment, particularly in the 
case of Mexico. In both cases, after nationalisation, the number of people employed 
and the average wage paid increased without a proportional increase in production. 
However, it is fair to say that in Mexico over-employment was more important to the 
overall labour costs than the level of salaries for the period between nationalisation and 
the oil boom, whereas the opposite was true in Venezuela after its own nationalisation. 
Finally, it is worth noticing that labour costs before the 1970s ranged only between 
one-fourth and one-half of the price of a barrel. After the oil boom, labour costs 
represented no more than five to ten percent of the price of a barrel. 
Operation Costs 
Labour costs do not account for all the costs involved in producing a barrel of oil. 
Other costs such as raw materials, services provided by third parties, insurance, 
administrative costs, transport, depreciation, etc. should be also taken into account. 
Such costs have been used as an alternative to the costs of labour and capital for the 
calculation of the resource rent. Traditionally, production costs have been divided into 
three components: 41 
1- Operating costs- normally referred to as production costs, assuming all equipment 
is in place. 
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2- Development costs -the installation of new productive capacity in already known 
pools, whether new or already partly developed. With the exception of exploration, 
all investment is included, below and above ground, including the costs of such 
facilities as marine terminals and jetties. 
3- Exploration costs- the cost of discovery of new fields and of new pools in existing 
fields. 
Actual cost data are usually proprietary to the resource-extracting firms or simply 
unknown. 42 Few if any of the published costs estimates are ever explained. Hence, it is 
difficult to know whether the cost series available refer to production, development or 
exploration altogether, or to random sums of items belonging to different categories. In 
any case, aggregate data on operating costs have proved difficult to find. And even 
when one can identify published data series there may be huge differences between 
different sources. This is an old problem. Already in the 1930s, governments were 
trying to improve the inspection systems of the books of the companies in order to 
establish their capacity to pay royalties, but always found strong opposition from the 
firms. 3 Cost of production was difficult for the committee of the Mexican 
expropriation to identify. 44 Government and the industry sources differed in their ways 
of allocating capital expenditures and their results cannot be compared. 5 The 
operating costs data collected for this research were mostly provided by the industry. 
Theoretically they comprised by labour costs, raw materials, energy expenditures, 
services provided by third parties, transport and the depreciation and amortisation of 
fixed capital and equipment. 
Notwithstanding the problems of comparing different cost series due to likely 
differences in definitions across time and location, this section presents several 
comparisons of costs between Mexico and Venezuela. Some scattered data regarding 
operating/development/exploration, i. e. production costs, were found for both 
41 Based on Adelman, The World Petroleum Market, pp. 46-77. 
42 R. Pindyck, The optimal exploration and production of non-renewable resources', Journal of 
Political Economy 86 (1978), S. Farrow, Testing the efficiency of extraction from a stock of resource', 
Journal of Political Economy 93 (1985). 
43 Gordon, The Expropriation of Foreign-Owned Property in Mexico , pp. 111-112 and chapter 4 in Lieuwen, Petroleum in Venezuela: A History. 
04 M6xico. Secretaria de Patrimonio Nacional, El Petrdleo de Mexico. The discrepancies between 
company accountants and official experts regarding the yearly costs of the companies are stunning. No 
effort is here made to justify either set of figures. The final settlement between government and 
companies indicates that the truth was probably somewhere between the two sets of figures. 
45 Mexico. Secretaria de Programaciön y Presupuesto, La industria petrolera en Mexico (Mexico D. F., 
1979). 
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countries. 46 These comparisons further illuminate the final estimates of the resource 
rent, since by explaining the difference in the costs we can get a better grasp on the 
factors that underpinned the value of the resource rent. 
Figure 4.3- 6: 
Labour costs share on production operating costs. Mexico and Venezuela, 1924-1985 
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Sources: see appendix G for operating costs sources. Labour costs aggregated from Figure 4.3-5 
The proportion of labour costs to total reported operating costs gives an idea of by 
how much basing the calculation on labour costs would inflate the rent. The data are 
shown in Figure 4.3-6; the continuous lines reflect the data reconstruction rather than 
data obtained from primary sources, which have been indicated with dots. Labour costs 
comprised approximately one-half of Venezuelan production costs, and peaked at 80 
percent in the second quarter of the century. In contrast, Mexico's wages and salaries 
represented only about a quarter of all Mexican oil production costs for most of the 
period considered. 47 It is also noticeable that the steady increase of the share of 
46 See Appendix G for data sources. Throughout this section both terms, production'operation costs, are 
used without actually implying a different category of costs. Both names involve the concept of all the 
costs involved in getting oil out of the ground. 
4' These results are in line with the estimates of Arps, who calculated current costs in the US industry in 
the 1950s to be 20 to 30 percent for labour and 30 to 50 percent for repairs and maintenance. Other 
expenses included insurance, damage, power, waste disposal and oil treatment. The results are also 
consistent with those of Hanson who estimated that other local costs in Venezuela were almost equal to 
wages and salaries for the period 1950-1957. See J. J. Arps, 'Valuation of Oil and Gas Reserves', in Frick 
(ed. ), Petroleum Production Handbook, Vol. 11 (New York, 1962) pp. 23-24, as quoted by P. G. Bradley, 
The economics qt Crude petroleum production, Vol. 48 (Amsterdam, 1967), p. 21 and J. A. I lanson, 
Q, 
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Mexican labour costs in total costs of production from the 1950s contrasts with the 
declining share of Venezuela's salaries in total costs from the 1960s. The result is the 
reduction of the gap between the two countries. The immediate implication of Figure 
4.3-6 is that Mexican costs other than wages and salaries were proportionally greater 
than in Venezuela. In order to confirm this, we shall look at the aggregate costs for the 
two industries and costs per barrel. 
Figure 4.3-7 compares the total costs of oil production in Mexico and Venezuela from 
1921 to 1984. Mexico's costs were more than double those of Venezuela before 1949. 
For the next quarter of the century, Venezuela's oil industry costs surpassed Mexico's, 
but not by a great amount. Actually, from the mid-1960s, aggregated cost in both 
countries were similar. Only after Venezuela's nationalisation of the oil industry in 
1976 did Venezuela's costs shoot above Mexican aggregate costs, opening the widest 
gap of the whole century between the two countries. The size of the Mexican costs 
portrays an oil industry that could be similar to Venezuela's if only in terms of costs. 
However, the Mexican oil industry was far smaller in actual production. 
The Venezuelan cost advantage per barrel produced has already been discussed with 
regard to labour costs. Exemption from import duties, low transport costs and the huge 
production per well also reduced expenses for foreign firms and the cost per barrel 
produced. By contrast, the Mexican cost inefficiency has been widely exposed in the 
literature, particularly in the years immediately after the nationalisation. 48 When 
Pemex was on the edge of bankruptcy in the early 1940s, the Union of Petroleum 
Workers pointed at issues related to poor management as part of the core problems of 
the company: 
'Cycles of Economic Growth and Structural Change since 1950', in Martz and Myers (eds. ), Venezuela: 
The Democratic Experience (Caracas, 1st ed., 1977), p. 66. 
48 See, among others, Standard Oil Company, The Reply to Mexico (New York, 1940); Syndicate of 
Petroleum Workers, 'Message to the Nation from the Syndicate of Petroleum Workers of the Mexican 
Republic', Excelsior (9 August 1940) August 9; 'Mexico's unsolved problem'. In The Petroleum Press 
Service. (London, 1941); J. R. Powell, The Mexican Petroleum Industry 1938-1950 (Berkeley, 1956); G. 
Philip, Oil And Politics In Latin America. Nationalist Movements And State Companies (Cambridge, 
1982) and Randall, The Political Economy of Mexican Oil. Some of the financial problems of Pemex 
are presented in Appendix E regarding exploration investments. 
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Figure 4.3- 7: Aggregate operating costs of oil production. Mexico and Venezuela 1921-1984 
Aggregate operating costs In the oil Industry. Mexico and Venezuela 1921-1984 
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Figure 4.3- 8: Operating costs per barrel produced . Mexico and Venezuela 1920-1984 
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`The control of income and expenditures by the Administration is daily more 
disastrous [... ] (the bases of the problem are) the manifest inability of the 
administrators, high salaries of confidential employees, burdensome sales 
contracts, loss of markets, failure to maintain domestic sales, disproportionate 
exploitation, etc. [... ] Another of the causes of the economic disequilibria is the 
purchase of materials for the industry in ignorance of proper commercial 
methods. [... ] Other direct cause of the depression is the sanding up of wells, 
principally in the Isthmus region. Petröleos Mexicanos failed to exercise the 
necessary technical care' 49 
The international press pointed in the very same direction. The Petroleum Press 
Service estimated a loss of over 100 million pesos ($5 million) for the period 193 8-40. 
It reproached the Mexican administration that it was falling severely short of sound 
commercial practice . 
50 To add to this, there was the effect of the boycott, which had 
been successfully mounted by the companies on supplies of capital goods to Pemex S1 
These factors contributed to the higher operation costs of the Mexican industry. 
Contrasts between the two oil industries appear very clear when comparing costs per 
barrel. Figure 4.3-8 shows the costs per barrel in both countries for the period 1920- 
1984. According to this data set, Mexico's cost per barrel produced was already twice 
that of Venezuela by the late 1930s. By 1945, producing a barrel of oil in Mexico was 
over six times more expensive, and was almost ten times as costly by the end of the 
1960s. The opposite tendencies in the amount of oil produced (Mexico more than 
quadrupled its production from 1970 to 1982, whereas Venezuela halved output 
between 1970 to 1985), together with rising aggregate costs contributed to the sharp 
increase of costs per barrel in Venezuela after 1970. Eventually, Venezuela's costs per 
barrel overtook Mexico's costs in the early 1980s. 
In any case, it is clear from this analysis the huge difference in the costs of extracting a 
barrel of oil between Mexico and Venezuela. This section has shown how labour costs 
are just a part of total costs of production. Yet they constitute a greater proportion in 
Venezuela than in Mexico, which indicates that costs other than labour costs are also 
greater in Mexico. This was a trend broken only after the developments of the 1970s. 
Given the difference in costs in both countries the rent is expected to be very different 
too. 
49 Syndicate of Petroleum Workers, 'Message to the Nation from the Syndicate of Petroleum Workers 
of the Mexican Republic', Excelsior (9 August 1940) August 9 as quoted in Standard Oil Company, The 
Reply to Mexico extracts from pages 116-119. Parentheses added. 
so 'Mexico's unsolved problem', in The Petroleum Press Service, No, 7, July 1941. 
51 Powell, The Mexican Petroleum Industry 1938-1950. 
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Capital Costs 
Deducting just the production costs would reflect the view that the entire surplus from 
production should be counted as depletion costs. In general, applications of the 
Hotelling-based methods have allowed for a return on fixed assets, thus dividing the 
surplus between physical and natural capital. Including a return on capital requires the 
choice of a rate of return on associated capital. The choice of this return is to a certain 
extent arbitrary. While the US Department of Commerce includes a6 percent return in 
its calculations, the UK Office for National Statistics assumes a real rate of return of 
15 percent S2 The rationale behind the former is that 6 percent is approximately the 45- 
year average real rate of return on investments in corporate bonds and equities, or 
alternatively, the return that the investment would have produced in another sector. 
That is a `normal' rate of return. 53 The latter corresponds to the figure safeguarded 
under the United Kingdom's oil and gas fiscal regime. It can be considered as a 
`normal rate of return on oil investment'. 4 The following paragraphs explore further 
the choice of the rate of return. 
Economists define investment as the act of incurring an immediate cost in the 
expectation of future rewards. Those rewards are a return on the capital invested. The 
direct relationship between uncertainty and return is well known. However, according 
to Dixit, most investment decisions have another two important characteristics in 
varying degrees. " First, the investment is partially or completely irreversible. In other 
words, the initial cost of investment is at least partially sunk; you cannot recover it all 
should you change your mind. Second, you have some choice about the timing of your 
investment. You can postpone the action to get more information about the future. 
Taking a `normal' rate of return forgets an essential fact: at such a rate, no investment 
would have been made for extracting the resource. Given the sunk costs in the oil 
industry, the risk involved (especially in underdeveloped countries) and the level of 
52 US Department of Commerce, 'Accounting for mineral resources: issues and BEA's initial estimates', 
Survey of current business (1994, April). Normal rates of return are also used by other studies; see for 
example, L. Lindholt, 'On Natural Resource Rent and the Wealth of a Nation. A Study Based of 
National Accounts in Norway 1930-1995', Statistics Norway. Research Department Discussion Papers 
281 (2000), p. 8 and P. Vaze, 'Environmental Accounts- Valuing the Depletion of Oil and Gas 
Reserves', Economic Trends (1996, April) 510. 
53 Other guesses for 'normal' rate of return include the 4 percent used by World Bank studies such as 
World Bank, Monitoring Environmental Progress: A Report on Work in Progress. (Washington, D. C., 
1995) and World Bank, Expanding the Measure of Wealth. Indicators of Environmentally Sustainable 
Development, Vol. 17 (Washington, D. C., 1997). 
54 According to Lindholt, 'On Natural Resource Rent and the Wealth of a Nation. A Study Based of 
National Accounts in Norway 1930-1995', p. 25, the Norwegian estimates of oil wealth by the Ministry 
of Energy and Industry and Ministry of Finance use 7 percent as working assumption. 
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uncertainty of initial oil investments, higher returns were required to attract 
investment. A former president of Gulf stated in 1961 that in purchasing oil and gas 
reserves, his company would not be interested in a6 percent rate of return on a 
discounted cash-flow basis, would regard 7.9 percent as borderline, and would be 
sufficiently interested in 9 percent to make a thoughtful investigation. For exploration 
and development combined, he thought an individual investor would require perhaps 
10 to 20 percent (after taxes). 56 Therefore, to use the `normal' rate of return may be to 
underestimate the real rate of return needed to generate the investment for depleting 
the resource, thus including part of the return legitimately belonging to the investors in 
the resource rent. 
Figure 4.3- 9: After tax returns in oil industry: USA, Venezuela and rest of the world, 1936-1994 
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Sources: USA, rest of the world and Venezuela from Baptista, Bases cuantitativas cue /a econoinia 
Venezolana. 1830-1995 (and data disk) , cuadro 1. 
Venezuela(PODE) for the years 1947-1955 took from the 'return on capital' entry, from 'financial 
summary of the Venezuela petroleum industry, 1947-1961', in Venezuela. Ministry of Mines and 
Hydrocarbons, Venezuelan Petroleum Industry. Statistical Data (Caracas, 1962), p. 24. For the rest of 
the period Venezuela. Ministerio de Energia y Minas, Petrolc'o r otros dato. '. estadistico. + (PODS) 
(Caracas, issued annually since 1958). 
55 From Chapter 1 in A. K. Dixit and R. S. Pindyck, Investment Under Uncertainty (Princeton, 1992). 
s' Sidney A. Swenrud. testifying before the Federal Power Commission in September 1961 as quoted in 
N. I. Eggleston, 'Methods and procedures for estimating fair market value of petroleum properties'. 
Journal of Petroleum Technology (May 1964). The ultimate source is Adelman, The 1Vorld Petroleum 
Market 
, pp. 53-54. 
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This view is confirmed by Figure 4.3-9, which contrasts after-tax rates of return on 
capital investment on oil industry in Venezuela (from two different sources), the 
United States and an average of the rest of the world excluding the United States. 
It is clear from Figure 4.3-9 that the returns on oil investment in Venezuela and in the 
rest of the world have been above the returns within the US. The after-tax rate of return 
on capital investment in the oil industry within the US has been between a lower limit 
of 2 percent and an upper limit of 14 percent. The average return in the US turns out to 
have been very close to the traditional 5 to 6 percent `normal' rate of return. However, 
the reported after-tax return on capital invested in Venezuela had an exceptional 
minimum of 8 percent with a maximum over 100 percent. According to these data, the 
average return on investment in oil in Venezuela has oscillated around 20 percent. The 
average yield for oil assets in the rest of the world lay in between those in the US and 
Venezuela. These data suggest that a `normal' rate of return seriously underestimates 
the return required by capital invested in the oil industry in Venezuela. 
Let us now consider the capital costs of a nationalised company of a producing nation. 
A state owned enterprise is expected to be able to waive most of the political risk. 
Furthermore, the greater the political risk, the greater is the competitive advantage of a 
national company. Therefore, its cost of capital is governed by commercial and 
technical risk added on to what it cost them to borrow, or what they can expect to get 
by lending money out. Here governments vary greatly. There is an indication that the 
government of Iraq believed that 5 percent is a proper cost of capital for them. 57 
Adelman argues this is surely much too low and he suggests 10 percent as a more 
appropriate figure based on the long-term rate for borrowers in some Middle East 
countries and Europe during the 1970s. Regarding Pemex, it is recognised that `new 
investments were financed almost in their entirety by long-term or short-term loans 
and by arrears of debts to the State' which may suggest that the cost of capital for 
Pemex was close to the normal rate of return S8 Nevertheless, even if the political risk 
is waived, uncertainty, irreversibility and timing issues also apply in state owned 
enterprises. Hence a `normal rate of return on oil investment' cannot be ruled out as 
appropriate even in this case. 
S' Based upon Adelman, The World Petroleum Market, p. 56. 
sa United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Petroleum Exploration: Capital 
Requirements and Methods of Financing (New York, 1962), p. 17. 
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Figure 4.3- 10: Capital investment per barrel. Mexico and Venezuela, 1921-1985 
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Figure 43- 11: Capital investment in the oil industry. Mexico and Venezuela 1938-1985 
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It is clear that the second component affecting the absolute magnitude of the payments 
to capital is the actual amount of capital invested (needed) by the industry. The 
amounts invested in both countries also offer a big contrast. Figure 4.3-10 illustrates 
the different pattern of capital investment per barrel produced in Mexico and 
Venezuela from 1921 to 1985, although Mexican data are very sketchy before 1938. 
Although it is not apparent in Figure 4.3-10, by 1924 investment in Venezuela was 
already three times the investment in the Mexican oil industry. Bearing in mind the 
differences in volume produced, it is clear that the very low investment -almost nil in 
the years immediately after the expropriation- undertaken in Mexico well into the 
1960s contrasted with the high levels of investment per barrel produced in Venezuela 
up to the 1950s. Mexican investment only took off in the mid-1960s with the creation 
of the Institute of Petroleum and a more active policy regarding exploration. The high 
volume of production explains the low investment per barrel in Venezuela in the 1960s 
and early 1970s rather than a decrease in the investment level. This is revealed in 
Figure 4.3-11, which shows the total investment in millions of dollars for both 
countries over the same period. In absolute numbers, capital investment in Venezuela 
exceeded investment in the Mexican oil industry by a great deal throughout the 
century. Again, the change in ranking occurs during the roller coaster years of the mid- 
1970s. In fact, this took place at an incredible speed. Until 1971, capital investment in 
the Mexican oil industry was not even half the investment carried out in Venezuela - 
44 percent to be precise. Only four years later, in 1975, total capital investment in the 
Mexican oil industry exceeded investment in Venezuela by 30 percent, just to fall 
below Venezuelan levels by the early 1980s. 
The objective of this section was to establish the value of the contributions of labour 
and capital inputs, or in their absence, the average costs of production in the oil 
industry of Mexico and Venezuela. These figures are needed in the calculation of the 
surplus revenue accruing to the owner of the resource that is going to be denominated 
resource rent. This section demonstrated that this was not a straightforward matter. The 
variety of costs incurred in oil production, the little disaggregation of the data 
published and the particular characteristics of production under state management 
complicated the estimation of the factor payments. Nevertheless, series of labour costs, 
capital payments and average costs of operation have been produced. It is time to 
calculate the resource rent. 
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4.4 The Resource Rent 
The previous sections have presented a description of the basic components needed for 
the calculation of the resource rent. Given the complications associated to the data set, 
several permutations are considered as possible approximations to the resource rent. 
Table 4.4-1 summarises the different alternatives that have been used in the calculation 
of the resource rent for Mexico and Venezuela. 
Table 4.4-1: 
Resource rent calculation: permutations considered and nomenclature 
b 
öii 
ýw 
a 
ý. 
7 
a 
Permutation (a) Permutation (b) 
N, (a, ) = p*q-cl-r*k N, (b)= p*q-oc 
) N(a N(b) 
r ua rý r) ut (b) _ q q 
Calculated for: 
r=6% 
r= 15% 
r= return reported by the 
companies (Venezuela only) 
Mexico Venezuela Mexico Venezuela 
t- 1935-1987 t- 1920-1985 t- 1921-1987 t- 1920-1985 
Notes: 
N aggregated resource rent; u rent per unit (per barrel); 
p oil price; q oil produced (barrels); cl cost of labour in oil fields; r rate of return; k fixed capital 
investment; oc operation costs 
Examples of labels herein: 
Vz [N(a6)] reads as Venezuela's aggregated rent resulting from permutation (a), using a normal 
return to capital of 6 percent. If no number attached, e. g. N(a), the companies' rate of return is used. 
Mx(u(b)J refers to the Mexican rent per unit calculated using permutation (b), etc. 
For both countries two basic alternative measures were devised. On the one hand, the 
rent was calculated as the standing surplus after subtracting the cost of labour in oil 
fields and the payments to capital from the price of oil [permutation (a)]. On the other 
hand, the rent has been calculated as the difference between price and the operation 
costs presented above [permutation (b)]. The first permutation, N(a) herein, has further 
variations regarding the returns to capital. Based on the discussion on rates of return 
above, three alternatives are considered for Venezuela: the return of capital reported by 
the companies, a `normal' rate of return of 6 per cent, and a `normal return to oil 
investment' of 15 per cent. For Mexico the rates of return considered are a `normal' 6 
per cent return and a `normal return to oil investment' of 15 per cent. 
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This section presents the results of these permutations using the data set compiled in 
this chapter for Mexico and Venezuela. 
The Resource Rent in Venezuela 1920-1985 
Aggregated rents and rents per unit calculated under the different permutations for 
Venezuela's oil are reported in Table 4.4-2. The upper value of the resource rent is 
generally obtained when applying a `normal' rate of return to capital. The lower value 
is obtained from permutation (b) for the first half of the century, whereas from the mid 
1950s, is generally obtained when the actual rate of return reported by the companies is 
used. The shift seems to coincide with the increasing returns reported by the 
companies from the 1950s. The mid value is always obtained when the `normal rate of 
return to oil' applied. 
It is possible to identify distinct phases in the evolution of the rents in Venezuela. The 
first years of the oil industry in Venezuela result in negative rents. In fact, the case of 
net returns turning negative has been raised in a number of environmental accounting 
exercises. 59 In the case of Venezuela the start up costs of the industry explain this 
result. The references about the early days of the oil industry cited in Chapters 1 and 3 
argued that it took some years before Venezuelan oil fields were profitable. The 
historiography identified the year 1922 as the turning point, and indeed, for all but one 
of the permutations, it is the last year with negative rents. The second phase in the 
evolution of the resource rents in Venezuela goes from 1925 to the mid 1940s. For 
these years the rent fluctuates much more than in subsequent periods. This may be 
indicating the instability -in prices, returns and labour costs- of an infant industry, but 
also reflecting the effects of the historical events -1930 crisis and the Second World 
War-. In a third phase, the rent increases during the late 1940s to a fairly stable level 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s up to the big jump of 1973-1974 that marks the 
beginning of the last phase. These last two phases are strictly linked to the evolution of 
the oil prices (see Section 4.2 above, Figure 4.2-1 in particular). 
59 P. Bartelmus, The value of nature: valuation and evaluation in environmental accounting', in 
Environmental Accounting in Theory and Practice, Vol. 11 (London, 1998), p. 278 cites A. Bom's 
evaluation of Canadian resources as example. L. Lindholt, 'On Natural Resource Rent and the Wealth 
of a Nation. A Study Based of National Accounts in Norway 1930-1995', Statistics Norway. Research 
Department Discussion Papers 281 (2000), identifies negative rents when estimating the rents 
associated to Norwegian fish stocks. M. Lindmark, Towards Environmental Historical National 
Accounts for Sweden. Methodological Considerations and Estimates for the 19th and 20th Centuries., 
Vol. 21 (1998), p. 78 obtains negative rents for Swedish iron ore for the early 1930s. 
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Table 4.4-2: 
Venezuela's resource rent under different permutations, 1920-1985 
As percentage 
rent, N Rent per unit, u ercentage 
of price per 
barrel 
year N(a) 
MII. Bly. 
N(a6) 
MII. BIv 
N(a15) 
Mll. Bly 
N(b) 
MI1. Bly 
u(a) 
Blv. 
u(a6) 
Blv. 
u(a15) 
Blv. 
U(b) 
BIv. 
u(a) u(a6) u(a15) u(b) 
1920 -4.8 -4.8 -4.8 -17.1 -9.5 -9.5 -9.5 -34.1 
1921 -4.4 4.4 -5.1 -18.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.7 -12.9 
1922 -2.0 -2.0 -3.7 -17.2 -0.9 -0.9 -1.7 -7.8 
1923 7.4 7.4 4.4 -14.3 1.7 1.7 1.0 -3.3 22% 22% 13% 
1924 38.1 38.1 31.5 4.2 4.2 4.2 3.5 0.5 47% 47% 39% 5% 
1925 114.6 114.6 98.4 68.1 5.8 5.8 4.9 3.4 63% 63% 54% 37% 
1926 235.7 235.7 206.0 162.2 6.6 6.6 5.8 4.5 71% 71% 62% 49% 
1927 261.1 261.1 218.4 152.0 4.3 4.3 3.6 2.5 67% 67% 56% 39% 
1928 427.3 427.3 375.2 256.7 4.0 4.0 3.5 2.4 76% 76% 67% 46% 
1929 634.0 648.3 581.7 459.9 4.7 4.8 4.3 3.4 77% 79% 71% 56% 
1930 702.9 678.4 608.2 439.7 5.2 5.0 4.5 3.3 85% 82% 73% 53% 
1931 451.7 399.7 332.1 302.2 3.9 3.4 2.8 2.6 89% 79% 66% 60% 
1932 619.6 557.3 496.3 493.5 5.3 4.8 4.3 4.2 96% 87% 77% 77% 
1933 267.3 232.8 176.2 161.1 2.3 2.0 1.5 1.4 82% 72% 54% 50% 
1934 370.9 350.5 303.6 244.4 2.7 2.6 2.2 1.8 81% 77% 67% 54% 
1935 390.6 377.6 332.7 289.0 2.6 2.5 2.2 1.9 80% 78% 68% 59% 
1936 408.7 408.8 362.7 312.8 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.0 77% 77% 68% 59% 
1937 430.0 433.2 384.5 328.5 2.3 2.3 2.1 1.8 73% 74% 65% 56% 
1938 367.9 352.5 293.0 276.4 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.5 68% 65% 54% 51% 
1939 299.8 304.2 238.1 219.7 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.1 59% 60% 47% 43% 
1940 305.1 326.1 257.5 243.8 1.7 1.8 1.4 1.3 58% 62% 49% 46% 
1941 432.0 495.2 426.7 421.3 1.9 2.2 1.9 1.9 63% 72% 62% 61% 
1942 178.6 256.8 188.2 171.8 1.2 1.7 1.3 1.2 39% 56% 41% 37% 
1943 265.1 371.7 295.0 301.7 1.5 2.1 1.6 1.7 46% 65% 52% 53% 
1944 492.9 593.9 513.8 494.7 1.9 2.3 2.0 1.9 59% 71% 62% 59% 
1945 668.5 745.3 648.2 606.2 2.1 2.3 2.0 1.9 63% 70% 61% 57% 
1946 923.2 1,035.6 905.6 802.9 2.4 2.7 2.3 2.1 61% 68% 60% 53% 
1947 1,365.9 1,699.6 1,502.3 1,586.3 3.1 3.9 3.5 3.6 58% 72% 64% 67% 
1948 2,308.6 2,803.2 2,556.7 2,477.9 4.7 5.7 5.2 5.1 63% 77% 70% 68% 
1949 2,255.7 2,469.1 2,200.9 2,126.8 4.7 5.1 4.6 4.4 67% 74% 66% 63% 
1950 2,515.2 2,832.7 2,561.0 2,288.2 4.6 5.2 4.7 4.2 70% 79% 72% 64% 
1951 2,600.2 3,033.7 2,754.2 2,438.2 4.2 4.9 4.4 3.9 68% 79% 72% 63% 
1952 2,943.1 3,439.4 3,123.1 2,846.3 4.5 5.2 4.7 4.3 67% 79% 72% 65% 
1953 3,139.2 3,614.3 3,284.9 2,902.5 4.9 5.6 5.1 4.5 69% 79% 72% 63% 
1954 3,389.6 3,928.8 3,593.7 3,163.3 4.9 5.7 5.2 4.6 69% 80% 73% 64% 
1955 3,706.0 4,668.5 4,316.1 4,155.8 4.7 5.9 5.5 5.3 65% 82% 76% 73% 
1956 4,020.2 5,415.2 4,956.6 4,874.7 4.5 6.0 5.5 5.4 61% 83% 76% 74% 
1957 4,966.2 6,878.3 6,277.0 6,427.2 4.9 6.8 6.2 6.3 60% 83% 76% 77% 
1958 5,099.3 5,888.5 5,261.6 5,387.4 5.4 6.2 5.5 5.7 69% 80% 72% 73% 
1959 4,915.2 5,467.5 4,789.4 4,954.6 4.9 5.4 4.7 4.9 71% 78% 69% 71% 
1960 4,732.5 5,210.7 4,572.1 4,810.3 4.5 5.0 4.4 4.6 69% 76% 67% 71% 
1961 4,872.3 5,506.1 4,907.0 5,059.6 4.6 5.2 4.6 4.8 70% 79% 70% 73% 
1962 5,350.1 6,150.3 5,592.0 5,680.0 4.6 5.3 4.8 4.9 71% 82% 75% 76% 
1963 5,258.3 6,071.1 5,550.4 5,560.8 4.4 5.1 4.7 4.7 71% 82% 75% 75% 
1964 7,767.4 9,152.5 8,653.4 8,173.2 6.3 7.4 7.0 6.6 73% 86% 82% 77% 
1965 7,487.2 9,045.5 8,551.9 8,263.4 5.9 7.1 6.7 6.5 71% 86% 82% 79% 
1966 7,317.6 8,751.6 8,295.8 7,960.6 5.9 7.1 6.7 6.5 72% 86% 82% 78% 
1967 7,636.9 9,096.6 8,671.7 8,294.6 5.9 7.0 6.7 6.4 73% 86% 82% 79% 
1968 7,782.6 9,434.0 8,990.5 8,671.1 5.9 7.2 6.8 6.6 72% 87% 83% 80% 
1969 7,826.7 9,110.9 8,663.9 8,185.9 6.0 6.9 6.6 6.2 75% 87% 83% 78% 
1970 8,683.2 9,519.5 9,088.4 8,532.0 6.4 7.0 6.7 6.3 79% 87% 83% 78% 
1971 10,681.7 11,803.6 11,385.9 10,466.8 8.2 9.1 8.8 8.1 81% 89% 86% 79% 
1972 11,084.3 11,390.9 11,143.4 9,890.5 9.4 9.7 9.5 8.4 87% 89% 87% 77% 
1973 16,166.1 17,605.1 17,178.3 16,015.6 13.2 14.3 14.0 13.0 84% 92% 90% 84% 
1974 44,891.6 46,156.1 45,686.0 44,641.1 41.3 42.5 42.1 41.1 93% 96% 95% 93% 
1975 36,412.3 37,274.3 36,840.9 34,298.2 42.5 43.5 43.0 40.1 92% 94% 93% 87% 
1976 35,552.5 37,870.0 37,409.2 35,881.9 42.4 45.1 44.6 42.8 89% 95% 94% 90% 
1977 36,757.3 42,188.3 41,662.7 39,348.5 45.0 51.7 51.1 48.2 84% 96% 95% 90% 
1978 34,045.3 38,338.2 37,662.5 34,682.0 43.1 48.5 47.7 43.9 84% 94% 93% 85% 
1979 54,422.3 63,254.1 62,337.5 58,633.8 63.3 73.6 72.5 68.2 82% 96% 94% 89% 
1980 75,104.2 84,938.3 83,690.1 78,184.4 94.7 107.1 105.5 98.6 84% 95% 93% 87% 
1981 83,813.2 92,116.1 90,320.7 85,619.5 109.0 119.8 117.5 111.3 86% 94% 92% 88% 
1982 69,602.6 74,947.4 72,278.0 69,453.5 100.7 108.5 104.6 100.5 86% 92% 89% 85% 
1983 61,358.2 63,992.7 60,657.9 57,921.1 93.4 97.4 92.3 88.2 86% 90% 85% 81% 
1984 89,561.8 97,190.6 93,405.6 90,502.4 135.9 147.5 141.7 137.3 85% 92% 89% 86% 
1985 81 892.4 86 336.0 82 187.4 95 064.7 133.6 140.8 134.1 155.1 86% 91% 86% 99% 
Sources: own elaboration from the data in previous sections. Labels as defined in Table 4.4-1. 
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A noticeable characteristic of the numbers in Table 4.4-2 is that rent accounted for the 
principal share of the price of a barrel of oil throughout the century for all 
permutations. The share tended to increase over time. From the 1940s the rent per unit 
systematically accounted for more than 60 percent of the price. By 1960, the rents 
calculated represented more than 70 percent of the price and the highest proportions, 
around 95 percent, were obtained for the late 1970s. 6° The implicit consequence is that 
costs of production declined systematically relative to the price of oil. This evolution 
of the costs contrast to the constant or increasing costs generally assumed in the 
theoretical discussions of resource rents. The absence of technological change in the 
theoretical models would in part explain the difference between the historical and the 
theoretical evolution of costs and rents. 
In nominal levels, the rents per unit, u, were less than 7 bolivars ($2 approx. ) per barrel 
for all the period previous to the oil shock. In 1973, u ranked between 13.0 and 14.3 
bolivars ($3.10- $3.4). The value rose to levels between 41.1 and 42.5 bolivars ($9.7- 
$10.1) in 1974. By 1981 the rents peaked at 109.0 - 119.8 bolivars ($25.4-$27.9), very 
close to the range obtained in 1985 ($22.2-$25.8). These results are very similar to 
Repetto's findings for Indonesia's oil rent, particularly for those obtained from 
permutation (b), which is equivalent to Repetto's calculation. 61 
The profile of the aggregated rents, N, shares the basic characteristics of the underlying 
per unit rent just described but the amount of oil extracted has a separate impact on the 
nominal value of N. For instance, while u remained almost unchanged from the late 
1940s to the 1960s, the value of N in1948 had doubled by 1956 and tripled by 1969 as 
a consequence of the rapid increase in oil production. The opposite occurred during the 
1970s when at the same time as prices (thus rent per unit) increased, production slowed 
down. Price and quantity produced are the driving forces defining the nominal value of 
the rents. While the former was the crucial variable for u, the latter had a bigger impact 
in N. 
60 These figures are consistent with the general views generated in the late 1970s and 1980s. `The 
difference between market value and production costs is extremely high for oil today -the value 
attributable to the resource itself is rarely less than 80 % of current market price and often greater than 
95%'. R. Stauffer, Accounting for "Wasting Assets". Income Measurement for Oil and Mineral- 
Exporting Rentier States, Vol. 25 (Vienna, 1984), p. 8. 
61 R. Repetto, Wasting Assets: Natural Resources in the National Income Accounts (Washington, D. C., 
1989). He found the rent to be $2.90 for 1973, $9.06 for 1974 and for the last year of the study, 1984, 
rent was $24.30. 
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The Resource Rent in Mexico 1921-1987 
Aggregated rents and rents per unit calculated under the different permutations for 
Mexico's oil are reported in Table 4.4-3. As in the case of Venezuela the upper value 
of the resource rent is obtained when applying a `normal' rate of return to capital, the 
mid value when the `normal return to oil' applied and the lower value is obtained by 
permutation (b). 
It is possible to identify general phases in the evolution of the rents in Mexico. From 
the peak of production in 1921 until well into the 1940s, Mexico's per unit and 
aggregated rents continuously decreased. The decreasing production and increasing 
costs (particularly salaries) reported in the previous sections account for this result. As 
in the case of Venezuela, the 1950s represent a relatively stable period. However, 
during the 1960s rents start to decrease again. The investment programmes initiated in 
those years account for this fact. 62 The trend changed abruptly in 1970 with the sharp 
increase in rents that continued until the 1980s. 
The main characteristic of Table 4.4-3 is that permutation (b) delivers negative figures 
from the very date of the nationalisation up to 1973. N(b) is positive from 1921 up to 
1938, becoming seriously negative until the late 1940s when it starts recovering only 
to fall again from the early 1960s. It has been just mentioned that negative resource 
rents have been reported elsewhere in the literature. Real losses are normally 
associated with a down turn of the market when assets may continue to be exploited, 
despite actual losses, in the hope of better times ahead (price increases or higher 
quality discoveries). 63 As a consequence, negative rents have been considered as 
temporary exceptions to otherwise positive resource rents. From the exposition in 
Chapter 3 and the analysis of costs in this chapter, it is possible to argue that the 
negative rents in Mexico are the result of the exploitation strategy followed by 
Mexico's government rather than the result of market fluctuations. When market 
forces do not rule (or operate in an imperfect fashion) negative rents can became the 
rule rather than the exception as the Mexican example demonstrates. Nevertheless, 
resources continued to be depleted regardless of the efficiency of the exploitation. 
Such depletion should still be accounted for, but negative rents, as Lindmark pointed 
out, are difficult to interpret in the context of environmental accounting 64 
62 See the investment section above and Appendix E for exploration investment. 
63 P. Bartelmus, 'The value of nature: valuation and evaluation in environmental accounting', in 
Environmental Accounting in Theory and Practice, Vol. 11 (London, 1998), p. 278. 
64 Lindmark, Towards Environmental Historical National Accounts for Sweden. , p. 78. 
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Table 4.4-3: 
Mexico's resource rent under different permutations, 1920-1985 
centag 
Aggregated rent, N Rent per unit, u 
As peroer 
barrel 
price 
year N(a6) 
Mill. pesos 
N(a15) 
Mill. pesos 
N(b) 
Mill. pesos 
u(a6) 
esos 
u(a15) 
Pesos 
u(b) 
Pesos 
U(a6) u(a15) u(b) 
1921 304.57 1.57 83% 
1922 244.36 1.34 73% 
1923 205.18 1.37 72% 
1924 152.74 1.09 56% 
1925 179.87 1.56 60% 
1926 115.46 1.28 51% 
1927 126,45 126,45 68.29 1,97 1,97 1.07 80% 80% 43% 
1928 73,62 73,62 26.84 1,47 1,47 0.54 72% 72% 26% 
1929 65,60 65,60 24.66 1,47 1,47 0.55 71% 71% 27% 
1930 61,55 61,55 29.81 1,56 1,56 0.75 76% 76% 37% 
1931 55,52 55,52 23.82 1,68 1,68 0.72 72% 72% 31% 
1932 49,63 49,63 11.46 1,51 1,51 0.35 66% 66% 15% 
1933 57,86 57,86 11.65 1,87 1,87 0.38 70% 70% 14% 
1934 109,04 109,04 27.06 2,86 2,86 0.71 86% 86% 21% 
1935 113.97 113.42 22.37 2.83 2.82 0.56 83% 83% 16% 
1936 104.53 103.93 7.79 2.55 2.53 0.19 77% 77% 6% 
1937 192.95 192.28 25.42 4.12 4.11 0.54 84% 84% 11% 
1938 133.20 132.48 -33.58 3.46 3.44 -0.87 
73% 73% -18% 
1939 107.63 105.20 -111.80 2.51 2.45 -2.61 59% 
58% -61% 
1940 81.55 74.44 -197.21 1.85 1.69 -4.48 51% 
47% -124% 
1941 83.32 81.52 -250.73 1.94 1.89 -5.83 
55% 54% -166% 
1942 61.64 59.84 -233.72 1.77 1.72 -6.71 
46% 44% -173% 
1943 63.35 61.28 -270.65 1.80 1.74 -7.70 
44% 42% -186% 
1944 43.81 39.40 -348.56 1.15 1.03 -9.13 
29% 26% -231% 
1945 26.51 15.98 -459.44 0.61 0.37 -10.55 
16% 10% -279°/u 
1946 69.53 59.45 -512.74 1.41 1.21 -10.41 
27% 23% -202% 
1947 95.60 87.68 -664.90 1.70 1.56 -11.81 
34% 31% -236% 
1948 306.36 290.79 -540.08 5.24 4.97 -9.23 
59% 56% -104% 
1949 412.22 391.43 -507.79 6.77 6.43 -8.34 62% 
59% -76% 
1950 737.08 704.86 -495.54 10.18 9.73 -6.84 
74% 71% -50% 
1951 854.98 823.03 -506.02 11.06 10.65 -6.55 
72% 70% -43% 
1952 967.04 933.47 -462.21 12.51 12.08 -5.98 73% 
71% -35% 
1953 656.61 613.05 -720.64 9.07 8.46 -9.95 
63% 59% -69% 
1954 957.91 880.69 -678.52 11.45 10.53 -8.11 
66% 60% -47% 
1955 997.48 908.47 -812.49 11.16 10.16 -9.09 
63% 57% -51% 
1956 1,081.69 1,000.51 -833.56 11.93 11.04 . 9.19 
63% 59% -49% 
1957 1,395.71 1,276.19 442.24 15.81 14.46 -5.01 65% 60% -21% 
1958 1,228.90 1,083.82 -820.10 13.14 11.59 -8.77 
22% 19% -15% 
1959 987.68 843.23 -1,207.47 10.25 8.75 . 
12.53 53% 45% -65% 
1960 664.06 435.73 -1,644.27 6.70 4.40 -16.60 41% 
27% -101% 
1961 1,342.55 1,134.20 -1,375.45 12.57 10.62 -12.88 
59% 50% -60% 
1962 1,548.65 1,374.05 -1,407.11 13.85 12.28 -12.58 
60% 54% -55% 
1963 1,507.72 1,339.33 -1,621.65 13.13 11.66 -14.12 
58% 51% -62% 
1964 1,474.52 1,244.30 -1,718.31 12.76 10.77 -14.87 
55% 47% -64% 
1965 1,354.98 1,148.61 -1,881.12 11.49 9.74 -15.95 
49% 42% -68% 
1966 1,212.38 931.49 -2,107.52 10.01 7.69 -17.40 
43% 33% -75% 
1967 1,185.42 721.56 -2,452.14 8.91 5.42 -18.43 38% 23% -79% 
1968 981.42 514.50 -2,812.35 6.89 3.61 -19.76 
30% 16% -85% 
1969 1,121.84 664.55 -3,241.01 7.49 4.43 -21.63 
33% 20% -96% 
1970 1,050.03 635.67 -3,525.22 6.70 4.06 -22.50 29% 18% -98% 
1971 1,745.92 1,334.26 -3,084.11 11.20 8.56 -19.78 
38% 29% -67% 
1972 2,109.21 1,638.15 -2,703.94 13.07 10.15 . 16.76 41% 32% -53% 
1973 4,703.35 4,059.85 -889.35 28.52 24.62 -5.39 62% 53% -12% 
1974 24,029.17 23,152.75 10,995.16 114.50 110.33 52.39 87% 84% 40% 
1975 32,123.24 30,864.95 18,525.46 122.80 117.99 70.82 88% 84% 51% 
1976 50,602.45 48,450.37 36,886.92 172.64 165.29 125.84 91% 87% 66% 
1977 100,964.59 97,758.16 83,752.71 281.95 273.00 233.89 93% 90% 77% 
1978 122,561.50 116,918.23 101,609.99 276.91 264.16 229.57 92% 88% 76% 
1979 209,874.85 202,362.37 178,320.15 390.88 376.89 332.11 93% 90% 79% 
1980 517,399.55 503,209.79 477,722.70 730.18 710.15 674.18 96% 93% 88% 
1981 740,845.46 719,755.58 681,302.35 877.87 852.87 807.31 96% 93% 88% 
1982 1,881,754.29 1,852,534.08 1,783,200.50 1,877.18 1,848.03 1,778.87 97% 96% 92% 
1983 4,429,150.09 4,408,110.88 4,255,133.04 4,552.49 4,530.86 4,373.62 99% 98% 95% 
1984 2,331,022.40 2,312,098.64 2,070,376.97 2,378.98 2,359.66 2,112.97 96% 96% 86% 
1985 8,148,324.36 8,091,513.57 7,767,675.40 8,486.66 8,427.49 8,090.21 98% 97% 94% 
1986 7,847,933.75 7,759,218.68 7,124,104.01 8,856.60 8,756.49 8,039.74 97% 95% 88°/, 
1987 23,235,250.45 22,989,274.15 21,177 741.37 25,056.37 24 791.12 22,837.60 97% 96% 88% 
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Sources: own elaboration from the data to previous sections. Laoets as aennea in t sole'.. '. -i. ror i yc i- 
1934, permutation (a) only accounts for labour costs. 
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Permutation (b) regains positive rent values from 1974 up to the end of the period 
considered. These values are very similar to the obtained by permutation (a) for the 
same years. Permutation (a) obtained positive rents for all the years considered. In 
relative terms, u(a, ) represented roughly the same share of the price of a barrel of oil in 
Mexico as it did in Venezuela at the beginning and the end of the period considered. 
For the years in between 1940 and 1970 the share of u(a, ) on the price is smaller than 
in the case of Venezuela, but still the rent represented more than half the price per 
barrel for the majority of years. 
In nominal terms, the rent accruing to Mexican oil fluctuated widely, yet on average 
the oil rent per unit in Mexico stayed below $1 before the oil shock. Both the higher 
factor costs and the lower price of Mexican oil account for this result. The oil boom 
catapulted Mexican rents to a level that surpassed other oil-producing countries' rents. 
In 1970 the rent per unit still ranged 4.06 to 6.7 pesos ($0.3-$0.5). It rose to 110.33- 
114.5 pesos ($8.30-$9.44) by 1974 reaching 730.18 (approx. $31) in 1980. 
Nevertheless, the poor quality of the data underlying the calculation should be 
acknowledged and these results must be taken with caution. 
From the calculation of the resource rent of Mexico and Venezuela in this section we 
learned that the quantity extracted and, most importantly, the price of oil have the 
greatest weight in determining the nominal value of the rent. The choice of the rate of 
return on capital has only a marginal impact on the final values, even more so in the 
case of Mexico where capital investment (thus payments) had a very small significance 
overall. It is also noticeable that the relative size of the resource rent with respect to the 
price of oil has been very high historically. It is widely recognised for the last third of 
the twentieth century that the rent is the most important component of the price of a 
barrel of oil. The results of this section demonstrate that it has also been the case from 
the early days of the oil industry. A simple but crucial observation also derives from 
these rents: they neither are constant nor grow at the rate of interest over time. That is 
rents do not behave in accordance to the theoretical models reviewed in Chapter 2. At 
front, that is not much of a problem because most theoretical models depend on a 
number of assumptions that are not quite true. Only if the assumptions become crucial 
to the results this observation can invalidate the model. 
The rents calculated in this section along with the data about the variation of reserves 
and the life expectancy of the resource presented above are the basic inputs for the 
calculations in Chapter 5. Despite the concerns regarding the quality of the underlying 
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data, the resource rents for Venezuela and Mexico calculated in this section appear 
fairly robust, consistent with similar exercises on the literature and with the history of 
each country. Even the negative rents obtained for Mexico by one of the permutations, 
are not surprising in the context of the history of Mexican oil industry described in 
previous chapters. On the one hand, the negative rents obtained for Mexico under 
permutation (b) seem to indicate that the Mexican strategy is expensive in its own way, 
if not in terms of resource depletion (for the pace of extraction was slower for 
sometime), definitely in terms of efficiency. On the other hand, Mexico's case is 
exceptional to a degree, although not a unique case. Negative rents are more common 
than theoretical models acknowledge. The possibility of a long-standing negative rent 
requires further investigation by environmental accounting theory, for the depletion 
continues to take place but no cost can be assigned to it if the resource rent is the basic 
input to valuation methods. 
4.5 Oil Taxes and Rents 
Chapter 2 noted that taxes have been considered the best proxy for the resource rent 
when the government fully participates in the production process 65 In Chapter 3 we 
saw how scholars that evaluated the so called `sowing oil' policies in Venezuela also 
preferred to concentrate on the analysis of the collection of taxes and its expenditure in 
order to assess the transformation of the transitory income from oil into permanent 
wealth for the nation. 66 It is therefore worthwhile to contrast the results of 
environmental accounting with these approaches since they share at last one objective, 
that is, obtaining a better account of the true economic performance of these 
economies. Having gone this far in the calculation of the resource rent in Mexico and 
Venezuela along the lines proposed by the environmental accounting literature, it is 
now time to assess how comparable the environmental accounting methods are to the 
traditional procedure. The most straightforward method of checking to whether taxes 
make a good substitute for the resource rent is to compare their magnitude in Figures 
4.5-1 and 4.5-2. 
65 R. Stauffer, Accounting for 'Wasting Assets. Income Measurement for Oil and Mineral-Exporting 
Rentier States, Vol. 25 (Vienna, 1984), p. 19 and also B. Mommer, ' Integrating the oil. A structural 
analysis of petroleum in the Venezuelan economy', Latin American Perspectives 23 (1996 summer) 90, 
p. 141. 
66 Among others, see, History, p. 119; T. E. Carrillo Batalla, La evaluacian de la inversion del ingreso 
fiscal petrolero en Venezuela [conference sponsored by Universidad Central de Venezuela. Foro 
Petrolero 1965] (Caracas, 1968); C. Balestrini, 'LCuil ha sido el papel cumplido por la explotacidn 
petrolera en el proceso de modernizacibn de la sociedad venezolana? ', in Mieres (ed. ), Ilacia la 
Venezuela Post-petrolera [conference sponsored by la Academia Nacional de las Ciencias Econdmicas 
in 19851, Vol. 1 (Caracas, 1989). 
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Figure 4.5- 1: Oil taxes and rents. Venezuela 1920-1989 
(mill. bolivars at current prices) 
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Sources and notes: Sources and notes: resource rents as in Section 4.4, for the sake of clarity 
only N(a)15 permutation is plotted here. Oil taxes compiled from the sources in Appendix C. 
Figure 4.5- 2: Oil taxes and rents. Mexico 1912-1989. 
(mill. pesos at current prices) 
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Sources and notes: Sources and notes: resource rents as in Section 4.4, only N(u) permutation 
is plotted here (for 1912-1935 the continuous line is only a guess-estimate of the rents since 
data are missing for the calculation Oil taxes compiled from the sources in Appendix C. 
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It is clear from this comparison between taxes and rents that the government was only 
able to appropriate part of the oil rents. Oil fiscal revenues systematically 
underestimate the value of the rent corresponding to oil resources in Venezuela. The 
government has progressively been able to get hold of a greater share of the rents 
generated by the oil industry. By contrast, in the case of Mexico, taxes levied on the oil 
industry exceeded rents obtained for a number of years during the 1940s and the late 
1960s, as shown in Figure 4.5-2. However, it is well known that Pemex was unable to 
fulfil its fiscal duties for many years. 67 Taxes were in many cases paid in arrears but 
still annotated in the year they were levied. 
The early days in both countries saw a larger gap between oil taxes and rents. This 
coincides with the view of contemporaries who complained about how little the nation 
was obtaining from the exploitation of national resources. 68 The gap closed in Mexico 
after nationalisation, more due to the reduction of the rent than to the increase of the 
taxes collected by the government. In contrast, the effects of the Venezuelan 
Hydrocarbons Law of 1943, which sharply raised taxes in Venezuela are very visible 
in this comparison; the gap between taxes and rents narrowed rapidly from that year 
onwards. 69 
The conclusion of this section is that both governments managed to capture a bigger 
share of the rent as the century went by, but neither was able to capture the whole of 
the rent at any point in time. Hence, taxes fall short as proxy for the resource rent. 
They only measure how good governments are at seizing rents, but do not show the 
part of the rent that labour (via extra wages or extra labour) and/or capital (via extra 
profits) managed to acquire. Authors using taxes as proxy for the rents generated in the 
oil sector run a serious risk of underestimating the rent effects. 0 
67 According to Philip, G., Oil and Politics in Latin America. Nationalist Movements And State 
Companies (Cambridge, 1982), p. 338, Pemex could not meet its commitments to the state and owed 
arrears of tax. From 1954 the company presented losses in its accounts. New investments were financed 
almost in their entirety by long-term or short-term loans and by arrears of debt to the state. 'On 
December 31 1958, the accumulated deficit totalled 215 million pesos', United Nations. Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Petroleum Exploration: Capital Requirements and Methods of Financing 
(New York, 1962), p. 17. 
68 This has been already mentioned generally in Chapter 1, and more specifically in Chapter 3. 
69 References to the 1943 Law can be found above in Chapters 1 and 3. 
70 It would be the case of Stauffer, Accounting for 'Wasting Assets'. Income Measurement for Oil and 
Mineral-Exporting Rentier States and Mommer, ' Integrating the oil. A structural analysis of petroleum 
in the Venezuelan economy', p. 141. 
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4.6 Conclusions 
158 
This chapter presented the calculation of the oil resource rents of Mexico and 
Venezuela for the period 1920-1985. It discussed not only the data, but also the most 
suitable ways of using the available information and provided sensitivity analysis of 
the crucial variables. Oil stocks and flows, price and costs series derived from the 
chapter are major items for the potential generation of environmental accounts of 
Mexico and Venezuela as the one depicted in Figure 2.2-2 for example. 
In the process of generating the resource rent, the chapter compared the two oil 
industries in quantitative terms. The chapter made obvious how the contrasting 
production strategies presented in the previous chapter translate into very different rent 
results. The negative rents obtained for Mexico under permutation (b) seem to indicate 
that the Mexican strategy was expensive in terms of efficiency. This observation also 
rises interesting economic questions. Was Mexico's strategy sensible in limiting its 
production because costs were so high? Should it have limited its output to zero? Or 
were the high costs of production a consequence of the policy? Was Mexico inefficient 
because of the closure to foreign investment and foreign markets? Nevertheless, these 
questions are far beyond the scope of this research. What it can be established with the 
data presented is that the strategy chosen by the Mexican government could have been 
better implemented. It is plausible to argue that at the time of the nationalisation 
Mexico `simply ran out of oil deposits that could be extracted at competitive costs, 
given prices, technology and competitive sources. ' 71 However, the data presented 
suggests that for most of the period after the nationalisation costs could have been 
reduced by changing policies (for instance, reducing the labour force and increasing 
production to take advantage of economies of scale). 
The possibility of a long-standing negative rent also requires further investigation by 
environmental accounting theory, for the depletion continues to take place but no cost 
can be assigned to it if the resource rent is the basic input to valuation methods. 
The chapter also showed how taxes fall short as proxy for the resource rent. They only 
measure how good governments are at seizing rents, but do not show the part of the 
rent that labour (via extra wages or extra labour) and/or capital (via extra profits) 
managed to acquire. 
71 S. H. Haber, N. Mauer and A. Razo, 'When Institutions do not Matter: The Rise and Decline of the 
Mexican Oil Industry', Paper presented at the Economic If story Seminar at UC Berkeley, September 
2001 (no published). 
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Several remarks need to be made in relation to the contrast between the actual 
behaviour of some of the variables over time and the assumptions generally adopted in 
theoretical models of resource depletion. The most noticeable is the mismatch between 
the historical evolution of the resource rents and the assumptions in the literature. The 
models based on Hotelling's principle, assume prices over time while the rate of 
extraction and the stocks remain constant. It is remarkable that at some point in 
history, oil prices were thought to be relatively stable, almost constant, while 
production has never been constant, even at times of little or no discoveries. The 
absence of technological change in the theoretical models would in part explain the 
difference between the historical and the theoretical evolution the rents. This 
divergence between the theoretical assumptions and the actual behaviour of the 
variables is likely to have an impact on the results offered by the methods. This will be 
explored in Chapter 5, for which the results of this chapter are basic inputs. 
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`Although minerals are probably the easiest 
environmental asset to include in environmental accounts, 
the practice of valuing reserves and the depletion of those reserves 
has nevertheless met with frustration. ' 
Chapter 5 
Value and Depreciation of Oil Resources under Different 
Methods. Venezuela and Mexico 1920s-1980s 
5.1 The Results of the Net Price Method 
5.2 Implementing the Present Value Method 
The Value of the Resource 
The Depreciation of the Resource 
5.3 The User Cost Method 
5.4 Imputed Income Method 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
`Ex post and ex ante analyses are not alternatives. They should be viewed as 
complementary techniques for improving our knowledge. The ex ante analysis is a 
prediction of what is expected to happen; the ex post analysis is a check on what 
actually did happen. '2 
It is particularly important that the economic analysis of environmental and resource 
policies includes an ex post perspective. Our knowledge of the physical and economic 
systems on which ex ante analyses are based today is extremely limited. It is necessary 
both to develop more comprehensive models and also to put more effort in the 
verification of these models through ex post comparisons of the predictions with the 
results. 
It must be emphasised that the ex post verification of the analytical models used in 
resource valuation is not simply a comparison of actual results with predictions. As 
shown in Chapter 2, ex ante models are based upon some view of the future with 
projections of economic magnitudes. The additional complication in ex post analysis is 
to distinguish the effects of our inability to anticipate the future accurately from the 
analytical failure of the models. In other words, to what extent the difference between 
what is expected to happen and what actually did happen is due to unexpected changes 
1 G. A. Davis and D. J. Moore, 'Valuing mineral stocks and depletion in green national income accounts', 
Environment and Development Economics 5 (2000), p. 110. 
2 A. M. Freeman, The Measurement of Environmental and Resource Values: Theory and Methods 
(Resources for the Future, Washington D. C., 1993), p. 14. Most of the introduction of this chapter 
derives from this source. 
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that could not be anticipated, and which ones to flaws in the models - imperfect 
underlying theory, missing variables, misleading assumptions, etc. The real benefit of 
ex post analysis is in making the most of the opportunity to improve on the analytical 
models used as much as in understanding the path that history took. 
At the core of this chapter is the quest for a value of the petroleum resources from 
which an estimate of depletion/depreciation can be derived to produce better indicators 
of economic performance. It should be clear from the start that the depreciation 
measures wholly depend on the value assessed for the resource in the first place, or the 
assumptions made regarding such value. This chapter demonstrates that although in 
practice the methods described in Chapter 2 may avoid such calculation, all methods 
make some assumption regarding the value of the resource. `While it is perfectly 
legitimate for theoreticians, assuming away these messy details can lead practitioners 
into trouble. '3 
Given the nature of the methods and aiming to build on previously presented materials, 
this chapter first gives the figures for depreciation obtained through the net price 
method when applied to the historical data of Mexico and Venezuela. It is then 
recognised that the net price is just an approximation, very much restricted by the 
underlying assumptions, to the change in value of the resources (where value is 
estimated as the present value). Therefore, the second section deals with the actual 
calculation of the present value of oil resources in both countries using the data 
compiled in the previous chapter. The value of the resources has also been 
approximated by the Hotelling Valuation Principle, which will be compared with the 
actual present value. The empirical implementation of the algebra of the present value 
is problematic. Different possible solutions have further implications for the value of 
the resource, the depreciation that derives from it and the results provided by other 
methods, particularly that of the user costs. The latter is discussed in the third section, 
and its results are highly dependent on the assumptions made to obtain the present 
value. 
Finally, the imputed income method is implemented as specified by Sefton and Weale. 
This is a pioneer calculation since this method has not found yet is way into the 
empirical attempts of environmental accounting. Its main implication is that while the 
net price is the correct adjustment for closed economies, open economies need to 
impute an income to the stock targeted for exports; in the case of a pure resource 
3 J. RVincent, 'Green accounting: from theory to practice', Environment and Development Economics 5 
(2000), p. 20. 
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exporter the user costs approximates this result greatly. This suggests a different type 
of adjustment for each of our two case studies. 
5.1 The results of the Net Price Method 
Equation 2.3-3 defined the present value of a natural resource, VV, as the sum of the 
expected net revenue flows discounted at nominal or real interest rates for the life of 
the asset, which in its compact form can be expressed as: 
yr 
n=O 11 - 
i) 
[5.1.1] 
For our purposes, the value of the natural capital asset (oil) in a year is taken to be the 
present value of the sum of future expected rents over the lifetime of the resource. 
Therefore, in the above equation, N, is the resource rent as specified in the previous 
chapter. The expected life of the resource for a given year t is given by n and i is the 
social discount rate. 
Natural resource wealth is usually defined as the present discounted value of all future 
resource rents. According to the depreciation approach, the change in value/wealth 
from V to V+j, due to use/depletion during the year, represents the depreciation of the 
mineral asset that should have not been accounted as income. Therefore, it needs to be 
discounted from traditional indicators of economic performance. 
Chapter 2 also showed how, under very strong assumptions, A V, = - (pt - MCI) qt. 
" That 
is, depreciation can be approximated by the Hotelling rent. Yet, as was said above, 
many early applied studies and most current work estimate depreciation through the 
net price method using average (A C1) instead of marginal costs (MC) .6 The net price is 
nothing but the value of the rent (11) calculated in section 4.4, where permutation (b) 
possibly remains closer to the original method advocated by Reppetto and associates 
since it does not include the payment to man-made capital 7 Figure 5.1- 1 compares the 
net price per barrel (ui), and Figure 5.1-2 the aggregated net price (Ni) - ut multiplied 
by the production in a given year qr for both countries. 
L. Lindholt, 'On Natural Resource Rent and the Wealth of a Nation. A Study Based of National 
Accounts in Norway 1930-1995', Statistics Norway. Research Department Discussion Papers 281 
(2000), p. 6. 
Optimal management, endogenous prices and endogenous costs being the most restrictive 
assumptions. 
6 The exceptions to the general use of AC, have been noted in section 2.3. 7 R. Repetto, Wasting Assets: Natural Resources In the National Income Accounts (Washington, D. C., 
1989). 
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Figure 5.1-1: Net price per unit (u) of oil in Mexico and Venezuela I924-1987 (S per barrel) 
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Sources: rents calculated in section 4.4. Labels defined in Table 4.4-1. Note that 
permutation (b) for the case of Mexico cannot be plotted from 1937 to 1974 because of its 
negative values. 
Figure 5.1-2: Net price (Pt) of oil in Mexico and Venezuela 1924-1985 (million $) 
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Figure 5.1-1 contrasts the net price per barrel in Mexico and Venezuela. The main 
characteristics of each rent were analysed in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, the 
feature that stands out here is the gap between the net price obtained per barrel in both 
countries: Mexico was always lower until the late 1970s. The only exception is the 
period 1935-1938, in which, taking permutation (a), Mexico gained a slight advantage. 
A plausible explanation for that advantage in the years immediately before the 
nationalisation is that foreign companies reduced the pace of investment and activities 
(and thus costs) as the expropriation loomed, hence generating an increase in the net 
price. As regards the post oil boom period, the higher price obtained by Mexican oil 
explains the behaviour of the net price and the leap ahead of Mexican per unit net price 
in the period 1979-1985.8 The almost $10 differential in price translated into a similar 
difference in the net price by 1982. 
At the aggregate level, the divergence in the amounts produced exacerbates the 
differences found at the per barrel level. This is seen in Figure 5.1-2. Not only did 
Venezuela have a higher net price per unit, but also a far greater production until the 
mid-1970s. Therefore the gap widens considerably only to narrow rapidly between 
1973 and 1976. By then, the sudden expansion in Mexican oil production, combined 
with higher net and absolute prices resulted in an aggregate net price far greater than 
for Venezuela. At the time, Venezuela was undergoing the cut in production brought 
about by the nationalisation of the industry. 
This section began by stating that the net price has been used as a proxy for the change 
in the value of the resource, i. e. the depletion or depreciation value of the resource. 
Therefore, according to the net price results, it is safe to say that Venezuela's 
petroleum resources depreciated more than those of Mexico did until the 1970s. From 
then onwards, Mexican petroleum assets depreciated much faster than those of 
Venezuela did. The relative magnitude of this adjustment with regard to the size of 
each economy is analysed in Chapter 6. 
In its most radical form, the net price aspires to modify traditional indicators of 
economic performance not only by discounting the depletion of the resource, but also 
by adding the discovery of new resources to income .9 Accordingly when new 
discoveries exceed the depletion of the resource then there should be a net contribution 
e See section 4.2. 
9 Such was the procedure used by the World Resource Institute for greening the national accounts of 
Indonesia, see R. Repetto, Wasting Assets: Natural Resources In the National Income Accounts 
(Washington, D. C., 1989). 
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to income. This calculation simply involves multiplying u1 by the net change in volume 
of proven reserves over the accounting period. In our case this involved combining the 
data in Figure 5.1-1 with the data provided in Figure 4.1-2. The results of the net price 
applied to the net variation of reserves are shown in Table 5.1 - 1. Observe the volatility 
of the series both in terms of levels and signs. 
There are, however, serious objections to this practice. The attempt to include 
variations in the stock of natural resources challenges both accounting practice and 
economic common sense. Traditional accounting practice does not record income until 
it materialises. In addition, capital formation does not necessarily have the same effect 
on the economy, as do additions to the mineral stock, and therefore should be 
accounted differently. Including net variation of stocks in national accounts would 
cause fluctuations resulting in green accounts being less useful for policy-making and 
macro-economic analysis than conventional accounts. Take the example of the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis, whose environmentally adjusted accounts for the United States 
for the period 1958-1991 included the Alaskan oil finds of 1970 as capital formation. 
The result was a serious distortion of GDP growth, wiping out the 1970 recession and 
causing an apparent recession in 1971. Thus, when including mineral additions as 
capital formation, the aggregate GDP series may become more volatile and may not 
accurately reflect movements in production and employment. 10 It is for these reasons 
that the United Nations System of Integrated Environmental and Economic 
Accounting omits additions in the production accounts but captures them in the assets 
accounts. Similar effects can be expected if the numbers in Table 5.1-1 were to be used 
for generating environmentally adjusted accounts for Mexico and Venezuela. 
10 W. D. Nordhaus and E. C. Kokkenlenber (eds. ), Nature's Numbers: Expanding the U. S. National 
Economic Accounts to Include Environment (Washington D. C., 1999), p. 11. By his part, S. El Serafy, 
'Green accounting and economic policy', Ecological Economics 21 (1997) 3, p. 222, ft. 11. reported that 
the procedure for adjusting the US accounts in respect to natural resources for the first quarter of 1994 
included the net variation in stocks, an initiative that has been subsequently abandoned. 
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Table 5.1-1: Strict net price method: unit net price times net variation of reserves (NPR) 
Mexico and Venezuela 1925-1985 (mill current US dollars) 
Year Mx[NPR(a6)] Mx[NPR(b)] Mx[NPR(a15)1 Vz]NPR(a)] Vz[NPR(a6)] Vz[NPR(a15)] Vz[NPRu(b)] 
Mill curr USS mill curr USS mill curr USS mill curr USS mill curr USS mill curr USS mill curr USS 
1925 3 93 93 80 55 
1926 2 139 139 122 96 
1927 2 92 92 77 54 
1928 1 86 86 75 52 
1929 1 99 102 91 72 
1930 1 306 295 264 191 
1931 1 202 179 149 135 
1932 0 246 221 197 196 
1933 0 158 138 104 95 
1934 1 225 213 184 148 
1935 3 1 3 259 250 221 192 
1936 3 0 3 201 201 179 154 
1937 4 1 208 210 186 159 
1938 6 -1 188 180 149 141 1939 -21 22 -2 141 143 112 103 
1940 12 -29 11 278 297 234 222 1941 0 0 319 365 315 311 
1942 4 -15 202 290 213 194 
1943 8 -33 8 247 347 275 281 1944 69 -548 6 321 387 335 322 
1945 -4 72 244 271 236 221 
1946 -14 106 -1 135 152 133 118 
1947 -17 119 -1 83 104 92 97 
1948 -19 34 -1 528 641 584 566 1949 239 -295 22 895 980 873 844 
1950 -49 33 -4 732 824 745 666 1951 398 -235 38 460 537 487 431 
1952 466 -223 45 227 265 240 219 
1953 -8 9 1,469 1,691 1,537 1,358 
1954 319 -226 293 1,238 1,435 1,313 1,156 
1955 180 -147 164 2,281 2,874 2,657 2,558 
1956 199 -153 18 2,208 2,975 2,723 2,678 
1957 525 -166 48 2,595 3,594 3,279 3,358 
1958 732 -488 645 1,959 2,262 2,021 2,070 
1959 228 -279 19 444 494 432 447 
1960 235 -583 15 587 646 567 597 
1961 204 -209 17 -774 -875 -780 -804 1962 20 -18 1 -110 -126 -115 -117 
1963 149 -160 13 296 342 312 313 
1964 79 -92 6 262 308 292 275 
1965 -108 150 -9 74 89 84 82 
1966 223 -388 17 -510 -610 -578 -555 
1967 92 -190 5 -1,228 -1,463 -1,394 -1,334 1968 24 -70 13 -380 -460 -438 -423 
1969 24 -69 1 -1,066 -1,241 -1,181 -1,115 1970 -1 4 -1 -1,645 -1,804 -1,722 -1,617 
1971 -125 222 -9 298 329 317 292 
1972 -42 54 -3 -234 -241 -235 -209 1973 100 -19 8 14,904 16,231 15,837 14,765 1974 3,124 1,429 3,01 0 0 0 0 
1975 5,551 3,201 5,33: -1,712 -1,752 -1,732 -1,612 1976 53,056 38,675 50,80 -1,316 -1,402 -1,385 -1,328 
1977 60,168 49,911 58,25 -2,431 -2,790 -2,756 -2,603 1978 294,331 244,016 280,77 2,437 2,744 2,696 2,482 
1979 84,480 71,778 81,45 3,652 4,245 4,183 3,935 
1980 477,241 440,644 464,15 25,735 29,105 28,677 26,791 
1981 425,573 391,369 413,45 11,637 12,790 12,541 11,888 
1982 0 0 104,352 112,365 108,363 104,128 
1983 14,903 14,318 14,83 28,496 29,720 28,171 26,900 
1984 -20,944 -18,602 -20,77 48,577 52,714 50,661 49,087 1985 -23,249 -22,163 -23,08 28,949 30,520 29,053 33,605 
Sources: Figure 5.1.1 and Figure 4.1-2. Labels: Mx for Mexico, Vz for Venezuela, NPR for net price 
using net reserves, rent permutations as defined i n Table 4.4-1. 
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The net price in its simplest form has been severely criticised for overestimating both 
the value and the depreciation of non-renewable resources. " The criticisms come from 
theoretical speculation regarding the mismatch between the assumptions made by the 
net price method (see Chapter 2) and alternative, more realistic, assumptions regarding 
the future paths of prices, costs and depletion rates. It is worth recalling here that the 
net price has also been criticised for being based on the assumption that none of the 
resource is exported abroad. That is precisely why the description of the strategies 
taken by Mexico and Venezuela and the data set assembled in Chapter 4 can help to 
shed light on this debate. We can now test the actual path taken by the present values 
and its variation through time, hence directly addressing the issue of depreciation of 
the resources. It will then be possible to assess whether the net price overestimates the 
depreciation, by how much, and under what circumstances. 
5.2 Implementing the Present Value method 
It is often argued that the implementation of the present value method depends too 
much on the expected rate of change of oil prices and of the cost of developing the 
reserves. 12 To be sure, those authors that have attempted to apply this method had no 
other option but to impose strict assumptions regarding the expected behaviour of 
prices, costs and quantities produced, which are underpinned by implicit assumptions 
regarding technological stagnation. Assumptions of constant rates of extraction and 
constant (or semi-constant) rents are commonplace. 13 
In fact, just as the net price tries to approximate the change in value from t to t+1 by 
avoiding the calculation of the value of the resources, the value of the resource itself 
has its own short cut in the Hotelling Valuation Principle (HVP). According to the 
latter, the value of the resource is the result of multiplying the Hotelling rent per unit 
(which we approximated with u1, in Figure 5.1-1), by the reserves remaining in the 
current year. 
11G. A. Davis and D. J. Moore, 'Valuing mineral stocks and depletion in green national income 
accounts', Environment and Development Economics 5 (2000), p. 111; also see Seroa and Ferraz in the 
same issue of the journal on the 'tendency' to exaggerate depreciation. 
12 Some authors explicitly refuse to apply this approach given the difficulty of having to speculate about 
future values for prices, quantities, costs of extraction, etc. Examples are T. M. Crowards, 'Natural 
Resource Accounting: A Case Study of Zimbabwe', Environmental and Resource Economics 7 (1996), 
p. 214 and G. D. Santoprieto, 'Alternative Methods for estimating resource rent and depletion costs: the 
case of Argentina's YPF, Resources Policy 24 (1998) 1, p. 41. 
13 P. Vaze, 'Environmental Accounts- Valuing the Depletion of Oil and Gas Reserves', Economic 
Trends (1996, April) 510, p. 41 and M. Common and K. Sanyal, 'Measuring depreciation of Australia's 
non-renewable resources: a cautionary tale', Ecological Economics (1997) 26, p. 26. 
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However, the availability of historical data enables the calculation of the present value 
by using actual prices and costs series. This is the equivalent of having perfect 
foresight from every point in time. It is interesting to contrast the results of both 
alternatives (keeping the rent constant versus using the actual data assuming perfect 
foresight) in order to evaluate the potential divergence between the ex-ante and the ex- 
post results. If they differ by a great deal, those reluctant to apply this method would 
have one more argument in their favour: that the assumptions bias the results 
considerably. If, on the contrary, actual data and assumed values result in similar 
present values, then the method will be endorsed. Speculating about the validity of the 
present value results under different assumptions has further relevance to the user costs 
and the net price approaches, since both are based on the present value results (see 
Chapter 2). 
This section elaborates on the results of implementing equation [5.1-1] under a variety 
of assumptions. This first exercise provides us with the present value of the resources, 
which we can then compare with the HVP. Once the value is known, its change over 
time can be calculated. Hence the depreciation value can be estimated using the 
present value method. 
The Value of the Resource 
Having all the historical variables calculated in Chapter 4 in hand, one can calculate the 
present value implementing equation 5.1-1 assuming perfect foresight. Take the 
example of 1920, the first year for which the rent has been calculated for Venezuela. In 
that year, the amount of oil known in the reserves was enough to sustain current 
production for another 21 years (n = 21). Therefore, V, 920 is the sum of the discounted 
resource rents obtained for every year up to 1941. Algebraically: 
pv1: VI N 
N1921 
+ 
N1922 
+ ...... 
+ 
N1941 
920 - 1920 
+ 
(1 + lý (1 + i) 
2 ý1 +1 21 
Following this procedure, V, 972 turns to be the last year for which enough data are 
available to produce a present value of all `future' rents. From that year onwards, the 
time horizon expands beyond 1985, the last year for which the rent has been calculated 
for Venezuela. " Under this perfect foresight scenario the rent, the quantity extracted 
14 Given that this approach tries to emulate a perfect foresight scenario, it is relatively weak to constrain 
the time horizon of the reserves to those known in any given year. In a perfect foresight scenario, both 
Mexicans and Venezuelans would have known their reserves would last longer than the historical data 
set suggest in any specific year. One could place the aggregate oil available to both economies during 
the century at the start of their production period and start the depletion from then on. As shown in 
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and the time horizon change from year to year according to the historical data set. " In 
equation 5.2-1, PVI adds up the discounted values of the total aggregated rents 
obtained historically. 
However, the most common approach in the literature when implementing the present 
value method has been to assume that the resource rent remains constant and that 
extraction occurs at a constant rate until the resource is exhausted. " Such an approach 
presupposes constant prices for oil and constant costs of extraction. To calculate V192o, 
it entails adding up the discounted value of the rent of 1920 for the 21 years the 
resource was expected to last. The equation to be used would then be: 
N1920 N1920 N1920 
PV2: V1920 =N1920+(1+i)+(ltiý2 +...... +(1+1 21 
[5.2-2] 
Using this approach permits to extend the results to the very last year for which the 
value of N is known; that is 1985. In equation 5.2-2, PV2 calculates the present value 
of the production of 1920 should the rent and the quantity extracted remain as in the 
year in question until the expected exhaustion of the resource. That is a different 
concept from PVI, which calculates the present value of the aggregate rents generated 
in `future' years, with different rents and quantities from those produced in the year in 
question. 
A further implementation of equation 5.1-1 is still possible. It calculates the present 
value of the quantity extracted in year t. This is the present value of the expected rents 
the amount currently extracted would produce in the years to come, allowing the rent 
Table 4.1-1, Mexican aggregate production until 1985, plus the reserves in that year, amounted to a total 
of 83,561 million barrels, which can be thought to be available for disposal during the period 1901-1985. 
Venezuela totals about 68,747 million barrels for the period 1917-1985. That would imply discounting 
over 2000 years in order to calculate the present values at the beginning of the century! 
Alternatively, one could grant a 20-year time horizon throughout the period. This is not the equivalent to 
an infinite time horizon, but it is long enough to avoid worrying about immediate exhaustion. Calculated 
this way, the present values for both Mexican and Venezuelan oil reserves continuously rise over time 
leaving no room to calculate a depreciation value. 
1s Only the social discount rate does not change from year to year. A sensitivity test is performed later 
in the section to account for this. 
16 Vaze, 'Environmental Accounts- Valuing the Depletion of Oil and Gas Reserves', , p. 41 says 'for 
operationalise this analysis it is assumed that the reserves are depleted a constant rate and that unit rents 
either stay constant or rise at 3 percent real'. That is, production is set constant. Common and Sanyal, 
'Measuring depreciation of Australia's non-renewable resources: a cautionary tale', , p. 26 also set the 
rate of extraction equally for all the years considered. Other implementations of present value 
methodology applied to resource rents under these very same assumptions are the ones by World Bank, 
Expanding the Measure of Wealth. Indicators of Environmentally Sustainable Development, Vol. 17 
(Washington, D. C., 1997), p. 32; L. Lindholt, 'On Natural Resource Rent and the Wealth of a Nation. A 
Study Based of National Accounts in Norway 1930-1995', Statistics Norway. Research Department 
Discussion Papers 281 (2000), p. 6; And the US Bureau of Economic Analysis net present value 
estimates according to W. D. Nordhaus and E. C. Kokkenlenber (eds. ), Nature's Numbers: Expanding the 
U. S. National Economic Accounts to Include Environment (Washington D. C., 1999), chapter 3. 
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per unit (prices and costs) to vary. The justification for this permutation stems from the 
fact that the theoretical implementation is rather incoherent. It uses n as the lifetime of 
the resource every year and yet allows the rents to include all the production of future 
years, which would be impossible to produce with the current reserves. However, this 
third permutation allows for the constraint of the life expectancy and also for the 
continuation of the production as in the current year but accepts that prices and cost 
vary in the future. So, for our example of Venezuela in 1920, the present value under 
this variant would be: 
PV3: V1920 =u+ 
U1921 - q1920 
+ 
U1922 - q1920 
+.... + 
U1941 - g1920 
[5.2-3] 
1920 g1920 (I+1) (I+l)2 (I+i)21 
where ug represents the rent per unit and q the quantity extracted. This is a much more 
logical way of calculating the present value of year t than PVl and PV2. By 
multiplying the current production by the present value of the rent per unit (rather than 
by calculating the present value of the aggregated rents as in PVi), it captures the 
wealth (i. e. the present value) of the current year's production, should it be sustained 
until the exhaustion of the reserves currently known. This approach allows changes in 
prices, costs and discoveries as they occur by allowing the rent per unit to change over 
time unlike in PV2. Table 5.2-1 summarises the underlying assumptions behind each 
of the three implementations. 
The variables needed to execute the formulae in Table 5.2-1, namely Nt (under its 
different permutations) and n, are available from the previous chapter. Nevertheless, 
the social discount rate, i, is again a choice variable. The best possibility is to perform 
a sensitivity test in order to make explicit the bias introduced by this variable in the 
calculations. For this purpose, three alternative social discounts have been considered 
3,6 and 15 per cent. 
For PVI and PV3,1972 turns out to be the last year for which sufficient data is 
available to produce a present value discounting actual rents. From that year onwards, 
the time horizon expands beyond the last year for which Nr is available for each of the 
countries. On its part, PV2 can be calculated until the end of the period since in this 
implementation the rents of the current year are projected into the future. 
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Table 5.2 -1: Underlying assumptions for three implementations of the Present Value Method 
Variable PVl pV2 PV3 Theoretical definition Common implementation Alternative implementation 
Price Changes from t to t+n 
N Costs Change from t to t+n 
`q Quantity Changes from t to t+n 
Reserves (n) Changes from t to t+n 
Social discount Kept constant 
Kept constant as in t 
Kept constant as in t 
Kept constant as in t 
Changes from t to t+nS 
Kept constant 
Changes from t to t+n 
Changes from t to t+n 
Kept constant as in t 
Changes from t to t+n 
Kept constant 
Algebraically V=Z 
Nl+n 
V =Z 
N, 
V= 
ur+n 
n=0 11+1ýn 
t 
01-0 -Ftýn 
t q, 
e-0 
(I+ i). 
It generates... .. the present value of the aggregated .. 
the present value of the 
aggregated rents generated in the "' "the present value of 
the current 
rents generated every year to come vent year 
year's production 
e 
Mexico Venezuela Mexico Venezuela Mexico Venezuela 
max 1+n=1987 max t+n-1987 1-1920-1987 tý1935-1985 maxt+n-1987 max On-1983 t=1935-7972 i-1920-1972 t-1935-1972 t-1920-1972 
When this equation is implemented for forecasting purposes, reserves are normally kept to the level of the initial year through 
the period. So the present value for 1921 would be discounted for 20 years, for 1922 for 19 and soon and so forth. In contrary in 
this historical exercise, additions to reserves are allowed as they occurred. Every year is a starting point in itself, with its own 
production, prices, costs and reserves available for the calculation of the present value. This produces a different path from the 
forecast exercises 
Sources: own elaboration. 
For exposition purposes only the results for the representative Nt are presented 
numerically in Tables 5.2-2 and 5.2-3.17 This can be done with confidence since the 
graphical representation in Figures 5.2-1 and 5.2-2 demonstrate that the differences 
accruing to the different rent assumptions are negligible when compared to the 
differences of implementing alternative present value formulations. 
The first result of this exercise is that the various implementations of the present value 
have different sensitivities to the social discount rate used. The results of both 
countries show that the most sensitive of the three approaches to the change in the 
preference for the future is PV1. The different present values also react differently to 
variations over time of Nt and n. While changes in the value of the rent of the current 
year have the greatest impact on PV2, the other two implementations, PVl and PV3, 
are more affected by changes in the life expectancy of the resource in a context of 
increasing rents over time. More crucially, the three algebraic expressions produce 
very different descriptions of the level and the evolution of Vt. 
17 Evaluating the three algebraic expressions of the present value for the different variants of Nt and i 
generated a matrix of results of 36 columns for Venezuela and 27 columns for Mexico. 
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Table 5.2-2: Present values of Venezuelan oil resources, 1920-1985. 
Different implementations and discount rates. 
Year PVI PV2 PV3 
1=3 1=6 1-15 1=3 1=6 1=15 1-3 1-6 1-13 
Mtl. Blvs. MII. Blvs MII. Blva 11. Blvs MII. Blva MII. Blvs 11. Blvs MII. Blvs MII. Blvs 
192 3,680 2,624 1,07 12 8 1 
1921 8,108 4,853 1,504 66 46 l 
192 23,732 11,130 2,1 158 102 4 
1923 43,156 17,515 2,691 112 72 3 393 239 10 
192 101,595 31,912 3,311 869 534 24 1,395 652 25 
1925 9,098 6,099 2,603 1,765 1,333 731 1,079 855 53 
192 5,511 4,351 2,53 3,156 2,504 1,48 1,520 1,282 881 
192 4,589 3,859 2,551 2,826 2,340 1,49 2,084 1,804 1,281 
192 3,734 3,323 2,48 3,575 3,136 2,25 2,955 2,657 2,04 
192 2,358 2,234 1,940 3,246 3,032 2,53 2,512 2,376 2,05 
193 2,733 2,512 2,02 4,397 4,003 3,13 2,729 2,526 2,07 
1931 2,812 2,514 1,89 2,918 2,591 1,91 2,270 2,061 1,61 
193 3,234 2,826 2,02 5,088 4,410 3,09 2,410 2,144 1,61 
1933 4,263 3,487 2,140 2,050 1,736 1,16 2,521 2,140 1,444 
193 11,597 8,294 3,664 4,300 3,484 2,13 4,739 3,671 2,05 
1935 15,452 10,781 4,42 4,909 3,936 2,37 5,847 4,416 2,32 
193 17,683 12,334 4,991 5,351 4,290 2,58 6,386 4,787 2,45 2 
1937 20,376 14,201 5,67 5,673 4,548 2,741 8,054 5,993 2,97 
193 23,502 16,382 6,481 4,323 3,466 2,08 8,602 6,379 3,09 
193 27,593 19,254 7,623 3,513 2,816 1,69 10,053 7,461 3,6 
194 60,989 31,594 10,57 4,977 3,659 1,93 12,609 8,812 3,83 
1941 54,570 29,411 11,264 7,654 5,783 3,17 14,342 10,481 4,966 
194 264,228 88,365 17,38 4,538 3,020 1,43 31,026 15,546 4,09 
194 191,730 75,171 18,73 6,736 4,608 2,24 27,571 15,734 5,213 
194 71,807 47,838 18,313 9,215 6,962 3,81 21,700 15,586 7,40 
1945 59,891 42,963 19,26 10,292 8,084 4,70 24,038 18,284 9,66 
194 51,060 38,996 20,111 12,829 10,394 6,38 25,855 20,641 12,051 
194 48,201 38,190 21,494 19,436 16,093 10,28 27,497 22,616 14,131 
194 48,099 38,889 22,990 31,438 26,322 17,19 30,167 25,216 16,363 
194 61,462 47,945 26,260 29,846 24,442 15,30 33,651 27,309 16,69 
195 55,550 44,920 26,61 31,491 26,366 17,22 34,330 28,610 18,43 
1951 54,578 44,901 27,66 32,045 27,136 18,131 37,277 31,456 20,79 
1952 53,379 44,675 28,64 34,210 29,306 20,05 37,730 32,282 22,01 
1953 69,144 56,020 33,52 40,391 33,818 22,08 43,646 36,268 23,32 
195 73,778 59,876 36,04 44,188 36,997 24,16 47,719 39,597 25,391 
195 78,018 63,491 38,545 53,071 44,434 29,02 55,202 45,766 29,28 
195 81,921 66,746 40,64 60,947 51,028 33,331 63,864 52,860 33,65 
195 86,801 70,532 42,65 77,182 64,622 42,20 74,330 61,216 38,483 
195 129,803 98,191 50,40 71,353 58,435 36,59 105,157 79,896 41,91 
195 128,278 98,506 51,911 61,965 51,305 32,79 109,384 84,104 44,81 
196 150,840 114,712 58,71 59,154 48,978 31,30 139,686 105,263 52,900 
1961 150,656 116,748 62,26 60,336 50,517 32,99 142,376 109,193 56,85 
196 150,121 118,551 65,964 65,063 55,096 36,81 155,154 121,130 65,4 
1963 174,339 137,276 75,50 64,579 54,687 36,53 192,405 149,131 78,505 
196 173,852 139,629 80,451 94,790 81,202 55,56 201,555 159,388 87,86 
1965 199,376 159,539 90,355 93,677 80,249 54,90 248,223 195,275 105,08 
196 222,965 178,764 101,11 90,872 77,846 53,2 280,781 221,288 118,73 
196 221,109 180,696 106,73 88,908 77,065 54,05 294,806 237,153 133,40 
196 218,810 182,346 112,77 85,681 75,161 54,11 300,878 247,251 146,44 
196 262,499 218,565 134,76 82,569 72,431 52,14 369,530 304,088 180,60 
197 261,451 222,495 145,01 79,852 70,905 52,45 383,600 323,181 204,06 
1971 324,075 275,748 180,10 100,037 88,829 65,71 473,957 399,561 253,461 
197 445,074 374,044 237,56 106,199 93,160 67,07 631,128 524,989 323,02 
1973 211,225 176,850 115,51 
197 619,552 507,384 317,711 
1975 584,940 459,403 267,44 
197 593,964 466,490 271,561 
197 683,895 531,786 304,65 
197 637,887 491,179 277,14 
197 989,763 777,344 452,52 
198 1,459,858 1,113,362 619,21 
1981 1,663,088 1,244,922 674,16 
198 1,599,644 1,110,778 549,97 
198 1,425,003 961,186 463,04 
198 2,280,256 1,507,382 714,08 
1985 1 2,118,418 1358 096 629 21 
Sources and notes: PV2 from 1920-1924 results in negative figures. The representative 
permutation of the rent used is Vz[N(al5)], as defined in Table 4.4-1 and listed in Table 4.4-2. 
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Figure 5.2-1: Present value of Venezuelan oil resources 1920-1985. 
Implementations PVI, PV2 and PV3 at three different discount rates. 
Venezuela 1920-1985 
PV1, PV2 and PV3 . i=3% 
2,5e+06 
D\/1 
50000 
f 
0 
2 
E 100 
1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 
year 
Present Values at i=3% 
Venezuea1920-1985 
PV1, PV nd PV3, i=6% 
2.0e+06 
PVI 
50000 
.0 
E 100 
/ 
PV 
1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 
year 
Present Values at i=6% 
Venezuela 1920-1985 
PV1. PV2 and PV3, i=15% 
1.0e+06 
PvI 
50000 
f9 
L 
Ei oo f ` 
1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 
year 
Present Values at i=15% 
Sources and notes: all the permutations of N, are plotted for each present value implementation. The 
upper and lower values within each present value mimic the upper and lower values of the 
corresponding N,. Calculated from rents obtained in Chapter 4 applied to the formulae in Table 5 2- I. 
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The consequences of the different implementations for the overall performance of the 
present value at the time of calculating the resource wealth and its depreciation over 
time are better understood by looking at the results the different implementations 
produced for our two cases. The first three columns of Table 5.2-2 show the evolution 
of the present values calculated for Venezuela using the historical aggregated rents 
(PVJ) at different social discount rates. PV1 depicts a severe decline in the present 
values from 1924 when small/normal discount rates are applied. Indeed, the present 
value only regains the level of 1924 in 1940. Time horizon variations account for this: 
1924 represents the year with the longest life expectancy of the Venezuelan oil 
reserves in the data set, 55 years (see Figure 4.1-3). The implication is that V, 924 is 
obtained by discounting all the rents obtained up to 1979, therefore adding to V1924 the 
discounted value of some of the years in which the greatest rents were obtained 
historically. Subsequent years enjoy much-reduced life expectancies (as low as 7 years 
in 1929), which reduces the amount of rents to be added to the calculation of the 
present value. It is only by the early 1940s, when the time horizon temporarily returns 
to 30-40 years, that the present values regain high values. From then onwards, the time 
horizon remains quite steady until the breakthroughs of the early 1970s. Hence, the 
increases in Vt after the mid-1940s have more to do with the gradual addition of 
generous discounted rents at the tail of the formula for each individual year than with 
variations in n. 
Nevertheless, variations in n have a great influence on the evolution of PV1. An extra 
year of life expectancy gained (lost) in relation to the previous year's calculation 
implies adding (losing) the discounted value of a future rent at the very end of the 
summation. Given the increasing magnitude of the aggregate rents over time, changes 
in the life expectancy of the resource dominate the variations in PV1. This is evident in 
the similarity between the profiles of n (Figure 4.1-3) and PV1 (Figure 5.2-1). Observe 
that the linkage between PV1 and the time horizon progressively fades away the higher 
the discount rate used. 
It was said at the beginning of the section that the present value of all future rents 
represents the resource wealth. Accordingly, the message from PV1 is that 
Venezuela's oil wealth decreased sharply throughout the second half of the 1920s and 
during the late 1940s. Less obviously, some years during the 1950s and the early 
1960s also show decreasing wealth when measured by this approach. In contrast, the 
early years of the oil industry and the 1930s are portrayed as periods of rapid increases 
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in of resource wealth. One might expect movements in wealth to correspond to the 
periods of increasing reserves (adding wealth) and fast depletion of reserves (decreases 
in wealth). Per contra, the relation is not to the actual level of the reserves - which 
increases virtually throughout the period- but to how long the reserves were expected 
to last. " 
The traditional assumptions that the reserves are depleted at a constant rate and that 
unit rents stay constant when calculating the present values, that is PV2, produce quite 
different results. To start with, PV2 reproduces the three stages already identified in 
the calculation of N in the previous chapter. It has three relatively stable levels. The 
first runs from the beginning of the oil industry to the 1940s, where the curve moves 
up to the next level, achieved in the 1950s, and from then to the 1970s, where the next 
step up occurs. The profile and the timing are the same regardless of the discount rate 
used. These phases were not identifiable in the evolution of PVl. Moreover, PV1 and 
PV2 tend to move in completely opposite directions. For instance, PV1 decreases 
sharply from the mid- I920s to the 1930s, while PV2 undergoes a sudden increase. The 
same happens during the early 1940s. When PV1 starts decreasing after the peak of 
1942, PV2 experiences the highest growth of the whole period. It may seem as if 
variations in n have an opposite effect; when the time horizon expands, PV1 increases 
whereas PV2 decreases. In fact, this is not the case. The addition of an extra year of 
life will produce the same effects as in the previous exercise, which is to add one extra 
discounted rent at the tail of the formula, thus increasing the present value. The 
variation of PV2 is entirely due to the variations of the rent. Consider the example of 
1942, PV1 presents a peak for that year as a result of the value of n increasing to 41 
years. In practical terms it implies the addition of the discounted rents obtained up to 
the 1980s. However, 1942 is a trough for PV2 because N1942 has a very small value 
(see Table 4.4-2). The small rent is the result of the cutback in production provoked by 
the Second World War. Simultaneously, this cut is responsible for the increase of the 
life expectancy of the resources in that year that drives PV1 to a peak. 
For its part, the evolution of the third implementation considered here, PV3, lies 
somewhere in between the two previous cases. It has the most stable of the three 
profiles, pointing to a steady increase in the value of the resource wealth of Venezuela 
from the 1930s to the end of the series in 1972. This is a direct consequence of the 
formulae employed. PV3 attempts to estimate the wealth corresponding to the current 
18 Section 4.1 showed reserves levels only declined for the late 1950s and the 1960s. 
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year's extraction (allowing for future changes in technology) rather than the wealth of 
all the possible future production or the value of the current production under the 
assumption of no technological change. Hence, its value lies in between PV1 and PV2. 
The profile of PV3 shows an almost uninterrupted path of increasing wealth. In fact, 
regardless of the social discount rate employed, PV3 surpasses the value obtained by 
PV1 in the early 1960s. The explanation lies in the slowdown in production that occurs 
after 1970. Both implementations allow the rent per unit to change each year. But 
while PV3 maintains the current rate of extraction until the current reserves are 
exhausted, PV1 allows the rate of extraction to change as it did historically. In 
addition, PV3 uses the high rates of extraction of the 1960s to calculate the present 
value of the current year's production, whereas PV1 introduces the smaller output that 
takes place later on. Therefore, in the presence of diminishing production, PV3 brings 
about a higher value than PVI. 
Starting in the early 1940s, the values shown in each permutation have a tendency to 
converge. Actually, from the late 1940s and for almost a decade, the values of PV3 and 
PV2 are almost identical. Stable rents explain the similarity of the results. Allowing the 
rent to vary from year to year, as in PV3, is not much different from keeping them 
constant, as in PV2, if the value of rent per unit hardly changes over time. In other 
words, this is the only period over which the assumptions of PV2 closely match 
historical events; thus, the implementation using historical data tends to converge 
towards PV2 values. It is, however, quite an exception. 
In fact, the year 1957 signals the end of this convergence tendency. All the values for 
PVl and PV3 after 1958 progressively include the discounted rents of the 1970s and 
1980s, while those for PV2 continue discounting only the current year's rent. Since 
those `future' rents, constitute additional terms to the equation over time and are larger 
than the rents obtained in the 1960s, their addition makes for divergence until the end 
of the series. 
The same exercises have been carried out for the Mexican data set. The results are 
shown in Table 5.2-3 and Figure 5.2-2. 
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Table 5.2-3: Present values of Mexican oil resources, 1935-1987. 
niffarpnt imnlmmpntatinnc and discount rates. 
year PV1 PV2 PV3 
i=3 1-6 1-15 1-3 i-6 i=IS 1-3 1-6 I-IS 
MII. Pesos MII. Pesos MII. Pesos MII. Pesos MII. Pesos MII. Pesos MII. Pesos Mll. Pesos MII. Pesos 
1935 10,480 5,939 1,60 2,348 1,683 86 5,183 3,162 1,101 
193 10,677 6,174 1,71 2,110 1,525 78 5,323 3,294 1,158 
193 9,634 5,863 1,79 3,642 2,702 1,445 5,628 3,628 1,357 
193 11,548 6,853 1,93 2,633 1,919 1,003 5,198 3,269 1,132 
193 9,137 5,857 1,91 1,878 1,432 79 4,854 3,241 1,221 
194 10,790 6,854 2,18 1,463 1,105 60 5,590 3,701 1,357 
1941 11,696 7,513 2,46 1,494 1,129 61 5,786 3,870 1,45 
194 15,283 9,427 2,921 1,244 899 465 5,570 3,631 1,318 
1943 18,511 11,136 3,39 1,305 935 47 6,334 4,079 1,481 
194 218,916 88,006 8,83 985 679 33 26,496 12,154 2,285 
1945 42,957 22,422 5,26 546 391 201 12,508 7,387 2,433 
194 16,989 11,671 4,81 1,280 958 51 8,577 6,171 2,862 
194 15,451 11,280 5,30 1,569 1,220 69 9,298 7,023 3,615 
194 15,273 11,549 5,93 4,695 3,725 2,20 9,629 7,508 4,183 
194 18,072 13,385 6,74 6,982 5,376 3,033 11,060 8,534 4,75 
195 16,030 12,540 7,04 10,875 8,718 5,25 12,028 9,669 5,821 
1951 17,009 13,251 7,41 13,102 10,395 6,15 13,050 10,480 6,32 
195 33,871 22,426 9,15 16,379 12,612 7,11 19,411 13,904 6,935 
1953 76,296 44,908 12,93 11,454 8,735 4,85 28,785 18,595 7,34 
195 189,359 103,609 22,45 17,181 12,980 7,121 56,805 33,855 10,641 
1955 194,053 108,810 24,72 17,400 13,270 7,38 61,472 37,266 11,901 
195 559,715 297,013 53,79 19,401 14,657 8,041 113,691 64,615 16,45 
195 4,941,750 2,392,057 314,20 26,975 19,834 10,48 511,036 255,180 40,38 
195 8,756,851 4,223,803 546,89 23,751 17,463 9,233 913,605 449,669 65,74 
195 9,018,291 4,475,928 627,51 18,644 13,831 7,39 968,483 489,881 76,467 
196 36,512,792 17,161,626 2,061,35 13,124 9,566 5,003 3,969,030 1,876,001 234,31 
1961 37,607,492 18,190,618 2,369,78 25,947 19,078 10,08 4,406,615 2,143,094 289,67 
196 38,734,336 19,280,632 2,723,71 29,234 21,686 11,60 4,752,650 2,377,940 347,311 
1963 59,120,480 29,549,592 4,225,721 28,461 21,113 11,29 7,433,034 3,728,128 545,49 
196 41,090,060 21,660,380 3,598,32 26,446 19,980 10,961 5,206,837 2,757,478 470,763 
196 42,321,244 22,958,440 4,136,381 23,636 18,026 10,025 5,472,070 2,981,598 550,81 
196 64,597,936 35,189,148 6,420,99 21,148 16,129 8,97 8,561,669 4,677,990 868,94 
196 44,895,920 25,793,296 5,467,17 19,459 15,131 8,66 6,544,681 3,775,392 818,043 
196 68,529,448 39,535,908 8,488,79 16,110 12,527 7,17 10,670,538 6,173,507 1,347,03 
196 70,584,320 41,907,024 9,760,98 17,812 13,989 8,14 11,568,615 6,887,578 1,629,50 
197 49,055,492 30,716,524 8,310,50 15,492 12,419 7,485 8,418,569 5,291,512 1,460,33 
1971 74,880,632 47,084,356 12,906,21 25,758 20,650 12,445 12,766,389 8,048,942 2,239,293 
197 77,125,248 49,907,568 14,840,13 29,879 24,208 14,86 13,607,675 8,828,530 2,663,22 
1973 66,628 53,982 33,145 
197 310,888 257,407 164,53 
197 394,990 330,708 216,01 
197 907,582 685,681 376,16 
197 1,657,336 1,288,720 738,3 
197 3,573,363 2,113,262 939,51 
197 6,018,280 3,601,752 1,608,72 
198 15,004,766 8,908,072 3,966,13 
1981 21,599,848 12,773,997 5,679,07 
198 51,894,380 31,895,690 14,420,16 
1983 123,863,232 75,423,176 33,945,04 
198 65,188,120 39,694,548 17,864,97 
1985 229,382,960 139,050,496 62,451,64 
198 226,337,200 134,906,192 60,157,11 
198 658,278,016 397,299,104 178 090 19 
Sources and notes: The representative permutation of the rent used is Mx[N(a6)], as defined in Table 
4.4-1 and listed in Table 4.4-2. 
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Figure 5.2-2: Present value of Mexican oil resources 1920-1985. 
Implementations PV1, PV2 and PV3 at three different discount rates. 
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Sources and notes: The results of N, (b) are represented by dots and its negative results excluded. The 
upper and lower values within each present value mimic the upper and lower values of the 
corresponding N. Calculated from rents obtained in Chapter 4 applied to the formulae in Table 5.2-1. 
Value and depreciation 179 
Whenever the variation N(a) of the rent is available, the present value using the 
historical data for Mexico (PVi) is always positive. PVI peaks in 1944, and suddenly 
rises steeply in the 1950s to reach a new plateau by 1960. The higher the discount rate 
used, the smoother these features become. The explanation comes again from how 
PVl is calculated and from the effect of the variations in n. By 1944, the life 
expectancy of Mexican oil reserves had risen to 36 years, a level that would not be 
attained again until the 1970s. When calculating V, 944, this life expectancy entails the 
summation of the discounted rents obtained up to 1980. This also accounts for the 
steep rise in the 1950s. The present values of those years incorporate the massive rents 
of the 1970s. The value of Mexican oil, according to the theoretical implementation of 
the present value (PVJ) stops growing as fast and stabilises from 1960. The life 
expectancy of the resource again accounts for this. From 1960, n diminishes 
systematically; hence no new item is added to the tail of the equation. In the case of 
Mexico too, the sensitivity of PVl to the choice of social discount rate is again the 
highest of the three implementations, as shown in Figure 5.2-2. 
The early years of the Mexican industry can only be approximated using operating 
costs to calculate the base rent, N(b). This results in decreasing present values from 
1921 to 1926; in other words, oil resources in Mexico `depreciated'. From 1927, the 
present values become negative. This is not a surprising result, since we know N(b) 
has negative values from 1938 to 1973. Added up in the formula, these negative rents 
turn present values negative ten years before the actual rent becomes negative. 19 
Positive present values are regained in 1953, that is twenty years before the actual rent 
becomes positive again. The massive rents obtained in the second half of the 1970s 
account for this result. In fact, V1953 includes the discounted rents obtained up to 1978. 
All the 1950s values benefit from the inclusion of the rents of the late 1970s and early 
1980s and thus show an impressive growth rate. 
It is evident from Figure 5.2-2 that PV2 evolves in the opposite direction to PVI. It 
declines sharply while PV1 peaks in 1944. Again, changes in the current value of the 
rent are more important for PV2 than for PVl. Since the former only discounts the 
current value of the rent it mostly mirrors the evolution of the rent itself. Therefore, the 
declining value of N(a) (see Table 4.4-3) that is observable for that period, forces PV2 
downward here. The gap between the different implementations becomes wider from 
1950 when, by virtue of rather constant rents, PV2 remains flat while PV1 and PV3 
19 Negative figures cannot be shown in a logarithm scale graph. 
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shoot up. The result is that, while the latter two are counted in millions from the early 
1960s, the former does not even reach 50,000 pesos. According to the common 
implementation (PV2), the steep growth of Mexican oil resources only occurs after 
1970. 
Since PV2 uses the current year's rent discounted as many times as the life expectancy 
indicates, it depends entirely on the value of N(b). When using the PV2 formula, a year 
with negative rent will always have a negative present value and a year with positive 
rent will result in a positive present value. Therefore, PV2[N(b)] is negative for the 
same years as N(b); that is from 1938 to 1973. The use of N(b) under the constant 
extraction assumption, results in decreasing present values for the period before 
nationalisation. This coincides with the trend of PVl N(b) above. In the period after 
1973 present values increase sharply year upon year as a consequence of the increase 
in oil prices and the subsequent increase of rents. 
As noted before, the third permutation offers an intermediate answer. The value of the 
current year's production, PV3, presents a profile closer to PVl albeit on a smaller 
scale, since it includes the changes in prices and cost but not the amounts produced in 
the future. 
The evolution of the value of the Mexican oil varies in accordance with the algebraic 
expression, i. e. the underlying assumptions used for its calculation. In a static world 
with no change in future prices, costs and rates of extraction, like the one portrayed by 
PV2, Mexican resources lose value for every year until the Second World War. After a 
speedy recovery, they regain their value and maintain it at an almost constant level 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and then steadily lose some value towards the 
beginning of the 1970s. In the mid-1970s, Mexican oil resources undergo a sustained 
growth of a similar degree to the late 1940s, but much more extended in time. 
This evolution diverges from that portrayed by the `perfect foresight' scenarios 
described by PVI and PV3. The value of oil increases rather in the inter-war years. It 
does not stabilise during the 1950s, but undergoes a sharp increase which is much 
more short-lived than the final one depicted by PV2. Finally, it does not decrease 
smoothly during the late 1970s but maintains a constant upward trend from the early 
1960s. 
It was mentioned earlier that those reluctant to apply the present value method would 
have one more argument in their favour if the assumptions greatly bias the results. 
Indeed, this seems to be the case. The starting assumptions regarding the future 
behaviour of prices, costs, rates of extraction, etc. greatly influence the value given to 
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the resources at a particular point in time. However, that should not preclude us from 
using the results obtained by the present value, so long as we are aware of the 
assumptions underlying the algebra and of the likely effects of changing our 
assumptions within each implementation. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, one can compare the historical value of oil 
resources in Mexico and Venezuela calculated so far. Figure 5.2-3 shows the per- 
barrel and aggregated values of both countries using a normal social discount rate for 
all the three implementations used in this section. 
Again the different implementations tell quite different stories both at per unit and 
aggregate level, most notably regarding the relative value per unit produced in each 
country. Despite the higher costs of production in Mexico, and the consequent lower 
rent per barrel, a barrel produced in Mexico has a higher value than in Venezuela from 
the mid-1950s onwards if we follow PVI and PV3. Even in the case of PV2, whose 
profile closely follows that of the rents, the gap between values per unit in the two 
countries is very small. The longer life expectancy of Mexican reserves accounts for 
this result in the case of PV2. 
At the aggregate level, each implementation shows a different timing. While PVI 
indicates that Mexican oil resources catch up with Venezuela's petroleum wealth as 
early as the mid-1950s, PV2 maintains the gap that does not close until the end of the 
1970s. Yet according to PV3, Mexican oil wealth never matched that of Venezuela 
(though the series are only available until 1972). 
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Figure 5.2-3: Comparative Value of Mexican and Venezuelan oil resources, 1920- 
1985 ($ per barrel and million $) 
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Sources and notes: Labels as defined in Table 4.4-I. Note that the present value per unit has 
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5.2-3. 
Mx N(a)I 
VZ (a)75 
143699 1 
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Yet another point remains to be made in relation to the present value. That is the 
relationship between the values calculated here and the Hotelling Valuation Principle 
(HVP) that tries to approximate them by assuming the rent per unit follows Ilotelling's 
rule (i. e. u, increases at the rate of interest). The literature has put forward a number of 
theoretical exercises that demonstrate that the HVP overvalues the resource. 20 Figure 
5.2-4 plots the s HVP versus the present value assuming constant rents, which is the 
comparison implied by the theoretical exercises. 21 
Figure 5.2-4 Mexico and Venezuela: Hotelling Valuation vs. Present Value 
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Sources: own elaboration from data in Chapter 4 and this section. 
20 See for instance GA. Davis, and D. J. Moore, 'Valuing, mineral stocks and depletion in green national 
income accounts', Environment and Development Economics 5 (2000). 
21 Note however that the theoretical definition given in Chapter 2 of the HVP was Q, (p, -M(', ), that is 
available reserves times the difference between price minus marginal costs. We can only calculate it 
using average costs. 
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The message from Figure 5.2-4 is that the higher the rate of return used, the more the 
HVP overvalues the resource. However, we know from the exercises above, that PV2 
undervalues systematically the value of the resource at every rate of discount if rents 
are allowed to change over time. Consequently, it is safe to say that the HVP 
overvalues the resource if, and only if, the value assigned to the resource is that 
resulting from PV2. That is, if the resource is valued maintaining the assumption that 
the rents in the future remain as in the current year. 
In summary, the different evolution of each of the present values resulting from the 
various implementations is relevant for the assessment of the actual value of the 
resources and for the calculation of the depreciation. The gaps observed among the 
different present value permutations depict quite different stories regarding the 
evolution of the resource wealth of Mexico and Venezuela. The most common 
implementation, PV2, generates the lowest value for the resources compared with PVl 
and PV3. This is the case because current rents projected into the future, as in PV2, fall 
short in a world where rents increase both through growing production and improved 
technology. PVl includes both increasing production and technological change (new 
uses for the resource, reduced costs, etc), and provides the upper limit so long as the 
pace of extraction keeps increasing over time. Otherwise, if production is reduced in 
the future, PV3 takes the lead. PV3 only includes technological change (since 
production is kept as in the current year) and may be taken as a middle of the road 
option. In a scenario where rents per units and production decreased over time, the bias 
would work in the opposite way. PV2 will overstate the value of the resource 
compared to the other two implementations. The social discount rate is not a very 
important variable. The life expectancy of the resource, n, turns out to be a much more 
important one at the time of shaping the path of the resource value. 
There is a further implication of the different implementations. If one wished to 
increase resource wealth, the strategy would vary. Using PV2, the best way of 
increasing Vr is by raising N1. The most obvious way to do so would be to increase 
current year production, qr. This might reduce n, but the expected effect will be still an 
overall increase of V1, because: 
RQ, NN 
O'` [5.2-4] 
,,. 0 
(1+i)" (l+ i)" 
If PV2 is used, reducing the life expectancy of the resource is the strategy for 
increasing the value. Using the same argument, a cut in production thus increasing the 
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value of n, would not lead to an increase in value. This is because, if the country is a 
price taker, the reduction in the rent for every year in the sum can never be 
compensated by the addition of an extra year of life. 2 
In contrast, if PVI or PV3 are used, expanding the time horizon for the resource 
becomes an option. An increase in n can be achieved by: (1) increasing reserves or (2) 
reducing production enough to gain an extra year of life for the resource. It can be 
argued that the former depends on random factors, but the latter is just a 
straightforward management decision. In a setting with increasing rents over time it is 
quite likely that a reduction in q1sufficient to ensure a further year of production would 
lead to higher V, if: 
AN < 
N, +(,, +, ) [5.2-5] 
(1+i)("+') 
Given the magnitude of the rents by the end of the period under consideration, it is not 
heroic to assume that a cut in production and the consequent rent reduction in year t 
would be more than offset by the addition of an extra term with big rents at the end of 
the equation. Therefore, the use of different formulae is not a simple disagreement 
about the best way of implementing the algebra. It has strategic implications for the 
management of the resources. 
The Depreciation of the Resource 
This chapter seeks a measure of the cost of using natural capital. Depreciation is the 
change in value of assets (mineral assets in this case) as a consequence of their use 
over time. Since the value of the assets has now been estimated, the variation in value 
can be calculated as the difference among the present values of consecutive years, 
simply VV+1- V1. In general, negative values are expected from such a calculation. This 
expectation derives from the underlying assumptions regarding future behaviour of 
rents and constrain to the life expectancy of the resource, which is normally fixed at its 
value at time t. From simple observation of the series presented above, one can 
anticipate that a continuous depreciation is an unlikely outcome since the value of the 
assets shows an increasing trend over time. 
22 The price taker assumption is needed as otherwise a cut in production could lead to an increase in 
prices keeping the rent at the same level or even increasing it. If prices are not affected by the 
production cut, the aggregated rent will be reduced. The unit rent can also be expected to get smaller in 
the presence of scale economies. 
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Table 5.2-4: Change in value of Venezuelan oil resources, 1920-1985 (V1,1-VO 
. >vl,., _PVI, IV'2,. 1 -PV'2, No price 
t 1+1 i3 i6 1 15 i3 i6 1 /5 i3 16 1 15 . 1't 
MII. ß1v, bill. BISs MII. BIvs MII. BI s h111.131v> h111. I36s MII. Ills Atll Ill,, 6111 13I\, * MII Ilks 
1920 1921 4,428 2,539 43 1251 iI41 4 53 38 18 
1921 1922 15,625 6,935 65 15 15 1 92 56 2 
1922 1923 19,424 6,904 531 198 131 6' 234 137 65 
1923 192 58,439 14,759 62 757 462 20 1,002 414 14 4 
1924 1925 (92,498) 12_7,174) (708 895 799 49 315' 203 282 31. 
1925 192 (3,587) (1,949) 164 1,392 1,171 751 441 427 343 08 
1926 192 (922) (575) I' (331) (165) 13 564 522 401 20oo 
1927 192 (8551 (676) (64 750 797 762 871 854 75 2(8 
1928 192 1,3761 (1,243) (548 (330) (1041 27 (443) (2811 I4 375 
1929 193 375 325 8 1,152 971 60 218 ISO 21 'til 
1930 1931 79 72 (133 (1,479) (1,412) I, 2_' 1 45'I (465 4'- 5 
1931 1932 423 386 133 2,170 1,819 1,17 140 82 _ 21 
1932 1933 1,028 779 11 (3,0381 (22.675) 11,934 III (4) I" 4'ßo 3 
1933 193 7,335 5,309 1,52 2,251 1,748 97 2,218 1,531 61: lo 
1934 1935 3,854 2,738 75 609 452 233 1,108 744 26 ', o3 
1935 193 2,232 1,706 571 442 354 21 538 372 12. 332 
1936 1937 2,692 2,035 68 322 258 15 1,668 1,206 51 302 . 
1937 193 3,127 2,392 809 ( 1.350) ( 1,083) (652 548 386 12' 384 
1938 193 4,090 3,134 1,142 1810) 1649) (391 1,451 1,082 51' 293. 
1939 194 33,396 13,635 2,95 1,464 843 23 2,555 1,351 233 238 
1940 1941 (6,419) (2,322) 68 2,677 2,123 1,23 1,734 1,668 1,13 'S'. 
1941 1942 209,658 60,636 6,123 (3,116) (22,763) 1,734 16,684 5,065 1ß1A 421, . 
1942 1943 (72,498) (13,239) 1,342 2,198 1,589 811 (3,4'') 188 1,116 1 A's 
1943 194 119,923) (27,753) (417 2,479 2,354 1,57 (5,8"))) (148) 2,18 ")5 
1944 1945 (11,915) (5,055) 95 1,078 1,122 88 2,338 2,697 2,261 ýI 11 
1945 194 (8,831) (4,146) 84 2,536 2,310 1,67 1,816 2,357 2,38 0-45 ' 
1946 1947 (2,860) (896) 1,382 6,608 5,699 3,905 1,643 1,975 2,07 ')5 c 
1947 1948 (101 736 1,49 12,001 10,229 6,90 2,670 2,600 2,232 I, 5n' 3 
1948 194 13,363 9,675 3,27 II, 592I (1,879) 4,887 3,485 2,092 335 2, ß'o 
1949 195 15,912) (3,229) 35 1,645 1,923 1,91 678 1,302 1,73 _, 2003 
1950 1951 (971) (34) 1,04 554 771 91 2,947 2,845 2,36 2, Sol l 
1951 1952 1,199) (249) 98' 2.165 2,170 1,921 454 827 1,21 22'754 2 
1952 1953 15,765 11,928 4,87 6,181 4,512 2,03 5,915 3.986 1,313 3,123,1 
1953 I95 4,635 4,009 2,522 3,797 3,179 2,07 4,074 3,329 2,06 3,284 
1954 1955 4,240 3,773 2,49 8,883 7,437 4,85 7,483 6,169 3,89 3,5')3 
1955 195 3,903 3,396 2,103 7,876 6,594 4,30 8,662 7,095 4,36 4, ) IoI 
1956 195 4,880 3,818 2,00 16,235 13,593 8,87 10,466 8,356 4,82 4,954( 
1957 195 43,002 27,829 7,74 (5,830) (6,187) (5,619 30,827 18,680 3,43. 6,277.1 
1958 195 (1,525) (5) 1,50 (9.388) (7,129) (3,71)5 4,227 4,208 2,89 
1959 196 22,562 15,994 6,80 (2,811) (2.327) (1,488 30,303 21,159 8,08 4,781). 
1960 1961 (184) 1,673 3,55 1,182 1,539 1,69 2,690 3,930 3,95 4,1'2 I 
1961 1962 (535) 1,460 3,69 4,727 4,579 3,81 12.778 11,937 8.60 43)07 i 
1962 1963 24,218 18,619 9,54 (484) (410) (274 37,250 28,001 13,03 5,5')_' i 
1963 196 (487) 2,066 4,94 30,211 26,516 19,021 9,150 10,257 9,35 5,550. 
1964 1965 25,524 19,890 9,903 (1,112) (953) (i52 46,668 35.887 17,22 ß, o1; 
1965 196 23,589 19,283 10,75 (2,805) (2,403) (I, o44 32,558 26,013 13,64 8,551 ' 
1966 1967 (1,856) 1,699 5,62 (1,964) (781) 793 14,026 15,864 14,672 82)5 , 
1967 196 2_, 299) 1,435 6,03 (3,227) (1,903) 5. 6,071 10,098 13,03 8,071 
1968 196 43,689 36,484 21,98 (3,112) 12,730) 11,9o5 68,653 56,837 34,15 9,990 
1969 197 (1,049) 3,695 10,251 (2,718) (1.526) 30 14,070 19.094 23,462 8,60) 
1970 1971 62,624 53,758 35,091 20,186 17,924 13,26 90,356 76,379 49,39 9,088. 
1971 1972 121,000 100,661 57,463 6,162 4,331 1,355 157,171 125,428 69,56' 11,385 
1972 1973 105,026 83,690 48,44. 11,143 
1973 197 408,327 330,534 202.196 17,1781 
1974 1975 (34,612) (47,981) 50.171 457ßo 
1975 197 9,024 7,087 4,12 31, ~111 
1976 197 89,930 65,296 33,091 31,40) 
1977 197 (41,005( 40I'08I 27,1_' 41,113 
1978 197 351,876 286.166 175,383 37,0 
1979 198 470,096 336,018 166,681 
1980 1981 203,230 131,561 54,95 ß3, m0 I 
1981 1982 n,, 444) (134,144) (124,197 90,1511 
1982 1983 1'1,142 ) (149 59_) 180, E>'3 , 
1983 198 855,253 546,196 251,041 
1984 1985 (161,837) (149,2286) 1ß4,81D `(I 1ý» 
Sources and notes: Numbers in parenthesis indicate depreciation (negative change in value), except for 
the net price, which presented in absolute value. Table 5.2-2 for l', and Table 4.4-2 for A't=(Vz[NaI5]). 
The use of alternative permutations of Nt does not alter the substantive message of these results. 
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Tnhle 5.2-5_ Charme in value of Mexican oil resources 1935-1987 (V, -VJ 
PV'I,., -PV 1, PV2,. 1 -rv2, Pv3,., -I 
V3, 
t to i-3 16 ! =15 ii i-6 i15 i7 i6 i 15 Net price 
MIL Pesos MII. Pesos MII. Pesos MII. Pesos MII. Pesos MII. Pesos MII. Pesos N111. Pesos MII. Pesos 
1935 193 197 236 II (237) (157) (73 140 132 5 II+ 
1936 193 (1,043, (311) 7 1,532 1,177 65 305 334 20 o 
1937 193 1,914 990 141 (1,010) (783) (442 (430) (359) (2b I') 
1938 193 2,411) (995) (24 (755) (487) (207) (344) (28) 8 
1939 194 1,653 996 275 (415) (327) 190 736 460 13 I))7 
1940 1941 906 659 281 32 24 13 196 169 93 
1941 1942 3,588 1,914 455 (250) (230) X154 (216) (2391 )13i S 
1942 1943 3,228 1,708 475 61 36 I 765 447 163 o1 
1943 194 200,405 76,870 5,43 320) (2561 (146 20,161 8,076 80 
1944 1945 (175,959) (65,584) 13,577 (439) (287) (133 (13,988) (4,7681 14 1i 
1945 194 (25,968) (10,751) (443) 734 567 31 (3.931) (1,216) 43 71, 
1946 194 11,538) (391) 488 289 262 18 721 852 753 0`) 
1947 194 (178) 269 62 3,125 2,505 1,50 331 484 56 `)i 
1948 194 2,799 1,836 811 2,287 1,651 82 1,431 1,027 56 3<0 
1949 195 (2,042) (846) 301 3,893 3,342 2,221 968 1,135 1,071 
317 
1950 1951 979 711 373 2,227 1,677 90 1,022 812 503 7; 
1951 1952 16,862 9,175 1,741 3,277 2,217 962 6,362 3,423 611 ')` 
1952 1953 42,425 22,482 3,77 (4,9225) (3,877) (2,258 9,373 4,691 411 )o7 
1953 195 113,063 58,701 9,523 5,727 4,245 2,263 28,020 15,260 3.29: oSt 
1954 1955 4,694 5,201 2,267 219 290 25 4,667 3,410 1,25 95 
1955 195 365,662 188,203 29,06 2,001 1,387 661 52,219 27,350 4,557 99, 
1956 195 4,382,035 2,095,044 260,41 7,574 5,177 2,44 397,345 190,565 23.935 1,081 
1957 195 3,815,101 1,831,745 232,691 (3,224) (22,371) (1,253 402,569 194,489 25,367 1,395 
1958 195 261,440 252,126 80,621 (5,107) (3,633) (1,835 54,877 40,212 10,71 1.228 
1959 196 27,500,000 12,700,000 1,433,833 (5,520) (4,2b4) (2,396) 3,000,548 1,386,120 157,843 98' 
1960 1961 1,094,700 1,028,992 308,43 12,823 9,512 5,085 437,584 267,093 55,36 664 
1961 1962 1,126,844 1,090,014 353,92 3,286 2,608 1,513 346,036 234,846 57,635 1. )42 
1962 1963 20,400,000 10,300,000 1,502,00 (773) (573) (307 2,680,384 1,350,188 198,185 1.54, 
1963 196 (18,0(j0,0001 (7,889,212) (627,393 (2,015) (1,133) (332 (2,2_6,1971 (970,050) (74,73) 1,50 
1964 1965 1,231,184 1,298.060 538,053 (22,811) (1,954) (936 265,233 224,120 80,04 1.47 
1965 196 22,300,000 12,200,000 2,284,611 (2,487) (1,897) (1,055 3,089,599 1,696,392 318,131 1.35 
1966 196 (19,700,000) (9,395,852) (953,813 (1,690) (998) (302' (2,016,988) (902,598) )S0,81)7 1,212 
1967 196 23,600,000 13,700,000 3,021,61 (3,349) (2,604) (1,492 4,125,857 2,398,115 528,98 1.180 
1968 196 2,054,872 2,371,116 1,272,191 1,702 1,462 96 898,077 714,071 282,47 981 
1969 1970 12 1,500,000H I1,200,000)I I, 450,483 (22,320) (1,570) (650 (3,150.04b) 1,596.066) (169,171 1,121 
1970 1971 25,800,000 16,400,000 4,595,71 10,267 8,231 4,96 4,347,820 2,757,430 778,95 I" )` 
1971 1972 2,244,616 2,823,212 1,933,92 4,121 3,558 2,41 841,286 779,589 423,933 
1972 1973 36,749 29,774 18,281 
1973 197 244,260 203,425 131,391 a"'' 
1974 1975 84,102 73,302 51,475 
1975 197 512,593 354,973 160,155 
1976 197 749,754 603,039 362,133 io, oo, 
1977 197 1,916,026 824,542 201,216 I m, 1)< 
1978 197 2,444,917 1,488,491 669,20 I' , >n 1 
1979 198 8,986,486 5,306,320 2,357,414 4 °"ý' 
1980 1981 6,595,082 3,865,925 1,712,93 `I'"(')' 
1981 1982 30,300,000 19,100,000 8,741,09 3i)"8ý' 
1982 1983 72,000,000 43,500,000 19,500,000 I, ýx1"''- 1 
1983 198 (58,700,000(( 35,700,000I( 1 6,100,000 4.4 7')" 1 
1984 198" 164,000,000 99,400,000 44.600,00 '""I"'ý-' 
1985 198 (3,0.35,760 (4,144,31.31 X 2,294,524 0,145,; '- 
1986 198 432.000,000 262,000.000 1 18,000.00 " ", 1' "') ; 
Sources and notes: Numbers in parenthesis indicate depreciation (negative change in value). except for 
the net price that is presented in absolute value. Table 5.2-3 for V, and Table 4.4-3 for N! (Mx[Na6] is 
used). The use of alternative permutations of Ni does not alter the substantive message of these results, 
except if permutation Nh is used given (its negative sign). 
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Tables 5.2-4 and 5.2-5 report the differences between consecutive year's present 
values. That is the direct estimation of the right hand side of the fundamental equation 
of asset equilibrium presented in Chapter 2 (equation 2.3-2). Since the net price 
method is an attempt to approximate the change in value, the last column of each table 
provides the relevant net price for comparison. 
As expected, negative changes in value (i. e. depreciation) are not the rule but the 
exception for the two countries regardless of the implementation used for calculating 
the present value. In addition, the higher the social discount used, the less frequent 
depreciation becomes. More crucially, the net price is not a good approximation to the 
change in value. Worse, contrary to a widespread view in the literature the bias is not 
systematically upwards. 23 The net price both overestimates and underestimates 
changes in value. The net price seems to have a tendency to underestimate during the 
first half of the century and to overestimate during the second half. Before analysing 
the reasons behind the poor performance of the net price, lets analyse the results for 
each country. 
The differences across the columns are striking. Of the 53 years (1920-1972) for which 
PVI and PV3 were calculated for, only a minority of years show depreciation - i. e., a 
diminished value of the resources. The sensitivity of PVJ to the discount rate has 
already been mentioned. This translates here as the higher the social discount applied, 
the less the number of years for which a depreciation in value is obtained. For 
Venezuela, the range goes from 22 years (at 3 percent) to 6 years (at 15 percent). As it 
can be expected from the simple observation of the upward trend of the series, the 
implementation PV3 results in depreciation for just 5 years clustered around 1930 plus 
one other in the early 1940s. For its part PV2, the most common implementation in 
the literature, records the highest number of years showing depreciation. This is 
regardless of the fact it covers a longer period (1920-1985). Just over one third of the 
years observed present a depreciation in value in the case of Venezuela. Unlike the 
other implementations, the social discount has a small impact on PV2 depreciation 
findings. 
23 It has become widely accepted that the net price overestimates depletion. Most of the demonstrations 
(if not all) are theoretical, and therefore subject to the assumptions regarding the alternative scenarios.. 
See for example G. A. Davis and D. J. Moore, 'Valuing mineral stocks and depletion in green national 
income accounts', Environment and Development Economics 5 (2000). Nevertheless, this paper finds 
that under several assumptions the direction of the bias is unknown for the value of the reserves -thus 
for the depreciation too. 
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Identifying the periods over which Venezuelan oil resources lost value is also 
dependent on the formula used. While the variation that assumes perfect foresight 
(PVI) signals the 1920s and the 1940s as the decades with most depreciation, the 
variation that keeps variables constant (PV2) points to the late 1950s and the whole of 
the 1960s as the years in which more value was lost. 
The results for Mexico present some similarities but also important differences when 
analysing the depreciation values obtained using the present value methodology. The 
main similarity, again, is that assuming perfect foresight (PVi) generates less years 
with depreciation than the traditional operational approach (PV2) suggests. The 
sensitivity to the rate of discount also remains. However, here the net price tends 
almost systematically to underestimate the depreciation obtained from the change in 
value. 
All in all, the present value method obtains depreciation for periods in which one 
would expect Mexican oil assets to depreciate. These are: 
  the 1920s , which were years of 
fast depletion; 
  the 1940s, when Mexican oil fields lost value and productivity due to the 
nationalisation; 
  the 1960s and the early 1970s, when resource rents decreased due to increasing 
labour costs. 
Note that no depreciation is observed at the time of the massive discoveries of the 
early 1970s. This result is consistent with the fact that the resource base grew 
tremendously during those years, expanding the time horizon and thus the present 
value of the resource by virtue of the extra terms added at the tail of the formula. As a 
consequence, the value of the resource appreciates over time. 
This last fact is directly connected with the issue of why the net price is not a good 
proxy for the change in value of the resources. As used in applied studies, the net price 
method estimates gross, not net changes in value. `By making V1+1-V, = - (pj -ACS)=Nt 
the applied studies have ignored the capital gain (loss) associated with holding the 
resource (which is conveyed by the first term of equation 2.3-2, that is Vt(i/(1 +i)). It 
appeared that the only problem with the net-price method was that it used average 
costs instead of marginal costs. Unfortunately, this advice was misguided. This is not 
to say it was incorrect: it was indeed correct, but only under the strong assumptions 
Value and depreciation 190 
underlying it (see Section 2.3). Since the assumptions are violated, the capital gains 
term in the definition of the change in value becomes important. '24 
The results demonstrate that the value given to the resource in any given year depend 
greatly on the assumptions regarding the behaviour of the rent over time. The most 
common assumption, that of keeping rents constant over time, tends seriously to 
underestimate the historical present values of the resources in both Mexico and 
Venezuela. In the absence of better tools for predicting future trends of prices, rates of 
extraction and costs, and the pace of new discoveries the calculation of depreciation is 
a hazardous undertaking. In addition, the expectation of obtaining a depreciation value 
to charge yearly for the use of the resource fords no satisfactory answer in the presence 
of capital gains. 
With regard to methodology, one of the most important findings of the section is the 
confirmation that the net price is a poor approximation to the change in value of the 
resource. That should not be new to most experts in the field. What is new is that the 
results presented here demonstrate that the net price does not systematically 
overestimate the depreciation values, even under the most restrictive assumptions. The 
net price both underestimates and overestimates the change in the value of oil 
resources in Mexico and Venezuela, because it is indeed a measure of gross change in 
value. 
The results also prove that the life expectancy of the resource has a role to play in the 
value of the resource, which is at least as relevant as the discount rate chosen. This is 
mostly ignored by the literature as a result of the assumptions regarding the value of n 
over time. This variable depends on both the rate of extraction and the variation of the 
stock of reserves. Typically, both extraction and stock are held constant which make n 
decrease one year at a time as exhaustion of the resource takes place. In the exercises 
carried out here, both the rate of extraction and the stock of resources vary constantly 
and as a consequence, the time horizon of consecutive years can be very different. 
Therefore, it should be kept in mind that an important part of the change in value over 
time observed is due to the variations in the time horizon from period to period. 
Since the present value is at the core of all calculations regarding the value of natural 
resources, the results in this section have further implications for the other main 
method, the user cost. 
24 J. RVincent, 'Green accounting: from theory to practice'. Environment and Development Economics 
5 (2000), p. 21. Parenthesis added. 
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5.3 User Cost Method 
The actual magnitude of the present value for a given year is also relevant to the 
calculations put forward by El Serafy. His user cost method proposes to match the 
present value of the finite income from the resources to the present value of a perpetual 
income generated by investing part of the rents generated in a given year. 25 His 
working assumptions lead him to use our PV2 measure as the value of the finite 
income in his calculation. 26 Hartwick and Hageman have already pointed out that, in 
the case of changing yearly receipts, El Serafy's measure could be a poor 
approximation to the amounts that can be consumed (reinvested) from the yearly 
receipts. However, their result was based on the elaboration of a hypothetical case. 
7 
The first part of this section presents the results under the constant rents assumption. 
Then rents (and thus prices and costs) are allowed to change using the results of PVI 
and PV3 from the previous section for the calculation of the user costs. This simple 
exercise demonstrates the user cost reproduces exactly the net change in value (right 
hand side of equation 2.3-2) regardless of the assumptions made about the value of the 
resource, but that once the assumption of constant rents over time is removed, the 
amount that can be consumed keep no relation to the rent produced in the current 
period. 
The algebra of the user cost method (see Chapter 2) demonstrates that, if receipts are 
kept constant, the amount that should be set aside and invested to create a perpetual 
stream of income is a proportion of the current year receipts. Under this assumption, 
the proportion is equal to 1/(1+i) "+ It is possible to calculate the proportion of net 
receipts that correspond to the user cost using the historical data of Mexico and 
Venezuela. The two pieces of information needed are the life expectancy of the oil 
reserves in the two countries at the current rate of extraction (n) and the social discount 
2 For El Serafy, setting part of the proceeds aside for reinvestment is only a metaphor. 'The owner may 
dispose of his receipts any way he chooses. But he should be made aware of the fact that his true income 
is only a fraction of his total receipts'. S. El Serafy, 'The Proper Calculation Of Income From Depletable 
Natural Resources', in Ahmad, Serafy and Lutz (eds. ), Environmental Accounting For Sustainable 
Development: a UNEP- World Bank Symposium (Washington D. C., 1989), p. 16. 
26 El Serafy argues that in his method 'it is not necessary to estimate the absolute value (present value) 
of the total mineral reserves or resort to what is known as 'wealth accounting' Ibid. p. 16. I lowever, 'an 
estimate of the value (present value) of total reserves is implied by his formula' as already pointed out 
by J. Hartwick and A. Hageman, 'Economic depreciation of mineral stocks and the contribution of El 
Serafy, in Lutz (ed. ), Toward Improved Accounting for the Environment: An UNSTAT-World Bank 
Smposium (Washington, D. C., 1993), p. 221. Parentheses added. 
27 Ibid, p. 217. 
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rate (i). We shall see that, given any rate of discount, the variations in the value 
resulting from the equation are solely due to variations in n. 
The choice of the social discount rate is more difficult to ground historically. The US 
Tariff Commission in 1932 used 6 percent 28 An identical figure was used in 1970 for the 
calculation of the present value of future production, in order to compensate Pauley Co 
for the cessation of the exploration contract this company had with Pemex29 El Serafy 
suggests 5 percent or thereabouts as an approximation to what classical economists used 
to call a natural rate of time preference. 30 This should not deter us from attempting the 
calculation using different values of i. 
Figures 5.3-1 and 5.3-2 plot the proportion of receipts that should be accounted as user 
costs for both countries using the historical data on life expectancy of the resource and 
considering two values of i; 6 and 3 percent. The value of n has also been plotted to 
facilitate the understanding of its influence on the calculation. 
28 US Tariff Commission, 'Production cost of petroleum products and of refined petroleum products'. 
(Washington, D. C., 1932), p. 59. 
29 A. Echevarria, E. Loreto, W. Friedeberg, et al., Dictamen sabre el valor que representa para 
Petröleos Mexicanos el compromiso contraido en el contrato Puley-Noreste celebrado originalmente 
con E. W. Pauley (Mexico D. F., 1970,27 February), p. 3. 
30 S. El Serafy, 'The Proper Calculation Of Income From Depletable Natural Resources', in Ahmad, 
Serafy and Lutz (eds. ), Environmental Accounting For Sustainable Development: a UNEP- World Bank 
Symposium (Washington D. C., 1989), p. 16. 
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Figure 5.3-1: Venezuela 1920-1985. Proportion of the net receipts to be accounted as User ('ost 
(assuming constant rents over time) 
Venezuela: 1920-1995: Porportion of the net receipt th. l should be accounl. d (dI"c°0n led) at user c°. 1 
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Figure 5.3-2: Mexico 1920-1989. Proportion of the net receipts to be accounted as 
User Cost (assuming constant rents over time) 
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Figures 5.3-1 and 5.3-2 reveal the direct effect of the fluctuations of n and of the different 
values of i on the final value. When the time horizon shortens, a higher proportion of the 
rent is due to be reinvested. Since Venezuela's oil reserves enjoyed a shorter life 
expectancy than Mexico's, the user costs suggest Venezuela should have set aside a 
larger proportion of the rents received for guaranteeing the future flow of income than 
Mexico. On average the recommendation of the user costs for Venezuela ranges from 32 
percent at a6 percent social discount rate to 55 percent when 3 percent is used, whereas 
the averages for Mexico range from 22 to 44 percent, respectively. 
According to the strict user cost method, at a6 percent social discount rate, Mexico 
must have reinvested as much as 60 percent of the net receipts from oil during the 
early 1920s. During those years oil exhaustion seemed plausible. Thereafter, when the 
exhaustion horizon rises to 20 years, the user cost suggests that less than 30 percent of 
the net receipts should have been reinvested for guaranteeing an equal flow of income. 
By the end of the period, huge discoveries extended the time horizon of Mexican oil 
and a mere 2 percent of the net receipts should have been set aside. 
In the early days of Venezuela's booming oil industry, the user cost recommends a low 
proportion of reinvestment. It is as low as 4 percent in 1924 (i is set at 6 percent). Due to 
the subsequent heavy exploitation of the oilfields, their life expectancy remained quite 
low for most of the period, as seen above. The consequence is that Venezuela should 
have set aside between 40 and 50 percent of the net receipts for most of the period, at a6 
percent discount rate. From the early 1970s, Venezuela's oil production slowed down; the 
lower the amount of oil depleted, the longer the life of the current reserves. The effect of 
this on the user cost recommendation is that a decreasing proportion has to be reinvested 
all the way to the end of the period. 
If one decreases the rate of discount i to 3 percent, thereby increasing the preference for 
the future, the figures rise by some 20-percentage points. That is to say Mexico should 
have set aside 80 percent in the early 1920s, between 40 and 50 percent throughout the 
period until 1970, and around 18 percent in the 1980s. The recommendation for 
Venezuela reaches 19 percent in 1924, ranges from 60 to 70 percent in the period up to 
the 1970s and finally decreases smoothly to 24 percent in 1985. It is clear from Figures 
5.3-1 and 5.3-2 that the choice of i is also critical for the results. A mere three percentage 
points of difference in the social discount (from 3 to 6 percent) produces about 20- 
percentage points difference in the result. Therefore, time preference matters. The lower 
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the discount rate, the bigger the proportion of the rents that should be set aside. Yet life 
expectancy matters also. 
It is also interesting to see that the period in which the lowest proportion of net receipts 
should have been reinvested is the 1970s-l980s. It is the period of highest receipts for the 
oil industry and also the one in which concerns regarding sustainability came to the fore. 
Nevertheless, according to these results, it is the period with the least need to care about 
the future. The discrepancy generated by the two different social discounts is greater 
when longer time horizons are present. In presence of a short-lived resource, both 
social discount rates imply relatively similar high reinvestment policies. This is 
observable in the late 1920s and second half of the 1960s. However, when the life 
expectancy of the reserves increases, a smaller part of the rent needs to be reinvested 
and a bigger percentage of the rent can be consumed. The lower the preference for the 
future and the longer the life expectancy of the resources, the smaller the amount that 
should be reinvested. During the 1970s and particularly the early 1980s, Venezuela 
exemplifies the point. The life expectancy of Venezuelan oil fields grew consistently 
during those years. Starting from the same rents, the lower preference for the future of 
6 percent generates a reinvestment path that decreases at a faster pace than the 
reinvestment recommendation at 3 percent. 
Theoretically, new discoveries do not have to be accounted as income in this approach. 
Yet, if discoveries occur, and the same pace of extraction is kept, the time horizon 
automatically increases and so does the proportion of the rent that can be consumed in 
the current period -since the proportion that needs to be reinvested shrinks. Equally, if 
the owner decides to keep the reserves-to-extraction ratio unchanged by raising his 
annual extraction when new discoveries are added, income will also rise through the 
increase of the rents obtained. Therefore, in practice, discoveries have a direct effect 
on 'income'. 31 
So far, the user costs seem to provide a satisfactory answer to our quest for the value 
that should not be accounted as income (i. e., the value that should be subtracted from 
traditional measures of income). The problem is that, when the constant rents 
assumption is removed, the algebra of the sum of geometric series is no longer valid. 
Therefore, the hypothetical amount that should be reinvested for continuing to yield 
the same level of income in perpetuity does not correspond to a proportion of the rent. 
31 Reckoning that the market share of the producer is small, thus neither discoveries nor increasing 
production will alter prices. 
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To demonstrate this point, it is necessary to recall the algebra supporting the user cost 
method, yet in a more simplified fashion than in Chapter 2. 
User cost is derived from setting equal the present value of the finite series produced 
by the resource, N, to the value of a perpetual income X. 
YN 
_i 
X [5.3-1] 
(1+i)" 
"=o (1+i)" .-0 
In the previous section, the left hand side of equation 5.3-1 has been calculated as 
PV1, PV2 and PV3 depending on the assumptions regarding the evolution of N,, that is 
the value of the resource V1. The right hand side is the sum of a perpetual geometric 
series whose simplified result can be found in any maths book. Therefore the equations 
can be rewritten as: 
V- X [5.3-2] 
l+i 
for whatever implementation of the present value, V. The value off is therefore: 
X =V .( 1- 1+i) 
[5.3.3] 
The user cost is meant to be the difference between this true income and the rents 
obtained every year. Thus user cost is X-N, which replacing X by the expression in 
[5.3-3] and simplifying becomes: 
UC=V, 
l+i -NS 
[5.3-4] 
which is also the expression for Vt+i-Vt derived in equation 2.3-2.32 The user cost is 
therefore equivalent to the net change in value. Now, if PV2 replaces Vt in the 
equations above, N-X becomes the proportion of N that Figure 5.3-2 and 5.3-2 have 
above, that is 1/(l+i) " +1. But if we remove the basic underlying constant rents 
assumption and we plug PVl or PV3 into the equations above, the results are quite 
different. Tables 5.3-1 and 5.3-2 report the results of applying equation 5.3-4 to the 
different values generated for Vt. 
32 Hartwick and Hageman, 'Economic depreciation of mineral stocks and the contribution of El Serafy', 
p. 215. 
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Table 5.3-1: El Serafy's user costs (net change in value Vt(i/l+i) -N1) for Venezuelan oil resources, 1935-1987 
UC(1) uc(2) 
EI Serafv's user cost 
(Cy; ) 
Year i=3 i=6 i-15 i3 i6 1 !i i3 i6 1 is 
mll. blvs mll. bh, s mll. bles mll. blcs mll. blcs mll. blvs mll. bl s Mll. blcs ml) hlcs 
192 107.2 148.5 140.1 0.4 0.4 01 
1921 236.1 274.7 196. 1.9 2.6 2 
1922 691.2 630.0 281. 4.6 5.8 5 
1923 1,252.6 987.0 346. (1 1) 10.31 (0() 7.0 9.1 9. 
192 2,927.6 1,774.8 400. (6_) (1.3) 0. 9.1 5.4 
1925 166.6 246.8 241.1 (47.0) (22.9) 30 070) (50.0) X28 , 
192 (455) 40.3 125.1 1114.11 (64.2) (12o (lol7) (1334) Ol I 
1927 154.71 0.1 114.3 )136.1) (86.0) (233 f 1S77) (116.3) I 
192 -, oo4) (187.1) (50.8 (271.1) (197.7) 1ß(" . 25`1 I) (224.8) I( U') I 192 (513.0) (455.2) (328.7 (487.2) (410.1) (2_51 ýU6 5) (447.2) (3 13 3 
193 (528.6) (466.0) 1343.6 (480.1) (381.6) (198 _8 7) (465.2) 1337 6 
1931 (250.2) (189.8) (85.0 (247.1) (185.4) 182.1 (215.4) (121.1 
1932 (402.1) 133631 (231.8 (348.1) (246.7) (92.8 470 1) (375.0) (285.5 
1933 (5'-0) 21.2 103. 1116.5) (78.0) (24.9 11'2.8) (55.1) 12. ' 
193 34.2 165.9 174.3 178.4) (106.4) (24.6 1(, ýi 
6) (95.8) 010 
1935 117.4 277.5 243. (189.7) (109.9) (23.3 ' 1(, -, 4) (82.8) 2, ) ' 
193 152.4 335.4 288. (206.8) (119.9) (255 I-o_7) (917) ill`) 
193 209.0 419.4 355. 219.3) (127.1) (270 14')9) 4521 2. 
193 391.5 634.3 552. 167.1) (96.8) (20.0 4225) 68.1 110.3 
193 565.6 851.7 756. 1 135.8) (78.7) (16.7 54.7 184.2 231. 
194 1,518.9 1,530.8 1,122. 112.5) (50.4) (5.1 109.7 2413 242 
1941 1,162.7 1,238.1 1,042. (203.8) (99.4) 112_. 9 (90 166.5 221 . 
1942 7,507.8 4,813.6 2,079. (56.0) (17.3) 10.6 715.5 691.7 346.1 
1943 5,289.4 3,959.9 2,148. (98.8) (34.2) (1.7 508.0 595.6 384 
194 1,577.7 2,194.0 1,874. (245.4) (119.7) (15.6 118.3 368.4 451. 
1945 1,096.2 1,783.7 1,864. 348.4) (190.6) (34.4 51.9 386.7 612.2 
194 581.6 1,301.7 1,717. (531.9) (317.3) (73.2 ( 152 0) 262.8 666.3 
194 (98.4) 659.4 1,301. (936.2) (591.4) (160.6 (7014) 1222 11 340. 
194 (1,155.8) 1355.. 4 442. (1,641.0) (1,066.8) 13142 (1,678.1) (1,12_94) 14'_25 
194 (410.71 513.0 1,224. (1.331.6) (817.4) (2046 . 11,220.8) (655.1) (_'3 o 195 (943.0) (183) 910. (1,643.8) ((, 068.6) (314.7 (1.561.1) (941.6) ('o1) 
1951 (1,164.5) (212.6) 854. (1,820.8) (1,218.2) 13892 (1,668.5) (973.7) 423 
1952 1,568.41 (5943) 613. (_. 12_6.7) (1,464.2) (5076 (2,024.2) (1,295.8) (282 2 
1953 11, _'71.0) (1139) 1,087. _. 108.4) (1,370.7) (403 7 (2,013.7) (1.232.0) (2242 8 195 11,444.8) (204.5) 1,108. 12,306.7) (1,499.5) (441.7 (2.203.8) (1,352.4) (28) 8 
1955 ('_, 043.7) (722.2) 711. (2,770.3) (1,801.0) (530.4 (2,708.3) (1,725.61 (3)o i 
195 (2.570.5) (1,178.5) 345.3 (3,181.4) (2,068.2) (609.1 (3,096.5) (1,964.51 0 
195 (3,748.8) (2,284.6) (713 4 (4,029.0) (2,619.2) (771.4 (4,112.0) 12,811 9) (S 
195 (1,480.9) 296.4 1,312.1 3,183.4) (1,954.0) (489.0 (2,198.8) 173')2 1 205. 
195 (1,053.2) 786.4 1,98 1. (2,984.6) (1,885.3) (511.8 11,603.51 128 8 1,055. 
196 (178.7) 1,921.0 3,086. (2,849.2) (1,799.81 (488.6 1503.6) 1,386.2 2.327. 
1961 (519.0) 1,701.4 3,214.1 13,149.6) (2,047.5) 1603.1 (760.1) 1,273.7 2,509.3 
1962 (1,219.5) 1,118.5 3,012. (3,697.0) (2,473.3) (790.3 ( 1.072 91 1,264.4 2,947.1 
1963 (472.6) 2,219.9 4,298. (3,669.5) (2,454.9) (7844 53.6 2,891.0 4,689.3 
196 (3,589.7) (7499) 1,840.3 (5,892.5) (4,057.0) (1,406.4 (2,782.9) 368.6 2,806. 
196 (2,744.8) 478.6 3,233. (5,823.4) (4,009.5) (1,389.9 (1,322.1) 2,501.4 5,155. 
196 (1,801.7) 1.822.9 4,892. (i, 649.0) (3,889.4) (1,348.3 (117.7) 4.230.0 7,191.5 
196 (2_, 231.6) 1,556.4 5,250. ( 6,082.1) (4,309.5) (1,620.8 (85.1 1 4,752.0 8,729. 
196 (2,617.4) 1,330.9 5,719. (6,494.9) (4,736.1) (1,932.4 (_2711 5,004.8 10,111. 
196 1 1,018.3) 3,707.7 8,914.1 6,259.0) (4,564.0) (1,862 2 2,099.1 8,548.6 14,893.1 
197 (1,473.3) 3,505.7 9,826. (0,762.6) (5,074.9) (2,246.5 2,0844 9,204.9 17,528. 
1971 (1,946.8) 4,222.4 12,106. (8,472.2) (6,357.8) (2,814.4 2,418.7 11,230.7 21,6743 
1972 1,819.9 10,028.9 19,843. 8,050.2) (5,870.2) (2,395.2 7,239.0 18,572.9 30.990. 
1973 11,026.1) (7,167.9) (2,1112 
197 (27,640.8) (16,966.2) (4,2245 4 
1975 (19,803.8) (10,837.0) (1,957-4 
197 (20,109.3) (11,004.1) (1,987.5 
197 (21,743.4) (11,561.6) (1,924,8 
197 (19,083.3) (9,859.9) (1,513.1 
197 (33,509.5) (18,336.9) (3,3 12,0 
198 (41,170.0) (20.669.6) (2,923 6 
1981 (41,881.2) (19,853.4) (2,385 9 
1982 (25, (, 86.4) (9,403.8) (542.8 
1983 ( 1), 1330) (6.2512) (2(, 04 
198 I2o, )n) 41 (8,08'_ I) (2(, 1 (, 
1985 1_1), 4581), (5,31.11 (IIii 
Sources: own elaboration from the present values in Section 5.2. Negative numbers shown in 
parenthesis. UC(I). UC(2) and UC(3) correspond to the user costs generated by PVI, 1T2 and PV 3 
respectively. 
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Table 5.3-2: EI Serafv's user costs (net change in value V, (i/l+i)-N, ) for Mexican oil resources, 1935-1987 
Year 
tIC)! ) UC(2) 
EI Serat'v's user cost 
1(('(3) 
i-3 i6 1 15 i-? i6 i 15 i3 16 i 1i 
MII. Pesos MII. Pesos MII. Pesos MIL Pesos MII. Pesos MII. Pesos Mll. Pesos MII. Pesos Nil], Pesos 
1935 59 222 9 (65) In _ i22ß 65 3 193 75 245 II 1601 (18) 2 n 82 47 
193 139 41 (114) (40) 12 I(, 
193 66 255 II (77) (25) (5 52 14 
193 63 224 141 (66) (27) -t 1 76 52 
194 118 306 203 (49) (19) 26 128 95 
1941 136 342 23 (50) (19) ýS 29 136 10 
1942 213 472 31 65) (11) 1 44 144 II 
1943 261 567 38 (36) (10) ýI 55 168 13 
194 2,519 4,938 1,10 (24) (5) 310 644 25 
1945 627 1,243 66 (15) (4) o 189 392 291 
194 270 591 55 (42) (15) (2 110 280 30 
194 233 543 59 (60) (27) (4 109 302 37 
194 30 347 46 (198) (96) (19 )881 119 23 
194 (22) 345 46 1256) (108) (17 (164) 71 20 
195 (372) 27) 182 (483) (244) (52 (455) (190) 22 
1951 (469) (101 II (552) (267) (52 (550) (262) 3)) 
1952 (314) 302 22 (600) (253) (39 (562) (180 (62 
1953 651 1,885 1,031 1402) (162) (23 (115) 396 302 
195 2,060 4,907 1,97' (580) (223) (29 28 958 43 
1955 2,172 5,162 2,22 (611) (246) 135 88 1,112 555 
195 7,569 15,730 5,93. 1655) (252) (33 800 2,576 1,06 
195 68,276 134,004 39,58 (818) (273) (28 6,037 13,048 3,872 
195 121,794 237,854 70,10: (720) (240) (25 11,868 24,224 7,347 
195 129,379 252,367 80,86' (585) (205) (2.3 13,281 26,741 8,98 
196 499,189 970,749 268,20 (385) (123) (II 53,977 105.525 29,89 
1961 528,481 1,028,315 307,76 (787) (263) (27 61,078 119,965 36,441 
1962 560,023 1,089,808 353,71 (917) (321) (36 67,712 133,052 43,753 
1963 859,160 1,671,111 549,673 (893) (313) (35 107,079 209,518 69,64 
196 629,410 1,224,585 467,873 893) (344) (45 78,840 154,609 59,92 
1965 667,337 1,298,179 538,173 (830) (335) (47 85,488 167,415 70,49 
196 1,023,714 1,990,626 836,30 (743) (299) (42 135,040 263.580 112,12 
1967 750,076 1,458,812 711,925 (745) (329) (55 108,777 212,516 105,51 
196 1,150,550 2,236,900 1,106,253 617) (272) (45 178,829 348,462 174,71 
196 1,219,471 2,370,974 1,272,05 (714) (330) (60 199,487 388,741 211,423 
197 893,606 1,737,621 1,082,92 (688) 1347) (74 153,072 298,470 189,42 
1971 1,369,643 2,663,406 1,681,673 (1,144) (577) (123 232,689 453,855 290,33 
1972 1,451,509 2,822,847 1,933,561 (1,404) (739) (170 255,032 497,619 345,26 
1973 (3,131) (1,648) (380 
197 (16,532) (9,459) (2,568 
1975 ( 22,491) (13,404) (3,948 
197 (30,631) (11,790) (1,537 
1977 ý 63,429) (28,018) (4,665 
197 (61,010) (2,943) 116 
197 (104,969) (6,00'_ 1 (42 
198 257,941) (13,169) (78 
1981 (368,787) (17,789) (97 
1982 (952,754) (76,338) (863 
1983 (2,232,358) (159,914) (1,530 
198 (1,174,870) (84,161) (809 
1985 X4,098,310) (277,542) (2,458 
198 (3,919.6271 (2_11,714) 1, +14 
198 i11,6o3,4311 X746,622) j6, uQi 
Sources: own elaboration from the present values in Section 5.2. Negative numbers shown in 
parenthesis. UC(1). UC(2) and UC(3) correspond to the user costs generated by PV1, PI'2 and P! '3 
respectively. 
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Comparing Table 5.3-1 and 5.3-2 with Table 5.2-4 and 5.2-5 in the previous section it 
turns out that `change of the value' calculated here (VV(i/(1 +i)-Ni) does not replicate 
the `change in value' calculated there (Vt+, -Vd 
33 If the approximation is only rough, it 
is because our historical scenario does not fit some of the theoretical abstractions 
supporting the equality. Nevertheless, the contrast of the results for each country 
remains, since it reveals that outside the El Serafy assumptions, the value of 
Venezuelan oil resources depreciated to a greater extent and more often than Mexican 
ones. 
According to the numbers in Table 5.3-1 and 5.3-2, current generations could have 
consumed far more than the rent they were currently obtaining from the resource. The 
results show that once the constant rents assumption is removed, the true income, X, 
that represents the amount that can be consumed without jeopardising future 
generation's ability to consume according to El Serafy, is greater than the rent for a 
number of years. This is shown by the positive figures in the table. This is a result 
quite on line with the history of oil producer countries. They could, for instance, 
borrow against the resources they hold. 34 
Still, the figures generated do not represent a value that can be charged as depreciation 
for the use of the natural resource in the national income accounts. Although El Serafy 
himself is not in favour of depreciation methods, he would take away his user cost 
from the GDP itself, `for it does constitute neither an economic rent nor a value added 
to the economy. Thus, it is wrong to describe as current production that which is not, 
applauding as good economic performance what comes from the liquidation of subsoil 
assets rather than from labour, capital formation, technological progress and efficient 
organisation'. 35 But, removing one of El Serafy's assumptions, produces an outcome 
that increases rather than decreases the GDP of resource producers. This hardly seems 
satisfactory. 
33 J. R. Vincent, 'Green accounting: from theory to practice', Environment and Development Economics 5 
(2000), p. 21, defines in this manner the two sides of the equation. 
34 Both Mexico and Venezuela used oil as collateral for borrowing in international markets during the 
late 1970s and the early 1980s. In words of P. Lucke, 'oil sales were used to catalyse external borrowing 
and bring forward high levels of future income', see Luke, P., 'Debt and Oil-led Development: The 
Economy Under Lopez Portillo', in Philip, G. (ed. ), The Mexican Economy (London, 1988), p. 70 
35 El Serafy, The Proper Calculation Of Income From Depletable Natural Resources', , p. 12-13. 
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5.4 Imputed Income Method 
Finally we turn to the adjustment proposed by Sefton and Weale 36 We must remember 
that their departing concept of income and their interpretation of the adjustment are 
different from the methods implemented above. Sefton and Weale's adjustment to 
conventional net income seeks the calculation of welfare income rather than a better 
proxy for sustainable-Hicksian-income. They construct the adjustment term as the 
adjustment corresponding to the extraction of exhaustible resources (-N1) plus an 
income imputed to the stock of the resource due for exports (i. e. the gains from trade, 
Vr(i/(1 +i)). In this framework, V1 is calculated as the present value of the expected 
gains from the stock of the resource targeted for exports assuming Hotelling's rule 
holds. Under these assumptions, as shown in Section 2.4 above, V, can be `constructed 
from an estimate of the total remaining stock of the resource and the estimate of the 
present ratio of the domestic to foreign final consumption of this resource' times the 
price net of extraction costs. 37 In our notation it translates as Vl=u, QE. Observe that, as 
it was noted in Chapter 2, in practical terms the adjustment proposed by Sefton and 
Weale responds to the formulation described for all the other methods (-N1 
+(Vt(i/(1+i)) with the difference that the value of the resource is a function only of the 
resources made available for exports rather than the total stock. 
For Venezuela the imputed income adjustment resulting of this method is almost 
identical to the adjustment produced by El Serafy's method at low interest rates (UC(2) 
in Table 5.3-1 above). This is the case because the values of V1 assigned by the two 
methods are very similar at low interest rates. For Venezuela there is almost no 
difference between using the whole of the stock or just the stock dedicated to exports 
for the calculation of Vt since the country exported most of the oil it produced (see 
Figure 1.1-1). Note that if instead of using the stock targeted for exports we use the 
whole of the stock then the value assigned to the resource corresponds precisely to the 
Hotelling Valuation Principle shown in Figure 5.2-4, that is VI=u, QE - u, Q=HVP. 
From Figure 5.2-4 we also know that HVP-PV(2) at low interest rates. As a 
consequence, the adjustments of El Serafy and Sefton and Weale are very similar for 
Venezuela. 
36 J. A. Sefton and M. R. Weale, 'The net national product and exhaustible resources: The effects of 
foreign trade', Journal of Public Economics 61 (1996) 
37 Ibid, p. 46. 
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Table 5.4-1: Sefton and Weale adjustment, imputed value to the stock targeted for exports. 
Venezuela 1921-1985, 
Year 6, - U, QE 
i=3°i 
I 1;, li/l I i) 
i=6°b i=155 
1921 (149.081 0.77 3 33) 114.341 
1922 1140541 0371 142_31 114t, (), 
1923 202.65 1.51 7.08 22.05 
1924 1,724.67 18.71 66.10 193.43 
1925 2,446.21 (2_7.15) 40.07 220.67 
1926 4,194.66 183.801 31.46 341.15 
1927 3,464.23 117.50) (2_. 31) 233.45 
1928 4,246.87 251.46) (134.76) 178.79 
1929 3,990.64 (465.45) (355.79) 161 16i 
1930 5,328.35 (452.97) (306.56) 86.84 
1931 3,540.41 228.97) (131.69) 129.70 
1932 6,233.77 314.70) (143.411 316.84 
1933 2,547.60 (101.96) (31.96) 156.13 
1934 5,543.86 142.09) 10.25 419.56 
1935 6,429.00 145.49) 31.16 505.82 
1936 7,050.14 II i7.37) 36.35 556.87 
1937 7,519.11 (165.54) 41.07 596.21 
1938 5,761.94 (125.19) 33.14 458.55 
1939 4,709.35 1100.961 28.44 376.14 
1940 7,263.64 (45.95) 153.63 689.92 
1941 10,644.62 I 116,71 1 175.78 961.68 
1942 7,928.94 42.75 260.62 846.02 
1943 10,791.19 19.30 315.82 1,112.54 
1944 13,136.11 (131.17) 229.78 1,199.63 
1945 13,91 1.06 (243.061 139.18 1.166.25 
1946 16,569.10 423.00) 32.28 1,255.59 
1947 24,675.17 ('53.58) (105 i61 1,716.23 
1948 39,011.97 1,420.46) (348,51) 2,531.79 
1949 36,461.71 (1,138.86) (136.98) 2,555.02 
1950 39,511.32 1,410. _22) (324.551 2,592.61 
1951 38,786.71 (1,624.50) 1558,741 2,304.93 
1952 42,138.92 (1,895.72) (737.841 2,373.31 
1953 49,563.93 (1,841.30) (479.40) 3,179.95 
1954 54,155A1 (2,016.35) (528.29) 3,470.06 
1955 64,802.85 (2,428.62) (648.00) 4,136.46 
1956 73,072.17 (2,828.30) (820.46) 4,574.54 
1957 91,598.38 (3,609.07) (1,092.181 5,670.63 
1958 87,861.97 (2_, 702.49) (288.261 6,198.68 
1959 76,644.19 (2_, 557.04) (451.05) 5,207.67 
1960 73,001.87 (2,445.86) (439.95) 4,949.85 
1961 74,373.97 (2,740.73) (697.11) 4,793.99 
1962 76,710.32 (3,357.75) (1,249.941 4,413.67 
1963 75,832.04 (3,341.74) (1,258.06) 4,340.69 
1964 114,054.70 (5,331.45) (2,197.51) 6,223.26 
1965 110,532.69 (5,332.48) (2,295.31) 5,865.43 
1966 107,730.95 (5,157.97) (2,197.78) 5,756.10 
1967 101,568.39 (5,713.44) (2,922.59) 4,576.31 
1968 101,106.42 (6,045.65) (3,267.491 4,197.30 
1969 93,133.68 (5,951.31) (3,392.23) 3,483.93 
1970 87,447.84 (6,541.37) 14,138.52) 2,317.85 
1971 115,111.21 (8,033.12) (4,870.14) 3,628.64 
1972 121,395.17 (7,607.67) (4,272.03) 4,690.70 
1973 239,467.92 ( 10,203.47) (3,623.47) 14,056.68 
1974 713,399.88 (24,907.35) (5,304.86) 47,366.18 
1975 708,383.56 116,208.35) 3,256.30 55,556.97 
1976 717,854.94 116,500.85) 3,224.05 56,224.00 
1977 802,217.38 118,297.18) 3,74580 62,974.32 
1978 742,623.13 116,032.70) 4,372.77 5920138 
1979 1,144,123.63 (29,013.55) 2.424.18 86,895.98 
1980 1.709,050.38 (333,911.98 1 13,048.55 139,229.47 
1981 1,906,609.75 (34,788.37) 17,600.62 158.367.53 
1982 2,014,999.75 13,588.6 i) 41,778.63 190,548.09 
1983 1,859,640.38 (6,493.51) 1 44,604.80 181,903.91 
1984 3,153,399.75 1 1,559.03) 85,088.70 317,907.38 
1985 3.065,309.50 7,093.42 91,320.66 317,635.53 
u, =u(u!? ) and a; =N(a1 )=u(a1 5)'y, as in Table 4.4-I 
Q1. is the stock targeted for exports 'assuming the ratio of the domestic utilisation 
of the resource to foreign utilisation remains constant'. Data derived from the data 
in Appendix A. 
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Table 5.4-2: Sefton and Neale adjustment, imputed value to the stock targeted for exports. 
Mexico 1935-1985 
Year V, ii, Qt: 
i=3% 
-N, 6', (i/! Fi) 
i=6% i=1501 
1935 1,997.75 (55.78) (0.89) 146.61 
1936 1,657.15 (i6.27) (10.73 111.62 
1937 2,045.39 (133-37) (77.17) 73.84 
1938 945.37 105.67) (79.69) 9 8911 
1939 911.49 (81.09) (56.04) 11.26 
1940 689.32 (61.47) (42.53) 8.36 
1941 402.57 (71.60) (60.54) (3081) 
1942 170.28 (56.68) (52.00) (3943) 
1943 52.46 61.83) (60.38) (56,51) 
1944 27.18 (43.02) (42.27) (40_6) 
1945 29.18 (25.66) (24.86) (22,71) 
1946 101.56 (66.57) (63.78) (56.29) 
1947 114.33 (92.27) (89.13) (80.69) 
1948 1,198.39 271.46) (238.53) (150.05) 
1949 975.66 383.80) (356.99) (284.96) 
1950 2,319.55 (669.53) (605.79) (434,53) 
1951 1,686.54 (805.86 ) (759.51) (635-00) 
1952 3,766.17 (857.34) (753.86) (475.80) 
1953 876.51 1631.08) (607.00) (542.28) 
1954 1,372.45 (917.93) (880.22) (778.89) 
1955 1,547.23 95_2.41) (909.90) (795.67) 
1956 1,943.57 1,025.08) (971.67) (828.18) 
1957 1,419.20 1.314.38) (1,315.38) (1,. 10.60) 
1958 110.97 1,225.67) (1,222.62) (1,214.43) 
1959 33.28 986.721 (985.80) (983,341 
1960 228.80 (657.39) (651.10) (634.21) 
1961 2.608.93 (1,266.56) (1.194.87) (1.002.25) 
1962 2,930.71 1,463 29) (1,382.77) (1,166.39) 
1963 2,646.11 1,430.65) (1,357.94) (1,162.571 
1964 2,607.30 (1.398.58) (1,326.94) (1.134.44) 
1965 2,071.58 (1.294.64) (1,237.72) (1,084.771 
1966 2,566.76 (1,137.62) (1,067.09) (877.59) 
1967 2,081.27 11,124.80) (1,067.61) (913,951 
1968 1,516.93 (937.23) (895.55) (783.56) 
1969 1,574.04 1,076.00) (1,032.75) (916.53) 
1970 2,375.19 980.85) (915.58) (740.22) 
1971 1,696.81 (1,696.50) (1,649.88) (1,524.601 
1972 1,244.49 (2,072.96) (2,038.77) (1,946.89) 
1973 2,554.10 (4,628.96) (4,558.78) (4,370.20) 
1974 10,945.76 (223,710.37) (23,409.60) (22,601.46) 
1975 65,245.06 (30,2212.89) (28,430.12) (223,613.01 ) 
1976 151,312.21 (46.195.30) (4_2,037.61) (30,8b607) 
1977 475,758.31 (87,107.55) (74,034.88) (38,909.16) 
1978 2,395,1 12.37 1522,800.941 13,010.91 189,844.47 
1979 4,648,334.08 (74,486.48) 53,238.39 396,429.56 
1980 13,943,776.20 i 111,270.19) 271,87078 1,301,353.75 
1981 22,541,948.51 (84,283.81) 535,113.94 2,199,408.50 
1982 56,838,225.94 (226,271.88) 1,335,503.75 5,531,927.00 
1983 147,849,366.55 122,857 501 3.939,682.00 14,855,550.00 
1984 76,856,905.87 (92,471.751 2,019,368.50 7,693,791.50 
1985 260,638,189.67 (556,92100 6,604,780.50 25,847,960.00 
1986 259,935,103.18 277,008.50) 6,865,374.00 26,056,646.00 
1987 726,356,555.59 '. 079,234 00) 17,879,274.00 71,506,912.00 
1988 918,474.382.47 (3.2278,902_0W 21,958,53200 89,770,42400 
1989 822,735,404.02 001 5,107,928.00 65.851,312_. 00 
u, =u(ah) and : N, =N(a6)=u(uh)*q, as in Table 4.4-2 
Q1. is the stock targeted for exports 'assuming the ratio of the domestic 
utilisation of the resource to foreign utilisation remains constant'. Data derived 
from the data in Appendix A. 
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Mexico exported negligible amounts of oil until the mid-1970s consequently the 
expected gains from trade are very small and do not compensate the loss of the 
exhaustible resource until well into the 1970s as reported in Table 5.4-2. Accordingly, 
for the years in which Mexico restricted its oil exports, the adjustment to its conven- 
tional income in this model is negative and very similar to the adjustment produced 
by the net income price (which imputes no income at all to the reserves). 
It must be noticed that the value of the adjustment depends highly on the rate of 
interest used in its computation, particularly in the case of Venezuela where the rate of 
return also affects the sign of the adjustment. The sensitivity analysis assumed three 
alternative rates of interest 3,6 and 15 per cent. At low interest rates Venezuelan 
expected gains from trade do not suffice to compensate for the loss of exhaustible 
resources, thus the adjustment is negative. At high interest rates the expected gains 
from trade exceed the loss of natural capital and the resulting adjustment is positive. If 
we believe that 6 per cent is a reasonable interest rate over the twentieth century then, 
as predicted by Sefton and Weale, the adjustment takes positive and negative values at 
different points in time. 
Sefton and Weale do not explain what are the implications for the resource exporter of 
having a positive or a negative adjustment, except that their adjustment to the NNP of 
the resource exporter is far less severe than the net price adjustment 38 However, since 
their definition of income (welfare income) is expressed entirely in terms of future 
consumption, a negative adjustment to conventional income could be interpreted as 
indicating that the future consumption prospects of the economy are worse than the 
conventional net income indicates. Per contrary, a positive adjustment would indicate 
that the weighted average of future consumption (that is welfare income) is larger than 
the conventional national accounts suggests. Sefton and Weale do not specify whether 
a negative adjustment (conventional income > welfare income) implies that the 
country is actually consuming above the trajectory chosen by a rational utility- 
maximising consumer (above what would be optimal) and whether this indicates that 
actual consumption would decline in the future. What is clear is that welfare income 
can be both greater and smaller than conventional national income depending on the 
rate of discount used. 
The results of this model seem to indicate a preference of methodology depending on 
the actual use given to the resource. For a pure resource exporter, such as Venezuela, 
38 J. A. Sefton and M. R. Weale, 'The net national product and exhaustible resources' (1996) p. 43. 
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the user costs as proposed by El Serafy would be preferred over the net price. For an 
oil producer that uses the resource entirely for domestic production, such as Mexico 
during the period 1938-1970s, the net price will be preferred over the user costs 
method. A direct implication of Sefton and Weale's approach is that an oil producer 
receives no benefit from owning a vast reserve of an exhaustible resource unless the 
country plans to export the resource. While the net price adjustment imputes an 
income to none of the stock, the user costs imputes an income to the whole of the stock 
and Sefton and Weale impute an income only to the exportable part of the stock. 
Finally, Sefton and Weale rely on the optimal behaviour of rents over time. The 
sensitivity of the adjustment to the rate of return is a consequence of the fact that the 
expected gains from trade in this model arise from the application of Hotelling's rule. 
It has been noted earlier in the thesis that Hotelling's rule does not represent accurately 
the historical evolution of prices (and rents). Dropping this assumption and taking the 
historical data on exports (rather than keeping the proportion of exports to production 
fixed) and the historical rents produces very different results as it happened with El 
Serafy's method in the previous section. 
Figures 5.4-1 and 5.4-2 demonstrates that the value of the resource assumed in the 
theoretical models (the middle panel showing HVP, Sefton and Weale and the constant 
rents assumptions used by El Serafy) differ substantially from the perfect foresight and 
historical paths (shown in the upper and lower panels). This comparison gives an idea 
of the deviation between the optimal depletion path assuming no technological change 
and the historical path that we can assume is technologically determined. In the case of 
Sefton and Weale's model this fact induces to question the empirical influence of the 
gains from trade in our historical cases. Chapter 6 returns to these issues. 
39 Ibid, p. 31. 
40 Ibid, p. 34. 
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Figure 5.4-1: The value of the resource: Total stock versus export stock valued at optimal versus 
technologically determined paths. Venezuela 1920-1989 
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Figure 5.4-2: The value of the resource: Total stock versus export stock valued at optimal versus 
technologically determined paths. Mexico 1935-1985 
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5.5 Concluding remarks 
As anyone who performs applied works knows, many assumptions are made in coming 
with answers. It is not unusual for one to feel a little uncomfortable with some of these 
assumptions and to wonder what would happen if they could be relaxed. In the 
calculations in this chapter it was possible to relax the most common assumptions of 
environmental accounting described in Chapter 2 thanks to the historical data set 
assembled in Chapter 4. 
One of the main conclusions of the exercises in this chapter is that the underlying 
assumptions regarding the behaviour of rents over time are crucial to the actual level 
of the adjustments. That comes as no surprise. What is new, however, is that the 
conclusions obtained in the theoretical literature about the bias of the different 
methods are also linked to these assumptions. Therefore, the biases of the methods, as 
commonly assumed in the literature, only hold under the most restricted scenario of 
constant rents over time. The clearest example of this is the claim that the HVP leads 
to overvaluation, which is only true if compared with the valuation obtained using 
constant rents over time but not otherwise. 
It was also found that the value of the resource is very much related to the life 
expectancy of the resource. In most theoretical exercises both n and q are held constant 
at their initial levels. In those models capital gains/losses can only arise from changes 
in the price of the resource. In the case of our two countries the life expectancy of the 
resource varies due to changes in the pace of extraction and/or the finding of new 
discoveries. As a consequence, a great deal of the variations in the value of the 
resource observed comes from these changes in the life expectancy of the resource, 
providing an alternative source of capital gains. This result is clearly exemplified by 
the importance of life expectancy in each and every calculation; n turns out to be the 
key variable. It is more important than the choice of rate of discount or the underlying 
costs used (different rents have less effect on the result than variations in n). Since the 
life expectancy of the resource is to a certain extent a pure management variable 
(change the pace of extraction), it leaves room to speculate about the different 
strategies followed by these two countries. In fact, it has been demonstrated that 
Mexican per unit value is higher simply because Mexican reserves were expected to 
last longer, not because they were of better quality nor even more abundant. 
The chapter started by stating that the complication in ex post analysis is to distinguish 
the effects of our inability to anticipate the future accurately from the analytical failure 
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of the models. Through the findings of this chapter it can be argued that the difference 
between what is expected to happen and what actually did happen is for the most part 
due to a missing variable, namely technological change, and a misleading assumption, 
that is increasing scarcity which is at the root of Hotelling's principle. These should 
serve as a caveat to the recommendations resulting from adjustments based on these 
models. 
The chapter's purpose was to compare the results of the alternative methods thus 
filling the gap between the considerable progress made towards resolving basic 
theoretical issues and the lack of agreement on the empirical side about the most 
appropriate methods for making specific adjustments. Even the most recent attempts of 
applying environmental accounting do not settle for either the net price or the user cost 
method . 
41 Nevertheless, as a result of adopting the theoretical arguments spelt out by 
Sefton and Weale, it is possible to establish that the net price and the user cost are not 
competing methods as such, but alternative adjustments to different scenarios. While 
the net price is the correct adjustment for closed economies, open economies need to 
impute an income to the stock targeted for exports; in the case of a pure resource 
exporter the user costs approximates this result quite reasonably as the results for 
Venezuela in Section 5.4 have shown. This suggests a different type of adjustment for 
each of our two case studies. Since Mexico resembles the closed economy for the 
period 1938-1970s and Venezuela the pure resource exporter during the 20`h century, 
the net price should be the method used to the adjustment of Mexican national 
accounts for the aforementioned period, whereas the user costs should be used for 
Venezuela. In fact, implementing the methodology proposed by Sefton and Weale 
avoids having to switch from one method to another when Mexico changed its policy in 
the 1970s, since their method is able to capture the change in policy. 
These results are carried forward to Chapter 6 in order to see how the adjustments 
calculated here change the estimates of income of the cases studied. The caveats 
introduced by the discrepancies between the assumptions of the model and the actual 
evolution of rents, production, exports and the terms of trade shall not be forgotten 
there. 
41 See for instance, E. Newmayer, Measuring Genuine Savings: Are Most Resource-extracting Countries Really 
Unsustainable? ', in Munasinghe, M., 0. Sunkel and C. d. Miguel (eds. ), The Sustainability of Long-term Growth. 
Socioeconomic and Ecological Perspectives (Cheltenham, UK, 2001), pp. 422-443; A. C. Ilansen, 'Estimating Non- 
renewable Resource Capital Consumption', in Munasinghe, M., 0. Sunkel and C. de Miguel (eds. ), The 
Sustainability of Long-term Growth (Cheltenham, UK, 2001), pp. 397-421, or the recommendations made in W. D. 
Nordhaus, and E. C. Kokkenlenber (eds. ), Nature's Numbers: Expanding the U. S. National Economic Accounts to 
Include Environment (Washington D. C., 1999). 
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As will be clear for the reader of this report, the indicator 
arena is fu' ll of interesting and challenging Issues. It is also 
obvious that much of the work is in its infancy. Many of the 
results presented here are initial efforts at estimating 
indicators and are offered in the spirit of transparent 
exchange of research results and thinking. We hope to 
provoke dialogue and to advance both the methodologies 
used and the policy applications of indicators for 
sustainable development" 
Chapter 6 
Measuring the Illusion of Oil Wealth: 
Venezuela and Mexico 1920s-1980s 
6.1 Environmental Adjustment to Production 
Environmentally Adjusted GDP 
Effects on Performance and Growth 
6.2 Living Beyond their Means? 
The Standard Sustainability Indicator: Genuine Savings 
The Effects of the Terms of Trade 
The Effects of Technological Change 
6.3 Measuring the Illusion of Oil Wealth 
6.4 Conclusions 
Inasmuch as Chapter 5 can be considered as the contribution of economic history to 
environmental accounting, this last chapter can be considered as the contribution of 
environmental accounting to economic history. The chapter achieves this in three 
ways. Firstly, by looking at the effects of correcting gross measures by the use of oil 
resources, and the implications of such adjustment for economic performance and 
growth. Secondly, by asking whether Venezuela and Mexico were living beyond their 
means and examining the variables that supported consumption through out the 
twentieth century. Thirdly, by re-evaluating the arguments proposed by the 
historiography presented in Chapter 3, using the quantitative evidence produced in the 
thesis. 
This chapter answers the main question set in the introduction of the thesis: to what 
extent do environmental historical national accounts diverge from traditional national 
accounts? Chapter 2 discussed the three main approaches to the inclusion of natural 
resources in national accounts. It concluded that only inclusions in the System of 
National Accounts (SNA) or a restricted use of the System of Integrated 
1 World Bank, Expanding the Measure of Wealth. Indicators of Environmentally Sustainable Development, Vol. 17 
(Washington, D. C., 1997), p. 3. 
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Environmental and Economic Accounting (SEEA) are feasible. As it was pointed out 
in Section 2.2, the adjustment could be done at the GDP or at the net income level 
within the traditional SNA. Very briefly, the reasoning is as follows. In the view of the 
United Nations and the World Bank all natural resources are regarded as equivalent to 
man-made capital. Since net income is GDP minus an allowance made for the 
deterioration (depreciation) of man-made capital, including estimates of depreciation 
of natural capital will result in an adjusted net income measure. Nevertheless, in the 
traditional national accounts, reductions in stock are conventionally subtracted from 
GDP. Then, if one characterises exhaustible resources as `stock' rather than `capital', 
the adjustment should be done at the GDP level? In this last case, the whole of the rent 
should be discounted from the GDP. The first section of the chapter implements this 
adjustment to traditional GDP. It also establishes what effects such adjustment has on 
the historical performances of Mexico and Venezuela. 
Nevertheless, the core of environmental accounting literature opts for the correction of 
net income. In the second section of this chapter the results of the previous chapters 
are used to elucidate the main claims of environmental accounting regarding this 
adjustment. Did traditional indicators exaggerate income? Did traditional indicators 
encourage unsustainable levels of consumption? The answer to these questions is 
produced in a sequence of three exercises that connect the findings of the previous 
chapters: 
1. The first exercise computes the genuine savings indicator that was introduced in 
Chapter 2 as a test for weak sustainability. In the way it was originally formulated, 
the genuine savings indicator implies the use of the net price method for adjusting 
the traditional net income. By emphasising the level of genuine savings, we are in 
effect asking the question: how much of the adjusted income was actually 
consumed? Or in other words, were Mexico and Venezuela living beyond their 
means? In this first exercise Venezuela appears to have been living beyond its 
means for a very long period of time, yet the expected decline in well-being cannot 
be observed. Hence, the prediction of unsustainability implied by negative genuine 
savings comes into question. 
2. The second exercise considers whether this is explained by the terms of trade 
effects in open economies. Two alternative analysis are carried out: 
2 Section 2.1 elaborated on the different arguments in favour and against characterising non-renewable resources as 
either 'capital' or 'stock'. 
Measuring the Illusion of Oil Wealth 211 
a) The methodology used is that of Sefton and Weale that takes into account 
the expected gains in the terms of trade of an oil exporter. This second 
indicator reverses the view of the previous exercise, showing that 
Venezuela and Mexico were never consuming beyond their means if the 
expected gains from the terms of trade are taken into account. 
b) The methodology used is that proposed by Nicholson in 1960 for assessing 
the effect of the actual changes in the terms of trade on national income. 
This method belongs to the national income literature that adjusts for the 
terms of trade impact on the measurement of national income. The 
additions to welfare income due to the historical changes in the terms of 
trade differ substantially from the expected terms of trade effects derived 
from Sefton and Weale model resulting in the return of the paradox of 
negative genuine savings without observable declines in well-being. 
3. The third exercise examines the implications of technological change for the 
genuine savings indicator. From the results in Chapters 4 and 5 we know that 
technological change, in the form of lower costs and further oil discoveries, has a 
role to play in the value of the resources. These two factors are explored in the last 
exercise. 
This chapter demonstrates that technological change plays a crucial role in helping 
Venezuela to enjoy non-declining consumption levels despite consuming most of the 
rents generated by oil extraction. This is an important finding because while gains 
from trade have now been included in some environmental accounting models (for 
instance, Sefton and Weale), technological change has been left out. 
The third section of the chapter is dedicated to the re-evaluation of some of the 
arguments proposed in the historiography using the quantitative evidence produced in 
the thesis. Chapter 3 demonstrated that Mexican and Venezuelans of different epochs 
used arguments that can be linked to the literature of environmental accounting, such 
as `due to the nature of oil revenues an increasing gap opened between the real 
production capacity and its earning and expenditure possibilities' or 'after decades of 
consuming more than they produced, to restore balance, Venezuelans' real incomes 
3 J. L. Nicholson, 'The Effects of International Trade on the Measurement of National Income', Economic Journal 70 
11960) 279, pp. 608-612. 
A summary of the many attempts can be found in P. Gutman, 'The Measurement of Terms of Trade Effects', 
Review of Income and Wealth 27 (1981) December, pp. 433-453. The work of Gutman does not include the later 
attempt by K. Hanmada and K. Iwata, 'National Income, Terms of Trade and Economic Welfare', The Economic 
Journal 94 (1984) 376. 
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and consumption would have to decline'. 5 The claims of the contemporaries were 
mostly supported by qualitative rather than quantitative evidence. The calculations of 
this chapter help to fill this quantitative gap. Also, the Mexican claims regarding the 
internal use of the resource such as, `our effort should lead towards consuming in the 
country all the oil we produce; wasting not a single drop; we can be certain that when 
we have achieved this ideal, Mexico will be prosperous, important and respected', are 
qualified in the last section of the chapter. 6 
6.1 Environmental Adjustment to Production 
`If the marginal cost of extraction is the only cost, then any surplus accruing to the sellers is 
pure rent but represents value added in the conventional GDP. This certainly corresponds to the 
accounting practices currently being used under the SNA. Based on these practices, the 
expansion of economic activity as a consequence of accelerating the liquidation of subsoil 
assets appears to be good economic performance and is confused with the growth that comes 
from labour force expansion, capital formation, technological progress, and more efficient 
organisation. In the case of non-renewable resources the rent should not qualify as value added 
or national income. '? 
According to El Serafy, if an income correction is to be made, it should apply to GDP 
itself, it is not enough to effect the adjustment at NDP level since the whole apparatus 
of GDP with its structure, input-output relations and changes over time would be 
incorrectly calculated if revenues from depletable resources are counted as value added 
in GDP. Adjustment of GDP to exclude oil rents has also been advocated from other 
parts of the literature not strictly connected to the environmental issues. 8 
Table 6.1-1 carries out an adjustment to the traditional GDP following these 
arguments. Adjusted GDPs are calculated by deducting from traditional GDP the 
resource rents. The adjusted measures are compared with the traditional non-oil-GDP 
that results from deducting the oil sector GDP from the total GDP, which was typically 
used to confront the bias introduced by oil cash into the national statistics of oil 
produced countries as explained in Chapter 3. 
S The first quote belongs to A. Uslar Pietri, 'Los males del petroleo', El Nacional (1985) 28th April. The increasing 
disparity between consumption and production in a country such as Venezuela is also referred by B. Mommer and 
A. Baptista, 'El Petr6leo En Las Cuentas Nacionales: Una Proposic6n', Working Paper IESA 10 (1983), p. 3. The 
second quotation was taken from M. Naim and A. Pinango (eds. ), El caso Venezuela: una ilusidn de armonia 
jCaracas, 1974) 
J. D. Biez, 'Influencia de la guerra en el petr6leo mexicano', Revista de industria 5 (1939 November) 35. 
'In the perception of the classical economist the rent that qualifies as value added derived from the indestructible 
powers of nature. Such revenue is clearly sustainable where the powers of nature to reproduce it are not impaired, 
and it can therefore legitimately be counted as income. In the case of non-renewable resources, since they are not 
reproducible, the rent should not qualify as value added or national income'. S. EI Serafy, 'The Proper Calculation 
Of Income From Depletable Natural Resources', in Ahmad, Serafy, et al. (eds. ), Environmental Accounting For 
Sustainable Development: a UNEP- World Bank Symposium (Washington D. C., 1989), pp. 12-13. Most of this 
section relies on this same source. 8 See the references in Chapter 2 to the works of Stauffer, Mortimer and Baptista. 
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The first result of this exercise is that the environmentally adjusted GDPs are larger 
than the traditional non-oil GDP until the 1970s. GDP minus rents leaves Venezuela 
with less than 90 percent of traditional GDP from the late 1920s to 1945, and with 
around 80 percent from that date until the 1970s. There is some 5-percentage points 
difference compared with the traditional exclusion of the oil sector GDP. In the case of 
Mexico, the environmental adjustments leave GDP almost intact until the 1970s and 
are above 99 percent of the traditional GDP excluding the three years before the 
nationalisation for which data are available and the period 1949-1957. Even in those 
periods adjusted GDP is never less than 97 percent of traditional GDP. 
After the 1970s, when rents increased massively, GDP adjusted by rents becomes 
smaller than non-oil-GDP. For once, the effect is more dramatic in the Mexican case. 
Mexico's GDP adjusted by rents is between 90 to 85 percent of the traditional GDP by 
the late 1970s/early 1980s compared with non-oil-GDP which is still about 96 percent 
of the traditional GDP at the same date. For Venezuela the correction produced by the 
rents pushes the adjusted GDP well below 80 percent of the traditional GDP, reaching 
62 percent in 1974. At the end of the period, in both countries GDP adjusted by rents is 
approximately 85 percent of traditional GDP. 
All in all, the resource rent adjustments to GDP produce considerable corrections to 
the level of traditional GDP and the results differ from non-oil-GDP. While non-oil- 
GDP is an attempt to identify the economic activity that is independent from the oil 
sector, the environmentally adjusted GDP describes current production including the 
productive contribution of the oil sector (payments to production factors) but 
excluding the resource rents. 
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Table 6.1-1: Environmentally adjusted GDP as percentage of traditional GDP: 
Venezuela 1920-1985 and Mexico 1935-1985 
Year GDPNp/GDP D NoiIGDP/GDPTLDIGDPNP/GDPTIuD NoHIGDP/GDPTnAD 
1920 100.4 99.8 
1921 100.5 99.5 
1922 100.4 99.2 
1923 99.6 98.6 
1924 97.8 97.1 
1925 94.9 94.3 
1926 92.6 95.9 
1927 91.6 88.7 
1928 87.0 84.3 
1929 82.0 80.2 
1930 80.8 80.2 
1931 85.4 82.7 
1932 77.6 78.8 
1933 91.1 84.8 
1934 85.2 84.0 
1935 84.5 82.8 
1936 85.5 82.7 
1937 87.5 83.4 
1938 90.9 85.4 
1939 93.0 86.7 
1940 92.0 85.7 
1941 86.9 81.6 
1942 93.7 86.4 
1943 91.3 85.1 
1944 88.4 82.5 
1945 89.0 83.2 
1946 88.0 81.2 
1947 85.9 79.6 
1948 80.1 74.2 
1949 83.9 77.7 
1950 81.4 77.8 
1951 81.3 77.5 
1952 80.5 76.5 
1953 80.4 76.6 
1954 81.8 78.5 
1955 80.0 77.4 
1956 79.4 76.8 
1957 74.4 71.5 
1958 82.0 78.7 
1959 82.7 78.5 
1960 83.6 78.8 
1961 84.1 80.3 
1962 83.0 80.1 
1963 84.0 81.3 
1964 77.9 78.0 
1965 79.7 82.1 
1966 80.9 80.9 
1967 81.3 81.3 
1968 82.0 82.2 
1969 83.4 83.1 
1970 84.0 84.8 
1971 81.8 84.2 
1972 83.5 85.4 
1973 78.3 81.5 
1974 62.2 70.6 
1975 71.5 77.3 
1976 75.1 80.0 
1977 76.4 82.0 
1978 80.4 84.7 
1979 73.1 80.9 
1980 70.4 78.4 
1981 71.6 79.4 
1982 78.1 83.8 
1983 81.4 85.9 
1984 76.2 82.6 
1985 81.0 86.8 
97.5 97.4 
98.0 97.8 
97.2 97.7 
98.2 98.2 
98.6 98.7 
99.0 98.7 
99.1 98.7 
99.4 98.7 
99.5 98.7 
99.8 98.9 
99.9 98.8 
99.8 98.9 
99.7 98.8 
99.1 98.6 
98.9 98.6 
98.3 96.9 
98.4 97.2 
98.4 97.3 
98.9 97.3 
98.7 97.4 
98.9 97.4 
98.9 97.5 
98.8 97.5 
99.1 97.4 
99.3 96.8 
99.6 96.8 
99.3 96.8 
99.3 96.9 
99.3 96.5 
99.4 96.7 
99.5 96.8 
99.6 97.0 
99.6 96.9 
99.7 97.0 
99.7 97.2 
99.8 97.3 
99.6 97.5 
99.6 97.6 
99.3 98.0 
97.3 97.5 
97.1 97.5 
96.3 97.5 
94.5 96.8 
94.8 96.7 
93.2 97.2 
87.9 98.1 
87.4 96.2 
80.0 96.8 
74.2 94.5 
91.9 95.6 
214 
Sources and notes: elaborated from data in Appendix D for traditional indicators (GDP,. a and NoiIGDP). GDPNP: GDPtrad 
minus the resource rents. Rents are from Section 4.4. The GDP5p presented here corresponds to the traditional GDP minus 
N(a)J5 for Venezuela and N(a) for Mexico. 
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Effects on Performance and Growth 
This section looks at the effects of the adjustment to GDP on the positions of Mexico 
and Venezuela relative to other economies (especially to non-oil producers) and to the 
growth rates of each economy. Figure 6.1-1 shows the index of GDP per capita of six 
Latin American countries after implementing the environmental adjustment to the 
GDP of Mexico and Venezuela. 
Figure 6.1-1: Index GDP per capita of six Latin American countries after environmental 
adjustments were carried on for Mexico and Venezuela, 1900-1994 
250 
200 
150 
100 
50 
EArgentina 
--a- Brazil -fr-- Chile Colombia ---" Venezuela -w- Mexico 
Sources and notes: as Figure 1.2-1 for Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia. For Venezuela and 
Mexico, the traditional GDP was substituted by environmentally adjusted GDP (net price method) as in 
Table 6.1-1. The series were converted to 1980 international dollars using the implicit deflator and PPP 
obtainable in A. A., Hofman, The Economic Development of Latin America in the Twentieth Century 
(Cheltenham, UK, 2000). 
The adjustments applied to traditional GDP in Mexico and Venezuela affect the 
average GDP per capita of the region only slightly, and only for a few years in the 
1980s is the adjusted average smaller than the traditional average by more than 5 
percentage points. It was shown in Chapter 1 that Venezuela started the century with 
the lowest traditional GDP per capita of the six largest Latin American countries but by 
the 1950s it had surpassed them (see Figure 1.2-1). Venezuelan GDP per capita is much 
more similar to that of its neighbours after the implementation of the environmental 
adjustment. In fact, the gap with the average Latin American GDP per capita per capita 
halves from 50 percent higher to 25 percent higher in the years between 1950 and the 
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late 1960s. As would be expected, the effects on the relative position of Mexico are 
only appreciable from the 1970s and particularly from 1980. In the traditional view (see 
Figure 1.2-1), Mexico had the highest GDP per capita of the six countries by a good 
margin in the 1980s. After the environmental adjustment is implemented Mexico falls 
to second place. 
If these adjustments to GDP were taken into account, many statements based on the 
comparative levels of GDP would need to be re-examined. Statements such as 
'Venezuela exhibits a pattern of personal income distribution that is more characteristic 
of countries with a lower per capita income', or alternatively `the only Latin American 
countries with better income distribution than those predicted by the trends derived 
from international cross-sectional data for 1965 were Costa Rica, Panama, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela', would need to be re-examined on the light of the adjusted indicators .9 
The amount of economic analysis based on GDP and GDP per capita figures invites the 
thought that re-evaluation is likely to lead to different interpretations in some areas. 
This is an interesting aspect for further investigation. 
All in all, Venezuela remains one of the best performers of Latin America in terms of 
GDP growth, even after implementing the environmental adjustment. Table 6.1-2 
presents the growth rates of the traditional versus the adjusted GDP by periods, in a 
similar manner to that presented in Table 1.1-4. Nevertheless, some periods show 
changes in their rates of growth under the adjusted measures. The high but unstable 
growth of the export-led years of the early part of the century lessens by 1 to 1.5 
percentage points when adjusted. Similar results would be expected for Mexico, but 
there is insufficient data to calculate the rents. These are the years in which the 
divergence between traditional and environmental indicators commences. For 
Venezuela, the levels of the traditional and environmentally adjusted GDP run mostly 
parallel to each other until the oil boom when the gap widen considerably. As a 
consequence, the growth rates of both series are very similar. For Mexico, since the 
adjustment needed from the nationalisation of the oil industry onwards is very small, 
the effects on the growth rates are negligible too. 
9 The first statement belongs to P. P. Kuczynski, 'The Economic Development of Venezuela: a Summary view as of 
1975-1976, in Bond (ed. ), Contemporary Venezuela and its role in international affairs (New York, 1977), p. 49, 
the second one to H. Chenery, and M. Syrquin, Patterns of Development 1950-1970 (London, 1975) as quoted by 
M. Utrutia, Twenty-Five Years of Economic Growth, 1960-1985', in Urrutia (ed. ), Long-Term Trends in Latin 
American Economic Development (Inter-American Development Bank, Washington D. C., 1991), who in addition 
argues that 'the Venezuelan data show increasing equality from the late 1950s until 1983 and better income 
distribution than that found in the other large Latin American countries', p. 57. 
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The real changes for both countries appear after the oil shock. During the period 1973- 
1980, Venezuela's GDP growth rate almost halves from 4.1 to 2.5 percent, while 
Mexico's experiences the biggest reduction of all the sub-periods considered, from 6.4 
to 4.6 percent. This result is expected. In general, environmentally adjusted GDP 
showed slower growth than conventional GDP during the 1970s. 
It was said in Chapter 1 that both countries experienced substantial declines in GDP 
during the first half of the 1980s. Nevertheless, the growth of environmentally adjusted 
GDP for Venezuela is positive for those years. How can this result arise? The scale of 
the rents generated in 1974 and 1979 affect the adjusted measures, making the series 
much more erratic than the traditional indicators. This does not imply that the adjusted 
indicators erase the crisis of the early 1980s but they indicate a different timing. The 
adjusted indicators begin declining in real terms already in the late 1970s and 1980 is 
the trough from which indicators start to grow again. For the period 1978-1985, the 
growth rate resulting from the adjusted indicators ranges between -0.9 and -0.5 
percent, compared to -1.0 percent as traditionally measured. Therefore, according to 
the environmentally adjusted GDP, the 1980s crisis had already started in the late 
1970s. The notion that `the Venezuelan economic model was exhausted even before 
the oil boom' can be found in the literature of the 1990s. In that sense, this result 
confirms this view that oil wealth obscured an underlying economy in crisis. 10 
The results of Figure 6.1-1 and Table 6.1-2 need some qualification. It is likely that 
environmental accounting will also be relevant to other countries portrayed in the 
comparison. Examples include the Brazilian rainforest and mining or the Argentinean 
pampas and petroleum production. The relative positions sketched in Figure 6.1-1 and 
the growth rates of Table 6.1-2 are likely to vary if the environmental adjustment is 
applied to the rest of countries. 
Considering that environmental accounting claims that traditional national accounting 
generated an illusion of rapid growth, the environmental adjustment yields surprisingly 
small modifications to the traditional growth rates, particularly to those of Venezuela. 
The explanation lies, as noted above, in the fact that the environmental adjustment 
represents about 20 percent of the traditional GDP for most of the century, only 
reaching higher proportions from the 1970s onwards. As a consequence, the traditional 
and the environmentally adjusted GDP series run parallel to each other and their 
10 See, for example, M. Nairn, Paper, Tigers and Minotaurs. The politics of Venezuela's Economic Reforms 
(Washington, D. C., 1993); O. A. Echevarria, La economia venezolana, 1944-1994 (Caracas, 1995) and F. Coronil, 
The magical state: Nature, money, and modernity in Venezuela (Chicago and London, 1997). 
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growth rates are very similar. For Mexico, since the adjustment needed from the 
nationalisation of the oil industry onwards is very small, the effects on the growth rates 
are also very small for the period 1938-1974. 
This section has explored one of the two proposed adjustments to national accounts for 
taking into account environmental depletion, namely, the adjustment of the GDP. 
Interpreting these results in the light of the opening quote of this section, the level 
adjustment of Table 6.1-1 provides a measure of the amounts by which the expansion 
of economic activity in Mexico, and especially in Venezuela, has been a consequence 
of accelerating the extraction of subsoil assets. It showed that, as expected, the levels 
of GDP of Venezuela experience a significant reduction once oil depletion is taken 
into account, while those of Mexico remain almost untouched until after the 1970s. 
This has effects on the positions of the two countries relative to other economies. In 
relation to the growth rates, it seems that the growth that comes from labour force 
expansion, capital formation, technological progress, and more efficient organisation 
have also been significant in Venezuela and Mexico. The growth rates do not change 
substantially when the resource rent is excluded from the product measures. Venezuela 
remains the best performer in Latin America, although its rates of growth for the 
periods 1913-1929 and 1973-1980 are slightly reduced. Only the timing of the 1980s 
crisis seems to be brought forward under the adjusted indicators. Nevertheless, these 
results are only tentative since the application of the environmental adjustment to other 
nations portrayed in the comparison will surely be relevant. 
In any case, it was mentioned in Chapter 2 that gross measures do not indicate whether 
the nation is either building up or living off its capital. As a consequence, the 
environmentally adjusted GDP does not do any better than the traditionally computed 
GDP at the time of identifying whether the economy is on a path towards prosperity or 
extinction, whether it is sustainable or not. For that purpose, the analysis of net income 
is needed. 
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6.2 Living Beyond Their Means? 
From the discussion in the previous chapters it is clear that the core of environmental 
accounting relates to the correction of net income measures. In this section the results 
of the previous chapters are used to elucidate the main claims of environmental 
accounting regarding this adjustment. Did traditional indicators exaggerate income? 
Did traditional indicators encourage unsustainable levels of consumption? The answer 
to these questions is produced in a sequence of three exercises that connect the 
findings of the previous chapters: 
1. The first exercise computes the genuine savings indicator that was introduced in 
Chapter 2 as a test for weak sustainability. In the way it was originally formulated, 
the genuine savings indicator implies the use of the net price method for adjusting 
the traditional net income. By emphasising the level of genuine savings, we are in 
effect asking the question: how much of the adjusted income was actually 
consumed? Or in other words, were the countries living beyond their means? 
2. The second exercise examines in two alternative ways the role of the terms of trade 
in modifying the standard sustainability indicator in open economies: 
a) Using the methodology of Sefton and Weale (imputed income method) that 
takes into account the expected capital gains from trade for the adjustment of 
net income. 
b) Using one of the methodologies proposed in the national income literature for 
assessing the effect of the actual changes in the terms of trade on national 
income. 
3. The third exercise examines the implications of technological change for the 
standard genuine savings indicator through cost reduction and through new 
discoveries. 
This section demonstrates that technological change has a crucial role in helping 
Venezuela to continue to enjoy non-declining consumption levels despite consuming 
most of the rents generated by oil extraction. This is an important finding because 
while gains from trade have now been included in some environmental accounting 
models, technological change is left out. 
The exercises of this section are restricted by the availability of traditional macro- 
economic data. In particular, the short series on national income (NNP) bring forward 
the starting year of the analysis to 1936 for Venezuela and to 1950 for Mexico. This 
does not affect the main thrust of the argument. 
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The Standard Sustainability Indicator: Genuine Savings 
The traditional measure of a nation's rate of accumulation of wealth is gross saving. 
This is calculated as a residual: GNP minus public and private consumption. Gross 
saving represents the total amount of produced output that is set aside for the future. 
Gross savings rates can say little about the sustainability of development, however, 
because productive assets depreciate through time: if this depreciation is greater than 
gross saving, then aggregate wealth is in decline. Net saving, total gross saving less the 
value of depreciation of produced assets, is one step closer to a sustainability indicator, 
but focuses narrowly on produced assets. It has been already mentioned that if the 
equivalence between man made capital and natural capital stands, a country's 
consumption may be mainly supported by draining natural resources, i. e. from the 
depreciation of natural capital. By also subtracting the depreciation of natural capital 
we arrive to the concept of `genuine savings'. " From this concept derives the 
sustainability indicator already presented in Chapter 2 that can be expressed in the 
form'2 
Z= 
ÖMKM 
_Ö 
KN [6.2-1] 
where S is gross savings, SMKM and SNKN are man-made capital and natural capital 
depreciation respectively and Y is total output in the economy. According to its 
authors, Z `is an intuitive zero-order rule for determining whether a country is on or off 
a sustainable development path at any one point in time. The value of Z must be either 
zero or positive to ensure sustainability. ' 13 
By emphasising the level of genuine savings, we are in effect asking the question: how 
much of the adjusted income was actually consumed? The Z indicator can actually be 
re-expressed in the following terms: 14 
Z= 
NNP -C [6.2-2] 
where NNPadj is the environmentally adjusted net income and C is the sum of public 
12 It is worth emphasising that Z is an indicator of 'weak' sustainability. It assumes substitution possibilities 
between the component parts of capital. It is therefore possible to run down the stock of natural capital provided 
that the proceeds are reinvested. 13 D. W. Pearce and G. Atkinson, 'Measuring Sustainable Development', in Bromley (ed. ), Handbook of 
environmental economics (Cambridge, MA, 1995). 14 Gross savings are GNP minus consumption. Net savings are gross savings minus depreciation of physical capital, 
which can also be expressed as (GNP - 6mKM)-C - NNP-C. Subtracting natural capital depreciation from these net 
savings we arrive to genuine savings, NNP-&KN-C-NNPý, C. 
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and private consumption. Observe that, in the way it was originally formulated, the 
genuine savings indicator implies the use of the net price method for adjusting the 
traditional NNP. 
It should be noted that SMKM is quite large compared with most of the net balancing 
items in the national accounts. It is, on average, the largest adjustment to conventional 
national accounting measures. Its mean is more than 10 percent of mean GNP and 
nearly 60 percent of mean gross savings. ls Figures 6.2-1 and 6.2-1 compare the sizes 
of the man-made capital depreciation (SMKM) as recorded in the traditional accounts, 
with the measure of natural capital depreciation (&KI, ) implied by the genuine savings 
indicator, that is N1. 
Natural resource depreciation -approximated by the depreciation of oil resources- is 
larger than physical capital depreciation throughout the period studied in the case of 
Venezuela. For Mexico the scale of the natural depreciation cannot be dismissed from 
the 1970s onwards. Prior to that date the level of natural capital depreciation for 
Mexico was of the order of 1.5 percent of traditional GDP. At least two caveats are 
required in relation to this comparison. First, it is worth bearing in mind that the 
natural capital depreciation estimates calculated here are only considering a single 
natural resource, i. e. oil. It is the resource that generated the greatest rents and 
therefore the greatest depreciation during the century, but the depreciation of other 
natural resources should ideally be also accounted for (consider, for instance, natural 
gas). Therefore, the figures shown here underestimate natural depreciation. In the 
second place, the comparison should be regarded with caution since the historical 
estimates of consumption of fixed capital are feeble as noted in Appendix D, 
especially in the case of Mexico. All in all, however the message from Figures 6.2-1 
and 6.2-2 is clear: natural depreciation is by no means negligible. 
16 United Nations, System ofNationa/Accounts 1993 (New York, 1993), paragraph 6.201. Precisely for that reason 
it has been considered sufficient to carry on the adjustments on this section over NDP rather than to the NNP. 
Historical data for the reconstruction of the NDP (simply GDP less the depreciation allowance) are available, 
whereas for the complete recreation of the historical NNP the rest of data needed (net remittances from labour and 
capital to other nations, indirect taxes and subsidies) are not. 
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Figure 6.2- l: Man-made capital VS natural capital depreciation. 
Venezuela 1920s-1980s (mill. Bolivars current prices) 
Venezuela, fixed K consumption " Oil depreciation (Net Price) 
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Notes and sources: Own elaboration from the fixed capital consumption (SMKM) data sources in Appendix D and 
natural capital depreciation ÖNKN =N(a)15 as calculated in section 5.1. 
Figure 6.2-2: Man-made capital VS natural capital depreciation. 
Mexicol920s-1980s (mill. Pesos current prices (log)) 
Mexico, fixed Kconsumption " Oil depreciation (Net Price) 
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Notes and sources: Own elaboration from the fixed capital consumption (SMKM) data sources in Appendix D and 
natural capital depreciation SNKN = N(a6) calculated in Section 5.1 
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These estimates of natural depreciation are used for the computation of the Z indicator 
described in equation [6.2-1]. Figures 6.2-3 and 6.2-4 offer the graphical representation 
of the gross, net and genuine savings as percentage of GDP for Mexico and Venezuela. 
Figure 6.2-3: Genuine savings. Venezuela 1936-1985 (percentage over GDP) 
B ýo. 
Sources and notes: gross savings calculated as residual of GNP minus total consumption from A. Baptista, Bases 
Cuantitativas de in Economia Venezolana, 1830-1989 (Caracas, 1991), pp. 37-38. Net savings equal gross savings 
minus the consumption of fixed capital listed in Appendix D. The net saving series here are consistent with the 
calculated by Baptista as shown in Appendix D. For the calculation of the genuine savings the corresponding 
natural capital depreciation was deducted, its value is N= N(a15)as listed in Table 4.4-2. 
Figure 6.2-4: Genuine savings. Mexico 1950-1985 (percentage over GDP) 
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Sources and notes: Net savings sources as listed in Figure D. 1-2 in Appendix D. Gross savings calculated adding to 
net savings the consumption of fixed capital also listed in Appendix D. Natural capital depreciation corresponds to 
N= N(a 6) as listed in Table 4.4-3. 
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This first exercise shows Venezuela's Z indicator taking negative values by the 1930s 
and from 1944 it permanently failed to satisfy the rule in equation [6.2-1]. This is a 
striking result for an economy historically portrayed as an exceptionally high saver. 16 
The Mexican indicator only turned negative only for a couple of years in the early 
1980s. 17 In theory, these results indicate that Venezuela has been living beyond its 
means to a greater extent and for a longer period than Mexico. 
According to the World Bank `persistently negative rates of genuine savings must 
lead, eventually, to declining well-being'. 18 The puzzling question regarding this 
prediction is: for how long can a country endure negative genuine savings before the 
eventual decline of well-being becomes apparent? If Mexican results were the 
measure, it could be argued that a couple of years with negative genuine savings are 
sufficient to observe a decline in well-being by the mid 1980s. In contrast, in 
Venezuela negative rates of genuine savings occurred continuously for over 40 years 
and yet, as we know from Chapter 1, declining well-being was only perceived from the 
1980s, and according to some authors, only from the 1990s onwards. By any standards 
the negative rents of Venezuela were persistent enough, yet the expected decline in 
well-being was greatly delayed. Hence, the predicted unsustainability of negative 
genuine savings comes into question. 
It was mentioned in Chapter 2 that several authors have theorised about the role of 
capital gains arising from (1) improved terms of trade and (2) technological change in 
modifying the Z>0 rule. 19 These will now be explored separately. 
16 In 1961 the IBRD reported 'Venezuela has devoted 30 percent of its GNP to gross investment, a proportion 
equaled or exceeded in only a few European countries notably west Germany and Norway', International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), The Economic Development of Venezuela (Baltimore, 1961). 
17 These results are on the line of those reported by Pearce and Atkinson for Mexico for the year 1985 (0 genuine 
savings) and by the World Bank for the period 1970-1993, which report affirmed that the effects on Latin America 
level of genuine savings remained very low, 'as strong savers like Brazil and Chile are offset by the genuine 
dissaving of Venezuela and Ecuador and the near-zero genuine savings of Mexico'. See Pearce and Atkinson, 
'Measuring Sustainable Development', in,, p. 173 and World Bank, Expanding the Measure of Wealth. Indicators of 
Environmentally Sustainable Development, p. 12. 
1e World Bank, Expanding the Measure of Wealth., p. 8. This report used the net price method for evaluating natural 
capital depreciation. 
19 G. B. Asheim, 'Hartwick's rule in open economics', Canadian Journal of Economics 86 (1986); G. B. Asheim, 
'Capital gains and net national product in open economies', Journal of Public Economics 59 (1996) 3; J. M. 
Hartwick, 'Sustainability and constant consumption paths in open economies with exhaustible resources', Review of 
International Economics 3 (1996) 3; R. M., Solow, 'Intergenerational Equity and Exhaustible Resources', Review of 
Economic Studies (1974). For additional references in Section 2.3. 
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The Effects of the Terms of Trade 
The national income literature has long noted the problem that traditional indicators 
`may not be a good indicator of national welfare in an open economy experiencing 
substantial change in its terms of trade. '20 This occurs because traditional measures of 
output and income fail to account for the impact of changing terms of trade on the 
consumption possibilities of the economy. In this literature there are many attempts to 
adjust for the terms of trade impact on the measurement of national income. 1 The 
general result from those attempts is that `when the terms of trade deteriorated, 
measures of economic growth tended to overstate gains in real income; when they 
improved, those measures understated such gains. '22 
In earlier chapters it was found that the net price method is inappropriate for adjusting 
the net income for the depletion of oil reserves in open economies precisely because it 
ignores the effects on welfare income of the expected improvement of the terms of 
trade of an oil exporter. Accordingly, the sustainability rule Z presented in the section 
above would differ for open and closed economies. From the analysis in Chapters 2 
and 5 we know that the imputed income adjustment proposed by Sefton and Weale is 
able to identify this difference between open and closed economies. 23 In this second 
exercise, the Z indicator is re-estimated using equation [6.2-2], but rather than 
adjusting the traditional income by the net price method, the net income is adjusted by 
the imputed income method that was calculated in Chapter 5. Figures 6.2-5 and 6.2-6 
illustrate the effects of the expected gains from trade in modifying the Z indicator. 
When net income is adjusted using the imputed income method, it appears that 
Venezuela and Mexico consumed within their means throughout the period analysed. 24 
According to the results the levels of consumption were not necessarily unsustainable 
ex-post given the expected continuous improvement on the terms of trade of a resource 
exporter. However, the caveats given in Chapter 5 should be taken into account. 
20 K. Hamada and K. Iwata, 'National Income, Terms of Trade and Economic Welfare', The Economic Journal 94 
ill 984) 376, pp. 752. 
A summary of the many attempts can be found in P. Gutman, 'The Measurement of Terms of Trade Effects', 
Review of Income and Wealth 27 (1981) December, pp. 433-453. The work of Gutman does not include the later 
attempt by K. Hamada and K. Iwata, 'National Income, Terms of Trade and Economic Welfare', The Economic 
Journal 94 (1984) 376. 
22 D. Irwin, 'Terms of Trade and Economic Growth in Nineteenth Century Britain', Bulletin of Economic Research 
43 (1991) 1, p. 100. 23 JA. Sefton and M. R. Weale, 'The net national product and exhaustible resources: The effects of foreign trade', 
Journal of Public Economics 61 (1996). The method was dissused in Chapters 2 and implemented in Chapter 5. 24 This fact has been already pointed out by E. Newmayer, 'Measuring Genuine Savings: Are Most Resource- 
extracting Countries Really Unsustainable?, in Munasinghe, Sunkel, et at. (eds. ), The Sustainability of Long-term 
Growth. Socioeconomic and Ecological Perspectives (Cheltenham, UK, 2001). Newmayer uses the user costs 
method to refute the conclusions based on the net price method of the report by World Bank, Expanding the 
Measure of Wealth. Indicators of Environmentally Sustainable Development. Environmentally sustainable 
Development studies and monographs series, Vol. 17 (Washington, D. C., 1997). 
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Figure 6.2-5: Genuine Savings Taking into Account the Expected Gains from Trade. 
Venezuela 1936-1985 (percentage over traditional GDP) 
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Sources: Gross and net savings as in Figure 6.2-1. Genuine savings correspond to the NNP as listed in Appendix D 
minus the imputed income adjustment in Table 5.4-1 for a rate of interest of 6 percent. 
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Sources: Gross and net savings as in Figure 6.2-2. Genuine savings correspond to the NNP as listed in 
Appendix D minus the imputed income adjustment in Table 5.4-2 for a rate of interest of 6 percent. 
Figure 6.2-6: Genuine Savings Taking into Account the Expected Gains from Trade. 
Mexico 1950-1985 (percentage over traditional GDP) 
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It was shown in Chapter 5 that the expected gains from trade arise from the application 
of Hotelling's rule in the theoretical models. But the analysis of the behaviour of the 
rents in Chapter 4 revealed that there is no historical evidence supporting Hotelling's 
principle (rents have not grown at the rate of interest). Consequently, the possibility of 
escape from negative savings in open economies through the improvement of the 
terms of trade is considerably reduced and needs further investigation. 
The obvious way to establish the role of the terms of trade is to observe their historical 
evolution. Figures 6.2-7 and 6.2-8 reveal the terms of trade for Venezuela and Mexico 
for the relevant periods. Contrary to what would be expected from the application of 
Hotelling's rule, the terms of trade do not improve continuously in either of the two 
countries. Venezuelan terms of trade improved markedly from 1942 to 1957 and 
during the 1970s, but from the end of the 1958 until 1972 remained constant and from 
the early 1980s declined notably. In the case of Mexico, before it re-started its oil 
exports, the terms of trade exhibit a modest upward trend; when oil regained a 
significant position in Mexican exports from 1974, the terms of trade improved briefly 
but started to decline from the 1980s and finally arrived at a constant level. The 
historical terms of trade do not satisfy the theoretical predications of the imputed 
income method. 
It is possible to argue that even if the rents had increased at the rates assumed by 
Hotelling's rule, the gains from the terms from trade may have not continuously 
increased. Some of the gains apparently associated with the improved terms from trade 
may be lost since oil is a basic input for producing the goods that the oil-exporter- 
country needs to import ZS Higher oil prices will influence the price of imports and the 
gains from the terms of trade will be reduced. The theoretical models do not consider 
this feedback effect. 
These results do not overrule the fact that the terms of trade have an effect in 
modifying the Z indicator. Although Mexico and Venezuela did not experience the 
continuous improvement in the terms of trade implicitly assumed by the imputed 
income method, both countries were at different points in time open economies 
experiencing substantial changes in their terms of trade. As a consequence, their 
welfare incomes (their consumption possibilities) will differ from the standard income 
measures and this will have an effect on whether they were living beyond their means. 
u '[... ] the resource is essential for production' in Sefton and Weale model too. LA. Sefton, and M. R. Weale, 'The 
net national product and exhaustible resources: The effects of foreign trade, Journal of Public Economics 61 
(1996), p. 36. 
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Figure 6.2-7: Venezuelan Terms of Trade, 1928-1989 (1968=100) 
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Sources: Terms of trade calculated as the ratio between exports and imports price indexes. 
Export price index was elaborated using the exports and prices series of oil from Appendixes A 
and B. It is worth recalling that oil exports represent the vast majority of Venezuelan exports 
(see Figure 1.1-2) for the dates shown. Imports price index from A. Baptista, Bases 
Cuantitativas de la Economia Venezolana, 1830-1995 (Caracas, 1997). 
Figure 6.2-8: Mexican Terms of Trade, 1960-1989 (1995=100) 
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Source : W. Easterly, and M. Sewadeh, Global Development Network Growth Database, 
(2002), Available on line from: http: //www. worldbank. org/research/growth/pdfiles/GDN/ 
macro_tim e_series_6_200 I. xls. 
Measuring the Illusion of Oil Wealth 230 
A re-estimation of the Z indicator is needed taking into account the effect on income of 
the actual changes in the terms of trade instead of the expected gains from the terms of 
trade. `Since the mid-1950 many authors have discussed the measurement of the effect 
of changes in the terms of trade on real income. '26 In 1960 Nicholson proposed an 
adjustment procedure for assessing the effected of changes in the terms of trade on 
national income and product 27 His adjustment formula for income gains/loss is given 
by: 28 
i 
E` - _i[6.2-3] M MI 
where E' are exports in the current year t and, PE and PM denote exports and imports 
deflator respectively, thus the ratio PE /PM corresponds to the terms of trade. 
Employing this equation, Tables 6.2-1 and 6.2-2 present evidence on how much the 
terms of trade fluctuations actually affect estimates of national income and contrast 
these results with the expected gains from the terms of trade assumed by the imputed 
income method. The results are shown as the percentage adjustment in income (NNP). 
Within each table, Panel a examines the relevant periods by decade averages, while 
Panel b divides the years into periods based on broad trends (such as peak-to-trough 
movements) in the terms of trade. This second Panel magnifies the possible effects of 
the terms of trade on measured income in the case of the actual effect figures. The first 
line of each table describes the importance of trade in the economy. It is evident from 
this line that the share of exports in Venezuela's income is much important than that of 
Mexico. This is relevant because the effects of the changes in the terms of trade on 
income are more important the higher the proportion of income that is derived from 
exports. 9 
By decades, the adjustment is most significant in the 1970s and the 1980s but with 
opposite signs. The figures for the terms of trade adjustment may be interpreted as 
follows: if the increase in the terms of trade from 1970 to 1979 is taken into account, 
26 K. Hamada and K. Iwata, 'National Income, Terms of Trade and Economic Welfare', The Economic Journal 94 
1 1984) 376, pp. 761. 
J. L. Nicholson, The Effects of International Trade on the Measurement of National Income', Economic Journal 
70 (1960) 279, pp. 608-612. His adjustment has the advantage of being specifically designed for the adjustment of 
net income (rather than production that other methods attempt to adjust) and it does not include quantity changes 
which facilitate the comparison with the expected gains. These reasons justify the choice of this method among the 
available in the literature. For a discussion of the alternatives see K. Hamada and K. Iwata, 'National Income, 
Terms of Trade and Economic Welfare, The Economic Journal 94 (1984) 376. 28 Nicholson's formula is taken from K. Hamada and K. Iwata, 'National Income, Terms of Trade and Economic 
Welfare', The Economic Journal 94 (1984) 376, p. 769. It ignores net property income from abroad. 29 The relationship between the share of exports on income and the effects of the terms of trade on income has been 
explored by J. Spraos, Inequalising Trade? A Study of Traditional North/South Specialisation in the Context of 
Terms of Trade Concepts (New York, 1983). 
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then the recorded national income in 1979 understates the level of Venezuela's income 
by about 7.2 percent. Similarly, the decline in the terms of trade of the 1980s means 
that the national income in 1989 overstates the level of Mexico's income by about I 
percent. 
Table 6.2-1: Terms of Trade Effects on Venezuela's National Income 
(all figures as percentage of NNP) 
Panel a 
1936-1939 1940-1949 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1985 
Share of exports 32.4% 28.0% 32.2% 29.7% 31.2% 27.4% 
Expected effect 13.5% 17.2% 18.3% 15.4% 23.3% 41.4% 
Actual effect 0.3% 1.1% 1.3% 0.0% 7.2% -2.5% 
Panel b 
1936-1942 1943-1957 1958-1972 1973-1981 1982-1985 1936-1985 
Share of exports 32.8% 29.4% 29.2% 32.6% 26.1% 30.1% 
Expected effect 15.2% 17.9% 14.9% 30.3% 43.7% 20.9% 
Actual effect 0.1% 2.0% -0.3% 9.9% -8.3% 1.7% 
Sources: The expected effect on income from expected improvements in the terms of trade 
corresponds to the second term (Vt(i/(l+i)) of Sefton and Weale's adjustment as calculated 
in Section 5.4. The actual effect on income from changes in terms of trade calculated using 
Nicholson's method defined in equation [6.2-3] with data on exports as in Appendix B and 
terms of trade as in Figure 6.2-3. The sources of the NNP are listed in Appendix D. 
Figures 6.2-2: Terms of Trade Effects on Mexico's National Income 
(all figures as percentage of NNP) 
Panel a 
1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1960-1989 
Share of exports 6% 5% 14% 8% 
Expected effect 0.1% 1.8% 26.9% 9.6% 
Actual effect 0.1% 0.1% -1.0% -0.3% 
Panel b 
1960-1973 1974-1981 1982-1986 1987-1989 
Share of exports 5% 6% 16% 15% 
Expected effect 0.0% 7.8% 34.6% 17.3% 
Actual effect 0.0% 0.6% -2.6% 0.6% 
Sources: The expected effect corresponds to the second term (Vt(i/(l+i)) of 
Sefton and Weale's adjustment as calculated in Section 5.4. The actual effect on 
income from changes in terms of trade calculated using Nicholson's method 
defined in equation [6.2-3] with data on exports as in Appendix B and terms of 
trade as in Figure 6.2-4. The sources of the NNP are listed in Appendix D. 
In looking at broad trends in the terms of trade (Panel b), the adjustment is also 
important (about 2 percent) for the period 1943-1957 for Venezuela, and the effects of 
the changes in the terms of trade of the oil boom and oil crisis are considerably 
magnified for both countries. These findings may lead economic historians to revise, 
at the margin, their interpretation of parts of the century. As a consequence of the 
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terms of trade improvements, it appears that income increased much more than 
suggested by conventional estimates of national income during the 1970s. Likewise, 
the 1980s saw stronger losses in income than national accounts data suggested because 
of the sharp deterioration of the terms of trade during the `lost decade'. 
All in all, the actual effect on income from the terms of trade is much smaller than the 
imputed income for each and every period. This is also true for the whole period: an 
actual gain of 1.7 percent contrasts with the expected gain of 20.9 percent for the 
period 1936-1985 for Venezuela, and for Mexico an expected gain of 9.6 per cent 
contrasts with an actual loss of -0.3 percent for the period 1960-1989. The terms of 
trade do not appear to have helped oil producers over the long run as much as some 
theoretical models predict. We can now re-calculate the Z indicator taking into account 
the effects on income from the actual changes in the terms of trade. Figures 6.2-9 and 
6.2-10 display the results. 
Contrary to the results obtained using the expected gains from trade, the additions to 
welfare income due to the historical changes in the terms of trade do not suffice to 
compensate for the depletion of oil reserves, resulting in the return of the paradox of 
negative genuine savings for over 30 years in the case of Venezuela and yet no 
observable decline in well-being. The Mexican indicator also improves slightly as a 
consequence of the effects of the terms of trade, but it still remains negative for the 
early 1980s. 
At least two caveats should be noted to this section. 30 First, the analysis presented here 
presumes that an increase in the relative price of exportables, an improvement in the 
terms of trade, is also an improvement from some welfare standpoint. Although 
Krueger and Sonnenchein established this presumption, simple connections between 
the terms of trade and national income or economic welfare cannot necessarily be 
drawn. 31 `A tariff that improves the terms of trade, for example, may no increase 
national income if it reduces the volume of trade excessively. ' 32 Second, the figures for 
NNP and savings are estimates and their precision should not be overstated. Thus, the 
figures presented here should be considered merely illustrative of the impacts of the 
terms of trade and depreciation of natural capital on national income. 
30 The caveats to this section are the similar to the ones noted by D. Irwin, Terms of Trade and Economic Growth 
in Nineteenth Century Britain', Bulletin of Economic Research 43 (1991) 1, p. 97. 31 A. O. Krueger, and Sonnenschein, H., 'The Terms of Trade, the Gains from Trade, and Price Divergence', 
International Economic Review, Vol. 8, February, pp. 121-127. 32 D. Irwin, Terms of Trade and Economic Growth in Nineteenth Century Britain', Bulletin of Economic Research 
43 (1991) 1, p. 97. 
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Figure 6.2-9: Genuine Savings Taking into Account the Actual Gains from Trade. 
Venezuela 1936-1985 (percentage over traditional GDP) 
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Sources: Gross and net savings as in Figure 6.2-1. Genuine savings correspond to the NNP as listed in Appendix D 
twice adjusted: firstly by the effects of the changes in the terms of trade calculated in Table 6.2-1 and secondly the 
corresponding natural capital depreciation was deducted, its value is N- N(aI S)as listed in Table 4.4-2. 
Figure 6.2-10: Genuine Savings Taking into Account the Actual Gains from Trade. 
Mexico 1950-1985 (percentage over traditional GDP) 
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Sources: Gross and net savings as in Figure 6.2-2. Genuine savings correspond to the NNP as listed in Appendix D 
twice adjusted: firstly by the effects of the changes in the terms of trade calculated in Table 6.2-2 and secondly the 
corresponding natural capital depreciation was deducted, its value is N- N(a6)as listed in Table 4.4-3. 
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This section has explored the first of two theoretical objections to the Z>O rule: the 
role of capital gains arising from improved terms of trade. It has been shown that 
although theoretically it can be expected that the gains from improved terms of trade 
more than compensate for the cost of depleting oil resources in guaranteeing the future 
consumption of an oil exporter country, the historical changes in the terms of trade do 
not corespond to the theoretical expectations. The historical evolution of the terms of 
trade do not suffice to explain why Mexico and in particular Venezuela have enjoyed 
non-declining consumption levels despite consuming most of the rents generated by oil 
extraction. The next section analyses the second theoretical objection to the 
sustainability indicator: the effects of technological change. 
The Effects of Technological Change 
The second route of escape from negative savings offered by the theoreticians is 
technological change. The existing literature does not define the working mechanism 
of this alternative. Nevertheless, it is possible to think of several ways by which 
technological change can help to sustain consumption. The more general argument 
relates to total factor productivity growth by which the whole of the economy becomes 
more efficient, but this argument lies beyond the ambition of this dissertation. An 
alternative that can be explored is to consider the very argument used in the case of the 
expected capital gains from trade: the resource exporter `can enjoy a level of positive 
consumption, because even though the country depletes its resource stock, the value of 
the remaining stock increased in value. '33 The only difference is that the value of the 
remaining stock increases not because Hotelling's rule applies, but as a consequence of 
the progress in technology that added reserves and allowed increasing oil extraction 
for a growing demand of exports at lower costs. 
The valuations of the stock calculated in Chapter 5 demonstrated that the remaining 
stock increased in value. It proved that current rents projected into the future, as in 
PV2, fall short in a world where rents increase both through growing extraction and 
improved technology. PV1 included both future discoveries and technological change, 
providing the upper limit on the value of the remaining stock as long as the pace of 
extraction keeps increasing over time. PV3 included technological change (new uses 
for the resource, reduced costs, etc. ) but not future additions to the stock since it kept 
33 J. A. Sefton, and M. R. Weale, 'The net national product and exhaustible resources: The effects of foreign trade', 
Journal of Public Economics 61 (1996), pp. 41-42. 
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extraction constant and limited to the reserves available in the current year. New 
discoveries indirectly affect the value of PV3 since it can be argued that part of the 
reduction of the costs of production is due to the economies of scale allowed by greater 
oil fields. Furthermore, the life expectancy of the resource depends on the level of the 
current year reserves, which includes last year's stock plus this year's new discoveries 
net of extraction. However, future additions to the stock are not allowed in PV3 as they 
are in PVI. In a scenario where rents per unit and extraction (and demand for exports) 
decreased over time, the bias would work differently: PV2 would overstate the value 
of the resource compared to the other two implementations and PV3 would provide the 
upper limit to the value of the resource. 
If undertaking environmental accounting is for better policy management then 
predictive power is essential. The misfit between the different values associated with 
the stock is significant to both the environmental adjustment and also to the 
policymaker. Chapter 3 shows that erroneous forecasts, the confidence in continuing 
high oil prices, was blamed for the events of the `lost decade'. The results of the 
previous and this chapter show how the assumptions underlying the various methods 
of environmental accounting can result in very differing policy advice. 
The question is which one of the alternative values calculated is most appropriate to 
use for generating an alternative adjustment to income. Chapter 5 showed that using 
PV2 to generate the adjustment is equivalent to applying the user cost method and that 
this adjustment is about the same as the one produced by the imputed income method 
in the case of open economies, such as Venezuela, that export almost all of its 
resource. In addition, in Chapter 5 it was also found that the user costs (thus PV2) 
should not be used for Mexico for it only applies to open economies. These reasons 
should suffice to show why PV2 should not be used for generating the income 
adjustment. For PVl, it was argued in Section 5.1, there are serious objections to the 
attempt to include additional stock in the adjustments carried by environmental 
accountants. There is general agreement that including future additions to the stock of 
natural resources would make environmental accounts less useful for policy-making 
than traditional macro-economic indicators. Therefore if we want to take into account 
technological change, in the form of reduced costs but excluding future discoveries, 
then PV3 is most appropriate to calculate the value of the resource, the capital gains 
associated with its extraction and the adjustment to income. 
Spraos establishes the relationship between the terms of trade and the costs of 
extraction in order to achieve welfare neutrality for a resource-owing country. He 
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affirms that `with positive but constant marginal cost of extraction, the rate of terms of 
trade improvement needed to compensate for resource depletion will be slower the 
higher the initial share of marginal costs in price. If marginal cost of extraction rises, 
the needed rate of improvement of the terms of trade is faster the steeper the rise in the 
marginal cost because otherwise the royalty [rent] component will be eroded. 934 By 
implication if the cost of extraction decreases, the necessary rate of improvement in 
the terms of trade is slower the steeper the decrease in the marginal cost. Decreasing 
marginal costs of extraction are rarely considered in theoretical models for 
technological change is generally left out. From the previous section we know that the 
rate of improvement in the terms of trade in Mexico and Venezuela is slow and fails to 
compensate for the depletion of the resource. Was this compensated by a fall in the 
marginal costs of extraction? As explained in Chapter 4, marginal costs of extraction 
are not available to the researcher. Only average costs of extraction are available and 
even these are compiled with difficulty. Nevertheless, Table 4.4-2 provided evidence 
on the increasing share of the rent in the price of oil. The implication, given the 
relatively stable price of oil for most of the twentieth century, is that the cost of 
extraction declined systematically relative to the price of oil. This suggests that 
reduced costs (technological change loosely) may play an important role in modifying 
the standard sustainability indicator. 
One point remains to be made. In Chapter 2 it was indicated that only in open 
economies does the possibility of capital gains apply. If that is the case, and following 
the suggestion of Sefton and Weale in this context too, capital gains associated with 
technological change must only apply to that part of the resource that was exported but 
not to the amounts used in domestic consumption. 5 The results provided in Tables 
6.2-3 and 6.2-3 (column (3a)) consider this distinction and calculate the value of the 
resource as a function of the quantities exported rather than extracted. The final result 
is that when the effects of technological change are accounted for, the levels of 
consumption are not unsustainable ex-post. For illustrative purposes only, the results 
of considering both reduced costs and future discoveries are also displayed (column 
34 J. Spraos, Inequalising Trade? A Study of Traditional North/South Specialisation in the Context of Terms of 
Trade Concepts (New York, 1983), p. 80, footnote 6. Square brackets added. 
35 The fact that the resource is not exported does not necessarily imply a fully closed economy. Trade in other 
sectors may occur, as in the USA case. Then, it is possible to argue that it is the whole of the stock that should be 
taken into account. Sefton and Weale specify that the price the resources dedicated to internal consumption is 
identical to the price of the resource dedicated to exports. Thus domestic sales and export prices (and rents) increase 
exactly at the same rate. lt is expected that if trade occurs in other sectors the owner of the resource would be able 
to spend the rents received from internal sales in buying imports and investing abroad. It follows that domestic sales 
of the resource contribute to welfare income (expected future consumption) not only through domestic production 
of goods but also generating rents that could be used similarly as the rent generated by the exports of the resource. 
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(3b)). It can be seen how distorted a view is obtained if future additions to stock were 
allowed to enter the calculation, particularly in the Mexican case. 
These final calculations do not cover the period beyond 1972, because the life 
expectancy of the resource goes beyond the present day and data is required for 
stabilising the value of the resource. Yet it can be envisaged that some of the key 
factors that saved Venezuela previously from declining consumption were not present 
in the 1980s. These include the lower than expected prices, lower production, slower 
growth in demand for oil, and perhaps a slower pace of technological change than 
earlier in the century. The interesting events of 1980s and 1990s cannot yet be 
quantified. 
The results of Tables 6.2-3 and 6.2-4 confirm the hypothesis put forward in the 
introductory chapter: environmentally adjusted income of Venezuela diverge further 
from traditional income estimates than those of Mexico. As expected, income does 
indeed differ when natural resources are included in national accounts. But traditional 
income estimates do not always exaggerate income as standard environmental 
accounting predicts. The adjustments in these tables show that adjusted income can 
result in greater or smaller incomes than those traditionally estimated once the effects 
of the terms of trade and of technological change are also considered. This should not 
discourage environmental accountants for it implies that the misfit between traditional 
and environmentally adjusted income is even greater than simple theoretical models 
predicted. Traditional measures of income can no longer be considered either a reliable 
indicator of sustainable income or the future consumption possibilities of the economy. 
Paradoxically, the levels of consumption were not necessarily unsustainable ex-post 
given the existence of capital gains from trade and particularly from technological 
change. Lower costs of extraction, allowed by technological change, enabled oil 
producers to consume the rents without jeopardising future consumption. The terms of 
trade also influenced income, but much less than expected, being even negative in 
some instances. The results show that the role of technological change in sustaining 
the historical levels of consumption is substantial since the terms of trade did not 
improve in the continuous way needed to rescue the two economies from declining 
levels of consumption. This is an important finding because while gains from trade 
have now been included in some environmental accounting models (for instance, 
Sefton and Weale), technological change is left out. 
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Table 6.2-3: Living beyond its means? Summary of Venezuelan results 1936-1985 
Genuine Savings Standard Index Terms of Trade Effects Technological Change Effects 
Expected Actual Tech Change Tech Change and (on ly) Discove ries 
Year (1) Gross Net (1) (2a) (2a) (2b) (2b) (3a) (3a) (3b) (3b) 
NNDadj savings savings z NNDadj Z NNDadj Z NNDadj Z NNDadj z 
%ufNNP&W %dGDPTnd %a(GDPThI %ufGDPMd %orNNM1nd %e(GDPMd %ufNNRM %ofGDPUW %dNNPbad %ufGDPAtd %ufNNPoW %o(OD14d 
1936 83.3 14.7 10.5 -5.0 101.7 11.9 83.4 -3.9 95.8 6.7 115.4 23.9 
1937 85.7 10.1 6.7 -6.0 101.5 8.0 86.7 -5.0 98.3 5.1 115.6 20.3 
1938 89.9 13.6 10.0 1.0 101.1 11.0 90.2 1.2 102.3 12.0 121.9 29.6 
1939 92.2 11.0 7.5 1.0 100.9 8.3 92.1 0.4 106.0 12.8 127.8 32.4 
1940 91.2 10.6 6.7 -1.0 105.3 11.5 91.7 -0.8 108.3 15.3 152.4 54.0 
1941 84.7 11.8 6.8 -7.0 106.3 12.1 85.9 -5.1 106.0 13.4 144.3 44.1 
1942 93.0 12.7 7.5 1.0 109.7 16.2 90.9 -0.7 125.7 40.2 278.5 167.6 
1943 90.5 16.8 11.5 3.0 110.2 20.8 91.0 3.3 119.2 35.1 227.8 127.9 
1944 86.7 10.4 5.6 -7.0 105.9 10.7 88.4 -4.5 109.5 13.6 156.7 55.1 
1945 87.8 11.7 7.5 -4.0 102.6 9.8 88.8 -2.6 107.3 13.8 133.7 37.7 
1946 86.4 16.3 11.6 0.0 100.5 12.1 87.7 0.8 104.0 14.9 119.6 28.9 
1947 83.7 12.6 8.3 -6.0 98.9 7.4 85.7 -4.1 97.6 6.0 107.2 14.6 
1948 76.6 12.8 8.5 -13.0 96.8 5.8 82.1 -6.7 89.7 -0.5 96.7 5.7 
1949 82.1 17.9 13.7 -3.0 98.9 12.7 81.8 -2.6 94.7 8.6 104.2 17.4 
1950 78.7 21.6 16.4 -2.0 97.3 14.0 79.3 -1.7 92.2 9.2 99.8 16.3 
1951 78.5 20.5 15.1 -4.0 95.6 11.4 77.5 -4.4 92.4 8.1 98.3 13.7 
1952 77.7 21.9 16.5 . 3.0 94.7 11.9 80.5 -0.5 90.7 8.0 95.8 12.8 
1953 79.1 19.7 14.7 -4.0 97.0 12.0 80.2 -2.8 92.2 7.3 99.3 14.0 
1954 79.5 19.5 14.4 -4.0 97.0 11.8 81.1 -2.3 92.3 7.1 98.8 13.4 
1955 77.7 19.9 14.5 -5.0 96.7 11.6 81.0 -2.2 91.1 6.1 96.3 11.2 
1956 76.1 20.3 14.3 -7.0 96.0 10.9 79.4 -3.3 90.5 5.6 94.3 9.5 
1957 74.2 19.6 13.6 -9.0 95.5 9.8 81.4 -2.1 88.5 3.2 90.6 5.7 
1958 79.6 22.4 16.6 -2.0 98.9 15.6 75.5 -5.1 97.1 13.3 101.1 17.6 
1959 82.7 20.6 15.0 -1.0 98.4 13.5 81.3 -1.9 99.9 14.1 102.8 17.5 
1960 83.7 19.1 13.0 -1.0 98.4 11.6 83.3 -1.7 104.9 16.5 106.8 19.1 
1961 82.1 15.9 9.4 -7.0 97.5 7.1 82.5 -5.8 104.7 12.6 106.2 14.8 
1962 80.1 15.6 8.3 -10.0 95.5 4.5 81.9 -7.2 104.5 11.2 104.0 11.7 
1963 81.2 16.4 8.7 -8.0 95.7 5.0 80.8 -7.7 109.8 15.8 107.5 15.1 
1964 73.8 21.3 12.3 -11.0 93.4 6.7 75.6 -8.3 101.1 12.1 97.7 10.4 
1965 75.8 19.2 10.1 -11.0 93.5 4.6 74.7 -11.1 107.1 14.7 101.4 11.2 
1966 77.3 19.1 9.7 -10.0 94.0 4.6 75.6 -10.8 111.6 17.9 105.0 13.9 
1967 77.9 20.5 11.0 -8.0 92.5 4.7 79.2 -6.6 112.1 19.7 104.0 14.3 
1968 78.6 18.4 9.0 -10.0 92.2 2.5 78.8 -8.9 111.9 17.6 103.2 11.7 
1969 80.5 19.9 10.5 -7.0 92.4 4.0 78.8 -7.7 119.2 25.1 108.3 17.6 
1970 81.5 19.6 10.5 -6.0 91.6 3.2 81.3 -5.7 118.7 25.0 107.1 16.7 
1971 78.8 20.8 11.6 -7.0 90.9 3.8 82.3 -3.5 120.9 27.4 107.9 18.4 
1972 81.4 22.5 13.8 -3.0 92.9 7.5 79.3 -4.5 131.0 38.1 116.7 28.6 
1973 75.3 25.6 17.0 -5.0 94.8 12.4 85.1 3.8 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 
1974 58.6 39.7 32.7 -5.0 95.2 28.3 132.4 62.3 n. a. 11. a. n. a. n. a. 
1975 69.4 30.7 24.1 -4.0 102.7 26.6 46.1 -26.1 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 
1976 73.4 27.3 20.9 -4.0 102.3 23.0 70.4 -6.7 n. a. n. e. n. e. n. a. 
1977 74.7 24.3 18.0 -6.0 102.3 20.1 73.7 -6.6 n. a. n. a. n. e. n. e. 
1978 78.9 21.7 14.8 -5.0 102.5 17.1 72.1 . 11.0 n. a. n. a. n. e. n. a. 
1979 71.1 29.2 22.6 -4.0 101.1 23.6 92.4 15.5 n. e. n. e. n. a. n. e. 
1980 68.1 30.3 23.7 -6.0 105.0 28.3 82.3 7.2 n. a. n. e. n. a. n. e. 
1981 69.2 27.6 20.6 -8.0 106.0 26.1 73.3 -4.1 n. a. n. e. n. e. n. a. 
1982 75.6 16.9 8.8 -13.0 114.1 21.5 63.1 -24.3 11. e. n. a. n. a. n. e. 
1983 78.6 25.0 15.0 -4.0 115.7 28.0 69.1 -12.5 n. e. 11. e. n. a. n. e. 
1984 72.6 24.0 13.0 -11.0 125.0 34.5 72.0 -11.6 n. e. n. e. n. e. n. a. 
1985 77.9 23.0 11.0 -8.0 124.6 32.1 67.2 . 17.1 n. a. n. e. n. e. n. e. 
Sources and notes: traditional indicators a s in Aonendix D. Insufficient data for the calculation marked n. e. 
(1) NNP, 4= NNP,. d- N, (net price adjustment) as in Table 4.4-2. 
(2a) NNP, d; = NNPý. d- (Nt+(i/i+1)VJ for V, = uQE imputed income adjustment as in Table 5.4-1. 
(2b) NNP, 4= NNP, a- (N, + TOT) for TOT corresponds to the adjustment for the terms of trade in Table 6.2-1. 
(3a) NNP., ý= NNP w- (N, +(i/i+l)V) for V, =PV3 only applied to the resource exported as in Figure 5.4-1. 
(3a) NNPdj= NNPuýd- (N, +(i/i+l)VJ for V, =PV1 only applied to the resource exported as in Figure 5.4-1. 
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Table 6.2-4: Living beyond its means? Summary of Mexican results 1950-1985 
Genuine Savings Standard Index Terms of Trade Effects Technological Change Effects 
Expected Actual Tech Change Tech Change and (1) Gross Net (1) (only) Discoveries 
Year NNDadj savings savings z (2a) (2a) (2b) (2b) (3a) (3a) (3b) (3b) 
NNDadj Z NNDadj Z NNDadj Z NNDadj z 
%ofNNPti. d %o(GDPUd %ofGDPt. d %ofGDPti. d %ofNNPtnd %ofGDP&d %ofNNMnd %ofODPTW %ofNNPUW %dODPa %ofNNPo 4 %ofODAnd 
1950 98.0 20.3 7.1 5.5 98.3 5.7 n. a n. a 98.2 5.6 98.1 5.5 
1951 98.2 18.4 5.4 3.9 98.4 4.0 n. a n. a 98.3 3.9 98.3 3.9 
1952 98.2 20.6 7.4 5.9 98.6 6.2 n. a n. a 98.4 6.0 98.3 5.9 
1953 98.8 18.6 5.3 4.3 98.8 4.3 n. a n. a 98.9 4.3 99.2 4.6 
1954 98.5 20.4 7.6 6.4 98.6 6.4 n. a n. a 98.7 6.4 100.1 7.7 
1955 98.7 21.4 8.8 7.8 98.8 7.8 n. a n. a 98.9 7.8 100.1 8.9 
1956 98.8 21.5 8.7 7.8 98.9 7.8 n. a n. a 99.1 7.9 104.8 12.9 
1957 98.6 19.8 7.0 5.9 98.7 5.9 n. a n. a 99.1 6.2 168.0 66.3 
1958 98.9 19.0 6.3 5.5 98.9 5.4 n. a n. a 99.0 5.4 210.4 102.7 
1959 99.2 19.7 6.9 6.3 99.2 6.2 n. a n. a 99.2 6.2 209.6 102.5 
1960 99.5 21.2 6.9 6.6 99.5 6.5 99.5 6.5 100.4 7.3 468.9 328.2 
1961 99.1 17.5 4.5 3.9 99.2 3.8 99.2 3.8 104.7 8.2 467.6 295.3 
1962 99.0 17.4 5.1 4.4 99.1 4.4 98.9 4.2 104.8 8.8 458.8 281.9 
1963 99.1 17.6 4.4 3.7 99.2 3.7 98.7 3.3 107.0 10.2 554.4 384.1 
1964 99.3 15.7 3.6 3.1 99.3 3.1 99.3 3.0 104.7 7.4 418.5 267.2 
1965 99.4 15.5 3.3 2.9 99.4 2.9 99.4 2.8 104.3 6.8 412.5 259.9 
1966 99.5 16.9 4.8 4.5 99.6 4.5 99.5 4.4 108.9 12.2 482.2 321.5 
1967 99.6 18.7 6.6 6.4 99.6 6.3 99.5 6.1 105.6 11.3 382.8 243.9 
1968 99.7 18.7 6.5 6.3 99.7 6.2 99.6 6.2 107.8 13.0 449.8 300.4 
1969 99.7 26.0 13.2 13.0 99.7 12.9 99.8 13.0 107.0 19.5 413.2 295.0 
1970 99.7 25.8 14.4 14.2 99.8 14.1 99.6 14.0 108.0 21.8 321.2 221.2 
1971 99.6 27.5 12.8 12.5 99.6 12.4 99.6 12.4 104.6 17.0 374.5 269.8 
1972 99.6 27.4 13.1 12.8 99.6 12.7 99.7 12.8 102.6 15.5 352.6 249.4 
1973 99.3 27.0 13.9 13.3 99.3 13.2 99.3 13.2 n. a n. a n. a n. a 
1974 97.1 25.7 14.3 11.7 97.2 11.7 96.8 11.3 n. a n. a n. a n. a 
1975 96.9 24.3 14.1 11.3 97.2 11.5 96.9 11.2 n. a n. a n. a n. a 
1976 96.0 22.4 13.4 9.9 96.7 10.4 95.8 9.5 n. a n. a n. a n. a 
1977 94.1 22.3 15.1 9.8 95.7 11.0 94.7 10.2 n. a n. a n. a n. a 
1978 94.3 23.5 15.8 10.8 100.6 16.4 94.1 10.4 n. a n. a n. a n. a 
1979 92.5 23.6 15.9 9.3 101.9 17.7 91.7 8.3 n. a n. a n. a n. a 
1980 86.8 26.5 14.2 2.4 106.9 19.7 83.5 -1.8 n. a n. a n. a n. a 
1981 86.2 29.6 13.4 1.1 110.0 21.9 85.7 -0.3 n. a n. a n. a n. a 
1982 77.3 36.3 13.1 -6.5 116.1 27.3 79.0 -5.3 n. a n. a n. a n. a 
1983 69.9 32.6 13.1 -12.7 126.8 36.0 77.8 -5.9 n. a n. a n. a n. a 
1984 90.5 29.9 11.3 3.3 108.2 18.4 90.5 3.2 n. a n. a n. a n. a 
1985 79.8 34.4 11.4 -5.7 116.4 25.1 80.4 -5.4 n. a n. a n. a n. a 
Sources and notes: traditional indicators as in Anoendix D. Insufficient data f or the calculation marked n. a. 
(2) NNP,, b= NNPd- N, , net price adjustment as in Table 4.4-3. (2a) NNP. 4= NNPw- (N, +(i/i+l)Vj for V, = uQE, imputed income adjustment as in Table 5.4-2. 
(2b) NNP l= NNP, - (N, + TOT) for TOT corresponds to the adjustment for the terms of trade in Table 6.2-2. 
(3a) NNP, 4= NNPtrw- (N, +(i/i+l)V, ) for V, =PV3 only applied to the resource exported as in Figure 5.4-2. 
(3a) NNP,, b= NNP, w- (N, +(i/i+l)V, ) for V, =PVl only applied to the resource exported as in Figure 5.4-2. 
As in the previous exercises, the analyst should bear in mind that savings are for the 
most part a residual value calculated from the macro economic data analysed in 
Appendix D, that data refers to average and not marginal costs and that traditional 
macro indicators are also estimates. Nevertheless, the overall message of the section 
seems robust enough even when the figures provided are not as precise as desired. 
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6.3 Measuring the Illusion of Oil Wealth 
This chapter has implications that qualify some of the claims of the historiography 
reviewed in Chapter 3. In the case of Venezuela, it has been argued that `due to the 
nature of oil revenues an increasing gap opened between the real production capacity 
and its earning and expenditure possibilities'. 36 Also it has been stated that `after 
decades of consuming more than they produced, to restore balance, Venezuelans' real 
incomes and consumption would have to decline'. 37 The results of the previous section 
can be used to contrast these assertions with the quantitative evidence. 
The standard genuine savings indicator may not provide the rule for determining 
whether a country is on or off a sustainable development path at any one point in time 
but it does offer a tangible indicator for evaluating these claims. The negative genuine 
savings obtained for Venezuela in the first exercise (column (1)Z in Table 6.2-3) 
indicate that consumption was above the income generated from all productive 
activities, including the contribution of the oil sector (payments to production factors) 
but excluding the resource rents. Hence it can be said that Venezuelans were 
consuming more than they produced, that is there was a gap between the real 
production capacity and the expenditure of the economy. The gap however was not a 
constantly increasing one. It increased markedly during the 1960s according to these 
results, but it shrank during the 1970s to widen again in the early 1980s. Moreover, 
the results presented here do not support the second claim: consumption does not have 
to decline in the future as a consequence of this gap. The existence of capital gains 
provided an escape route as discussed above. 
The views of the scholars evaluating the `sowing oil' policies can also be re-examined 
in the light of this chapter. These scholars maintained that so long as oil tax revenues 
exceeded public capital investment, it was possible to talk of national impoverishment, 
given that the economy was failing to undertake investment equivalent to the fiscal 
resources received from the exploitation. 38 Thanks to the calculations made in the 
dissertation it can be established that they were inaccurate on at least two grounds. On 
the one hand, Chapter 4 showed that oil fiscal revenues are not a good measure of the 
rents generated by the oil sector since the government was only able to appropriate 
part of those rents. Therefore, their use would underestimate national impoverishment; 
36 A. Uslar Pietri, 'Los males del petroleo', El Nacional (1985) 28th April. The increasing disparity between 
consumption and production in a country such as Venezuela is also referred by B. Mommer and A. Baptista, 'El 
Petrbleo En Las Cuentas Nationales: Una ProposicGn', Working Paper IESA 10 (1983), p. 3. 37 M. Naim and A. Pinango (eds. ), El caso Venezuela: una ilusidn de ar, nonia (Caracas, 1974). 38 Hector Malave Mata in his remarks during the second session of the conference, in Carrillo Batalla, 'La 
distribuci6n del ingreso fiscal petrolero entre gastos corrientes y gastos de inversion', p. 9. 
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even if all tax revenues were reinvested, part of the rents generated would escape 
unseen by these observers. On the other hand, their view, as with standard 
environmental accounting, neglects the role of capital gains on rescuing the country 
even if reinvestment is not carried out to replace the depleted resource. 
Turning now to the Mexican side, Chapter 3 showed that the belief of the Mexican 
government in the early part of the twentieth century was that even if Mexico had 
continued to exploit the oil fields at a rapid pace and had exported the resource, this 
would not have contributed to higher income levels. Assertions such as `our effort 
should lead towards consuming in the country all the oil we produce; wasting not a 
single drop; we can be certain that when we have achieved this ideal, Mexico will be 
prosperous, important and respected' made this point very clearly. 39 
Mexican officials did not consider that by renouncing exports of the resource they 
were also giving up the opportunity of obtaining capital gains that would have 
increased their income. The dissipation of rents observed in Chapter 4 in the Mexican 
case acquires further importance in this context precisely because, as a closed 
economy for most of the century, replacing the depleted asset by means of 
reinvestment is more crucial for guaranteeing future consumption because capital 
gains cannot make up for the depletion of the resource. The Mexican strategy was 
costly not only in terms of efficiency, as suggested in Chapter 4, but also more 
hazardous in terms of sustainability than would have been thought a priori. 
Nevertheless, Mexico never lived beyond its means, for the amounts extracted were 
too small to put at risk the net capital accumulation of the economy. In the 1970s, 
Mexico's policy changed at the point when it would have become even more relatively 
expensive to remain a closed economy. Oil continued as a core development resource 
for the Mexican government, but now it not only supplied economical abundant energy 
but also, for the first time since the nationalisation, was an earner of export revenues. 
The undertaking of environmental accounting over the long run has yielded the 
reassessment of some of the claims of the historiography. Nevertheless, many pressing 
aspects of being an oil producer, which are relevant on the political economy side, 
remain unanswered. Notably the problem that most worried Uslar Pietri of how to 
transform the transitory income from oil into permanent wealth for the nation remains 
unsolved. Even when the results presented demonstrate oil producers could evade 
declining consumption by means of capital gains, the aim of producing different 
products in order to be less dependent on foreign commodities and to be able to pay 
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with things other than oil still remains on the agenda. Policy makers still have to 
decide whether to consume all, part or none of the rents generated in the current year 
and more importantly how to invest the rest for ensuring the survival of the economy. 
As El Serafy pointed out, even if all the rents were indeed reinvested it may have been 
wiser to delay extraction if the market interest rate available for financial investment 
turned out to be lower than the rate at which the resource would appreciate if left in the 
ground 40 Nevertheless, policymakers can now take into account that both the need for 
reinvestment, and the risks of not undertaking it, are associated with whether the 
country is making a productive use of the resource in a closed economy or exporting 
most of the resource and expecting capital gains to come to the rescue. Since the 
strategies of Mexico and Venezuela with respect to oil exploitation were based on 
these different ways of conceiving the contribution that oil could make to their 
economies these aspects of their political economies can also benefit from this 
research. 
6.4 Conclusions 
This chapter demonstrates that even when most natural resources have not grown 
scarcer historically, it is still important to account for them in the national accounts. 
This chapter carried forward environmental adjustments to traditional measures of 
economic performance, namely GDP and NNP. It found that the adjustments to GDP 
provide interesting qualifications to the economic performance of Mexico and 
Venezuela over the twentieth century, although the environmentally adjusted GDP 
does not do any better than the traditionally computed GDP identifying whether the 
economy is in a path towards prosperity or extinction, whether it is sustainable or not. 
For this purpose the analysis of net measures is needed. 
The findings of the chapter qualify the hypothesis set out in the introduction of the 
thesis substantially. As expected income does indeed differ when natural resources are 
included in national accounts. But traditional income estimates do not always 
exaggerate income as standard environmental accounting predicts. It has been found 
that adjusted income can result in greater or smaller incomes than those traditionally 
estimated. This should not discourage environmental accountants for it implies that the 
39 J. D. Bäez, 'Influencia de la guerra en el petrbleo mexicano', Revista de industria 5 (1939 November) 35. 40 S. El Serafy, 'The Proper Calculation Of Income From Depletable Natural Resources', in Ahmad, Scrafy and Lutz 
(eds. ), Environmental Accounting For Sustainable Development: a UNEP- World Bank Symposium (Washington 
D. C., 1989), p. 16. 
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mismatch between traditional and environmentally adjusted income is even greater 
than the theoretical models predicted. Traditional measures of income can no longer be 
considered either as a reliable indicator of sustainable income or taken as guidance of 
the future consumption possibilities of the economy. 
Paradoxically, the levels of consumption encouraged by traditional accounting were 
not necessarily unsustainable ex-post given the existence of capital gains from trade 
and technological change. It is through improved terms of trade and through increasing 
production and lowering costs of extraction, allowed by technological change, that oil 
producers managed to consume the rents without jeopardising future consumption. 
Furthermore, the results of the chapter show that the role of technological change in 
sustaining the historical levels of consumption is substantial since the terms of trade 
did not improve in the continuous way needed to rescue the two economies from 
declining levels of consumption. This is an important finding because while gains from 
trade have now been included in some environmental accounting models, 
technological change is left out. 
These results also have implications for the analysis of the contrasting strategies of 
Mexico and Venezuela. It would appear that Venezuela's pure-resource-exporter 
policy was more of a worry for environmental accountants, than Mexico's 
conservationist approach. Nevertheless, the fact that Mexico opted for a closed 
economy implies that there was a greater need to set aside the rents to replace the 
depleted asset than if it had remained an open economy. Only in an open economy 
does the possibility of capital gains on the depleting asset stock become relevant. In 
the 1970s, Mexican policy changed at the point when it would have become relatively 
even more expensive to remain as a closed economy. 
This should not however be taken as an endorsement of Venezuelan policies or of 
those recommending that little or none of the rent should be reinvested for 
guaranteeing future consumption possibilities. The resource exporter can consume 
today more not only on account of the expected gains from the terms of trade as 
shown, but also because more of the resource will be available tomorrow at lower 
costs thanks to technological change. But technological change is double edged. 
Technological change can give costs advantages to the competitor producer countries 
or in the extreme case it can eliminate the economic value of the reserves, etc. making 
obsolete the whole of the natural capital stock. Then not even reinvesting the whole of 
the current rent may guarantee the maintenance of the current level of consumption. 
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Conclusions 
Thanks to the literature on environmental accounting, recognition is growing that national 
income has never been accurately calculated for economies based on natural resource 
exploitation. Traditional national accounting practice ignores the loss of natural resources. 
According to standard environmental accounting, this produces exaggerated income, 
encourages unsustainable levels of consumption and is misleading about the economic 
prospects of resource extracting countries. Substantial progress has been made during the 
1990s in resolving theoretical issues involved in environmental accounting, although there is 
considerable disagreement on the empirical side about the most appropriate methods for 
making specific adjustments. 
Divorced from the concepts and methods proposed by the environmental accounting literature, 
the historiography of oil-producing countries contains plenty of arguments that resemble those 
of the environmental accountants. One of the contributions of the thesis is to show how 
Mexican and Venezuelan scholars have discussed the concept of national wealth, the 
ephemeral prosperity delivered by oil depletion and the biases that oil cash introduced in the 
perceptions of their countries' economic performance. Nonetheless the quantification of this 
arguments in the historiography was for the most part missing. This thesis fills that gap. 
The dissertation has connected these previously disparate literatures and has explored the 
resulting synergies. A priori it seemed that environmental accounting provided the tools for 
quantifying the hitherto qualitative observations of the historiography of two countries with 
very different strategies regarding the depletion of their natural resources. In the end, history 
has proved to be an excellent laboratory for an ex-post analysis of the concepts, models and 
methods of environmental accounting. Overall, the thesis is an examination of the tractability 
and usefulness of environmental accounting as a tool of economic analysis over the long run. 
This study contributes to the somewhat surprisingly small amount of comparative historical 
studies of either the oil industries or the economic histories of Venezuela and Mexico. At the 
outset, it outlines the historical evolution of the Mexican and Venezuelan economies and their 
respective oil industries during the twentieth century. The research also reviews the role oil 
played within each economy and the main themes of the countries' historiography. It 
establishes that the histories of Mexico and Venezuela are not only linked by their common 
institutional heritage, but also for the first quarter of the century Venezuela was the recipient 
of Mexican oil policies, whereas for the second half of the century, Venezuelan conduct 
affected the Mexican situation. The two countries never lost sight of each other's policies: 
Mexican nationalists took pride in their independence compared with the foreign exploitation 
of Venezuela's national wealth; Venezuelan nationalists were envious of the Mexican ability 
to exploit their own resources. From the comparative perspective the bonds became at least as 
apparent as the contrasts between the two countries. It also became clear that Venezuela's 
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exploitation policy resembles closely the text-book case of a pure-resource-exporting economy 
that worries environmental accountants, to whom Mexico's conservationist approach (at least 
during the period 1938-1976) would prima facie, be more sensible. 
As mentioned, there is no established best practice in environmental accounting but an array of 
seemingly competing approaches. It necessitated setting out the state of the art in order to 
understand the alternative concepts, methods and objectives of environmental accounting. 
From the survey of the literature, there are at least three ways of approaching the integration of 
natural resources into macro-economic indicators: (1) direct inclusion into the System of 
National Accounts (SNA), (2) the development of separate Satellite Environmental Accounts 
(SEA), (3) and the more sophisticated attempt of the System of Integrated Environmental and 
Economic Accounting (SEEA). After exploring each of these and presenting what has been 
empirically done within each approach, it was possible to establish that the only approaches 
that are simultaneously useful and tractable were the direct adjustment of the traditional SNA 
and the partial completion of the entries corresponding to oil depletion in the SEEA. 
A brief description of the SNA and of the reasons why it should be adjusted for the depletion 
of natural resources was the next step. The GDP is not very effective at identifying whether a 
nation is either building up its capital or living off its capital. The net measures of national 
income (NDP and NNP) make an allowance for the part of the capital base that is used up in 
generating the output in the current period and that should be replaced. Notwithstanding 
several caveats, net income at market prices is, in practice, the best approximation to the level 
of income that can be considered sustainable (that is Hicksian definition of income). 
Furthermore, net income provides information about a country's long-run consumption 
possibilities (that is Weitzman's welfare income). Main stream environmental accounting 
assimilates the depletion of natural resources to the depreciation of man-made capital. 
Therefore, since traditional national accounting does not make an allowance for natural capital 
depreciation, the traditional measures of income can no longer be considered either an 
indicator of sustainable income or taken as guidance as to the future consumption possibilities 
of the economy. Conventional national income estimates need to be adjusted for the use of 
natural resources; such is the aim of environmental accounting. The adjustment tries to address 
two interrelated but distinct questions: What is the 'true' net income of the economy? What 
should be done to ensure sustainability? The two are interrelated since the future of the 
economy is conditioned by current consumption and investment choices. 
The issue that generates most of the debate among those practising environmental accounting 
is how to calculate the adjustment for natural resource depletion. The Fundamental Equation 
of Asset Equilibrium (FEAE) was used in Chapter 2 as a general framework for presenting an 
array of seemingly competing theoretical methods. Two of the methods analysed (net price 
and user cost) have now found their way into the proposed systems of environmental 
accounting. The survey of the literature demonstrated how most of the recent attempts of 
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applying environmental accounting do not opt for one of these methods, but tend to present the 
results of both. The other two methods discussed (present value and imputed income) have not 
previously been used in empirical studies. Within this framework it was shown (1) that the 
adjustment of traditional NNP can be summarised in a single formulation (equation 2.3-22) for 
all the methods considered; (2) that all the methods require the estimation of the economic rent 
generated by the resource in year t (u1 and N, ); (3) that the implementation of each method 
differs due to different assumptions regarding the future behaviour of the rents. 
Nevertheless, the most important conclusion derived from this comparative analysis of the 
theoretical models of environmental accounting is that, at least in theory, different methods 
seem to apply to different scenarios. Hartwick, by implication, shows that the user cost method 
does not apply to a closed economy case. ' Sefton and Weale argue that the net price method 
does not apply to open economies, and from their theoretical propositions it can be inferred 
that, at least in part, the user cost method applies to the open economy case .2 In open 
economies the possibility of capital gains from trade on the depleting asset stock becomes 
relevant. In the light of these findings, the two methods that are considered rivals by the 
literature can be considered as relevant for different scenarios. 
Our two case studies offer very different examples of resource depletion strategies. Chapter 3 
showed that the Mexican and Venezuelan governments took different positions regarding the 
use of natural resources for most of the twentieth century. While Mexico's administration 
believed that the best way of making use of the oil endowment was to provide affordable 
energy for the country's industrialisation, Venezuelan governments maintained that the role of 
oil resources was to finance the development of the nation. Divergent strategies resulted, 
which affected every aspect of oil exploitation: legislation, management (public vs. private), 
pace of exploration and exploitation, etc. Importantly in terms of environmental accounting, 
Mexico approximates very closely the theoretical case of a closed economy and Venezuela 
that of an open economy willing to sell nearly all the resource to the rest of the world. 
Fitting the real world into the theoretical models proved to be an arduous task. In addition to 
the conceptual issues, the most daunting obstacles were problems involved in estimating 
quantities of stocks and flows and establishing monetary valuations. A good deal of the work 
concerned the elaboration of the data series needed for conducting environmental accounting. 
These series are a contribution in their own right. On the one hand, they permit quantitative 
comparison of the sharp contrasts between the Mexican and Venezuelan oil industries in terms 
of basic indicators such as production, exploration policies, labour and capital costs, fiscal 
policies, etc. On the other hand, oil stocks and flows, values and depreciation estimates are 
major components of environmental accounts. This will be of use for those attempting the 
J. M. Hartwick, , 'Natural resources, national accounting and economic depreciation', Journal of Public Economics 1990)43. 
J. A. Sefton, and M. R. Weale, 'The net national product and exhaustible resources: The effects of foreign trade', 
Journal of Public Economics 61 (1996). 
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more ambitious objective of producing a complete set of environmental historical national 
accounts including all the other natural resource depletion plus pollution and ecosystem 
changes for Mexico and Venezuela. These historical series can also serve as benchmarks for 
comparison with other oil-producing countries. Therefore, data series produced will be useful 
for those currently working on the generation of environmental accounts as much as for those 
working on more orthodox quantitative explorations of the histories of these two oil industries. 
In relation to the conceptual issues, the contrast between the historical evolution of the values 
taken by the variables and the assumptions generally adopted in theoretical models of resource 
depletion has a number of important implications. The empirical exercises disclosed gaps 
between theory and practice of environmental accounting that do not appear in theoretical and 
shorter-term exercises. For instance, environmental accounting theory does not contemplate 
the possibility of persistently negative rents. However, these have been obtained for Mexico. 
The issue of negative rents requires further investigation by environmental accounting theory, 
for the depletion continues to take place but no cost can be assigned to it if the resource rent is 
the basic input to valuation methods. Furthermore, the negative rents obtained for Mexico 
seem to indicate that the Mexican strategy was expensive in terms of efficiency. This results 
also rises interesting economic questions. Was Mexico's strategy sensible in limiting its 
production because costs were so high? Should it have limited its output to zero? Or were the 
high costs of production a consequence of the policy? Was Mexico inefficient because of the 
closure to foreign investment and foreign markets? Nevertheless, these questions are far 
beyond the scope of this research. What it can be established with the data presented is that the 
strategy chosen by the Mexican government could have been better implemented. It is 
plausible to argue that at the time of the nationalisation Mexico simply ran out of oil deposits 
that could be extracted at competitive costs, given prices, technology and competitive sources. 
However, the data presented suggests that for most of the period after the nationalisation costs 
could have been reduced by changing policies (for instance, reducing the labour force and 
increasing production to take advantage of economies of scale). 
A simple but crucial observation also derives from the historical evolution of the rents: they 
were not constant nor did they grow at the rate of interest over time, contradicting the two 
main assumptions adopted by the literature. It was also found that the rent accounted for an 
increasing share of the price of oil throughout the century. The implicit consequence is that 
costs of production declined systematically relative to the price of oil. This evolution contrasts 
with the constant or increasing costs generally assumed in the theoretical discussion of 
resource rents. The absence of technological change in the theoretical models partly explains 
the difference between the historical and the theoretical evolution of costs and rents. 
An advantage of the historical data set is that it has made possible the relaxation of the most 
common assumptions of environmental accounting. One of the main conclusions of the 
exercises in the thesis is that the underlying assumptions regarding the behaviour of rents over 
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time in the theoretical models are crucial to the actual level of the adjustments. That comes as 
no surprise. What is new, however, is that the conclusions obtained in the theoretical literature 
about the bias of the different methods are also linked to these assumptions. Therefore, the 
biases in the methods, as commonly believed in the literature, only hold under the most 
restricted scenario of constant rents over time. It was also found that the value assigned to the 
resource is very much related to the expected life expectancy of the resource. Most theoretical 
exercises assume the initial stock of the resource will not change over time. In those models 
capital gains/losses can only arise from changes in the price of the resource. In these two 
countries the life expectancy of the resource has varied due to changes in the pace of 
extraction and/or new discoveries. As a consequence, a great deal of the variations in the 
observed value of the resource comes from changes in the life expectancy of the resource. 
As a result of applying the theoretical arguments spelt out by Sefton and Weale, the 
dissertation established that the net price and the user cost are not competing methods as such, 
but are appropriate for different scenarios. While the net price is the correct adjustment for 
closed economies, open economies need to impute an income to the stock targeted for exports; 
in the case of a pure resource exporter, user costs approximates this result quite reasonably as 
the figures for Venezuela demonstrated. This requires a different type of adjustment for each 
of our two case studies. Since Mexico resembles the closed economy for the period 1938- 
1970s and Venezuela the pure resource exporter during the twentieth century, the net price is 
appropriate for adjusting Mexican national accounts for the aforementioned period, whereas 
the user costs should be used for Venezuela. In fact, implementing the methodology proposed 
by Sefton and Weale obviates switching from one method to another when Mexico changes its 
policy in the 1970s, since their method is able to capture the change in policy. 
The principal concern of the thesis was the quantification of the claims of environmental 
accounting; or in other words, to what extent do environmental historical national accounts 
diverge from traditional national accounts? The dissertation has answered this question for 
Mexico and Venezuela. In doing so, it has also quantified some of the claims of the 
historiography. The findings of the dissertation qualify the initial hypothesis substantially. As 
expected income does indeed differ when natural resources are included in national accounts. 
But traditional income estimates do not always exaggerate income as standard environmental 
accounting predicts. It has been found that adjusted income can result in greater or smaller 
incomes than those traditionally estimated. This should not discourage environmental 
accountants for it implies that the misfit between traditional and environmentally adjusted 
income is even greater than the theoretical models predicted. Traditional measures of income 
can no longer be considered either a reliable indicator of sustainable income or taken as 
guidance of the future consumption possibilities of the economy. 
Paradoxically, the levels of consumption were not necessarily unsustainable ex-post given the 
existence of capital gains from trade and technological change. It is through improved terms of 
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trade and through increasing production and lowering costs of extraction, allowed by 
technological change, that oil producers managed to consume the rents without jeopardising 
future consumption. Furthermore, the results of the thesis show that the role of technological 
change in sustaining the historical levels of consumption is substantial since the terms of trade 
did not improve in the continuous way needed to rescue the two economies from declining 
levels of consumption. This is an important finding because while gains from trade have now 
been included in some environmental accounting models, technological change is left out. 
These results also have implications for the analysis of the contrasting strategies of Mexico 
and Venezuela. It would appear that Venezuela's pure-resource-exporter policy was more of a 
worry for environmental accountants than Mexico's conservationist approach. Nevertheless, 
the fact that Mexico opted for a closed economy implies that there was a greater need to set 
aside the rents to replace the depleted asset than if it had remained an open economy. Only in 
an open economy does the possibility of capital gains from the terms of trade on the depleting 
asset stock become relevant. In the 1970s, Mexican policy changed at the point when it would 
have become even more relatively expensive to remain as a closed economy. 
This should not however be taken as support for Venezuelan policies or for those 
recommending that little or none of the rent should be reinvested for guaranteeing future 
consumption possibilities. The resource exporter can consume today more not only on account 
of the expected gains from the terms of trade as we saw, but also because more of the resource 
will be available tomorrow at lower costs thanks to technological change. But technological 
change is double edged. Technological change can give costs advantages to the competitor 
producer countries or in the extreme case it can eliminate the economic value of the reserves, 
etc, making obsolete the whole of the natural capital stock. Then not even reinvesting the 
whole of the current rent may guarantee the maintenance of the current level of consumption. 
The results presented here are initial efforts at estimating indicators and are offered in the spirit 
of transparent exchange of research results and thinking. They are intended to stimulate 
dialogue and to advance both the methodologies used and the policy applications of indicators 
for sustainable development. The analysis of different economic strategies and their impact on 
development and environmental depletion measures yield new questions for the long-term 
sustainable growth debate. Consequently, the results obtained have implications for political 
planning over the use of the environment and the use of the recommendations made by the 
environmental adjustments. We said in the introduction that if these tools turn to be useful in 
historical perspective, it would allow greater confidence in the implementation of future 
policies based upon their recommendations. Precisely because we now know more about the 
biases and the inconsistencies of the methods of environmental accounting in historical terms, 
the thesis contribute to increase the confidence in the implementation of policies based upon 
their results in the future. 
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Appendix A 
Oil Production and Consumption 
The amount of oil produced in Mexico and Venezuela is well known from the start of 
production. Governments needed to know the amount produced in order to claim the 
corresponding taxes and royalties on production. Therefore, official figures on 
production were well kept. By looking at the evolution of this variable, one can clearly 
see the different strategies adopted by Mexico and Venezuela. Nevertheless, there are 
reasons for thinking that production data might be underestimated in the early days. 
Since exploitation taxes, commonly known as royalties, represented a fixed amount of 
the production value declared by the company the result is presumably an under- 
declaration of production by the companies. Underestimation of oil export value in the 
official accounts seems unavoidable. Indeed, efforts to improve the inspection system 
always found strong opposition from the companies. ' 
Sources for oil production and domestic oil consumption data in table A. 1: 
Mexico 
Oil production 
" 1901-1992: Mexico, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informätica, 
(INEGI), Estadisticas histöricas de Mexico (Mexico D. F., 3rd ed., 1994), cuadro 
11.1, p. 559. 
National demand for oil 
" Obtained by subtracting exports volume from total production. Volume of oil 
exports available from the sources and series listed in appendix B. 
Venezuela 
Oil production 
9 1920-1990: Baptista, A., Bases cuantitativas de la economia Venezolana. 1830- 
1995 (and data disk) (Caracas, 1997), cuadro B-5. 
National demand for oil 
" 1920-1990: Baptista, A., Bases cuantitativas de la economia Venezolana. 1830- 
1995 (and data disk) (Caracas, 1997), cuadro B-5. 
See chapter VI in Lieuwen, E., Petroleum In Venezuela :A History. University of California 
Publications in History, Vol. 47 (Berkeley, 1954). 
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Table A-1 Oil production and national demand for crude oil. 
Mexico and Venezuela 1901-1990 (thousand barrels) 
OIL PRODUCTION NAT. DEMAND 
Year Mexico Venezuela Mexico Venezuela 
000 barrels 000 barrels 000 barrels 000 barrels 
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Year Mexico Venezuela Mexico Venezuela 
000 barrels 000 barrels 000 barrels 000 barrels 
1901 10 na 
1902 40 n. a 
1903 75 n. a 
1904 126 n. a 
1905 251 n. a 
1906 502 n. a 
1907 1,005 n. a 
1908 3,932 n. a 
1909 2,714 n. a 
1910 4,634 n. a 
1911 12,553 11,652 
1912 16,558 8,829 
1913 25,696 4,366 
1914 26,235 2,870 
1915 32,911 8,142 
1916 30,516 3,248 
1917 55,293 9,270 
1918 63,828 12,061 
1919 87,063 11,514 
1920 157,069 500 11,561 9 
1921 193,398 1,400 21,130 19 
1922 182,278 2,200 1,412 26 
1923 149,584 4,300 13,978 49 
1924 139,678 9,100 9,979 97 
1925 115,515 19,900 16,657 210 
1926 90,421 35,700 9,047 369 
1927 64,121 60,400 11,149 630 
1928 50,151 106,000 16,764 1,479 
1929 44,688 136,100 17,639 1,406 
1930 39,530 135,200 12,559 1,404 
1931 33,039 116,900 10,536 1,230 
1932 32,805 116,700 10,217 1,232 
1933 31,001 118,200 8,975 1,255 
1934 38,172 136,300 13,154 1,445 
1935 40,241 148,500 17,796 1,577 
1936 41,026 154,600 19,991 1,631 
1937 46,803 185,800 37,592 1,945 
1938 38,482 188,000 23,546 2,000 
1939 42,891 204,500 28,248 2,200 
1940 44,045 183,800 35,742 2,600 
1941 43,031 226,800 39,886 2,900 
1942 34,826 152,000 33,908 2,800 
1943 35,153 179,400 35,153 3,000 
1944 38,197 257,000 36,662 3,970 
1945 43,543 323,400 40,832 4,500 
1946 49,240 388,500 46,208 5,700 
1947 56,298 434,900 45,373 9,100 
1948 58,520 490,000 52,459 10,600 
1949 60,902 482,000 48,972 14,500 
1950 72,422 546,000 64,995 18,800 
1951 77,308 
1952 77,278 
1953 72,433 
1954 83,651 
1955 89,395 
1956 90,660 
1957 88,266 
1958 93,533 
1959 96,393 
1960 99,049 
1961 106,784 
1962 111,849 
1963 114,867 
1964 115,576 
1965 117,959 
1966 121,149 
1967 133,043 
1968 142,360 
1969 149,860 
1970 156,686 
1971 155,911 
1972 161,367 
1973 164,909 
1974 209,855 
1975 261,589 
1976 293,117 
1977 358,090 
1978 442,607 
1979 536,926 
1980 708,593 
1981 843,917 
1982 1,002,436 
1983 972,908 
1984 979,843 
1985 960,133 
1986 886,111 
1987 927,319 
1988 914,909 
1989 917,355 
1990 930,023 
622,000 
660,000 
644,000 
691,000 
787,000 
899,000 
1,014,000 
951,000 
1,011,000 
1,041,000 
1,065,000 
1,167,000 
1,185,000 
1,241,000 
1,267,000 
1,230,000 
1,292,000 
1,319,000 
1,311,000 
1,353,000 
1,295,000 
1,178,000 
1,228,000 
1,086,000 
856,000 
839,000 
816,000 
790,000 
860,000 
793,000 
769,000 
691,000 
657,000 
659,000 
613,000 
653,000 
664,000 
696,000 
696,000 
779,800 
64,557 20,900 
73,378 22,600 
67,666 27,600 
78,005 32,800 
83,106 38,800 
87,502 45,200 
87,969 51,700 
93,415 47,800 
95,227 49,000 
91,776 46,700 
99,092 46,500 
104,383 55,300 
106,766 57,200 
108,079 60,500 
107,373 64,200 
110,877 65,600 
133,043 66,900 
142,360 70,900 
149,860 70,200 
156,686 73,100 
155,911 76,900 
161,367 83,500 
164,909 95,800 
204,051 94,100 
227,207 90,200 
258,647 99,500 
284,354 105,100 
309,360 116,700 
342,441 127,200 
405,637 140,700 
443,139 149,300 
457,822 149,400 
411,903 145,800 
421,839 135,900 
436,613 135,100 
415,407 141,500 
436,394 142,700 
436,657 149,120 
n. a 141,500 
n. a 145,800 
Sources: described above 
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Appendix B 
Export Dependency Series 
Sources for total and oil exports data in table B-1: 
Mexico: 
Total exports: 
" 1901-1990 (in dollars in the original): Mexico, Instituto National de Estadistica Geografia 
e Informätica (INEGD, Estadisticas histöricas de Mexico (Mexico D. F., 3rd ed., 1994), p. 
799-800. 
Oil exports: 
" 1911-1936: Mexico, Government of, 'Estadistica Petrolera', Revista de Industria. Revista 
Mensual 1 (1937 December) 2, p. 21 (converted here from volume to value by multiplying 
the former by the prices shown in Appendix F). 
" 1937: Haber, S., N. Mauer and A. Razo, 'When Institutions do not Matter: The Rise and 
Decline of the Mexican Oil Industry', Paper presented at the Economic History Seminar 
at UC Berkeley, September 2001 (no published). 
" 1938-1939: PEMEX, (Petröleos Mexicanos), Informes del Director General Senador 
Antonio Bermudez 1947-1952 (Mexico D. F., 1952), p. 47. 
" 1940-1974: Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior S. A., Comercio Exterior de Mexico 
(Mexico D. F., Vols. for the period 1948-1973); (there were no exports between 1967 and 
1973). 
" 1974-1988: PEMEX, (Petröleos Mexicanos), Anuario Estadistico 1988 (Mexico D. F., 
1988), p. 121. 
Venezuela: 
Total exports and oil exports: 
" 1911-1963: Venezuela, Ministeno de Fomento, Anuario Estadistico de Venezuela 1957- 
1963 (Caracas, 1964), p. 1049. From 1911 to 1917, 'oil exports' refer to asphalt exports. 
" 1956-1967: Venezuela, Ministeno de Fomento, Anuario Estadfstico de Venezuela 1967 
(Caracas, 1968). p. 372, (overlapping years coincide with the previous source). 
" 1965-1975: Venezuela, Ministeno de Energia y Minas, Petröleo y otros datos estadisticos 
(PODE) (Caracas, issued annually since 1958) for the years 1970,1973 and 1975, p. 11 in 
all cases; (overlapping years coincide). From 1967 to 1975 there are some disagreements 
in the official published data over the value of oil exports due to different valuation 
(reference prices, tax prices, market prices) 
" 1976-1985: PODE , 1985, pp. 1 and 13. 
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Table B. 1 Total exports and oil exports. Mexico and Venezuela 1901-1985 
(millions of national currency at current prices) 
Mexico Venezuela 
Oll Oil Total oil/total Oil Oil Total 
year exports exports exports value exports exports exports oil/total 
000 barrels mill pesos mill pesos % mill barrels mll Blvs mll Blvs % 
1901 n. a. 160.2 
1902 n. a. 182.1 
1903 n. a. 206.6 
1904 n. a. 191.3 
1905 n. a. 209.9 
1906 n. a. 269.2 
1907 n. a. 249.0 
1908 n. a. 242.9 
1909 n. a. 231.3 
1910 n. a. 259.8 
1911 902 0.2 294.0 
1912 7,729 1.9 298.5 
1913 21,331 6.4 305.3 
1914 23,366 7.0 321.3 
1915 24,769 9.9 251.0 
1916 27,269 15.0 486.1 
1917 46,024 39.1 305.9 
1918 51,767 72.7 375.0 
1919 75,550 138.0 392.8 
1920 145,509 291.0 854.6 
1921 172,268 325.9 766.1 
1922 180,866 332.2 643.5 
1923 135,607 259.2 567.2 
1924 129,700 252.6 614.2 
1925 98,858 256.1 680.8 
1926 81,375 202.6 691.5 
1927 52,972 130.2 632.5 
1928 33,387 67.9 591.8 
1929 27,050 55.7 570.0 
1930 26,971 55.2 430.8 
1931 22,503 52.8 366.6 
1932 22,588 52.1 305.6 
1933 22,026 58.7 368.2 
1934 25,018 83.3 643.7 
1935 22,446 76.6 750.0 
1936 21,036 69.4 775.4 
1937 18,253 89.4 892.4 
1938 9,211 43.6 837.1 
1939 14,936 63.4 1,119.6 
1940 14,643 53.0 1,155.3 
1941 8,303 29.2 1,181.2 
1942 3,145 12.2 1,321.6 
1943 918 3.8 1,989.0 
1944 655 0.0 2,096.2 
1945 1,535 5.8 2,428.4 
0.1% 1.3 117.5 1.1% 
0.6% 1.5 130.9 1.1% 
2.1% 2.9 152.5 1.9% 
2.2% 1.4 111.5 1.3% 
3.9% 1.7 121.3 1.4% 
3.1% 1.4 117.7 1.2% 
12.8% 2.0 120.0 1.7% 
19.4% 2.6 102.7 2.5% 
35.1% 2.6 258.7 1.0% 
34.1% 491 3.3 170.6 1.9% 
42.5% 1,381 11.8 133.6 8.8% 
51.6% 2,174 15.7 137.8 11.4% 
45.7% 4,251 28.7 156.7 18.3% 
41.1% 9,003 65.5 213.5 30.7% 
37.6% 19,690 137.5 330.0 41.7% 
29.3% 35,331 246.6 395.4 62.4% 
20.6% 59,770 280.8 444.1 63.2% 
11.5% 104,521 466.9 609.6 76.6% 
9.8% 134,694 593.6 778.6 76.2% 
12.8% 133,797 634.1 762.5 83.2% 
14.4% 115,670 547.8 651.6 84.1% 
17.1% 115,468 531.6 628.3 84.6% 
15.9% 116,945 553.2 617.5 89.6% 
12.9% 134,855 608.5 671.9 90.6% 
10.2% 146,923 649.3 711.7 91.2% 
9.0% 152,970 684.2 768.5 89.0% 
10.0% 183,855 770.0 871.9 88.3% 
5.2% 186,000 828.3 887.3 93.3% 
5.7% 202,300 895.3 953.3 93.9% 
4.6% 181,200 809.0 860.9 94.0% 
2.5% 223,900 1,000.6 1,061.6 94.3% 
0.9% 149,200 635.7 710.5 89.5% 
0.2% 176,400 786.2 862.1 91.2% 
0.0% 253,030 1,056.9 1,121.4 94.2% 
0.2% 318,900 1,025.0 1,107.9 92.5% 
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Table B. 1 Total exports and oil exports. Mexico and Venezuela 1901-1985 
(millions of national currency at current prices) 
year 
Oil 
exports 
000 barrels 
Mexico 
Oil Total 
exports exports 
mill pesos mill pesos 
oil/total 
value 
% 
Oil 
exports 
mill barrels 
Venezuela 
Oil Total 
exports exports 
mll Blvs mll Blvs 
oil/total 
% 
1946 2,711 14.0 2,765.0 0.5% 382,800 1,330.7 1,449.1 91.8% 
1947 3,032 15.2 3,462.4 0.4% 425,800 2,053.6 2,168.3 94.7% 
1948 10,925 96.6 4,107.0 2.4% 479,400 3,340.4 3,484.4 95.9% 
1949 6,061 66.5 5,615.8 12% 467,500 3,259.0 3,360.5 97.0% 
1950 11,930 163.7 4,267.9 3.8% 527,200 3,760.5 3,892.2 96.6% 
1951 7,427 113.4 5,116.5 2.2% 601,100 4,371.7 4,533.7 96.4% 
1952 12,751 217.7 5,408.8 4.0% 637,400 4,616.3 4,858.4 95.0% 
1953 3,900 56.0 4,836.2 12% 616,400 4,552.8 4,841.7 94.0% 
1954 4,767 83.1 6,983.2 1.2% 658,200 5,337.0 5,661.0 94.3% 
1955 5,646 100.0 9,232.5 1.1% 748,200 5,900.8 6,277.7 94.0% 
1956 6,289 118.5 10,090.0 1.2% 853,800 6,646.9 7,096.9 93.7% 
1957 3,158 76.7 8,826.3 0.9% 962,300 7,289.1 7,924.5 92.0% 
1958 297 17.7 8,863.8 0.2% 903,200 7,091.9 7,720.3 91.9% 
1959 118 2.3 9,037.5 0.0% 962,000 7,281.5 7,937.0 91.7% 
1960 1,166 19.2 9,233.8 0.2% 994,300 7,394.4 8,500.3 87.0% 
1961 7,273 155.6 10,043.8 1.5% 1,018,500 7,449.7 8,092.2 92.1% 
1962 7,692 176.5 11,331.3 1.6% 1,111,700 8,058.0 8,688.6 92.7% 
1963 7,466 169.1 11,801.3 1.4% 1,127,800 8,155.2 8,806.8 92.6% 
1964 8,101 187.5 12,833.8 1.5% 1,180,500 10,138.0 10,852.0 93.4% 
1965 7,497 174.8 14,080.0 1.2% 1,202,800 10,144.0 10,925.0 92.9% 
1966 10,586 244.7 14,623.8 1.7% 1,164,400 9,746.0 10,558.0 92.3% 
1967 10,272 239.6 13,786.3 1.7% 1,225,100 10,504.0 11,391.0 92.2% 
1968 n. a n. a 14,562.5 n. a 1,248,100 10,277.0 11,154.0 92.1% 
1969 n. a n. a 16,772.5 n. a 1,240,800 10,681.0 11,644.0 91.7% 
1970 17,970 504.0 16,120.0 3.1% 1,279,900 10,973.0 12,125.0 90.5% 
1971 7,745 433.0 17,070.0 2.5% 1,218,100 13,479.0 14,840.0 90.8% 
1972 5,055 324.0 20,830.0 1.6% 1,094,500 15,090.0 16,273.0 92.7% 
1973 4,826 449.0 25,896.3 1.7% 1,132,200 22,306.0 23,642.0 94.3% 
1974 5,804 1,668.0 35,665.0 4.7% 991,900 61,827.0 64,062.0 96.5% 
1975 34,382 5,288.0 38,280.0 13.8% 765,800 44,666.0 46,704.0 95.6% 
1976 34,470 7,003.0 57,354.8 12.2% 739,500 37,089.8 39,244.8 94.5% 
1977 73,736 23,431.0 105,504.0 22.2% 710,900 39,481.0 41,640.0 94.8% 
1978 133,247 41,796.0 137,996.2 30.3% 673,300 37,528.0 39,548.0 94.9% 
1979 194,485 91,691.0 201,219.9 45.6% 732,800 58,519.0 61,908.0 94.5% 
1980 302,956 239,503.0 347,325.3 69.0% 652,300 78,328.0 83,072.0 94.3% 
1981 400,778 357,538.0 475,974.4 75.1% 619,700 81,723.0 84,647.0 96.5% 
1982 544,614 953,188.0 1,275,914.5 74.7% 541,600 67,068.0 71,191.0 94.2% 
1983 561,005 1,942,564.0 3,353,571.1 57.9% 511,200 59,948.0 65,146.0 92.0% 
1984 558,004 2,762,506.0 2,061,257.2 
_57.0% 
523,100 85,714.0 97,214.0 88.2% 
1985 523,520 3,753,144.0 6,784,675.6 55.3% 477,900 78,282.0 92,108.0 85.0% 
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Appendix C 
Fiscal Obligations 
Taxes have always been at the core of the policy-making regarding oil. For 
governments, taxes have historically been the way of getting the `just' share of the oil 
profits for the nation. Royalties, surface taxes, exploitation taxes, exploration rights 
and concessions are the means by which oil is transformed into revenue for the state. 
In contrast, the companies mostly saw taxes as part of the costs of production. This 
appendix does not aim to compare the different fiscal regimes of Mexico and 
Venezuela or their implications, but only to provide a brief idea of the evolution of oil 
taxation in each country. 
As a consequence of the Spanish legal heritage, the basic principle governing the fiscal 
regime of oil resources in Mexico and Venezuela is that the subsoil belongs to the 
Nation and therefore the ownership of minerals below the surface is separate and 
distinct from ownership of the surface. Therefore, all petroleum legislation has national 
scope. The Mexican government levied two main kinds of taxes before nationalisation: 
production taxes and export taxes. The production tax on oil was a tax per unit (cubic 
meter). It was included within the `Taxes over the exploitation of natural resources', 
which also comprised mining surface taxes, mining production, use of public waters, 
game, fishing, woodlands, etc. No production tax was levied on oil from 1901 to 1912. 
In Venezuela, the oil concessions were subject to the Mining Codes (C6digos Mineros 
of 1905,1909,1910 and 1918) until 1920, when the first Hydrocarbons Law was 
passed. Seven other laws subsequently modified this legislation during the period 
1921-1938. The amount, rates and formulae of each tax category were carefully laid 
out in the text. A new Hydrocarbons Law was enforced in 1943 and with some 
modifications, remained in place until oil was nationalised in 1976.1 Put simply, the 
history of the Venezuelan oil industry's fiscal obligations is one of an increasing share 
for the Nation, which culminated in the nationalisation of the industry. 
The first difficulty when trying to compile the amounts involved was learning the 
definitions of the different tax categories, their nomenclature and the evolution of the 
fiscal system in order to understand the origin of the numbers provided by different 
1 For a chronology and specification of the basic taxes levied under the different hydrocarbons laws up 
to 1943 see Appendix A in Venezuela. Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons, The petroleum industry 
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sources. In the case of Mexico, for instance, it is difficult to discern the categories 
included within Pemex's taxation system, except that the export tax seems to be 50 
percent of the export value from the 1980s. Therefore, before presenting the series, it is 
necessary to explain briefly the definitions of petroleum-related fiscal duties. Although 
not always set out in this manner, one can assign oil taxes to six main categories: 
royalties, income tax, initial exploitation, exploration, surface taxes, custom duties and 
others. 
Five of those six categories are rather easy to define. Royalty oil is a percentage of the 
total quantity of oil produced in each field. In order to calculate the royalty in cash, the 
volume of royalty oil is multiplied by a royalty value in the producing field. The 
agreements to calculate the royalty value, that is, the `price' of a metric ton of oil at the 
well-head, are quite complex and varied throughout the century. `Income Tax' refers 
to the different obligations imposed on the net income of the companies. 3 `Initial 
exploration' is equivalent to the price of the concession. Therefore, it was levied only 
once when a new concession was granted. `Exploration tax' was paid during a specific 
time period during which the title-holder could explore the area before deciding 
whether to go for an exploitation concession. The government fixed the time span in 
advance. A `surface tax' was levied on all concessionaires from the date on which the 
government granted the parcel for exploration. It usually took the form of a fixed 
annual sum per hectare. Surface taxes have been paid since the earliest times. The 
reason behind this lay in the fact that huge concession areas were lying idle instead of 
either being developed or returned to the nation. `Other taxes', depending on the 
publication, may include any combination of those five or actually include 'other 
taxes' such as transportation taxes or customs duties. 
The six categories can be aggregated in different ways: production taxes, export taxes, 
hydrocarbon taxes, regular taxes, occasional taxes, etc. Generally, the term 'oil taxes' 
refers to the aggregation of all the original categories, but occasionally `total petroleum 
and its fiscal obligations by A. Parra', in Ist Venezuelan Petroleum Congress organked by the 
Venezuelan Society of Petroleum Engineers (Caracas, 1962),. 2A detailed description of the schedule for determining the royalties on crude oil produced is presented 
in Appendix C of Ibid. 
' For Venezuela, net income was determined by subtracting the following items from gross income: 
operating and administrative costs, wages and salaries, royalty payments to the government, 
depreciation and amortisation charges and other expenses incurred in the country necessary to produce 
the income. Ibid., p. 27. 
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taxes' may include just some of the six. Table C-I has been elaborated as a guideline. 
It attempts to clarify the commonest aggregate terms used in different publications. 
Takle C-I! Nomenclature of fiscal oblieation al! renations 
Exploration Initial 
Exploitation 
Surface Royalty Others Income tax Customs duties 
Occasional Taxes Regular Taxes 
Production Taxes Export Taxes 
Total Oil Taxes 
Source: own elaboration 
After the 1940s, the relative importance of the occasional taxes decreased abruptly in 
Venezuela due to the policy of not granting concessions. This event coincided with the 
creation of the income tax (in effect from 1 January 1943), which soon became the 
second most important after the royalties .5 
Some qualifications are needed regarding the consistency of the data. The fiscal duties 
levied on oil production, the actual taxes collected and the taxes declared by the 
companies differ slightly. The basic reason is the time that elapsed between the 
imposition of the levy and the collection of the tax. In addition, the companies added 
some taxes to their capital accounts. Whenever possible, the amount used here was that 
of the actual receipts collected. It is also important to notice that from 1966 taxes were 
computed at the new higher rate, based on the tax reference price or realised price, 
whichever was higher. Tax reference prices for crude oils were set according to a 
mathematical formula articulated on basic gravity differentials. Indeed, the 
Venezuelan 
government presented the companies with a retroactive bill back to 1958, claiming the 
differential between the reference price and the price declared by the companies. 
Therefore, figures for those years were revised and the most recent were adopted 
for 
the series. Figures C-1 and C-2 compare total fiscal income to oil fiscal revenues 
for 
Mexico and Venezuela. 
Venezuela. Ministerio de Fomento, Diversos Aspectos de la Economia Venesolana (Caracas, 1948) 
and Venezuela. Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons, 'The petroleum industry and 
its fiscal obligations 
by A. Parra', were useful in the elaboration of the table alongside with substantial 
crosschecking of 
figures. 
s By 1946, income tax accounted for 30 percent of all regular taxes and by 1961, after 
the application of 
the 50-50 share with the companies, it accounted for almost 50 percent of all regular 
taxes. Royalties 
accounted always for more than 50 percent of all regular taxes from 1938 to 1961. 
Source: Table D-4, 
Appendix Din Ibid. 
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Figure C-1: Oil taxes vs. total fiscal income. Mexico 1901-1989 (mill. pesos) 
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Sources: same as Table C-2 
Figure C-2: Oil taxes vs. total fiscal income. Venezuela1917-1985 (mill. bolivars) 
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Sources: same as Table C-2 
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Sources and notes for total and oil taxes data in Table C-2: 
Mexico 
Oil Taxes 
" 1912-1920: Mexico, Government of, 'Estadisticas del Petröleo', Estadistica 
NacionaL Febrero (1925) 4, p. 26. The source names the Secretarfa de Hacienda y 
Credito Publico, Departamento de Impuestos Especiales as the ultimate origin of 
the data. Oil taxes include production and export tax of crude oil. 
" 1920-1933: Mexico, Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico, Departamento de 
Impuestos Especiales, Secciön de Petrbleo, Cuadros estadisticos del petröleo, 
1925-1930 Vols. I and 2 (Mexico D. F., 1936). It refers to production and export 
tax on crude oil (excludes derivatives). 
" 1934-1936: Ibid. plus royalty payments from Mexico, Secretaria de Patrimonio 
Nacional, El Petröleo de Mexico. Recopilaci6n de documentos oficiales del 
conflicto de orden econömico de la industria petrolera con una...., (Mexico D. F., 
1940 1st ed., 1963). 
" 1937: Mexico, Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico, Direcci6n General 
Tecnica de Ingresos, Oficina de Investigaciones Econ6micas, La Industria del 
Petröleo en Mexico edited by Manterola, M. (Mexico, D. F, 1938), p. 387. 
" 1938-1990: Mexico, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informätica 
(INEGI), Estadisticas histöricas de Mexico (Mexico D. F., 3rd ed., 1994), p. 574. 
Total tax receipts: 
9 1901-1911: Mexico, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografa e Informätica 
(INEGI), EstadIsticas histöricas de Mexico (Mexico D. F., 3rd ed., 1994). 
" 1912-1924: It is possible to infer government income for 1912 and 1918 from the 
data provided by Wilkie, J. W., The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and 
Social Change since 1910 (Berkeley, 1967), Table 1.11, p. 28. The gaps were then 
filled linearly. 
" 1925-1989: Mexico, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informätica 
(INEGI), Estadisticas histöricas de Mexico (Mexico D. F., 3rd ed., 1994). 
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Venezuela: 
Oil taxes: 
" 1917-1955: Venezuela. Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons, Venezuelan 
Petroleum Industry. Statistical Data (Caracas, 1962), Appendix D, Table D-5. 
Includes royalty, surface tax, income tax (from 1944), customs duties, other taxes, 
and occasional taxes. 
" 1955-1964: PODE 1970, p. 155. Regular taxes actually collected by the Exchequer. 
" 1964-1974: PODE 1974, p. 141. Regular taxes actually collected by the Exchequer. 
" 1974-1985: PODE, 1984. Regular taxes levied (excluding gas royalties) 
Overlapping years generally coincident, otherwise the most recent source was used. 
Total tax receipts: 
" 1917-1963 (here only up to 1943): Carrillo Batalla, T. E., La evaluaciön de la 
inversion del ingreso fiscal petrolero en Venezuela [conference sponsored by 
Universidad Central de Venezuela. Foro Petrolero 1965]. Colecci6n Foros y 
Seminarios. Serie Foros. 5, (Caracas, 1968), cuadro no. 7, p. 234-235. 
" 1943-1976: Banco Central de Venezuela, La economia venezolana en los 41timos 
treinta cinco anos (Caracas, 1978), p. 273 . 
" 1977-1985: PODE, 1985, p. 1 
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Table C-2 Total vs. oil fiscal revenues. 
Mexico and Venezuela 1901-1985 (mill. national currency at current prices) 
Mexico I Venezuela 
Year Governm. total Oil sector Share Governm. total Oil sector Share 
Tax income Tax paid oilltotal Tax Income Tax paid oil/total 
Mill. pesos mill. pesos mill. blvs mill. blvs 
1901 63 0.0% 
1902 66 0.0% 
1903 76 0.0% 
1904 86 0.0% 
1905 92 0.0% 
1906 102 0.0% 
1907 114 0.0% 
1908 112 0.0% 
1909 99 0.0% 
1910 106 0.0% 
1911 111 0.0% 
1912 126 0.49 0.4% 
1913 131 0.77 0.6% 
1914 137 1.23 0.9% 
1915 142 1.91 1.3% 
1916 147 3.09 2.1% 
1917 153 7.07 4.6% 72.00 0.16 0.2% 
1918 158 11.48 7.3% 53.00 0.69 1.3% 
1919 181 16.69 9.2% 57.00 1.31 2.3% 
1920 205 28.65 14.0% 101.00 1.47 1.4% 
1921 228 38.13 16.7% 82.00 2.21 2.7% 
1922 252 47.75 19.0% 71.00 7.50 10.6% 
1923 275 29.48 10.7% 88.00 3.78 4.3% 
1924 299 28.22 9.5% 102.00 5.91 5.8% 
1925 322 20.95 6.5% 120.00 20.89 17.4% 
1926 309 13.39 4.3% 172.00 17.88 10.4% 
1927 307 9.93 3.2% 182.00 21.43 11.8% 
1928 311 5.69 1.8% 187.00 46.19 24.7% 
1929 322 4.23 1.3% 230.00 50.54 21.9% 
1930 289 3.32 1.2% 256.00 47.33 18.5% 
1931 256 2.45 1.0% 210.00 46.98 22.4% 
1932 212 2.57 1.2% 185.00 45.15 24.4% 
1933 223 3.23 1.4% 172.00 44.78 26.0% 
1934 295 9.45 3.2% 172.00 52.05 30.3% 
1935 313 8.09 2.6% 203.00 59.30 29.2% 
1936 385 8.87 2.3% 189.00 63.61 33.7% 
1937 451 10.59 2.3% 274.00 81.78 29.8% 
1938 438 41.00 9.4% 331.00 118.61 35.8% 
1939 566 63.00 11.1% 341.00 109.48 32.1% 
1940 577 87.00 15.1% 354.00 97.71 27.6% 
1941 665 76.00 11.4% 346.00 121.45 35.2% 
1942 746 76.00 10.2% 325.00 87.76 27.0% 
1943 1,092 93.00 8.5% 306.00 139.30 45.5% 
1944 1,295 92.00 7.1% 446.00 269.39 60.4% 
1945 1,404 109.00 7.8% 614.00 353.50 57.6% (cont. ) 
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Table C-2 Total vs. oil fiscal revenues. (cont. ) 
Mexico and Venezuela 1901-1985 (mill national currency at current prices) 
Mexico Venezuela 
Year Governm. total Oil sector Share IGovernm. total Oil sector Share 
Tax income Tax paid oil/total Tax Income Tax paid oil/total 
Mill. pesos mill. pesos mill. blvs mill. blvs 
1946 2,012 137 6.8% 716.00 489.01 68.6% 
1947 2,055 181 8.8% 1,100.00 689.48 62.7% 
1948 2,268 231 10.2% 1,562.00 1,158.10 74.1% 
1949 3,891 230 5.9% 1,936.00 1,269.34 64.7% 
1950 3,641 293 8.0% 1,896.00 901.06 47.5% 
1951 4,884 312 6.4% 2,267.00 1,317.10 58.1% 
1952 6,338 327 5.2% 2,408.00 1,475.82 61.3% 
1953 5,023 339 6.7% 2,534.00 1,589.07 62.7% 
1954 7,714 399 5.2% 2,632.00 1,497.90 56.9% 
1955 9,024 459 5.1% 2,992.00 1,712.00 57.3% 
1956 10,194 493 4.8% 4,380.00 2,037.00 70.9% 
1957 10,870 540 5.0% 5,405.00 2,618.00 70.7% 
1958 13,183 508 3.9% 4,706.00 2,680.00 57.7% 
1959 14,163 576 4.1% 5,743.00 3,153.00 56.2% 
1960 19,458 694 3.6% 6,147.00 2,930.00 48.8% 
1961 19,941 778 3.9% 7,074.00 3,160.00 45.7% 
1962 20,398 840 4.1% 6,486.00 3,142.00 48.9% 
1963 19,704 864 4.4% 6,604.00 3,511.00 54.4% 
1964 28,976 955 3.3% 7,197.85 4,693.00 65.2% 
1965 64,283 1,015 1.6% 7,310.77 4,752.00 65.0% 
1966 66,619 1,097 1.6% 7,793.38 4,941.00 63.4% 
1967 79,459 1,134 1.4% 8,582.83 5,699.00 66.4% 
1968 85,278 1,301 1.5% 8,824.24 5,824.00 66.0% 
1969 97,509 1,455 1.5% 8,730.89 5,483.00 62.8% 
1970 109,064 1,585 1.5% 9,569.05 5,751.00 60.1% 
1971 120,549 1,776 1.5% 11,695.59 7,684.00 65.7% 
1972 148,445 1,921 1.3% 12,309.12 7,964.00 64.7% 
1973 205,661 2,283 1.1% 16,099.00 11,221.00 69.7% 
1974 281,626 3,800 1.3% 42,649.53 36,508.00 85.6% 
1975 403,615 7,674 1.9% 38,130.49 29,513.00 77.4% 
1976 528,451 9,682 1.8% 39,443.54 28,991.00 73.5% 
1977 734,180 19,764 2.7% 36,572.21 26,588.00 72.7% 
1978 950,647 30,283 3.2% 38,566.10 24,798.00 64.3% 
1979 1,293,073 62,390 4.8% 55,791.00 38,440.00 68.9% 
1980 683,781 168,107 24.6% 76,022.13 54,964.00 72.3% 
1981 931,777 242,706 26.0% 77,918.95 59,608.00 76.5% 
1982 1,515,403 317,040 20.9% 73,376.79 46,154.00 62.9% 
1983 3,396,592 1,345,300 39.6% 68,672.57 38,800.00 56.5% 
1984 5,089,025 1,710,680 33.6% 104,663.93 63,845.00 61.0% 
1985 8,218,361 2,741,998 33.4% 99,333.33 57,216.00 57.6% 
Sources: as described above 
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Appendix D 
National Accounts Estimates 
D. 1 The Evolution and Reliability of Mexico's National Accounts Estimates 
The Evolution of the Mexican National Accounts Estimates 
A Note on Mexican on Physical Capital Depreciation and Savings 
D. 2 Brief History of National Accounting in Venezuela 
Notes on Venezuela's Saving Series 
National accounts began in Latin America towards the end of the 1940s and, as will be 
seen, they only started to acquire importance in the early 1950s. ' At that time, the work 
consisted of estimates of the gross domestic product by industrial origin and its 
structure by type of expenditure. In 1947, under the technical guidance of Simon 
Kuznets, a study by L. M. Dominguez presented national income estimates for Latin 
American countries based on official publications. By the 1960s, all Latin American 
countries produced estimates of their GDP, and some of them had managed to draw up 
-with certain restrictions- a simplified system of accounts following the 
recommendations of the United Nations. Venezuela and Mexico were two of the first 
countries to implement the SNA of the United Nations. However, until relatively 
recently, a problem was the lack of proper independent estimates with which to cross- 
check the official estimates of product and income. This rather surprising point will be 
confirmed below when analysing the sources of GDP series for both countries. We are 
nevertheless attempting to approximate the measures of income and wealth of 
Venezuela and Mexico as closely as possible taking into account the recent concerns 
for exhaustible resources. 
This appendix justifies the choices made with to regard the national income data 
sources used in the thesis for Mexico and Venezuela. For each of the two countries the 
appendix first surveys the successive approximations to national accounting series 
before entering in the specific problems associated with each country's data series. 
' C. Noriega, The Present State of National Accounts in Latin America', Review of Income and Wealth 
XII (1976) 2. 
2 L. M. Dominguez, National Income Estimates of Latin American Countries, Vol. X (New York, 1947). 3 For a detailed view in the adoption of the new system by Venezuela, see, L. Urdaneta, 'Some aspects 
of the revision of the system of national accounts in Venezuela', Review of Income and Wealth 22 (1976) 
1. 
° C. Noriega, The Present State of National Accounts in Latin America', Review of Income and Wealth 
XII (1976) 2, p. 136. 
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D. 1 The Evolution and Reliability of Mexico's National Accounts Estimates during the 
20`h Century 
When one first approaches the availability of historical economic indicators, one tends 
to start by looking first at the official sources and then uses independent estimates to 
assess their reliability. We show here that, in the case of Mexico, while official sources 
are readily available there is very little independent work done which permits an 
immediate assessment of reliability by comparison of the data. Therefore, it is 
necessary to look closely at the official sources in order to identify their potential 
biases and to establish the quality of the data provided. With this aim in mind, we start 
by briefly reviewing the individuals and institutions involved in the development of 
economic indicators of Mexico throughout the century. We then assess the quality and 
reliability of the most recent estimates and conclude by summarising the qualifications 
one should make for different periods. 
The Evolution of the Mexican National Accounts Estimates 
The study of the economic development of Mexico from the end of the 190' century to 
the present day has been hindered by the absence of systematic data until 1939, when 
the Banco de Mexico began to prepare such information. Although the economic 
statistics of the Porfiriato (1900-1910) were relatively advanced for their time, the 
changes brought by the revolution and the reform plunged the country into a statistical 
dark age. Therefore, work on national income estimates for Mexico did not begin until 
the late 1930s. The first printed estimate of national income by Emilio Alanis Patino 
appeared in 1938 published by the Direcci6n General de Estadistica (General Bureau 
of Statistics). 5 It was prepared on the basis of his own estimates of national wealth for 
1929, to which an arbitrary coefficient of 0.2 was applied to provide a national income 
estimate. In 1942, ex-president Abelardo L. Rodriguez released statistics on national 
income for 1929 and 1941 that appear to have been developed on the basis of Alanis 
Patiflo's earlier estimates. 6 
3 Mexico. Secretaria de la Economia Nacional. Direccidn General de Estadistica, Mexico en cijras 
(Mexico D. F., 1938) A fine review of national statistics before 1930 can be found in Mexico. 
Departamento de la Estadistica Nacional, Anuario de 1930 (Mexico D. F., 1932). Specialised references 
to historical estimates of national income prepared before 1950 are E. Vargas Torres, 'Estimaciones del 
ingreso nacional de Mexico', in Primera Reunion de Tecnicos sobre el Banco Central (Mexico D. F., 
1946) and G. H. Aubrey, 'The National Income of Mexico', I. A. S. I. Estadistica (1950 June) A more 
recent study on the historical statistics of Mexico is Pefia, Sergio de la and J. W. Wilkie, La estadistica 
econömica en Mexico : los origenes (Mexico, D. F, 1994). However, most of this section relies on C. W. 
Reynolds, The Mexican Economy. Twentieth-Century Structure and Growth (London, 1970). 
6 'Sacrificios de la poblacidn rural', in El Universal, 28 December 1942, as quoted in Aubrey, 'The 
National Income of Mexico', p. 190. 
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After Alanis Patino, the major figure in Mexican national accounting was Josue Saenz. 
He was Director of the General Bureau of Statistics in the 1940s and he was largely 
responsible for the first consistent time series of national income estimates covering 
the period 1929 to 1945. His work was subsequently expanded to include later years. 
These series are an estimate of `net domestic output of goods and services', in which 
gross production of the various groups was adjusted wherever possible for payments to 
other industries for raw materials, fuel and power, depreciation, cost of transport and 
indirect taxes. 
Despite the significant contribution made by the General Bureau of Statistics, a report 
to the Banco de Mexico in 1946 called attention to the wide discrepancies in existing 
estimates of the net national product for 1942, ranging from a figure by Alanis of 4,079 
million pesos, Säenz's second estimate of 8,928 million pesos (net domestic output) 
and a further estimate by the Banco de Mexico of 11,972 million pesos. 8 
As from 1947, the Banco de Mexico itself embarked upon a major effort to prepare 
more reliable benchmark estimates of national income for the years 1939 to 1945, 
partly in response to a request of the IBRD. 9 The resulting estimates were used as a 
basis for interpolation of intervening years, utilising indices of the volume of 
production of goods and services, which were reflated by a combination of wholesale 
price indices. The IBRD continued to provide a stimulus for improving the national 
income estimates as a requirement for the evaluation of the performance of the 
Mexican economy and loans policies towards the country. 
In 1951, a joint working party of Mexican and World Bank economists prepared a 
GNP series based upon four benchmark years (1939,1944,1946 and 1949). Income 
was classified by principal production sector, by distributive shares and on a functional 
basis, with annual statistics interpolated for the entire period 1939-49 and estimates for 
1950.10 The World Bank study, despite its numerous weaknesses, represented a 
milestone in Mexican economic statistical research. Successive improvements in the 
quality and coverage of post War data eventually revealed a much more rapid rate of 
growth of real output than earlier series had indicated. 
7 The figures first appeared in J. S'aenz, 'El ingreso nacional neto de Mexico, 1929-1945', Revlsta de 
Economia (1946 February) 28. A subsequent updated series appeared in Mexico. Secretaria de la 
Economfa Nacional. Direccidn General de Estadistica, Compendia estadlstico 1947 (Mexico D. F., 1947 
January), p. 534. 
8 Vargas Tores, 'Estimaciones del ingreso nacional de Mexico'. 
9 Banco de Mexico, Informe anual (Mexico D. F., 1950). 
10 R. Ortiz Mena, V. Urquidi, et al., El desarrollo econdmico de Mexico y su capacldad para absorber 
capital del exterior (M6xico D. F., 1953). 
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One year later, the Nacional Financiera began estimating total supply and demand in 
the economy, based upon the Banco de Mexico's gross product estimates plus its own 
series on trade, public and private investment, public consumption, and net inventory 
change. As a result of those efforts, a GDP series at factor cost by branch of activity 
from 1939 to 1950 was published in 1953.11 
In 1955, the Banco de Mexico drew upon the results of the 1950 population and 
agricultural censuses to revise its national income and product series for the years 1939 
to 1949. These figures have been revised in the Annual Reports of the Bank for each 
year since 1954. 
A third, but still institutional source of national income figures for Mexico is the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), which has been 
estimating the `producto bruto real' (real gross product) in constant prices since 
1950.12 The method used was weighting physical production indices by the relative 
values of the base year (1950). In addition to these estimates, in 1957 ECLA sponsored 
a study of the actual and projected trade conditions of Mexico. It was based upon a 
relatively detailed set of estimates of the principal components of Mexican national 
income and product for the period 1945-1955 with projections up to 1965, all 
expressed in 1950 pesos. 13 
Recognising the need for improved national income estimates, the Mexican 
government and the Banco de Mexico drew upon the services of Martin Ekker and 
Cornelius Oomens to prepare a detailed survey of national accounts and economic 
statistics in Mexico and an input-output table. Though the table refers to 1950, it was 
not completed until 1958.14 All subsequent Banco de Mexico official estimates of GDP 
and GNP through the end of 1968 relied upon the adjusted 1950 input-output table. 
It is not until the 1960s that attention was directed to quantitative indicators of 
Mexican economic history. A number of gaps in the data for the Porfiriato were filled 
11 Ibid. 
12 United Nations. Economic Commission for Latin America, Economic Survey of Latin America (New 
York, 1950) and subsequent years. 
13 United Nations. Economic Commission for Latin America, External Disequilibrium In the Economic 
Development of Latin America: The case of Mexico (New York, 1957) as quoted in Reynolds, The 
Mexican Economy. Twentieth-Century Structure and Growth , p. 336. 14 The original 1950 input-output table appears condensed in the article by Ekker in S. Kuznets, Income 
and Wealth series (Cambridge, 1951). See also Banco de Mexico, Estructura y proyecciones de la 
economia de Mexico, 1950,1960 y 1965 (Mexico D. F., 1958), as cited in E. Vargas Torres, 'Las 
estimaciones del ingreso nacional en Mexico', El Trimestre Econdmico (1960) 27. 
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by scholars at El Colegio de Mexico. '5 Nevertheless, the first detailed estimate of gross 
national product on an annual basis from 1895 to 1964 (with no data for the revolution 
years, 1911-1920) was prepared by Enrique Perez Lopez in constant pesos of 1950.16 
The pre-1939 estimates were calculated extrapolating the distribution of the 1939 total 
domestic product by sector (agriculture, livestock, mining, petroleum, manufactures 
and transport) back to 1895. The estimates were described as `provisional' by the 
author and only cover half of the gross national product before 1939. For the period 
after 1939, he used data prepared by the Banco de Mexico. '7 
Perez Lopez's estimates for the period 1895-1939 were revised, by Mario Gutierrez 
Requenes under the direction of L. Solis, Chief of Economic Studies of the Banco de 
Mexico, and extended to 1967.18 It looks as if the Banco de Mexico retained Perez 
Lopez's results for 1939-1960, changing the weights from 1950 to 1960. It redid his 
estimates for 1921-1939, but did not bother to modify his results for 1895-1921.19 The 
other independent estimate of gross domestic product for the years 
1900,1910,1925,1930 and 1940 is by Reynolds in 1970. This author recalculated 
production indices for the periods 1900-1907 and 1907-1929. His results are not that 
much different from those of Gutierrez. 
In the late 1970s, the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e Informätica 
(INEGI) replaced the Banco de Mexico as the provider of estimates. Therefore the new 
official series from 1960 onwards are those by INEGI2° Since 1985, it has also 
published a historical GDP series extending from 1895 to the present day. 21 To 
conclude this summary, one should add that Reyes Heroles and Sidaoui produced a 
detailed reconciliation of the Banco de Mexico figures and those of the INEGI. 22 
's Colegio de Mexico, Estadisticas econömicas del Porfiriato: comercio exterior de Mexico, 1877-1911 
(Mexico D. F., 1960). 
Colegio de Mexico, Seminario de Historia Moderna de Mexico, Estadisticas econdmicas del Porfiriato: 
fuerza de trabajo y actividad econ6mica por sectores (Mexico D. F, 1965). 
16 E. Perez Lopez, The National Product of Mexico: 1895 to 1964, in Perez Lopez and et al (eds. ), 
Mexico's Recent economic growth (Austin, 1967). 
17 Banco de Mexico, 'Informe sobre la revision preliminar de las estimaciones del producto nacional de 
Mexico pars los anos de 1950 a 1962, Comercio Exterior (September 1963). 
18 Banco de Mexico, Producto bruto interno y series bdsicas, 1895-1967 (Mexico D. F., January 1969). 19 The comment corresponds to A. Maddison and associates, The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity 
and Growth. Brazil and Mexico (Washington, D. C., 1992), p. 219. 20 Mexico. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informätica (INEGI), Sistema de cuentas 
nacionales de Mexico: cuentas consolidadas de la naci6n, oferta y utilizacl6n, producto Inferno bruto, 
1980-86 (Mexico D. F., 1987). 
21 Mexico. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informdtica (INEGI), Estadisticas histarlcas de 
Mexico (Mexico D. F., 3rd ed., 1994). 
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Table D-1: 
Successive approximations of Mexican National Income 
for the years 1929/1939/1942/1950 and 1960 
Author Date Concept used 
1929-30 
Million current pesos 
1939 1942 1950 1960 
Alanis Patino 1938 National Income 2,042 (1929) 
Alanis Patino 1943 National Income 3,070 
Säenz 1942 National Income 2,044 (1929) 6,916<, ý 
S'aenz 1943 National Income 2,835 0929 6,918 
Säenz 1945 Net Domestic 
Output 2,835 (19n 6,139 8,928 
World Bank Study 1951-52 National Product 5,737 9,255 37,816 
Ortiz/N. Financieraf 1953 GDP 5,824 9,393 38,077 
ECLA 1957 GDP 43,299 
Banco de Mexico 1959 National Income 5,900 9,500 37,500 
Banco de Mexico. i, 1959 GNP 6,657 41,500 
Perez L6pez' 1960 GNP 4,11 l(mo) 41.500 
Banco de Mexico 1962 National Income 36,630 
Banco de Mexico 1964 GNP 6,460 10,172 40,577 
Banco de Mexico 1964 GDP 6,559 10,332 41,060 
Gutierrez' 1969 GDP 4,111(1o) 
Solis-Banco de 1969 GDP 44,016 
Mexico" 
Reynolds" 1970 GDP 3,954(1930) 41,060 
Banco de Mexico' 1986 GDP 42,163 159,703 
INEGIf 1994 GDP 4,668(,,, o) 7,785 10,681 42,163 159,703 
Sources and notes 
The table is a combination of C. W., Reynolds, The Mexican Economy. Twentieth-Century 
Structure and Growth (London, 1970). pp. 330-31,340-41) plus own elaboration. 
Note that some of the differences in the figures correspond to differences in the concept used. 
4 R. Ortiz Mena, and et al (eds. ), The Economic Development of Mexico (Baltimore, 1953)., 
table 2, pp. 8-13 . 
4 Elaborated by Banco de Mexico but published by Mexico. Secretaria de Industria y 
Comercio. Direcciön General de Estadistica, Mexico en Cifras, 1959 (Mexico D. F., 1959), 
p. 55. 
a Based on the GNP estimate of 15,538 million 1950 pesos converted to current values using 
the wholesale price index for Mexico, D. F. (1930 = 100; 1950 m 378) quoted in C. W. 
Reynolds, The Mexican Economy. Twentieth-Century Structure and Growth (London, 1970). 
b Based on a 1930 GDP estimate of 14,946 million 1950 pesos converted to current values as 
in a. 
c Based on a GDP estimate of 15,540 million 1950 pesos converted as in a. 
d Banco de Mexico, Informe anual (Mexico D. F., 1960). 
e Banco de Mexico, Indicadores econdmicos (Mexico D. F., May 1986). 
f Mexico. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informatica (INEGI), Estadisticas 
histöricas de Mexico (Mexico D. F., 3rd ed., 1994). 
One reason for the tendency of policy-makers in the early years to disregard aggregate 
economic indicators was the wide variation in data available on crucial matters such as 
the level and rate of growth of agricultural and industrial production and the current 
value of national income and product. As a result, national income statistics until well 
into the 1950s were used primarily to reflect the successes or failures of political 
administrations rather than as basis for policy formulation. 23 
22 J. Reyes Heroles and D. Sidaoui, 'Cuentas nacionales y an3lisis macroecondmico'. (Mexico D. F., 
1981). 
23 Reynolds, The Mexican Economy. Twentieth-Century Structure and Growth, p. 330. 
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Table D-1 summarises the main approximations to national income and product made 
over the period 1938 -199424 As was mentioned above, no regular data collection or 
analysis was done until 1939. Therefore, if one were to analyse data reliability by 
periods, one should first divide the century into pre- and post-1939. Nevertheless, it 
should be obvious from the table figures that until well into the 1950s the range of 
variation of the estimates made them of little more than decorative value. The best that 
could be obtained as late as the mid-1960s was a reasonably accurate set of estimates 
of GDP and GNP by sector of industrial origin and by functional distribution. 25 
However, the successive efforts described above improved the quality of the data 
available to the researcher by quite a margin. Indeed, it is almost axiomatic that 
successive revisions of national income estimates have tended to shift revealed growth 
rates upward. 26 
It may be worth recalling the sources used and qualifications made by Maddison in 
two of his approximations to Mexican historical GDP series. 27 In his 1992 comparative 
work on Brazil and Mexico, he only used series going back to 1950.28 He used Banco 
de Mexico data for GDP at current market prices to 1979, thereafter, until the end of 
his series in 1988 he uses the INEGI's data. 29 Despite recognising that `the INEGI 
series, now the official source for national accounts, is wider in coverage than the 
earlier Banco de Mexico estimates', he still uses Banco de Mexico figures for most of 
his series. 0 Nevertheless, at least for the years 1921-1950, it seems as if the whole 
Banco de Mexico series have been revised by the INEGI according to the figures 
presented in the table above, since INEGI figures are always above those previously 
calculated by the Banco de Mexico. In his 1995 work, Maddison presented the levels 
of GDP and GDP per capita in constant dollars of 1970 from 1820 to 1994. Sources 
going back to 1950 are identical to those of his previous work . 
31 The 1900-1950 
estimates are based on sector weights for 1947 and data for the pre-1900 period is 
taken from INEGI, Estadisticas Histöricas de Mexico, 1985. He argues that the reason 
24 For another comprehensive survey of the quantitative history of Mexico see Statistical Abstract of 
Latin America Suplements, V. 27 'The Development of Quantitative History in Mexico since 1940'. 
Zs Reynolds, The Mexican Economy. Twentieth-Century Structure and Growth . 26 Ibid., p. 335. 
27 A. Maddison, Monitoring The World Economy, 1820-1992 (Paris, 1995) 
Maddison and associates, The Political Economy of Poverty . 28 Ibid., p. 221, sources to Table B. 2. 
29 Banco de Mexico, Indicadores econdmicos (Mexico D. F., May 1986) and M6xico. Instituto Nacional 
de Estadistica Geografia e Informätica (INEGI), Anuario Estadistico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos 
(M6xico D. F., 1990). 
30 Maddison and associates, The Political Economy of Poverty, p. 219. 31 Maddison, Monitoring The World Economy, 1820-1992, p. 143. 
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for inferring the 1900-1950 data instead of using official sources is that `for 1895-1960 
the official estimates, by the Banco de Mexico, are not adequately described. For 
1895-1921 they are identical in movement with the estimated of E. Perez Lopez. He 
describes his estimates as provisional, and, as he assumed that service output (half of 
GDP) moved at the same rate in real terms as commodity output, his estimates 
probably overstate growth (and)... the official Banco de Mexico series are very close to 
the estimates of Perez Lopez for 1939-60 but show lower growth than he does for 
1921-399.32 Therefore, he decided to infer the data from 1947 backwards. However, 
other historical studies have used and continue using data from the official sources, 
that is the Banco de Mexico and INEGI. 33 
The GDP data used on the present research corresponds to the most recent publication 
of the historical series of Mexico by the INEGI (1994). 4 According to the evidence 
presented here, this is the most consistent source available at least from 1950 to the 
present day. 
A Note on Mexican on Physical Capital Depreciation and Savings 
In absence of complete series historical national accounting is not possible to find a set 
of fixed capital consumption estimates readily available for Mexico pre-1970s that 
could be used in Chapter 6 for comparison with natural capital depreciation. However, 
there are a number of possibilities to reconstruct the series. For instance, one can 
estimate the fixed capital consumption on the basis of the national income estimates 
available, i. e. by difference between the GDP and the NDP (approximated by the 
national income). A complete set of national income can be put together from different 
sources for the period 1929-1992. However, it seems as if the national income 
produced by Banco de Mexico was calculated as a fixed proportion of the GDP. From 
1948 to 1960 that proportion is invariably 87 per cent. Alternatively, one should be 
able to produce series of fixed capital consumption if the gross and net stock of capital 
of the nation is known. Hofuran has recently produced series of gross and net stocks of 
32 Maddison and associates, The Political Economy of Poverty , p. 219. 33 Among others E. Cardenas, La industrializacidn mexicana durante la Gran Depresidn (Mexico D. F., 
1987); E. Cardenas, La politica econdmica en Mexico 1950-1994 (Mexico D. F., 1996) and R. Thorp, 
Progress, Poverty and Exclusion. An Economic History of Latin America in the 20th Century (New 
York, 1998). 
34 These series going back to 1950 fully match the figures presented by Maddison and associates, The 
Political Economy of Poverty. 
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capital for nine Latin American countries from 1950 at constant 1980 prices 35 Fixed 
capital consumption can be obtained by difference of the gross and net series. 
As a result of the lack of data, three different series of consumption of fixed capital 
were produced and analysed for the present research. `Series 1' covered from 1929 to 
1968 and used as its starting point the national income estimates from three different 
sources (see Figure D. 1-1): Säenz, Banco de Mexico and Nacional Financiera. `Series 
2' covered from 1950 to 1979, in which the series of Hofman serve as a base for 
calculating the consumption of fixed capital in current prices using the corresponding 
capital price indices supplied by the INEGI. 36 `Series 3' used the data from Mexican 
national accounts available from 1970 to 1992. The respective fixed capital 
consumption series resulting from each estimation are plotted in Figure D. 1-1 
The best way to obtain a coherent series for the whole period seems to be to connect all 
three series in the following way: Pre-1960 the national income estimates (i. e. Series 1) 
are used as NDP and the corresponding consumption of fixed capital calculated. From 
1960 to 1978, Series 2 are used, and from that date to the end of the period official 
national accounts are used (i. e. Series 3). Once the series of fixed capital consumption 
has been constructed it was used to construct the NDP (by subtracting fix capital 
consumption from the GDP) and the gross savings series that appear in Chapter 6. 
35 A. A. Hofuran, The Economic Development of Latin America in the Twentieth Century (Cheltenham, 
UK, 2000). He also summarises the previous attempts to generate estimates of the capital stock. 
36 Mexico. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informätica (INEGI), Estadisticas histdricas de 
Mexico, pp. 966-967. 
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Figure D. 1-1: Consumption of fixed capital from different sources. Mexico 1929-1989 
(mill. pesos at current prices) 
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Sources and notes: 
Series 1: 
Consumption of fixed capital inferred from the difference between national income and national 
product. National income sources as follow: 
1929-1940 J. Säenz, El ingreso national nets de Mexico, 1929-1945 (1946 February), p. 32 
1939-1960 Banco de Mexico, Informe anual (Mexico D. F., 1960), p. 73 
1939-1968, National Financiera, Statistics on the Mexican Econonni" (Mexico D. F., 1974), table 2.3 
(only taken from1950 onwards), ultimate source is Banco de Mexico. 
Series 2: 
1950-1979: consumption of fixed capital calculated as the difference between the gross stock and the net 
stock of capital estimated by A. A. Hofuran, The Economic Development o/ Latin America in the 
Twentieth Century (Cheltenham, UK, 2000), Table E. 20 reflated to current prices by the corresponding 
average price indices for buildings/infrastruture and machinery and equipment by Mexico. Instituto 
National de Estadistica Geografia e Informätica (INEGI), Estacüsticas histürica. s: dc' Alelxico (Mexico 
D. F., 3rd ed., 1994), pp. 966-967. 
Series 3: 
Consumption of fixed capital reported in the following sources: 
1970-1978 Mexico. Secretaria de Programaci6n y Presupuesto, Sistc'nicc dc' c ue'nta. s neu ionulr. c clcr 
Mexico (Mexico D. F., 1981), p. 57 
1977-1980 Mexico. Secretaria de Programaci6n y Presupuesto, Anncn"io E. stacli', tic"o dc lo. s E. vt hlo. ý 
Unides Mexicanos. 1981 (Mexico D. F., 1981), p. 309 
1980-1988 National Financiera, La economia mexicana en cifras 1990, p146-147 
1988-1989 Mexico. Instituto National de Estadistica Geografia e Inforinltica (INFGI), . 4nuerrio Estacli. etico dc los Estados Unidon Mexicuno. s (Mexico D. F., 1990). p. 569 
1990-1992 Mexico. Instituto National dc Estadistica Geografia e Infiortnitica (INEGI), Si. tteinti c/c' 
Cuentas Nacionales de tlexicol989-1992. Rc'su, nen Genei-al, Vol. I (Mexico D. F., 1994), p. 33 
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In relation to the saving data, net savings were only found from official sources fier the 
periods 1970-1985. For the period 1950-1970 they were constructed subtracting 
public and private consumption estimates from net income figures. Figure 1). 1-2 
shows that both series are very consistent with each other and lists the sources used. 
Figure D. 1-2: Net Savings. Alternative Estimates. Mexico 1950-1985 
(mill pesos at current prices) 
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Sources: Net savings from official documents as follow 1970-1978 from Mexico. Secretaria de 
Programaciön y Presupuesto, Mexico. Srstent ofAationu/ Accounts. General Simunarv Vol. I (Mexico D. F., 
1981). p. 58 and for 1979-1985 from Mexico. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informätica 
(INEGI), Sistema de cuentas nacionales de : Mexico: cuenta. s consolidadas de la nacit>n. o/i"rta 1, tutili: acton, 
producto interno bruto, 1980-86 (Aguascalientes, 1987), cuadro 2. 
Prior to 1970 net savings were calculated as the difference of NNP (as listed at the end of this appendix) 
minus public and private consumption from: 1950-1960 Nacional Financiera. La Econwmru tlesicunu en 
CiJi"as (Mexico D. F., 1978). cuadro 2.8: 1960-1978 Mexico. Secretaria de Programaci6n y Presupuesto. 
Mexico. System of'National Accounts. General Sun non Vol. I (Mexico D. F. 1981), Table I and 1980-1988 
Nacional Financiera, La Economia Mcxicana en Ci/i"os (Mexico D. F., 1990). pp. 1-16-147. 
Gross savings were estimated adding to these net savings the consumption of' fixed 
capital series described above. Note 'the irony that physical capital, not natural capital, 
appears to be the greater source of data problems for estimating genuine savings I... I 
Developing better estimates of physical capital should perhaps he a higher priority I'm 
green accountants than developing improved measures of natural capital'. " 
The sources for Mexican GDP, NNP and consumption of fixed capital used in this 
research are listed at the end of this Appendix. 
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D. 2 Brief History of National Accounting in Venezuela 
A brief review of the availability of historical national accounts data for Venezuela is 
undertaken in this section, together with an assessment of the quality of such data. A 
priori, it should be easier to gather data for Venezuela since data is only needed from 
1920s onwards -when oil production started. As in the earlier review of the availability 
of national accounts data for Mexico, official sources are observed first. Then 
international and independent estimates are introduced and compared with the official 
sources. Unlike the Mexican case, international and independent estimates of historical 
economic indicators for Venezuela seem to be more appropriate for the purpose of this 
study, since official publications appear to be quite inconsistent and incomplete in the 
long run. 
No official national accounts exist for Venezuela before 1950, except for a sketchy 
study of national income for 1936 by the Banco Central de Venezuela (BCV). The 
latter indicates a national income of 1,499 million bolivars 38 The BCV was created in 
1940. In 1965 it produced a commemorative publication of its 25`h anniversary, La 
Economia Venezolana en los Ultimos Veinticinco Anos, which covers statistical data 
going back to its creation. Nevertheless, the data provided is only aggregated at a 
national level from 1950 onwards. At that time, national accounts estimates of the 
BCV were calculated mainly by the income approach for current price estimates and 
by the production method for constant price estimates. Because of this dichotomy, 
considerable difficulties are encountered when seeking to reconcile series in current 
and constant prices. As a consequence of the introduction of several important 
modifications to the estimates after 1959, the data for the periods 1950-1959 and 1960- 
65 were not comparable. Moreover, because of frequent small changes in definitions 
and in basic sources and methods, the detail with which the estimates are provided 
varied almost from year to year as did the reliability of the data 39 
Two other BCV anniversary publications, marking the bank's 30`hand 35`h 
anniversaries, provide the best general outlook of the historical evolution of 
37 J. R. Vincent, 'Are Greener National Accounts Better? ', (2001) (unpublished paper), pp. 32.33. 38 Banco Central de Venezuela, Ingreso Nacional de Venezuela (Caracas, 1949), p. 93. 39 The analysis corresponds to Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
National Accounts of Less Developed Countries, 1950-1966 (Paris, 1968), p, 210-211. 
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Venezuela's national accounts 40 Despite being consistent, the accounts maintained by 
the BCV went through important methodological changes during the late 1960s. The 
earlier accounts were available in current and 1957 prices. Beginning in 1968, the 
BCV changed the system of accounts and the price base year changed to 1968 41 As a 
result of the conceptual changes introduced and the change in methodology, the BCV 
concluded that the old and the new systems were not comparable. 2 The BCV then 
considered the possibility of reconstructing the series from 1950 onwards under the 
new methodology. However, it was not possible since data were not available for most 
of the sectors in the new methodology. The main problem was that the old method 
took 1957 as base year reconstructing the intertemporal variations for a wide variety of 
aggregates through physical indicators and quantity indices, so no actual data existed. 
As a consequence, the series from both systems were included in the anniversary 
publication of 1978. The declared intention was to amalgamate both series statistically 
via interpolations. 
It seems that the BCV revised the new system's figures once again during the 1980s. 
Between 1984 and 1986, it published a Yearbook of National Accounts covering the 
period 1968-1985 43 These GDP figures are systematically higher than those published 
in 1978. A further change in the base year occurs during the mid-1980s, when 1984 
was adopted as the new base year. The most interesting contribution of this study is its 
observation of the effects of the change of base year from 1968 to 1984. Changes in 
the base year should not substantially modify the portrait of an economy. However, for 
Venezuela, some important variations in the trend of GDP take place when the base 
year. According to Baptista, `it is enough to draw attention to the rhythm of the 
economic activity between 1973 and 1975. For the 1968 accounts, GDP growth was 
very accelerated in between those years. Yet according to the 1984 accounts, GDP 
40 Accounts Banco Central de Venezuela, La economia venezolana en los tiltimos treinta arlos (Caracas, 
1971)and Banco Central de Venezuela, La economia venezolana en los tiltimos treinta cinco aiios 
(Caracas, 1978). 
41 The system change is described in Banco Central de Venezuela, Metodologla de las Cuentas 
Nacionales de Venezuela (Caracas, 1976). Until the adoption of the United Nations method of National 
Accounting in 1968, the real aspects of the economy were depicted through two aggregates: the 
Producto Territorial Bruto (Gross Territorial Product) and the Ingreso Nacional (National Income). The 
former provided an estimate of the production for final use carried out within the nation's territory; the 
latter reflected the income received by the country's residents for their contribution to the production 
process. 
42 Banco Central de Venezuela, Aspectos Metodol6gicos de las Cuentas Naclonales de Venezuela 
(Caracas, 1972), p. 20. 43 Banco Central de Venezuela, Anuario de Cuentas Nationales: 1968-1985 (Caracas, 1984-86). as 
quoted by A. Baptista, Bases Cuantitativas de Ia Econom la Venezolana, 1830-1989 (Caracas, 1991) 
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decreases in the same period'. 44 One has to be aware of the fact that the distortions 
coincide with the price explosion of the first oil shock. Baptista's explanation of the 
problem is the ill effect generated by the rent earned from oil. This is not the place to 
take this point any further or analyse the way he attempted to solve the problem. It is 
sufficient to mention it to draw the attention towards the risks of using constant prices 
in oil producing economies. 
International organisations also provided estimates of the economic position of 
Venezuela. The United Nations in 1950, simply took the 1949 BCV figure for 1936 
The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin without further comment 4S 
America (ECLA) did not consider Venezuela's income or product figures until well 
into the 1950s. 46 The ECLA in 1960 and the IBRD in 1961 assessed the position of the 
Venezuelan economy during the 1950s in some detail 47 Their analysis mainly focused 
on the external sector and dependence on oil production as much as on the regional 
disparities, but they did not produce aggregate economic indicators. Much later, in 
1978, the ECLA produced a historical set of series for Latin American economic 
growth. 48 However, according to Baptista, the disproportionate figures presented there 
for the contribution of the public sector to the GDP alter completely the overall image 
of Venezuela's economic development over the 1940s and 1950s 49 More recently, the 
ECLA again published the historical series of national accounts of several Latin 
American countries. It simply put together the official estimates, keeping the original 
base year constant for each period -that is, 1957 for the period 1950-68,1968 for the 
s° period 1968-84, and 1984 from that year to 1994. 
The IMF International Financial Statistics provides GDP and GNP figures from 1950 
onwards, which could indicate the use of the official data of the BCV. However, data 
from 1967 onwards are below the estimates of the BCV. 51 However, the ultimate 
44 Ibid., p. 98. 
45 United Nations, National Income Statistics of Various Countries (New York, 1950). 
46 The ECLA produced an estimate of an annual rate of growth of GNP per capita of 4 percent between 
1947 and 1955, yet it did not provide the yearly data. See United Nations. Economic Commission for 
Latin America, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1955 (New York, 1956), p. 4, Table 3. 
47 United Nations. Economic Commission for Latin America, 'Economic Developments in Venezuela in 
the 1950s', Economic Bulletin for Latin America 1 (1960) 1 and International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD), The Economic Development of Venezuela (Baltimore, 1961). 
48 United Nations. Economic Commission for Latin America, Series histdricas para el crecimlento de 
America Latina, Vol. 3 (Santiago de Chile, 1978). 
49 Baptista, Bases Cuantitativas de la Economia Venezolana, 1830-1989, p. 47. 
50 United Nations. Economic Commission for Latin America, America Latina y el Caribe: Series 
Regionales y Oficiales de CuentasNacionales, 1950-1994, Vol. 23 (Santiago de Chile, 1996). 
si International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (Washington D. C., several volumes), 
July 1972. 
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sources of those figures and revisions remain obscure. 52 The pay-off of that constant 
revision by the World Bank is the substantial modification of the figures over the 
years. The amendment of the World Bank always resulted in higher GDP values as 
shown in Table D-2, which presents several of the successive approximations to 
Venezuela product and income for selected years. 
Table D-2: Successive approximations to Venezuela Product and Income 
for the years 1936/1950/1960/1969 and 1975 
Author Date of Concept Used Estimate (million current bolivars) 
Publication 
1936 1950 1960 1969 1975 
BCV 1949 National 1,499 
Income 
1BRD" 1961 GDP 11,826 
OECD* 1968 GDP 11,826 25,620 
BCV' 1971 GDP 11,826 25,671 46,867 
BCV (modified)' 1978 GDP 47,568 
ECLA 1978 GDP 46,057 
World Bank 1980 GDP 11,743 25,340 46,334 116,351 
Baptista' 1991 GDP 2,504 13,784 27,832 52,068 120,919 
BCV* 1992 GDP 11,826 25,671 46,283 118,098 
World Bank* 1992 GDP 134,540 
Baptista' 1997 GDP 2,041 14,081 29,533 51,738 147,469 
Notes and sources: 
Banco Central de Venezuela, Ingreso National de Venezuela (Caracas, 1949). 
"International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), The Economic Development of Venezuela (Baltimore, 1961). 
The BCV seems to be the ultimate source. 
f Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), National Accounts of Less Developed Countries, 1950- 
1966 (Paris, 1968), p. 214. The ultimate source of the data is BCV but not specific source is provided. 
a Although the ultimate source is Banco Central de Venezuela, La economia venezolana en los uiltimos treinta atlas. Coleccibn 
XXX aniversario, (Caracas, 1971), the figures here are taken from Allen, L. Venezuelan Economic Development. A Politico. 
Economic Analysis. Contemporary Studies in Economic and Financial Analysis, edited by Altman, E. I. and I. Walter, Vol. 7 
(Connecticut, 1977), p. 269 
f Banco Central de Venezuela, La economia venezolana en los tiltimos treinta cinco allos (Caracas, 1978). valuc obtained 
multiplying a value of 46,819 million of 1968 bolivars times the wholesale price index for 1969 of 101.6 
United Nations. Economic Commission for Latin America, Series histdricas paro el crecimiento de America Latina. Cuademos 
Estadisticos de Is Cepal, Vol. 3 (Santiago de Chile, 1978). 
World Bank, World Tables, 1980 (Washington, D. C., 2nd ed., 1980). 
V These figures correspond to the GDP in 1968 prices multiplied by the GDP deflator provided by the author Baptista, A., Bases 
Cuantilativas de la Economia Venezolana, 1830-1989 (Caracas, 1991). pp. 35-36 for GDP and 300-301 for the dellactor. His 
figures in current bolivars are also available in the same source (pp. 37-38). 
*Banco Central de Venezuela, Series estadisticas de Venezuela de los tiltimos cincuenta dos Vol. I (Caracas, 1992), pp. 47-65 
$ World Bank, World Tables, 1992 (Washington, D. C., 1992), for some years are in purchaser values and not at factor costs 
y Baptista, A., Bases cuantitativas de la economic Venezolana. 1830-1995 (and data disk) (Caracas, 1997). Current prices GDP 
obtained using 1968 data times the deflator provided by the author 
Summarising, national and international official sources, due to constant changes of 
methods and uncertain linkage among them, provide only partial and rather 
52 The World Bank seems to provide its own estimates combining economic data provided by the 
economic missions to member countries which 'is systematically analysed, refined, updated and stored. 
These data are complemented from other official sources, notably the statistical offices and publications 
of other international agencies'. From the Preface to the World Bank, World Tables, 1980 (Washington, 
D. C., 2nd ed., 1980). 
s' J. A. Hanson, 'Cycles of Economic Growth and Structural Change since 1950', in Martz and Myers 
(eds. ), Venezuela: The Democratic Experience (Caracas, Ist ed., 1977) uses BCV figures, whereas 
Maddison, Monitoring The World Economy, 1820-1992 and Hofman, The Economic Development of 
Latin America in the Twentieth Century use Baptista's series for the earlier periods of their studies. 
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inconsistent series of economic indicators dating back to 1950. It is necessary to turn to 
independent estimates in order to get, on the one hand, some grasp of Venezuelan GDP 
before that year and, on the other hand, a more coherent/systematic series for the 
whole period. 
There are two main private contributions to the historical quantification of Venezuela 
economy for the period under consideration. The one by Izard, Series Estadisticas 
para la Historia de Venezuela of 1970, constitutes the first attempt to summarise 
historical statistical data of Venezuela and covers most of the century. His analysis 
seems to be mostly sectoral rather than aggregate. The second and more useful study is 
the one by Baptista. He presents GDP estimates for Venezuela in current and constant 
bolivars of 1968 and 1984. From 1920 to 1950, the GDP does not strictly correspond 
to the sum of the sectoral contributions. Once again, the reason is the lack of 
information for most sectors. Therefore, from 1920 onwards Baptista put together all 
the available information in order to elaborate a series up to 1960. He does not 
explicitly describe the specific method followed. It is also very difficult to ascertain the 
different sources and devices used to put the numbers together since sources are not 
discussed by dates. For the period 1950s-1989, covered by the official sources, he used 
the ones discussed above. However, it is not obvious how he linked the two systems. It 
is possible that he connected the series regardless of their different nature. 
Despite reservations over the reliability of these estimates (including the official 
sources), the truth is that the BCV ones were the most widely used until Baptista's 
figures appeared. His are now the common source used by other authors to evaluate 
Venezuela's economic history. 53 Maddison, for instance, took the `economic activity' 
in four sectors in 1936 bolivars for the period 1900-1920 and linked it to the 1920- 
1970 GDP by industry of origin in 1968 figures from Baptista. It is not clear from his 
description whether the data for 1900-1920 is also that provided by Baptista in the 
same work. From 1970 to 1990, Maddison used the World Bank tables elaborated in 
1992. 
Baptista has redone part of his work and enhanced the database available for 
Venezuela up to 1995 5.4 However, one additional problem with his data in this last 
publication is that GDP in current prices is not provided directly. He gives the GDP in 
constant bolivars of 1968 and 1984, as in his previous publication. Nevertheless, on 
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this occasion, when the deflators provided are used to turn the constant series into 
current prices, the results diverge slightly from one to the other and from his previous 
estimates. The GDP in current prices obtained from the GDP series in 1984 prices is 
rather unstable compared to the one obtained from multiplying the GDP in 1968 prices 
by the correspondent deflator. The fact that some of the most recent works on 
Venezuela use his series at 1968 prices seems to confine this observation. " 
Figure D. 2-1: Share of the oil sector in total GDP at constant prices. Venezuela 
1920-1995 
45% 
40% 
35% 
30% 
25% 
20% 
5% 
D% 
5% 
Sources: 
Total GDP and oil sector GDP at constant prices of 1968 from Baptista, Bases euantitativas J, - la 
economia Venezolana. 1830-1995 (and data disk) , cuadro 
11-2: Total GDP and oil sector 61)11 at 
constant prices of 1984 from Ibid, cuadro 11-; Total GDP and oil sector GDP at constant prices of 
1968 from Baptista, Bases Cuantitativas de la Econontiu Venezoluna, /<830-1989 , pp. 
35-36 
It is well known that a difference of a few years in the choice of base year could 
change gross domestic product by more than 30 per cent per capita in some instances. `° 
In the case of Venezuela, the effects are not only on the levels of' the (iI)I' obtained 
from different sources and base years but more crucially, the relative sizes of' the 
54 A. Baptista, Baues cuan/italivu. c de let economia { e, rezolana. M30-1995 (and dahi disk) (Caracas, 
1997). 
55 Thorp, P, "og, "etis. Poverty and Exclusion. An Economic Hiciurr o/ Latin Amerieir in the 20th 
p. 320. 
6 M. Urrutia, 'Twenty-Five Years of Economic Growth, 1960-1985', in Urrutia (cd. ). Long Fer, n 
in Latin American Economic Development (Inter-American Development Bank, Washington I). ("., 
1991)" p. 28. 
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different macroeconomic aggregates change considerably. In order to establish the best 
series to be used some checks should be undertaken. Take for instance the share of the 
oil sector in the total GDP at constant prices as portrayed by the different series of' 
Baptista shown in Figure D. 2-1. The share of the oil sector in the total ON, of' 
Venezuela ranges from well above the 30 percent to levels of below 1920 depending 
on the series used, where the 1984 series are systematically above both estimates with 
base 1968. How different are the estimates at current prices'? 
Figure D. 2-2: Venezuela GDP at current prices. 1920-1989 
(mill. of bolivars, different sources, log scale) 
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-ý BCV92 ý- Bapt9l(using 68) p Bapt97 (using 68) -- Bapt97 (using 84) 
Notes and sources: 
BCV92 from 1950-1989 total GDP series at current prices Banco Central dc Venezuela, Series 
es'tadistica. 1' de Venezuela dc los ilti, nos cincuentu uitus, Vol. I (Caracas, 1992), tome I, p. 47-65. 
The series was calculated over three different base years, 1957,1968 and 1984 for the periods 1957- 
1968,1968-1984, and 1984-1989 respectively 
Bapt9l(using 68), base series of total GDP at constant prices of 1968 from Baptista, Bar. %t s 
Cucantitutivus de la Economic Venezolana, 1830-1989 , pp. 35-36 reflated by the corresponding deflator for GDP Ibid., pp. 300-301 
Bapt97(using 68), base series of total GDP and oil sector GDP at constant prices of 1968 in the 
original source from Baptista, Bases cuantitutivac de hi econumia I enezolaim. /, ti 3(1-1995 (and 
data disk) 
, cuadro 11-2 reflated 
by the corresponding deflator for GDP Ibid., cuadro v i-10. 
Bapt97(using 84) Base series of total GDP and oil sector GDP at constant prices of 1984 from 
Ibid., cuadro 11-6 reflated by the corresponding deflator for GDP Ibid. , cuadro vi- 
Appendix D. National. 4ccounls '18 
Figure D. 2-3: Venezuela oil GDP from different sources. 1957-1989 (mill. of 
bolivars at current prices, log scale) 
1004000 
00000 
t BCV 1992---- Baptista9l(using 68)-¢- Bapttsta97'(using 68) - Bapttsta'97(u sing 84) 
Sources: 
BCV1992, Oil sector GDP from Banco Central de Venezuela, Series esttulistica., (it, 1'ene: uela tit, 
los idtintos cincuenta ai)os , pp. 148-150 and 
includes both oil and gas 
Baptista 91(using 1968) Oil sector GDP at constant prices of 1968 from Baptista, Bast's 
Cuantitativas de la Economia Venezolana, 1830-1989 , pp. 35-36. 
Oil sector GDP reflated using the 
export deflator up to 1968 and oil sector deflator for the rest of the oil sector series from Ibid., p. 294 
for oil sector and pp. 300-301 for exports. 
Baptista 97 (using 68), Oil sector GDP at constant prices of 1968 in the original source from 
Baptista, Bases cuantitativas de la econoinia 6'enezolana. 1830-1995 (and data dick, ) . cuadro 
11-2. 
Oil sector GDP reflated using the export deflator up to 1968 and oil sector deflator for the rest of 
the oil sector series from Ibid., cuadro vi-6 for oil sector and cuadro vi- 10 for exports 
Baptista 1997 (using 84) Oil sector GDP at constant prices of 1984 from Ibid., cuadro 11-6. Oil 
sector GDP reflated using the export deflator up to 1968 and oil sector deflator für the rest of the oil 
sector series from Ibid., cuadro vi-7 for oil sector and cuadro vi- II for oil sector. 
Notwithstanding the inconsistencies of the BCV series, we can compare the estimates 
for GDP and the GDP of the oil sector at current prices by the BCV for the period 
1950-1989 with those resulting from applying the corresponding deflators to Baptista's 
data. Regarding the total GDP shown in Figure D. 2-2, the only systematic bias is the 
one of the BCV estimate permanently remains below the levels of any of the three 
estimates of Baptista. For their part, Baptista's series swing around each other without 
a clear pattern. However, the data on the oil sector in Figure l). 2-3, show how the 
latest series that Baptista elaborated at 1968 prices considerably exceeds the other 
estimates when reflated to current prices. In fact, my own calculations demonstrate that 
the level indicated by the newest 1968 series when retlated is well above the actual 
gross income of the oil sector itself, that is, exceeds the amount obtained by 
multiplying oil prices by the amount of oil produced. As a result, the share of' the oil 
92 
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sector in total GDP at current prices in Figure D. 2-4 diverges from the one presented in 
Figure D. 2-1 at constant prices. 
5. 
Figure D. 2-4: Share of the oil sector in the total GDP at current prices. 
Venezuela 1920-1992 
Share of the oil sector in the total GDP at current prices. Venezuela 
1920-1992 
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Sources: as in Figures D. 2-2 and D. 2-3 above 
In the latest work of Baptista, the series that use 1968 as base year are the ones that 
indicate a bigger share of the oil sector in the total GDP. Per contra, it is noticeable that 
the other two series of Baptista result in relatively similar shares once they are both 
deflated. These exercises together with the warnings expressed above leave us to 
decide whether to use one of series elaborated by Baptista for the sake of internal 
coherence of the series or to emulate Maddison by taking the World Bank tables back 
to 1970 and to use Baptista's calculations for the rest of the period. The final working 
choice was to use the old series of Baptista elaborated at 1968 constant prices 
transformed into current prices, which seems to be the most stable and coherent of the 
ones produced. 
In sum, Venezuela's official national accounts cover a bit more than half of the period 
need by this research. Within the period a change in methodology in 1968 leave us 
with two not comparable series. Therefore, coherence and reliability can only he 
;l ntiý 4t ýfi ýti 14ß dý le 10 lß° äv ld° 14° äP 
ti dý 'IP '1° &° d~ a1° -'h le 141° 
e 
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assured from 1968. One should also be aware of the distortions introduced by the 
changes in base year, which alert us to the danger of using constant prices. Prior to 
1968 and back to 1950, the official estimates are coherent but not comprehensive since 
fewer sectors were included than under the new methodology. As for the period I920- 
1950, the best approximation seems to be the figures by Baptista, yet one has to take 
them cautiously too. 
Notes on Venezuela 's Saving series 
Savings are calculated as a residual of the macroeconomic series presented above. 
Therefore, savings data should be taken with all reserves. Baptista estimates net 
savings in his most recent publication (1997), but for the sake of consistency, the 
savings used in the exercises of Chapter 6 were calculated from the data of Baptista's 
previous publication (1991). Figure D. 2-5 compares the estimates used in the thesis 
with the estimates published by Baptista. 
Figure D. 2-5: Net Savings. Alternative Estimates. Venezuela 1936-1985 
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Sources: In order to obtain net sa%ings estimates, gross savings %%ere calculated first as the residual of GNI' minus 
total consumption from A. Baptista. Busces Cuuntitutivas de la Economic Vene: o/unu. M30- O. /4, w (Caracas. I')9I ), 
pp. 37-38. Note that national (as opposite to domestic) product is only available from 1936. Net sa%inps equal gross 
savings minus the consumption of fixed capital listed below in the sources to Table D-3b. These are compared %% ilk 
the net savings in A. Baptista, Buses Cuuntirutirus de !u Econuntiu I ene_olunu. INTO-1995 (Caracas. 1907). cuadro 
V-I. 
Despite the caveats regarding the discrepancies between l3aptista's two data sets 
described above, net savings come remarkably close to each other. Yet as residual 
value they should be regarded with caution. 
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Sources for national accounting data in Table D-3a: 
Mexico: 
Total GDP: 
" 1901-1970 & 1990: Mexico. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografla e 
Informätica (INEGI), Estadisticas histöricas de Mexico , p. 401-402, cuadro 8.1. 
" 1987-1988, Mexico. Secretaria de Programacibn y Presupuesto, Anuario 
Estadistico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1989 (Mexico D. F., 1989), p. 569, 
cuadro, 4.11. 
" 1971-1987: Mexico. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografla e Informätica 
(INEGI), Estadisticas histöricas de Mexico (Mexico D. F., 2nd ed., 1990), p. 318. 
Oil sector GDP: 
" 1929-1940: Säenz, 'El ingreso nacional neto de Mexico, 1929-1945', p. 32. 
" 1939-1950: Ortiz Mena, Urquidi, et al., El desarrollo econömico de Mexico y su 
capacidadpara absorber capital del exterior, Table 2. 
" 1950-1973: Nacional Financiera, Statistics on the Mexican Economy (Mexico D. F., 
1974), p. 24-26 based on data by Banco de Mexico (extracting and refining together 
petrochemical excluded); Contrasted and completed for the years 1960,1965-1978 
using Mexico. Secretaria de Programaciön y Presupuesto, La industria petrolera en 
Mexico (Mexico D. F., 1980). 
" 1979: Mexico. Secretaria de Programaciön y Presupuesto, Mexico: System of 
National Accounts. General Summary, Vol. I (Mexico D. F., 1981), p. 133 (rama 
06- crude oil extraction and natural gas). 
" 1980-1988: Mexico. Secretaria de Programaci6n y Presupuesto, Anuario 
Estadistico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1989, p. 568 multiplied by the 
appropriate value index. 
" 1989-1992: Mexico. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informitica 
(INEGI), Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de Mexicol989-1992. Cuentas de 
producciön a precios constantes y corrientes, Vol. III (Mexico D. F., 1994), p. 37. 
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NDP/NNP (national income figures): 57 
" 1929-1940: (National income) Säenz, 'El ingreso nacional neto de Mexico, 1929- 
1945', p. 32. 
" 1939-1960: (Net National income) Banco de Mexico, Informe anual (Mexico 
D. F., 1960), p. 73 (only used until 1950). 
" 1939-1968: (Net national income used only from 1950 to 1960), Nacional 
Financiera, Statistics on the Mexican Economy, table 2.3 ), ultimate source is 
Banco de Mexico. 
" 1950-1978: NDP equals the GDP from the sources above minus the consumption 
of fixed capital calculated from Hofman series (see next heading below). 
" 1979-1981: (NNP) Mexico. Secretarfa de Programacibn y Presupuesto, Anuario 
Estadistico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1981 (Mexico D. F., 1981), p. 26. 
" 1980-1988: (NNP) Nacional Financiera, La Economia Mexicana en Cffras 
(Mexico D. F., 1991) 1990, p146-147. 
" 1989-1992: (NNP) Mexico. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografla e 
Informätica (INEGI), Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de Mexicol989-1992. 
Resumen General, Vol. I (Mexico D. F., 1994), p. 33. 
In order to obtain a complete data series for NDP, its series for the period 1979-1992 
were calculated by subtracting the consumption of fixed capital from the GDP. The 
results are compatible with the NNP official series just referenced. 
Consumption of fixed capital: 
9 The years pre-1960 calculated as the difference between the GDP and the national 
income, (see above). 
" 1960-1978: the difference between the gross stock and the net stock of capital 
estimated in Hofman, The Economic Development of Latin America in the 
Twentieth Century , Table E. 20 reflated to current prices by the corresponding 
average price indices for buildings/infrastructure and machinery and equipment by 
Mexico. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografla e Informitica (INEGI), 
Estadisticas histöricas de Mexico , pp. 966-967. 
" 1977-1980: Mexico. Secretarfa de Programacibn y Presupuesto, Anuario 
Estadistico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1981, p. 309. 
9 1980-1988: Nacional Financiera, La economia mexicana en cifras 1990, p146-147 
57 See section D. 1 above and Figure D. 1-1. 
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9 1984-1987: Mexico. Instituto National de Estadistica Geografla c Inform3tica, 
Anuario estadistico 1988-89 p. 559. 
9 1988-1989: Mexico. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografla e Inform3tica 
(INEGI), Anuario Estadistico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, p. 569. 
" 1990-1992: Mexico. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informätica 
(INEGI), Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de Mexico1989-1992. Resumen General, 
p. 33. 
Sources for national accounting data In Table D-3b: 
Venezuela: 
Total GDP: 
" 1920-1989: base series at constant prices of 1968 from Baptista, Bases 
Cuantitativas de la Economia Venezolana, 1830-1989 , pp. 35-36 reflated by the 
corresponding deflator for GDP Ibid., pp. 300-301. 
Oil sector GDP: 
" 1920-1989: base series at constant prices of 1968 from Ibid., pp. 35-36 reflated 
using the export deflator up to 1968 and oil sector deflator for the rest of the oil 
sector. Ibid., p. 294 for oil sector deflator and pp. 300-301 for exports deflator. 
NNP: 
" 1920-1989: Baptista, Bases Cuantitativas de la Economfa Venezolana, 1830-1989, 
cuadro IV, p. 48. NDP Calculated subtracting from the GDP the consumption of 
fixed capital at current prices found in Baptista, Bases Cuantitativas de la 
Economia Venezolana, 1830-1989, cuadro IV, p. 48. 
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Table D-3a: Total GDP, oil sector GDP, consumption of fixed capital and NNP. 
MEXICO 
Year GDP 
mill. pesos 
oil GDP 
mill. pesos 
% oil In CDP 
Consumption of 
fixed capital 
mill. pesos 
NNP 
mill, pesos 
1920 n. a 
1921 5,455 
1922 4,590 
1923 5,014 
1924 4,633 
1925 5,239 
1926 5,469 
1927 4,987 
1928 5,018 
1929 4,863 80 2% 2,028 2,835 
1930 4,668 71 2% 1,967 2,701 
1931 4,218 68 2% 1,781 2,437 
1932 3,206 66 2% 929 2,277 
1933 3,782 79 2% 1,060 2,722 
1934 4,151 110 3% 901 3,250 
1935 4,540 119 3% 826 3,714 
1936 5,346 117 2% 1,093 4,253 
1937 6,800 156 2% 1,894 4,906 
1938 7,281 134 2% 1,958 5,323 
1939 7,785 104 1% 1,885 5,900 
1940 8,249 107 1% 1,849 6,400 
1941 9,232 120 1% 1,532 7,700 
1942 10,681 141 1% 1,181 9,500 
1943 13,035 165 1% 735 12,300 
1944 18,081 203 1% 1,981 16,100 
1945 20,566 244 1% 1,966 18,600 
1946 27,930 321 1% 4,230 23,700 
1947 31,023 383 1% 4,723 26,300 
1948 33,101 449 1% 4,301 28,800 
1949 36,412 526 1% 4,712 31,700 
1950 42,163 1,320 3% 5,533 36,630 
1951 54,375 1,504 3% 7,086 47,289 
1952 60,993 1,628 3% 8,026 52,967 
1953 60,664 1,638 3% 8,063 52,601 
1954 73,936 1,895 3% 9,504 64,432 
1955 90,053 2,377 3% 11,335 78,718 
1956 102,920 2,622 3% 13,177 89,743 
1957 118,206 2,917 2% 15,129 103,077 
1958 131,377 3,434 3% 16,689 114,688 
1959 140,772 4,570 3% 17,952 122,820 
1960 159,703 5,089 3% 22,886 139,084 
1961 186,781 6,001 3% 24,275 147,802 
1962 207,952 6,469 3% 25,746 160,476 
1963 207,952 7,256 3% 27,503 173,800 
1964 245,501 8,101 3% 29,810 203,200 
1965 267,420 8,594 3% 32,655 219,600 
1966 297,196 8,886 3% 35,812 246,200 
1967 325,025 9,996 3% 39,496 272,700 
1968 359,858 10,726 3% 43,903 302,400 
1969 397,796 11,192 3% 51,069 358,016 
1970 444,271 12,049 3% 57,348 415,336 
1971 490,011 12,042 2% 64,385 458,760 
1972 564,727 13,307 2% 72,032 528,337 
1973 690,891 13,511 2% 80,638 646,468 
1974 899,707 22,439 2% 90,670 839,495 
1975 1,100,050 28,040 3% 102,060 1,024,149 
1976 1,370,968 33,605 2% 112,708 1,268,524 
1977 1,849,263 58,380 3% 122,488 1,703,427 
1978 2,337,298 76,001 3% 133,224 2,160,363 
1979 3,067,526 85,957 3% 178,389 2,817,101 
1980 4,276,490 81,818 2% 236,591 3,928,832 
1981 5,874,386 225,958 4% 527,202 5,353,899 
1982 9,417,089 301,911 3% 956,298 8,299,932 
1983 17,141,694 950,351 6% 2,176,257 14,692,943 
1984 28,748,889 1,263,416 4% 3,358,693 24,571,149 
1985 47,402,349 1,640,713 3% 5,331,186 40,267,558 
1986 79,353,450 2,001,439 3% 10,870,871 64,704,574 
1987 195,614,485 7,036,561 4% 25,278,330 160,365,650 
1988 389,258,523 8,943,670 2% 46,762,736 331,944,644 
1989 503,667,765 6,302,209 1% 53,657,467 441,615,147 
Sources: as described above 
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Table D-3b: Total GDP, oil sector GDP, consumption of fixed capital and NNP. 
VENEZUELA 
Year GDP 
mill. bolivars 
OR GDP 
mill. bolivars 
% oil In GDP 
% 
Consumption of 
Fixed capital 
mill. bolivars 
NNP 
mill. bolivars 
1920 1208.3 2.3 0% 51.1 
1921 943.9 4.5 0% 43.1 
1922 932.3 7.2 1% 36.3 
1923 1075.1 15.3 1% 37.5 
1924 1420.7 41.1 3% 37.5 
1925 1942.0 110.4 6% 37.7 
1926 2780.7 112.6 4% 39.0 
1927 2591.2 293.4 11% 39.1 
1928 2887.9 452.4 16% 41.2 
1929 3225.3 637.3 20% 44.6 
1930 3175.0 627.7 20% 47.8 
1931 2277.9 393.1 17% 53.9 
1932 2215.3 469.0 21% 59.7 
1933 1971.3 299.0 15% 55.7 
1934 2049.8 328.6 16% 49.0 
1935 2152.7 370.9 17% 57.5 
1936 2504.6 433.1 17% 65.9 2,053 
1937 3087.7 512.5 17% 71.7 2,559 
1938 3230.1 470.0 15% 81.8 2,746 
1939 3416.8 453.4 13% 91.0 2,887 
1940 3238.9 462.9 14% 102.8 2,737 
1941 3321.4 596.7 18% 116.6 2,598 
1942 3005.7 407.6 14% 134.3 2,495 
1943 3401.6 506.3 15% 156.6 2,885 
1944 4430.7 776.1 18% 175.3 3,654 
1945 5904.5 989.9 17% 201.8 5,047 
1946 7535.4 1,414.0 19% 246.9 6,318 
1947 10616.8 2,165.3 20% 316.5 8,729 
1948 12830.7 3,314.6 26% 355.8 10,312 
1949 13705.8 3,055.9 22% 390.0 11,544 
1950 13784.4 3,055.9 22% 436.3 11,168 
1951 14759.3 3,316.4 22% 492.1 11,864 
1952 16048.5 3,765.3 23% 537.8 12,938 
1953 17865.3 3,936.6 22% 608.6 13,529 
1954 19888.4 4,245.7 21% 690.6 16,125 
1955 22139.9 4,866.1 22% 799.7 17,427 
1956 24187.8 5,593.1 23% 931.0 19,089 
1957 28822.5 6,997.7 24% 1,079.9 18,382 
1958 29176.2 6,234.0 21% 1,209.6 24,087 
1959 30899.2 5,975.2 19% 1,371.0 22,599 
1960 31798.1 5,897.9 19% 1,513.8 22,121 
1961 31465.8 6,072.3 19% 1,687.1 24,760 
1962 32855.7 6,548.4 20% 1,945.0 26,021 
1963 34681.3 6,481.9 19% 2,211.6 27,327 
1964 39197.1 8,630.4 22% 2,805.4 30,694 
1965 42172.2 7,565.4 18% 3,166.5 32,731 
1966 43532.9 8,322.4 19% 3,452.2 33,836 
1967 46303.5 8,640.2 19% 3,722.3 36,372 
1968 49810.2 8,865.0 18% 3,951.1 39,066 
1969 52068.6 8,808.8 17% 4,211.6 41,444 
1970 56683.2 8,607.9 15% 4,520.0 45,832 
1971 62587.6 9,881.0 16% 4,897.0 50,017 
1972 67726.2 9,897.8 15% 5,269.3 55,851 
1973 79242.2 14,653.0 18% 5,951.8 64,931 
1974 120919.8 35,606.7 29% 7,135.4 104,440 
1975 129439.3 29,330.1 23% 8,434.2 112,629 
1976 150419.8 30,068.2 20% 9,560.9 130,864 
1977 176316.6 31,821.1 18% 11,105.9 151,908 
1978 192023.8 29,379.1 15% 12,907.2 161,724 
1979 231856.4 44,384.1 19% 15,028.7 195,515 
1980 282564.0 60,997.8 22% 18,355.3 237,708 
1981 318147.4 65,631.2 21% 21,720.7 265,015 
1982 329649.9 53,267.8 16% 25,170.1 265,069 
1983 326292.5 45,854.1 14% 30,050.8 251,704 
1984 391825.1 68,287.8 17% 40,659.1 302,809 
1985 433594.8 57,197.1 13% 49,860.5 333,320 
1986 483463.2 34,247.9 7% 61,611.3 370,212 
1987 689026.3 62,540.8 9% 106,566.5 522,961 
1988 898281.4 70,369.! 8% 145,973.5 687,948 
1989 1533437.9 220,566.2 14% 273,906.8 1,121.984 
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Appendix E 
Oil Reserves 
Oil Reserves in Mexico: A Short Historical Note 
The evidence presented here will make clear that the late discovery of Mexican oil 
reserves was mainly the result of the indolence of the national company. Confirmation 
of this is provided by contemporary sources, and also by some more recent reviews of 
the state of exploration activities. The conclusion is that if foreign companies had 
continued exploiting Mexican oil during the century, more oil reserves could have 
been available by the late 1920s or 1930s at the latest and the pace of discoveries 
would have been faster. 
Although it can be argued that nationalist tendencies in Mexico paralysed exploration 
and reduced production several years before the nationalisation actually took place, the 
real cessation of exploration came with nationalisation. Exploration never played an 
active role in Pemex's oil policy and always lagged behind extraction. Prospecting 
activities were almost completely abandoned during some years. As late as 1970, only 
one-tenth of the area geologically recognised as a possible store of crude and gas had 
been explored. 
Contemporary and revisionist literature points to three main causes for the poor 
performance of Pemex's exploratory activity before the 1970s. The first reason is 
Pemex's insufficiency of technical knowledge, personnel and equipment. The second 
is the deficient financial situation of the national company, which thus could not afford 
the costs of undertaking exploration. Last but not least is the perception by the 
authorities that exploration, after all, was not an urgent matter. All three causes are 
briefly analysed below. 
The lack of technical knowledge, personnel and equipment was the principal problem 
in the years immediately after the nationalisation, and it continued to hamper 
exploration until relatively recently. ' The problem was first pointed out by foreigners 
1 Although widely accepted, some authors question Pemex's shortage of skilled labour. 'Pemex has 
always prided itself on the competence of its workers. The foreign companies were obliged by law to 
train and utilise Mexican nationals in the operations of their Mexican subsidiaries. Thus, even in the 
days immediately following the expropriation, skilled labour was one of the few areas in which Pemex 
did not suffer a severe shortage' R. B. Mancke, Mexican Oil and Natural Gas. Political, Strategic and 
Economic Implications (New York, 1979). The rest of this section will disprove this argument. 
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but also recognised early on by the Mexicans. In the words of the Standard Oil 
Company: 
`The Government makes much of the fact [... ] that it has bettered the companies' 
record (in number of wells completed and drilled). Not only is the figure below the 
average of the wells drilled by the companies during the three years preceding 
expropriation, but the Government has drilled almost exclusively in fields defined and 
developed by private initiative. Worst of all no new fields are being developed, 
possibly due to lack of technical personnel'. 2 
British companies expressed their doubts along the same lines, claiming that 'Cardenas 
[the president of the Republic at that time] will have to call foreign technicians and 
experts for training Mexicans to operate the industry now under his custody'. 3 
From the Mexican point of view, prospecting activities had to be reduced to a minimal 
level since data were not available. Foreign companies had taken with them most of 
the available information, including geological photographic evidence of an area 
around 3.000 square kilometres of Tabasco and Veracruz. 4 But the companies also 
controlled the petroleum geologists, who left the country with them. Therefore, 
information had to be patiently reconstructed by Pemex technicians who even lacked 
the materials to undertake the necessary fieldwork .5 Hence, even if the information had 
been available, there were no competent people in Mexico to interpret it promptly. The 
production department was said to have only five engineers in the period after 
expropriation. 6 Consequently, the key point was the lack of qualified personnel. This 
situation forced the national company to sign drilling contracts in 1949 with a US 
group that included American Independent Oil Company, Signal Oil and Gas and 
Edwin W. Pauley. Foreign companies undertook a great deal of the exploratory 
activity between 1950 and 1970 as shown in Figure E-1. 
2 Standard Oil Company, The Reply to Mexico (New York, 1940). Parentheses added. 
The Economist, March-April 1938. As quoted in E. Gonzalez Aparicio, 'La Economla Nacional y el 
Problema Petrolero', Revista de Economia II (1938) 7-12. 
4 A. M. Sordo and C. R. Lopez, Exploraciön, Reservas y Produccldn de Petrdleo en Afexlco, 1970-1985 
(Mexico D. F., ist. ed., 1988). For more information see J. Meneses do Gyves, El nuevo petrdleo de 
Mexico (Mexico D. F., 1983). 
s PEMEX, (Petröleos Mexicanos), Informes del Director General Senador Antonio J. Bermüdez 1947- 
1952 (Mexico D. F., 1952), 1948 report, p. 29. 
6 R. Sheldon, Poza Rica Field: Backbone of Oil Industry in Mexico', Oil and Gas Journal (1939), p. 
104 as quoted in. J. R. Powell, The Mexican Petroleum Industry 1938-1950 (Berkeley, 1956). 
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Figure E-1: Drilling by Pemex and contractors. Mexico 1917-1988 (km) 
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Sources: PEMEX, (Petrbleos Mexicanos), Anuario Estadistico 1988 (Mexico D. F., 1988), p. 34 
The Mexican oil industry had to wait until 1965 for the government to create the 
Mexican Petroleum Institute, an institution exclusively dedicated to the transfer of 
technology. By the 1970s, the Institute had become a major source of strength for the 
Mexican oil industry and a major influence in Latin America. 7 Its main contribution to 
exploratory activities was the systematic interpretation of the available geophysical 
information. Before 1965, foreign companies processed most of the information 
because Mexico had not generated enough capacity for processing and interpreting 
exploration data. 8 Therefore, it is clear that the national company lacked human 
resources for exploration, which hindered the discovery of new reserves for a period of 
over 25 years since the nationalisation. 
However, exploration was also handicapped by two other constraints, namely the 
insufficient financial resources of the national company and the management's 
G. Philip, Oil And Politics In Latin America. Nailunalist Movements And Stute Connpanie, 
(Cambridge, 1982). 
R Sordo and Lopez, E ploruciön. Reservar r Produccicin de Petrcileo en Alrsico, 1970-1985 
Parenthesis added. 
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indifference towards exploration. 9 Financial problems were a long lasting issue. 
During the first 20 years of operation of the monopoly, Pemex appears to have made 
only a negligible contribution to investment programmes. Furthermore, Pemex could 
not meet its commitments to the state and owed arrears of tax. From 1954, the 
company presented losses in its accounts. New investments were financed almost in 
their entirety through long-term or short-term loans and by arrears of debt to the 
state. 10 Although Pemex was able to maintain its central function (that of producing 
and selling oil to stimulate Mexican industry) the organisation increasingly had 
problems of its own. 
The company lagged in exploratory drilling, apparently because it was unwilling to 
risk its scarce capital. " The dearth of exploration was largely due to inability to import 
drilling rings, pipes, and other necessary equipment from the United States. 12 This 
biased the exploratory activity towards low cost programmes. The finding cost of 
crude reserves was calculated at $0.048 per barrel in 1952 and only $0.035 per barrel 
in 1956, since most of the drilling took place in areas which were already known to be 
oil bearing in the 1930s. 13 Owing to the relative stagnation of exploratory drilling, 
most of the additions to the proven reserves in the period 1960-1970 came from the re- 
examination of evaluation methods. 14 Financial capital constraints, as much as limits 
on human capital, constituted the major obstacles to the early expansion of Mexico's 
oil reserves. 
These obstacles were just perpetuated and enhanced by administrative inaction. 
Exploration never played an active role in Pemex's oil policy. This was justified 
because the reserves/production ratio, though declining, gave a certain margin of 
stability to exploitation from 1938 up to 1970.15 Immediately after expropriation, the 
richness of the existing fields and the disappearance of export outlets seemed to 
minimise the need for exploration. In 1953, Bermudez's Directors' Report mentioned 
for the first time the fact that Pemex was maintaining a 20-year reserves/production 
9A contract made some years earlier -1947- with a small Louisiana oil company to drill one hundred 
test wells lapsed because the company was unable to get equipment. Powell, The Mexican Petroleum 
Industry 1938-1950 this author quotes Excelsior, 21 August 1947 as the origin of this info. 10 On 31 December 1958, the accumulated deficit totalled 215 million pesos. United Nations. 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Petroleum Exploration: Capital Requirements and 
Methods of Financing (New York, 1962), quoted in Philip, Oil And Politics In Latin America. 
Nationalist Movements And State Companies . 11 11 Powell, The Mexican Petroleum Industry 1938-1950. 
t2 Ibid. 
13 Data from A. J. Bermudez, The Mexican National Petroleum Industry: A case study In Nationalisation 
(Stanford, 1963), Appendix, Table 6. The comment corresponds to Philip, Oil And Politics In Latin 
America. Nationalist Movements And State Companies . 14 Sordo and L6pez, Exploraci6n, Reservas y Produccidn de Petraleo en Mexico, 1970-1985. 
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ratio as a matter of policy. 16 There was no long-run strategy. Although the scarce 
financial capacity was a important, even more crucial was the authorities' perception 
that exploration development was not urgent. For supplying domestic energy needs, 
the pace of extraction still guaranteed an average availability of reserves of around 20 
years. '7 Pemex's decision-makers were able to overcome technical and financial 
problems to revitalise exploratory activity when the shortage of reserves threatened the 
company by the late 1960s. Hence, it should be obvious that the authorities' inaction is 
at least as important as the lack of human and physical capital for the slow pace of oil 
discoveries in Mexico. One can argue that all three causes of the late discovery of oil 
are directly linked to the nationalisation process. 
1s Ibid. 
16 PEMEX, (Petr6leos Mexicanos), Informe del Director General, 1953.1960 (Mexico D. F., 1953- 
1960). This view was still supported in later years as can be seen in PEMEX, (Petrbleos Mexicanos), 
Programa de actividades para el aflo 1959 (Mexico D. F., 1959), p. 1. 17 Sordo and Lopez, Exploraciön, Reservas y Producciön de Petraleo en Mexlc o, 1970-1985. 
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The historical map series in Map E-1 confirm the aforementioned fact that new areas 
were discovered only after the 1970s; until then, exploitation was concentrated in the 
previously known areas. New oil areas were found in the south of the country 
(Chiapas, Tabasco and Campeche) in the mid-1970s. These reserves increased by 60 
percent during 1978. However, their relevance to the national reserves diminished 
from 64 percent in 1977 to 41 percent in 1978. This was due to the incorporation of the 
proven reserves of Chicontepec, which participation in the national total achieved 44 
percent. The relevant fact for our purposes is that the existence of hydrocarbons in 
Chicontepec was known since 1931, but the field was not developed owing to all three 
problems discussed previously. 18 As for the southern fields, it could be argued that 
their late development depended on the improvement of oil drilling technologies. The 
reason was that the fields of Tabasco and Chiapas lie at a depth of 12,000 to 14,000 
feet, far deeper than Mexico's previously discovered oil reserves and Campeche's oil 
was offshore -a novelty for Mexican engineers. 
19 Against the depth problem, one is 
persuaded by the fact that American companies drilled beyond 12,000 feet by 193520 
The technology was available. Yet it is also true that of the 16 drilling machines 
Pemex owned in 1939,8 could only drill up to 900 meters (3,000 feet) and the rest 
could not go beyond 2,200 meters (7,300 feet), and still by 1947 none of the ones in 
use could drill beyond 3,000 meters (10,000 feet). ' Similarly, drilling in shallow 
coastal waters and lakes up to 150 meters deep began in the 1920s in the Caspian Sea 
near Baku and in Lake Maracaibo in Venezuela. It seems clear that a technological 
breakthrough was not required for the development of most of the fields discovered in 
the 1970s, just the financial resources. 
If foreign companies had continued exploiting Mexican oil throughout the century, 
more oil reserves could have been available by the late 1920s or 1930s at the latest and 
the pace of discoveries would have been faster. The reasoning is that under this 
hypothetical scenario, all the reasons for the late discovery of oil reserves are removed. 
Foreign companies had the human and physical capital to undertake exploratory 
activities. In addition, they could not allow themselves to disregard exploration drilling 
18 Data from the second chapter of Ibid.. 
19 R. B. Mancke, Mexican Oil and Natural Gas. Political, Strategic and Economic Implications (New 
York, 1979), p. 62. The author refers to the Tabasco and Chiapas areas as the Reforma field. 
20 American Petroleum Institute, Petroleum Facts and Figures (New York, 5th ed., 1937). The well was 
located in West Texas. Among the listed deep tests, there are two Mexican fields. Indeed, a well in the 
Mexican state of Veracruz reached 10,000 feet in 1931; it was the first one reaching that depth outside 
of US and held the world's record for almost two years. 
21 PEMEX, Inform es del Director General SenadorAntonio J. Bermüdez 1947-1952,1948 report, p. 34. 
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as Pemex did. Finally, no major technical breakthrough impeded an earlier 
development of the fields ultimately discovered in the 1970s. All these facts explain 
how, despite of its bigger overall endowment of oil, Mexicans have used a smaller 
proportion of reserves than Venezuelans. 
Notes and sources for oil reserves data in Table E-1: 
Proven reservoirs of hydrocarbons in million of barrels as by 31 December. The gaps 
in the series were filled by linear interpolation. 
Mexico 
" 1918: PEMEX, Informe del Director General, 1953-1960 
" 1938-1992: Mexico, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e 
Informätica (INEGI), Estadfsticas histöricas de Mexico (Mexico D. F., 3rd cd., 
1994) p. 536. 
For Mexico, reservoirs seems to include gas along with oil and therefore, the 
production of natural gas -converted into oil equivalents- were included included at 
the time of calculating the reserves/production (R/P) ratio. The R/P presented in 
Chapter 4 diverge slightly from the series provided by British Petroleum, BP Statistical 
Review of World Energy (yearly). Yet the average of BP separate estimates for oil and 
gas (over 40 years for oil and above 70 years for gas in 1985) coincides with the 
figures presented here. The fact that our calculation is consistent with the R/P 
described by Sordo and Lopez (1988) for the history of Pemex provides some 
reassurance about its reliability. 
Note the sudden change in the reserves figures in 1976. At 31 of December 1976, 
proven reserves were estimated at 6480 million of barrels by the `conservative' 
method, based on wheels under development. Another estimation included in `proven 
reserves' the reserves, which were economically and technically feasible of 
development. Thanks to that formula, 4680 million barrels were incorporated to the 
total proven reserves, resulting in 11160 million barrels. The new method offered two 
main advantages: lower costs and better looking prospects. Both characteristics were 
essential to a Mexican economy lacking the financial resources and needing a 
promising international projection. 22 
22 Sordo and Lopez, Exploraciön, Reservas y Producci6n de Petrdleo en Alerico, 1970-1985, pp. 102. 
103. 
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Venezuela 
0 1919,1924,1929,1934 and 1939: A. R. Martinez, 'El papel dc la explotaciön 
petrolera en el proceso de modernizaciön de la sociedad venezolana y la 
perspectiva inmediata', in Mieres (ed. ), Hacia la Venezuela Post petrolera 
[conference sponsored by la Academia Nacional de las Ciencias Econamicas 
in 1985], Vol. 1 (Caracas, 1989), p. 166. 
" 1925 and 1935: United Nations. Economic Commission for Latin America, 
'Economic Developments in Venezuela in the 1950s', Economic Bulletin for 
Latin America 1 (1960) 1, p. 59. 
" 1944-1970: Banco Central de Venezuela, La economia venezolana en los 
41timos treinta anos (Caracas, 1971), p114. 
" 1968-1976: Banco Central de Venezuela, La economic venezolana en los 
41timos treinta y cinco anos (Caracas, 1978), p. 65 (data back to 1944; 
overlapping years coincide with the previous source). 
" 1944-1985, PODS 1985, published the whole series. 
At least until 1967, Venezuelan reserves included condensed materials. In 1982, the 
reserves of the Orinoco river in Amazonia were also included in the proven reserves 
despite the technical difficulties involved in their potential exploitation. From 1970 
onwards, there are some important discrepancies between the figures published by the 
national offices and independent sources. These discrepancies obliged OPEC to 
publish two different sets of data for member countries. In the case of Venezuela, there 
is no a systematic relationship between the official and independent figures (mostly 
from the Oil and Gas Journal). 1970-1979 data available in the OPEC, Annual Report 
of 1979, p. 148. 
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Table E-1: Hydrocarbon reserves and reserves/production ratio. 
Mexico and Venezuela. 1918-1990 
Mexico Venezuela Mexico Venezuela 
Year Reserves R/P Reserves R/P I Year Reserves R/P Reserves R/P 
mill. barrels years mill. barrels years mill. barrels years mill. barrels years 
1918 1,200 18.8 1956 2,959 25.9 13,955 15.5 
1919 1,204 13.8 6 21.0 1957 3,374 28.4 15,592 15.4 
1920 1,208 7.7 106 29.6 1958 4,070 28.4 16,721 17.6 
1921 1,211 6.3 185 38.1 1959 4,348 27.4 17,003 16.8 
1922 1,215 6.7 270 46.7 1960 4,787 29.3 17,402 16.7 
1923 1,219 8.1 360 51.0 1961 4,990 28.5 16,879 15.8 
1924 1,223 8.8 503 55.3 1962 5,008 27.5 16,805 14.4 
1925 1,227 10.6 500 25.1 1963 5,150 27.0 17,011 14.4 
1926 1,230 13.6 611 17.1 1964 5,227 25.2 17,195 13.9 
1927 1,234 19.2 722 11.9 1965 5,078 24.1 17,250 13.6 
1928 1,238 24.7 833 7.9 1966 5,357 24.2 16,873 13.7 
1929 1,242 27.8 943 6.9 1967 5,486 22.7 15,959 12.4 
1930 1,246 31.5 1,258 9.3 1968 5,530 22.0 15,676 11.9 
1931 1,249 37.8 1,572 13.5 1969 5,570 21.0 14,890 11.4 
1932 1,253 38.2 1,887 16.2 1970 5,568 19.7 13,762 10.2 
1933 1,257 40.5 2,201 18.6 1971 5,428 19.6 13,919 10.7 
1934 1,261 33.0 2,516 18.5 1972 5,388 18.8 13,812 11.7 
1935 1,265 31.4 2,900 19.5 1973 5,432 18.6 18,567 15.1 
1936 1,268 30.9 3,197 20.7 1974 5,773 16.5 18,567 17.1 
1937 1,272 27.2 3,494 18.8 1975 6,338 15.5 18,398 21.5 
1938 1,276 30.0 3,791 20.2 1976 11,160 25.4 18,266 21.8 
1939 1,190 24.3 4,088 20.0 1977 16,002 22.9 18,035 22.1 
1940 1,225 25.4 4,605 25.1 1978 40,194 64.9 18,277 23.1 
1941 1,225 25.0 5,123 22.6 1979 45,126 61.1 18,524 21.5 
1942 1,236 30.6 5,640 38.1 1980 60,126 63.0 19,687 24.8 
1943 1,257 31.7 6,157 34.3 1981 72,008 64.1 20,144 26.2 
1944 1,548 36.2 6,674 26.0 1982 72,008 55.6 24,578 35.6 
1945 1,515 31.2 7,038 21.8 1983 72,500 57.9 25,887 39.4 
1946 1,437 26.5 7,214 18.6 1984 71,750 57.9 28,028 42.5 
1947 1,388 22.2 7,296 16.8 1985 70,900 58.7 29,326 47.8 
1948 1,367 21.0 7,642 15.6 1986 70,000 62.4 
1949 1,650 23.8 8,233 17.1 1987 69,000 59.0 
1950 1,608 19.1 8,724 16.0 1988 67,600 58.5 
1951 1,919 20.5 9,064 14.6 1989 66,450 57.1 
1952 2,241 23.6 9,221 14.0 1990 65,500 55.4 
1953 2,233 24.8 10,152 15.8 
1954 2,549 25.1 10,932 15.8 
1955 2,751 24.6 12,429 15.8 
298 
Sources: described above. 
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Appendix F 
Oil Prices 
A note about oil quality and pricing 
Crude oil pricing is one of the most controversial issues of the international petroleum 
industry. However, something can be said about some of the variables that influence 
the price of oil. There are two main aspects of crude oil quality that influence the price: 
the distillate content and the sulphur content. Additionally, the price differential of a 
crude oil varies with its location, and naturally reflects transportation cost. 
The gravity scale of the American Petroleum Institute (API) is the main quality 
criterion for crude oil pricing; the higher the gravity the higher the price of crude oil of 
a particular type. According to this classification, crudes are divided into three 
categories: heavy, medium and light oils. ' 
Heavy oils are those crude oils of API gravity in the range of 7 to 22 degrees. 
Approximately 1% of the free world crude oil is in this category. 2 Traditionally most 
Mexican oil was heavy and therefore of low value. Venezuela was the main source of 
Table F-1. Oil gravity 
heavy crude oils to international markets by the 
classification mid-1980s. 
HEAVY 7° to 22° 
Venezuela and Mexico 
MEDIUM 22.1°to 30° 
Venezuela, Nigeria 
LIGHT >300 
Middle East 
Sources: Jenkins, G., Oil Economist's 
Handbook 1985 (London, 1985). 
mid-1980s. 
Crude oils of API range 22.1 to 30 are considered 
medium crude oils. Two well known crudes of this 
class are Nigerian and Tia Juana (Venezuela). 
Venezuela has historically produced heavy and 
medium crudes 4 On Venezuelan crudes the price 
differential was about Scents/API gravity -identical 
value for US indigenous crude. 
Light crude oils are those of API gravity of more than 30 degrees. Light crude oils 
command a higher price than other grades because of their high distillate contents and 
1 Definitions and data from G. Jenkins, Oil Economist's Handbook 1985 (London, 1985). 
2 'Free world' was used to signal the exclusion of communist countries in the oil reports. 
3 US Tariff Commission, 'Production cost of petroleum products and of refined petroleum products'. 
(Washington, D. C., 1932), p. 51'. See also 'The next shock? ', in The Economist, 6 March 1999,. The 
article refers to the decreasing price of oil, which may drive heavy oil producers as Mexico or 
Venezuela out of business. 
° Gravity available at Venezuela. Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons, Venezuelan Petroleum Industry 
Statistical Data (Caracas, 1962), p. 9. 
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also because they invariably have low sulphur contents. Important suppliers of light 
crude oils include all countries of the Middle East. 
Still, the main difficulty consists in deciding what prices to use: posted prices, realised 
prices, discounted prices, etc. Posted prices are most relevant to our discussion, since 
they are the real foundation of revenue of the host governments of producing countries. 
Historically speaking, posted prices originated in the United States and they were 
buyer's price, not seller's prices. That is, they were announced by refiners, who thus 
defined the prices they were prepared to pay for crude oils at the well-head from any 
producers connected to their pipeline gathering system. After adequate transportation 
costs were added, posted prices were determined at export terminals on the U. S Gulf 
Coast. 5 One should be aware of the fact that realised prices were well under posted 
prices and therefore, using posted prices will overestimate the actual value of the 
resource. In any case one should also be aware that a price per barrel, whether posted, 
realised or discounted, is the result of a number of averages: the average yearly price in 
different markets of different oil qualities. Therefore, any price given is just an 
approximation to the actual value of oil produced in a year. 
Notes for Mexico's oil prices series: 
The historical time series for Mexican oil did not exist as such. For the purpose of this 
research, historical Mexican oil prices were compiled putting together diverse sources. 
This section summarises the range of sources available and their consistency. 
From 1901 to 1935, two sources provide the commercial value of oil production in 
Mexican pesos. Given that the amount produced is known, can obtain the price per 
barrel (a) by a simple division one. An alternative calculation is also possible for the 
years 1924-1937. The annual average posted price in New York of crude oil in 
Mexican pesos per metric tone (m3) is available for those years. We can convert pesos 
per m3 into pesos per barrel (b) by a mere multiplication 6A consistent disparity 
appears when contrasting the outputs of each source, as shown in Table F-2. 
5 T. Rifai, The Pricing of Crude Oil (London, 1974), p. 8. 
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Table F-2: Oil prices per barrel in Mexico, 1925-1935, alternative sources 
Year Pesos/m Pesos per barrel Differential Year Pesos/m ' Pesos per barrel Differential 
(a) (b) (a-b) (a) (b) (a-b) 
1925 24.61 2.590741 3.910529 -1.31979 1931 15.36 2.346616 2.440704 -0.09409 
1926 24.54 2.489713 3.899406 . 1.40969 1932 17.61 2.307149 2.798229 -0.49108 
1927 23.73 2.456978 3.770697 -1.31372 1933 21.37 2.665702 3.395693 -0.72999 
1928 18.63 2.032789 2.960307 -0.92752 1934 30.53 3.331229 4.851217 -1.51999 
1929 17.62 2.059293 2.799818 -0.74052 1935 27.58 3.413635 4.382462 -0.96883 
1930 16.30 2.047368 2.59007 -0.5427 
sources: 
(a) For the years 1901-1923, data published in Mexico, Departamento de la Estadistica Nacional, El 
progreso econömico de Mexico. Un estudio econdmico estadistico (Mexico D. F., 2nd ed., 1924), 
p. 28. Same data, but extended up to 1935 are available at Mexico, Government of, 'Estadistica 
Petrolera', Revista de Industria. Revista Mensual 1 (1937 December) 2 p. 21. Both sets are fully 
consistent. 
(b) Mexico. Secretaria de Patrimonio Nacional, El Petr6leo de Mexico (Mexico D. F., 1940 1st ed., 
1963) p. 45 for 1923-1933 data and pp. 74-75 for 1933-1937 data. New York posted prices. 
The price of crude oil in the New York market for 1925-1937 is consistently above the 
price resulting from the commercial value of the production by about one peso per 
barrel. The difference is most probably due to the transportation cost, since transport 
costs were included in the posted prices in the USA. The New York price was the 
official price used to calculate taxes by Mexican governments before the 
nationalisation.? Therefore, the consistency should not be surprising. For our purposes, 
nevertheless, prices excluding transport costs are more appropriate since they are 
closer to the price at well-head. 
As mentioned in the relevant section of Chapter 4, official price series for crude oil do 
not to exist in Mexico from 1938 to 1975. The price series for this period have been 
constructed assembling value and volume for exports of crude oil from the sources 
listed below. 
Prices for the period 1975-1985 are available from the BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy, 1987. These are official government selling prices on the first of January and 
first of July each year (average taken) for the Isthmus crude. Official government 
selling prices, although not withdrawn, became largely irrelevant from the beginning 
of 1986, when OPEC introduced a pricing new pricing system. 8 Thereafter, the Brent 
and West Texas Intermediate spot prices were the principal crude markers in 
international prices. Brent prices are the ones used here because they reflect better the 
price of heavy oil. 
6 We know X pesos/m3, if we multiply that by 0.1589 m3/barrel, we would have X pesos per barrel. 
That is the formula applied from 1925 to 1937. 7 M6xico. Secretaria de Industria y Comercio, El petr6leo en la Republica Mexicana (Mexico D. F., 
1917). 
8 The new price system is referred as netback. 
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Sources for oil prices data on Table F-3: 
Mexico: 
Oil prices: 
Oil prices series knowing volumes and values produced and/or exported, oil prices 
were inferred from the following sources: 
" 1901-1923: Mexico. Departamento de la Estadistica Nacional, El progreso 
econömico de Mexico. Un estudio econdmico estadfstico (Mexico D. F., 2nd ed., 
1924), p. 28. 
" 1923-1935: Mexico, Government of, 'Estadistica Petrolera', Revista de Industria. 
Revista Mensual 1 (1937 December) 2, p. 21. 
" 1938-1939: PEMEX, (Petröleos Mexicanos), Informes del Director General 
Senador Antonio J. Bermüdez 1947-1952 (Mexico D. F., 1952), p. 17. 
" 1940-1973: Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior S. A., Comercio Exterior de 
Mexico (Mexico D. F., Volumes for the period 1948-1973) and Banco Nacional de 
Comercio Exterior S. A., 6 anos en el comercio exterior de Mexico (Mexico D. F., 
1964). 
" Prices 1975-1985: British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 1987 
p. 14. Official Government selling prices on the first of January and July each year 
(average taken) for the Isthmus crude. 
Exchange rate (peso/US dollar): 
" 1901-1987: Mexico. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informätica 
(INEGI), Estadisticas histöricas de Mexico (Mexico D. F., 2nd ed., 1990), p. 855. 
" For 1980-1989: Mexico. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informätica 
(INEGI), Anuario Estadistico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (Mexico D. F., 
1990), p. 810. 
Venezuela: 
Oil prices: 
" 1921-1991: (in dollars per barrel in the original) Baptista, A., Bases Cuantitativas 
de la Economia Venezolana, 1830-1989 (Caracas, 1991). 
Exchange rate (bolivar/US dollar): 
" up to 1938: Venezuela. Ministerio de Fomento, Anuario estadistico de Venezuela, 
1938, pp. 417-420. 
" 1939-1963: Venezuela. Ministerio de Fomento, Anuario estadistico de Venezuela, 
1957-1963, p. 1046. 
9 1963-1985: PODS, 1985, p. 151. 
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Table F-3 Oil prices and dollar exchange rates: Mexico and Venezuela 1901- 
1989 
(National currency and dollars per barrel) 
Mexico Venezuela 
303 
Year 
Exchange 
Rate 
pesos/$ 
Oil price 
pesos/barrel $/barrel 
Oil price 
$/barrel blvs/barrel 
Exchange 
rate 
blvl/$ 
1901 2.11 0.20 0.09 
1902 2.39 0.20 0.08 
1903 2.38 0.20 0.08 
1904 1.99 0.20 0.10 
1905 2.02 0.20 0.10 
1906 1.99 0.20 0.10 
1907 2.01 0.20 0.10 
1908 2.01 0.20 0.10 
1909 2.01 0.20 0.10 
1910 2.01 0.20 0.10 
1911 2.01 0.20 0.10 
1912 2.01 0.25 0.12 
1913 2.08 0.30 0.14 
1914 3.30 0.30 0.09 
1915 11.15 0.40 0.04 
1916 23.83 0.55 0.02 
1917 1.91 0.85 0.45 
1918 1.81 1.40 0.78 
1919 1.99 1.83 0.92 
1920 2.01 2.00 1.00 2.69 15.06 5.60 
1921 2.04 1.89 0.93 1.23 7.38 6.00 
1922 2.05 1.84 0.90 1.31 7.07 5.40 
1923 2.06 1.91 0.93 1.46 7.74 5.30 
1924 2.07 1.95 0.94 1.74 8.87 5.10 
1925 2.03 2.59 1.28 1.80 9.18 5.10 
1926 2.07 2.49 1.20 1.77 9.29 5.25 
1927 2.12 2.46 1.16 1.24 6.45 5.20 
1928 2.08 2.03 0.98 1.02 5.30 5.20 
1929 2.08 2.06 0.99 1.16 6.03 5.20 
1930 2.12 2.05 0.96 1.15 6.15 5.35 
1931 2.43 2.35 0.97 0.72 4.33 6.01 
1932 3.17 2.31 0.73 0.81 5.51 6.80 
1933 3.53 2.67 0.76 0.61 2.75 4.50 
1934 3.60 3.33 0.93 0.88 3.34 3.80 
1935 3.60 3.41 0.95 0.84 3.28 3.90 
1936 3.60 3.30 0.92 0.88 3.43 3.90 
1937 3.60 4.90 1.36 0.96 3.17 3.30 
1938 4.52 4.73 1.05 0.93 2.88 3.10 
1939 5.18 4.24 0.82 0.80 2.47 3.09 
1940 5.40 3.62 0.67 0.93 2.87 3.09 
1941 4.86 3.52 0.72 0.98 3.03 3.09 
1942 4.85 3.88 0.80 1.01 3.12 3.09 
1943 4.85 4.14 0.85 1.03 3.18 3.09 
1944 4.85 3.96 0.82 1.05 3.24 3.09 
1945 4.85 3.78 0.78 1.06 3.28 3.09 
(cont. ) 
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Table F-3 Oil prices and dollar exchange rates: Mexico and Venezuela 1901- 
1989 
(cont. ) (National currency and dollars per barrel) 
Year 
Exchange 
rate 
pesos/$ 
Mexico 
Price 
pesos/barrel $/barrel 
Venezuela 
Price 
$/barrel blvs/barrel 
Exchange 
rate 
blvl/$ 
1946 4.85 5.16 1.06 1.26 3.89 3.09 
1947 4.85 5.01 1.03 1.75 5.41 3.09 
1948 5.74 8.84 1.54 2.41 7.45 3.09 
1949 8.01 10.98 1.37 2.25 6.95 3.09 
1950 8.65 13.72 1.59 2.12 6.55 3.09 
1951 8.65 15.27 1.76 2.00 6.18 3.09 
1952 8.65 17.08 1.97 2.14 6.61 3.09 
1953 8.65 14.36 1.66 2.30 7.11 3.09 
1954 11.34 17.44 1.54 2.31 7.14 3.09 
1955 12.50 17.71 1.42 2.34 7.23 3.09 
1956 12.50 18.85 1.51 2.36 7.29 3.09 
1957 12.50 24.28 1.94 2.65 8.19 3.09 
1958 12.50 59.44 1.74 2.50 7.73 3.09 
1959 12.50 19.26 1.54 2.23 6.89 3.09 
1960 12.50 16.43 1.31 2.12 6.55 3.09 
1961 12.50 21.40 1.71 2.12 6.55 3.09 
1962 12.50 22.94 1.84 2.08 6.43 3.09 
1963 12.50 22.65 1.81 2.03 6.27 3.09 
1964 12.50 23.15 1.85 1.94 8.54 4.40 
1965 12.50 23.32 1.87 1.88 8.27 4.40 
1966 12.50 23.12 1.85 1.88 8.27 4.40 
1967 12.50 23.33 1.87 1.85 8.14 4.40 
1968 12.50 23.25 1.86 1.86 8.18 4.40 
1969 12.50 22.63 1.81 1.81 7.96 4.40 
1970 12.50 23.00 1.84 1.84 8.10 4.40 
1971 12.50 29.38 2.35 2.35 10.22 4.35 
1972 12.50 31.50 2.52 2.52 10.84 4.30 
1973 12.50 46.38 3.71 3.71 15.58 4.20 
1974 12.50 131.63 10.53 10.53 44.23 4.20 
1975 12.50 140.00 11.20 10.99 46.16 4.20 
1976 15.69 190.63 12.15 11.15 47.39 4.25 
1977 22.69 303.48 13.38 12.54 53.67 4.28 
1978 22.76 301.57 13.25 12.04 51.53 4.28 
1979 22.82 418.75 18.35 17.96 76.87 4.28 
1980 22.95 763.09 33.25 26.44 113.16 4.28 
1981 24.51 919.13 37.50 29.71 127.16 4.28 
1982 57.18 1,929.83 33.75 27.47 117.57 4.28 
1983 150.29 4,621.42 30.75 25.31 108.58 4.29 
1984 85.19 2,470.51 29.00 26.70 159.93 5.99 
1985 310.28 8,649.06 27.88 25.89 155.08 5.99 
1986 637.87 9,172.57 14.38 12.82 160.25 6.77 
1987 1,405.80 25,908.89 18.43 16.32 202.50 9.62 
1988 2,289.58 34,252.12 14.96 13.51 168.88 12.33 
1989 2,483.37 45,197.33 18.20 16.87 210.88 15.25 
Sources: described above. 
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Appendix G 
Labour Force and Operation Costs Series 
Notes and sources on labour force estimates for Mexican oilfields: 
Aggregated labour costs of the oil industry -that is including all the labour involved 
from the discovery of oil to its actual delivery in the gas station- are available from 
Mexico, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informätica (INEGI), 
Estadisticas histöricas de Mexico (Mexico D. F., 3rd ed., 1994). Knowing oil 
production and quantity refined it was possible to estimate what amount of the 
labour force (and labour costs) belonged to each branch of the industry. 
Employees in oil fields are only available for: 
" 1934-1935: Mexico, Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico, Direcciön 
General Tecnica de Ingresos, Oficina de Investigaciones Econömicas, La 
Industria del Petröleo en Mexico edited by Manterola, M. (Mexico, D. F, 1938). 
" 1970-1979: Mexico. Secretaria de Programaciön y Presupuesto, La industria 
petrolera en Mexico (Mexico D. F., 1980), p. 360. 
As a consequence the data on employees in oil fields in Mexico needed to be 
estimated. The series were estimated using refining as control variable. The amount 
of oil processed was obtained from the following sources: 
" Crude processed 1921 and 1924-1935 and installed refining capacity in 1937 
from Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico. Direcciön General Tecnica de 
Ingresos. Oficina de Investigaciones Econömicas, La Industria del Petröleo en 
Mexico edited by Manterola, M., (Mexico, D. F, 1938). 
" 1938-1959: PEMEX, (Petröleos Mexicanos), Informe del Director General, 
1953-1960 (Mexico D. F., 1953-1960). 
" 1938-1985 also available from PEMEX, (Petrbleos Mexicanos), Anuario 
Estadistico 1988 (Mexico D. F., 1988). These series coincide with the data on 
barrels processed per day published by Instituto Mexican del Petröleo (ed. ), 
Memorias de Labores 1965-1973 Vol. I (Mexico D. F, 1984) and Memorias de 
Labores 1974-1979 Vol. II (Mexico D. F., 1984). 
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" 1985-1990 from Nacional Financiera, La Economfa Mexicana en Cifras 
(Mexico D. F., 1991), p. 89. 
The amount refined allowed to estimate the amount of people employed in refinery 
and therefore in oil fields. These estimates, based on the proportion of refining and 
production activities, are actually quite close to the limited actual figures available. 
These are compared in Table G-1. Even discounting the labour employed in refining 
activities, the estimated figures of labour force in the oil fields still overestimate the 
personnel directly involved in production activities as the table below shows. Yet 
for the sake of consistency the whole of the series used correspond to our 
estimation. 
Table G-1: Actual vs. estimated labour force in Mexican oil fields, 1970-1979 
Distribution of labour force In Mexican oil Industry 
Official estimates Estimation done for the thesis 
Primary Prima 
Total activities' Industrial" Transport"' Administration activities Other (refining) 
1970 71,062 36,501 16,775 7,474 10,313 42,136 28,92( 
1971 75,498 38,532 19,417 7,540 10,00 44,028 31,47( 
1972 75,748 38,652 17,929 7,829 11,338 42,088 33,66( 
1973 76,656 38,969 18,174 8,008 11,505 38,196 38,46( 
1974 77,679 39,479 19,376 8,199 10,61 37,959 39,72( 
1975 81,203 40,167 20,891 9,125 11,02 36,983 44,22 
1976 88,052 39,019 27,509 9,434 12,90 38,252 49,80 
1977 91,680 41,422 28,408 9,864 11,98 44,232 47,448 
1978 95,655 43,368 29,635 10,459 12,193 48,207 47,448 
1979 103,271 45,342 35,099 11,486 11,343 46,949 56,322 
P ercentages over total Percentages ov er total 
1970 51% 24% 11% 15°/ 59% 41% 
1971 51% 26% 10% 13°/ 58% 42°/ 
1972 51% 24% 10% 15% 56% 44°/ 
1973 51% 24% 10% 15% 50% 50°/ 
1974 51% 25% 11% 14°/ 49% S1°/ 
1975 49% 26% 11% 14°/ 46% 54°/ 
1976 44% 31% 11% 15°/ 43% 57% 
1977 45% 31% 11% 13°/ 48% 52°/ 
1978 45% 31% 11% 13°/ 50% 50% 
1979 44% 34% 11% 11°/ 45% 550% 
i Exploration and exploitation 
ii Refining and Petrochemical 
iii Marine and Sales 
Sources: official estimates from Mexico. Secretarfa de Programaci6n y Presupuesto, La industrla petrolera en 
Mexico (Mexico D. F., 1980). p360. 
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Once the labour force was divided between primary and other activities, it was 
possible to allocate the labour costs proportionally to the different categories. 
Labour cost sources are as follow: 
" 1934-1936: Mexico. Secretaria de Patrimonio Nacional, El Petröleo de Mexico 
(Mexico D. F., 1940 Ist ed., 1963), pp. 477-510. 
" 1937 PEMEX, (Petröleos Mexicanos), Informes del Director General Senador 
Antonio J. Bermüdez 1947-1952 (Mexico D. F., 1952). 
" 1938-1992 Mexico. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografa e Informätica 
(INEGI), Estadisticas histöricas de Mexico (Mexico D. F., 3rd cd., 1994), p. 573. 
Venezuela: 
Labour force: 
" 1921-1990 Baptista, A., Bases Cuantitativas de la Economla Venezolana, 1830- 
1995 (Caracas, 1997), cuadro B-5. 
Wages in oil industry: 
" 1921-1990 Baptista, A., Bases Cuantitativas de la Economia Venezolana, 1830- 
1989 (Caracas, 1991), pp. 139-141. 
Notes and sources on operation costs data in Table G-2: 
Mexico: 
" 1921: Mexico, Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico, Direccidn General 
Tecnica de Ingresos, Oficina de Investigaciones Econbmicas, La Industria del 
Petröleo en Mexico edited by Manterola, M., (Mexico, D. F, 1938). p. 152 
quoting the report by the Ingeniero Felipe Lianas, Camara de Senadores, in 
1923, titled `Mexico y su petroleo', notified a cost per barrel of 0.317 pesos in 
the Panuco zone at well-head and it was of 0.076 pesos per barrel in the 
Tuxpan zone. 
" 1927-1930: Operating costs from US Tariff Commission, 'Production cost of 
petroleum products and of refined petroleum products'. (Washington, D. C., 
1932). Cost per barrel in dollars in the original source multiplied by the 
exchange rate and the production here. 
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" 1934-1936: Mexico, Secretaria de Patrimonio Nacional, EI Petraleo de Mexico. 
Recopilaciön de documentos oficiales del conflicto de orden econömico de la 
industria petrolera con una...., (Mexico D. F., 1940 1st ed., 1963)., pp. 477-510. 
" 1970-1979: Official operating costs in oil fields published in Mexico, Secretaria 
de Programaciön y Presupuesto, La industria petrolera en Mexico (Mexico 
D. F., 1979), pp. 402-403. 
The gaps of the operating cost series were filled by linear interpolation of the cost 
per barrel. Then the inferred cost per barrel was multiplied by the specific 
production each year, thereby obtaining the value of the total production costs. As 
control of this procedure we had the labour costs of the industry. Calculating the 
proportion of operating costs that corresponds to labour costs the series such a ratio 
are very consistent throughout inferred and actual data providing a quite a good 
reassurance of the figures obtained for operation costs. 
Venezuela: 
0 1920-1926: Operation costs data inferred assuming a participation 50 percent of 
wages in the operating costs (see wages sources above) 
" 1927-1930: Operating costs data from US Tariff Commission, 'Production cost 
of petroleum products and refined petroleum products'. (Washington, D. C., 
1932). Cost per barrel in dollars in the original source multiplied here by the 
exchange rate and the production (see appendices E and A respectively). 
" 1930-1936: Inferred linearly, controlling for the share of wages in operating 
costs. 
" 1936-1938: PODE, 1940 
" 1938-1947: inferred using the same method than above. 
" 1947-1985: PODE, several years, from the table headed `Distribution of income 
per barrel' in the finance section every year, multiplied by the number of barrels 
produced a year. When figures were revised, the most recent estimate was taken. 
Depreciation, amortisation and retirements are not included within the operating 
cost category. 
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Table G-2: Employees, labour and operating costs In the oil Industry. 
Mexico and Venezuela 1920-1985 
Year 
Venezuela 
Operating cost Wages 
mill. blvs mill. blvs 
Employees 
exlco 
Operating costs Wages 
mill, pesos mill, pesos 
Employees 
in oil fields 
1920 24,6 12.3 3,46 3 
1921 28.4 14.2 5,15 8 61.3 17,110 
1922 32.8 16.4 8,12 6 90.4 16,313 
1923 47.6 23.8 12,14 8 80.8 15,637 
1924 76.6 38.3 16,17 5 119.3 14,720 
1925 114.6 57.3 21,17 4 119.4 14,286 
1926 169.6 76.3 21,24 0 109.7 12,672 
1927 237.5 99.9 27,221 89.3 31.1 15,753 
1928 305.5 100.2 21,009 75.1 28.3 16,249 
1929 361.0 128.3 12,064 67.4 26.4 16,063 
1930 392.1 106.6 8,832 51.1 19.4 14,718 
1931 203.7 61.1 10,855 53.7 22.0 14,573 
1932 149.3 44.8 11,546 64.2 26.1 13,218 
1933 163.3 53.9 12,333 71.0 24.8 11,274 
1934 211.4 74.0 13,754 100.1 18.1 8,070 
1935 197.5 79.0 21,268 115.0 23.0 8,996 
1936 217.8 91.0 22,496 127.6 30.4 10,416 
1937 260.1 122.9 22,392 203.9 35.9 10,844 
1938 265.6 149.8 18,627 215.6 48.4 12,339 
1939 285.8 157.2 19,186 293.8 72.8 14,926 
1940 284.4 156.4 16,470 356.6 73.1 16,045 
1941 265.5 146.0 17,021 402.1 66.8 13,755 
1942 290.7 159.9 22,145 368.8 72.3 14,294 
1943 269.3 148.1 26,235 416.1 80.7 15,728 
1944 339.1 186.5 44,585 499.8 104.5 16,140 
1945 453.1 249.2 51,788 624.0 131.0 17,969 
1946 709.6 390.3 61,077 767.0 178.0 22,303 
1947 765.4 520.5 46,878 947.2 181.4 20,911 
1948 1,171.1 681.4 44,335 1,057.5 200.7 20,624 
1949 1,224.3 703.1 43,592 1,176.5 242.6 20,694 
1950 1,288.6 563.0 45,109 1,489.3 235.2 23,732 
1951 1,405.7 624.0 44,784 1,686.2 303.9 26,383 
1952 1,518.0 714.0 43,327 1,781.9 330.2 25,416 
1953 1,674.4 743.0 42,851 1,760.4 354,1 25,949 
1954 1,769.0 780.0 44,103 2,137.4 449.5 27,826 
1955 1,534.7 787.0 45,652 2,395.6 526.3 29,065 
1956 1,681.1 835,0 44,720 2,542.5 573.2 27,977 
1957 1,875.9 1,024.0 43,331 2,585.4 667,8 29,939 
1958 1,959.1 1,040.0 40,690 2,856.3 710.6 29,467 
1959 2,011.9 1,047.0 37,324 3,063.8 772.4 28,253 
1960 2,009.1 1,183.0 34,818 3,271.7 811.2 27,665 
1961 1,917.0 1,071.0 33,742 3,660.4 8015 26,874 
1962 1,820.5 978.0 33,262 3,973.4 901.3 27,919 
1963 1,872.3 1,015.0 24,521 4,223.8 982.2 28,950 
1964 2,420.0 1,108.0 31,838 4,394.0 1,047,7 28,496 
1965 2,217.3 1,106.0 29,448 4,631.7 1,258,0 32,643 
1966 2,214.0 1,119.0 25,419 4,908.0 1,400,8 33,505 
1967 2,222.2 1,137.0 27,072 5,555.7 1,608,9 37,016 
1968 2,123.6 1,065.0 23,472 6,122.2 2,017,2 42,935 
1969 2,254.9 1,032.0 23,993 6,631.6 1,963,9 39,323 
1970 2,421.9 1,147.0 23,714 7,129.0 2,277.5 42,136 
1971 2,771.3 1,156.0 23,328 7,664.0 2,559,5 44,028 
1972 2,874,3 1,209.0 22,674 7,787.0 2,659,8 42,088 
1973 3,119.1 1,245.0 23,097 8,537.0 2,5153 38,196 
1974 3,388.3 1,560.0 23,824 16,627.0 3,008.7 37,959 
1975 5,213.0 1,948.0 25,102 18,097.0 3,224.1 36,983 
1976 3,876.2 1,581.0 26,120 18,991.0 3,897,2 38,252 
1977 4,447.2 1,257.0 30,493 24,920.0 6,188.6 44,232 
1978 6,027.7 1,921.0 33,424 31,867.0 7,998.1 48,207 
1979 7,473.4 2,242.0 36,606 46,516.0 10,083.8 46,949 
1980 11,554.0 3,968.0 39,189 63,966.0 14,072.5 51,348 
1981 12,165.6 4,472.0 39,595 76,285.2 16,782.7 58,839 
1982 11,788.5 4,515.0 40,105 153,888.5 33,853.5 65,315 
1983 13,415.9 5,121.0 38,401 439,024.8 96,583.5 77,096 
1984 14,893.4 5,682.0 38,915 213,807.1 47,037.6 72,328 
1985 5,963.0 39,138 726.738.8 159,882.5 69.362 
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Appendix H 
Capital Investment in the Oil Industry 
The amounts invested in both countries also offers a big contrast. Figure 11.1 illustrates 
the different pattern of capital investment per barrel produced in Mexico and 
Venezuela from 1921 to 1985, although Mexican data is very sketchy before 1938. The 
data series used are the following. 
Mexico: 
" 1924: Dept. Estadistica Nacional, as quoted in Gordon, W. C., The Expropriation of 
Foreign-Owned Property in Mexico (Washington D. C, 1941), p. 53. 
" 1935: Mexico, Secretaria de Patrimonio Nacional, EI Petrdleo de Mexico (Mexico 
D. F., 1940 1st ed., 1963), cuadros 145-160. 
" 1938-1979: Mexico, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informatica 
(INEGI), Estadisticas histöricas de Mexico (Mexico D. F., 3rd cd., 1994), p. 574. 
" 1960-1985: PEMEX, (Petröleos Mexicanos), Anuario Estadistico 1988 (Mexico 
D. F., 1988). 
Venezuela 
" 1920-1946: Baptista, A., Bases Cuantitativas de la Economia Venezolana, 1830- 
1989 (Caracas, 1991), cuadro V-30, allocating 60 percent of total investment to 
the production branch of the industry. 
" 1947-1961: Net capital investment in fixed assets in the production branch of the 
oil industry, Venezuela. Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons, Venezuelan 
Petroleum Industry. Statistical Data (Caracas, 1962), p. 24 
" 1960-1970: Net capital investment in fixed assets in the production branch of the 
industry calculated from data in total net capital investment in fixed assets 
multiplied by the corresponding percentage of the production branch of the 
industry, PODE, 1970, p. 142. 
" 1964-1974: same procedure over data in PODE, 1974, p. 13ff. 
" 1975-1985: same procedure over data in PODE, 1985, p. 131 
Overlapping data coincident, otherwise the most recent source was used. 
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Table H-1 
Year 
Capital investment in the production branch of the oil industry. 
Venezuela and Mexico 1921.1985 
Venezuela Mexico 
Capital Investment in oil Industry Capital Investment In oil Industry 
$/barrel mill. blvs mill. $ $/barrel mill. pesos mill. S 
1921 0.99 8.28 1.48 
1922 1.62 19.27 3.44 
1923 1.49 33.91 6.05 
1924 1.57 72.85 13.01 0.00 1.07 0.51 
1925 1.77 179.90 32.12 
1926 1.76 329.76 58.89 
1927 1.51 474.38 84.71 
1928 1.05 579.14 103.42 
1929 1.05 739.85 132.12 
1930 1.08 780.37 139.35 
1931 1.07 751.06 134.12 
1932 0.85 678.14 121.10 
1933 1.18 629.28 112.37 0.01 1.00 0.28 
1934 1.01 521.53 93.13 
1935 0.86 498.29 88.98 0.04 6.10 1.69 
1936 0.85 512.51 91.52 
1937 0.88 541.16 96.63 
1938 1.13 661.30 118.09 0.05 8.00 1.77 
1939 1.16 734.67 131.19 0.12 27.00 5.21 
1940 1.34 761.80 136.04 0.33 79.00 14.63 
1941 1.08 760.33 135.77 0.10 20.00 4.12 
1942 1.67 762.86 136.22 0.12 20.00 4.12 
1943 1.54 852.47 152.23 0.13 23.00 4.74 
1944 1.12 890.40 159.00 0.26 49.00 10.10 
1945 1.08 1,078.82 192.65 0.55 117.00 24.12 
1946 1.20 1,444.62 257.97 0.47 112.00 23.09 
1947 1.63 2,193.00 391.61 0.32 88.00 18.14 
1948 1.81 2,739.00 489.11 0.52 173.00 30.14 
1949 2.00 2,981.00 532.32 0.47 231.00 28.84 
1950 1.79 3,018.00 538.93 0.57 358.00 41.39 
1951 1.62 3,105.00 554.46 0.53 355.00 41.04 
1952 1.72 3,515.00 627.68 0.56 373.00 43.12 
1953 1.84 3,660.00 653.57 0.77 484.00 55.95 
1954 1.74 3,724.00 665.00 0.90 858.00 73.66 
1955 1.61 3,916.00 699.29 0.89 989.00 79.12 
1956 1.83 5,095.00 909.82 0.80 902.00 72,16 
1957 2.13 6,681.00 1,193.04 1.20 1,328.00 106.24 
1958 2.37 6,966.00 1,243.93 1.38 1,612.00 128.96 
1959 2.41 7,534.00 1,345.36 1.33 1,605.00 128.40 
1960 2.21 7,095.00 1,266.96 2.05 2,537.00 202,96 
1961 2.02 6,657.62 1,188.86 1.73 2,315.00 185.20 
1962 1.72 6,203.42 1,107.75 1,39 1,940.00 155.20 
1963 1.58 5,784.72 1,032.99 1.30 1,871.00 149.68 
1964 1.02 5,544.94 990.17 1.77 2,558.00 204.64 
1965 0.98 5,484.99 979.46 1.56 2,293.00 183.44 
1966 0.94 5,065.33 904.52 2.06 3,121.00 249.68 
1967 0.83 4,720.91 843.02 3.10 5,154.00 412.32 
1968 0.85 4,927.99 880.00 2.92 5,188.00 415.04 
1969 0.86 4,965.73 886.74 2.71 5,081.00 406.48 
1970 0.80 4,789.96 855.35 2.35 4,604.00 368.32 
1971 0.82 4,641.79 828.89 2.33 4,574.00 365.92 
1972 0.54 2,749.06 490.90 2.59 5,234.00 418.72 
1973 0.92 4,742.90 846.95 3.47 7,150.00 572.00 
1974 1.15 5,222.99 932.68 3.71 9,738.00 779.04 
1975 1.34 4,815.76 859.96 4.28 13,981.00 1,118.48 
1976 1.44 5,119.12 914.13 5.20 23,912.00 1,524.03 
1977 1.67 5,839.79 1,042.82 4.38 35.627.00 1,570,16 
1978 2.22 7,507.65 1,340.65 6.22 62,703.00 2,754.96 
1979 2.77 10,184.25 1,818.62 6.81 83,472.00 3,637.84 
1980 4.09 13,868.45 2,476.51 9.70 157,664.00 6,869.89 
1981 6.06 19,949.50 3,562.41 11.33 234,332.00 9,560.67 
1982 10.03 29,660.03 5,296.43 5.66 324,669.00 5,678.02 
1983 13.15 37,054.18 6,616.82 1,60 233,769.00 1,555,45 
1984 10.65 42,054.83 7,509.79 2.52 210,264.00 2,468,18 
1985 12.55 46,095.19 8,231.28 2.12 631,231.00 2,034.39 
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